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The role of stimuli when doing philosophy with children and adults

Ph.D. Thesis

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To Martin

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Abbreviations that have been used

P4C: Philosophy for children

PwC: Philosophy with children

c.o.i: Community of Inquiry

CoPI: Community of Philosophical Inquiry

P.I.: *Philosophical Investigations* (referring to Wittgenstein's book)

Tr.: *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (referring to Wittgenstein's book)

Abstract

Different stimuli have been used for doing philosophy with children (P4C/PwC), either specially designed for this reason, such as Matthew Lipman's novels or not, such as picture-books and works of art. Nevertheless, there is a gap in justifying philosophically the role of stimuli with in the context of the theory and practice of a philosophical community of inquiry. This gap is the subject of my conceptual research which aims at constructing a theory of what a stimulus is and its particular role within a philosophical inquiry.

In this thesis, philosophy is viewed as a way of life that contains both, generative and evaluative aspects and it is explored how it links with the epistemological presuppositions of philosophy with children. The nature of the stimulus is explained in a more pragmatic framework and it is fully distinguished from behavioristical use. It is argued that a stimulus is suitable for doing philosophy with children if the engagement of individuals with it generates *catalepsy* (a sense of grasping) and moments of *epiphany,* that can lead to *Eros* for further inquiry. It is claimed that this is possible when the narrative structure of the stimuli matches with the narrative understanding of the individual when engaging with the stimulus.

Zymotic thinking, a new term introduced in this thesis which refers to a mixture of critical, creative and emotional thinking that matures through a fermentative process in time is a way to explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life with generative and evaluative aspects. Consequences of zymotic thinking such as mapping of individuals' experiences, activating self-corrective thinking and adopting diatheses of openness and alertness are introduced as ways that explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy are also used to explain the connection between the stimuli and philosophy.

The philosophical points of this thesis are illustrated and supported further by: a) empirical examples of philosophical inquiries with children and adults, b) the reflective analysis of existing stimuli for doing philosophy with children and stimuli that came from children's experiences, and c) the offering of a sample of the author's stories that could be used as stimuli for doing philosophy with children.

"All children enter school as question marks and leave as periods" (Postman, 1996, p.70)

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INTRODUCTION

To set any educational aim it is required to 'picture' in one's mind the desirable type of the 'educated' person and the broader social context this educated person will be part of (Moore, 1982). It is also necessary for people to be convinced 'why' education is good for them to pursue. In other words people need a good 'narrative' about education that will motivate them to find meaning in their life (Postman, 1996). In different historical periods there have been different ideals of the good citizen and the ideal world that have shaped the aims of education. For instance, being brave and physically strong was important for people trained to become warriors and defend their country or even expand its borders.

Nowadays, one of the first priorities is to realise before it is too late that we are visitors on the "Spaceship Earth" which needs to be maintained if we want to maintain ourselves too (Postman,1996). As there are no authorities to show to people how to do so, a degree of tolerance towards diversity among people, a willingness to collaborate and learn from each other and a genuine care for preserving ourselves and others seem to be necessary. This presupposes that citizens are able to think critically and evaluate the situations they face, think creatively about new possible solutions that could make the world better and collaborate with each other. Education should aim at elaborating on children's thinking and to develop reasonableness.

Philosophy is by nature an activity that requires people to think critically. However, often it has been perceived as an abstract and academic activity that is out of children's reach. Matthew Lipman, an American philosopher, introduced philosophy in the classroom, and he suggested that "philosophy for children" (P4C) can enable children to develop their thinking further which consists of parameters such as critical, creative and caring thinking (Lipman, 2003). Critical thinking refers to one's ability to judge whether information received stands to reason and is based on criteria such as principles, laws, values, facts, rules and definitions (Lipman, 2003). Critical thinking entails also sensitivity within a context (e.g. special conditions and limitations that each situation upon judgement forces people to think about) and people's willingness to reflect and self-correct when there are good reasons for doing so (e.g. flaws and weaknesses in

thinking) (Lipman, 2003; Gregory, 2007a; 2007b). The chances are that people, who get used to questioning, explaining, clarifying or identifying their and other people's thoughts, are less likely to accept information passively and unconditionally.

Creative thinking refers to the ability to think 'outside of the box' or as Lipman describes, think in an imaginative, holistic, inventive and generative way and come up with new and fresh solutions to an existing problem or to see problems that others take for granted (Lipman, 2003).

Caring thinking involves being affectious, appreciative, active, empathetic and sensitive to others as one's thinking and decisions should bear in mind the impact on others (Lipman, 2003). It gives 'sensitivity' to thinking, aiding tolerance to others' views, and politeness and tactfulness when expressing possible opposition to others' ideas.

Collaborative thinking (Sutcliffe and William, 2000) refers to the skill of joining different people's ideas together, building on each other's ideas and through this synthesis making a step forward to developing new knowledge. It is a process that involves people in retaining or abandoning their initial thoughts for the construction and sake of bigger ideas. In my perception, it seems that collaborative thinking is a synthesis of many people's critical, creative and caring thinking that also may increase their well being.

Thus, critical and creative thinking serves in developing open-minded and independent thinkers. At the same time, caring and collaborative thinking contribute to a person becoming more *inter*dependent (Sutcliffe and Williams, 2000). Ideally education nurtures the kind of people, either children or adults, who are strong independent thinkers able to reason well and in parallel sensitive to other people's points of view and willing to change their mind (if there are good reasons for doing so).

As a researcher, with teaching experience and a philosophical background, I was inspired by 'philosophy with children' which combines at least two different disciplines:

philosophy and children's education - and demands an interdisciplinary approach. Focusing on the philosophical presuppositions of Matthew Lipman's work and reconstructing it philosophically (Nikolidaki, 2005) enabled me to have an understanding of how philosophy and children can benefit from each other. Achieving a scholarship with the Academy of Athens for studying philosophy abroad enabled me to dig deeper in philosophy with children[1] under the supervision of academics with a high reputation in the field. After much personal reading, practice of philosophy, discussions with my supervisors and others in the field of philosophy with children (professors from other universities, students, theoreticians and practitioners of philosophy for children in Europe, Australia and United States) potential topics that needed further research emerged[2].

Rationale

Among these subjects, it seemed that there was no clear identification of what the purpose is of using a stimulus, which could be Lipman's novels, a picture-book, a piece of art and many others[3] when doing philosophy with children. I wondered what is it that makes a story, a piece of art or anything else worthy as stimulus for philosophy. Is the stimulus necessary for philosophical discussion to start? From my experience as a new practitioner there were cases where the stimulus was completely ignored. This happened especially within a community of inquiry still inexperienced and not yet sensitive as to observe and make the most out of the stimulus. But is the stimulus only a *starting point*, with no need to pay further attention to it and explore it further theoretically?

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1 One restriction that I had from the Academy of Athens is that my research should be philosophical and not empirical. Even though this initially discouraged me as I felt stronger in doing empirical rather than purely philosophical research, it was a challenge to learn working under a philosophical discipline. A more theoretical Ph.D. could also work as a bedrock for future research in more educational settings.

2 For instance, the role of the teacher as a facilitator within a philosophical community of inquiry was a potential subject for further research.

3 See chapter 3

There is extensive literature about stimuli that have been used in doing philosophy with children[4], some pedagogical criteria of selecting them and records of children's dialogues that occurred using various stimuli. Nevertheless, there seems to be a gap in a philosophical justification for the use of stimuli and how individuals' engage with them[5]. Attending some modules from a course in creative writing at the University of Wales, Newport in parallel with my other studies enabled me to study the stimuli used for doing philosophy with children from another perspective: as a creator of stimuli myself.

Aims

What is missing, according to the literature review[6] of the various stimuli that have been used in doing philosophy with children, is the development and formulation of a theory about the stimuli that attempts an in-depth philosophical analysis of what a stimulus should be and how the different philosophical underpinnings influence its perception. The aim of this research is both descriptive (what a stimulus is) and normative (what a stimulus should be) (Moore, 1982). On one hand it critically presents how stimuli have been used already when doing philosophy with children and on the other hand I examine how stimuli should be regarded and what criteria should be taken into consideration for their selection.

Research questions that will be addressed are as follows:

- What is the nature of a stimulus?
- Is a stimulus necessary for doing philosophy with children?
- What makes a teacher or a child attracted towards one stimulus, but repelled by another?
- What is the nature of an individual's engagement with the stimuli?
- Can stimuli be linked with philosophy outside the classroom?

4 See chapter 3

5 For more details about the research gaps, please, see chapter 3.

6 See chapter 3.

- Can children offer stimuli and philosophise about them?
- Is it possible (and if so what are the presuppositions) for using a stimulus philosophically in a mixed group of adults and children?
- How is the stimulus linked with my perception of what philosophy is?

Method

The word 'method' means moving towards a goal, or at any rate in a secured direction: it means "going-after" (Natorp 1912c: 199-200). The ways in which one 'goes after' a goal reflect the different methods that can be used. Wittgenstein highlights that "there is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (*PI* 133). Bearing this in mind, the methodology used is a combined deductive (primary) and inductive (secondary) approach (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). The first case refers to the conceptual analysis of the meaning of the concept 'stimulus' and other key terms that are linked with it. The second case refers to the analysis of the empirical elements of the 'stimuli through my reflective practice.

The pursuit of the method is preceded by the hypothesis (Natorp, 1912). The investigation of the nature of the stimulus makes sense if what is understood as philosophy in this thesis is firstly identified. The main hypothesis of this thesis accepts philosophy as a way of life with both generative and evaluative aspects. This hypothesis is first checked and justified through argumentation and then applied to explain the properties of the concept 'stimulus' (Descartes, 1968). The end of this process is the construction of a theoretical structure of words, phrases and visual representations that offers a new understanding of what a stimulus should be within the tradition of doing philosophy with children.

Conceptual Analysis

The philosophical (conceptual) analysis of the concept 'stimulus' consists of breaking down its parts and other key terms that are linked with it so as to gain a clearer

understanding of what is meant by the term (Beaney, 2003). This is a two phase process. The first phase, the 'analytic', begins with clarifying a collection of beliefs about what a stimulus is and removing any vagueness, imprecision, confusion and complexity (Hager, 2003). For example, the word 'stimulus' is linked with behaviourism and one task of the conceptual analysis is to show in what ways the use of stimuli within the context of philosophical inquiry in this thesis is different from behaviouristic approaches. It is also explained why the term stimuli should be nevertheless still used.

To understand the concept of stimulus it is necessary to study it through other key concepts that are linked with it. Apart from the explanation of what each concept means, it is also argued how these concepts interconnect and how their linking offers an understanding of the nature of the stimulus. The stimulus is approached as a form of engagement with individuals that leads to the development of forces of attraction or repulsion, and there is argumentation over the reasons of this approach. The conceptual analysis aims to describe the nature of these powers and the kind of engagement achieved.

The metaphorical use of words is also another instrument used by conceptual analysis to clarify further the concept of stimulus. The fitting of the concept 'stimulus' within the understanding of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life is also a task left to conceptual analysis. The use of Venn diagrams enables describing visually the different ways of engaging with a stimulus. Also, other diagrams enable the visualisation of the concepts connected with a stimulus.

After the analysis of what a stimulus is, there is a need for the reconstruction of the stimulus in terms of the results of its analysis which is a "constructive" and "synthetic" process (Hager, 2003). More specifically, in the synthetic phase, the elements of the original conceptual framework and the necessary vocabulary are defined, and through this the main tenets of the theory for the stimuli are deduced (Hager, 2003).

Reflective practice

Philosophy, contrary to science, investigates nothing, if by investigation it is meant a deliberate process of gathering empirical data (Adler, 2004). The philosophical conceptual analysis is a deductive way to understand stimuli. However, achieving a better understanding of them is only possible if stimuli are not isolated from empirical use. Especially if the research tries to promote philosophy as a way of life, analysing stimuli and their nature without placing them into their everyday reality would be a methodological mistake. Even though this thesis does not aim at undertaking a large scale empirical research, it does, however, incorporate an element of praxis; some examples of the researcher's reflective practice which provide a richer illustration that either proves or disproves the previous conceptual analysis. My reflective practice focuses on three different parameters:

a) Observations and previous experience as a teacher in Greece

Before coming to the UK, I had been working as a teacher with children aged 4-6 at schools in Crete (2006-2007). Already familiar with philosophy for children, I had collected material from a variety of philosophical discussions with children's using various stimuli. Particularly, this material included:

- Spontaneous dialogues that emerged from children's experiences and stimuli that they brought into the discussions. These dialogues had been either recorded[7] or written down immediately after they had taken place.
- Material produced by children such as picture-books and drawings which either inspired a philosophical discussion or were made by the children afterwards as a follow up activity.
- Photographs of children that I had taken during discussions and activities about stimuli.

7 As a teacher I used to ask from parents, in the beginning of each school year, their written permission to use children's photographs, drawings and material they produced along with recordings of the dialogues we had for research reasons.

- Transcripts of children's dialogues and thoughts as they were expressed to me.

Some of this material is included in Appendices 4 and 5. I often direct the reader to the appendices for more concrete examples that illustrate the theoretical arguments developed in this thesis.

I now look at this material differently in the light of my new gained insight and understanding of philosophy with children as a result of my readings, observations and practising of philosophy with children after I came to UK. Some of this material became particularly interesting for illustrating ideas about viewing philosophy as a way of life and appreciating the stimuli that emerged from children's own experiences. The aim of the analysis of the dialogues is to show how the discussion about certain stimuli taken from children's own experiences can stimulate children's philosophical thinking.

b) **Conducting philosophical inquiries with children and adults using different stimuli**

In order to test the impact that stimuli have on children and whether my conceptual analysis of stimuli stands to reason I used some of them in philosophical inquiries with groups of children or mixed groups of children and adults. Particularly, I conducted philosophical inquiries using a variety of picture-books with:

- Children aged 4-5 and children aged 9-10 at a local school in Cwmbran (South Wales) once a week from March to May 2008 (2 different groups).
- International students from the University of Wales, Newport once a week from November 2008 to April 2009.
- Children aged 8-10 at an after-school philosophy club at a local school in Caerleon (South Wales) once a week from February to May 2009.
- A mixed group of adults and children at a local library as a voluntary activity once a week from January to May 2010.

Philosophical inquiries were also conducted with first year undergraduate students from the Philosophy and Religious Studies department at the University of Wales, Newport once a week from October to April 2008-2009 and October 2010 to April 2011. Stimuli for these inquiries came from students' reflections on lectures on Ethics they were receiving.

Some of the dialogues were recorded, transcribed and analysed after asking permission of the teachers and the children's parents I collaborated with[8]. The analysis of the dialogues aimed to show how the discussion about certain picture-books can enable children's philosophical thinking that is based on their critical thinking (e.g. reasoning, making judgements, giving examples and counter examples, giving definitions and clarifications), emotional thinking (e.g. being aware of their emotions when reasoning, caring for not insulting others with their contributions) and creative thinking (asking questions, generating new ideas, using words metaphorically etc).

I also kept a research logbook, completed immediately each inquiry had finished which contained:

- The questions that were raised and the one that had been selected for philosophical discussion.
- Notes from each inquiry concerning the philosophical elements that emerged.
- My observations and comments related to my understanding of children's responses.
- My pedagogical reflections on facilitation and critical commentary about my selection of the stimulus.

This logbook has been an important source of data to inform my conceptual analysis of the nature and role of stimuli for inquiry. Extracts from my logbook have been included in this thesis and indicate my own progress and changed understanding of the role of stimuli when doing philosophy with children.

8 Please, see the appendix 9 for the ethical forms that the participants voluntarily completed.

c) Experience from writing stories

Attending modules (writing fiction, advanced fiction and scriptwriting) from the creative writing course for undergraduate students at the University of Wales, Newport improved my English and offered me the opportunity of writing stories in English. Although writing stories is not a type of method, it seems as if a circular ongoing process has taken place which has enriched my understanding of what a stimulus is. The more I participated in the modules for creative writing, the better I understood the role of stimuli from the creator's point of view. Also, the better I understood the role of stimuli (through theory and practice), the better my stories became. As it will be shown in the following chapters, understanding that a good stimulus for doing philosophy should create catalepsy (a sense of grasping) with children enabled me to find ways of writing stories that can create such situations.

Structure of my thesis

The **first chapter** introduces what I understand by 'philosophy'. Philosophy is primarily the activity of philosophising and not just an academic activity. It is suggested that the aim of philosophy is achieving *eudemonia*. Philosophy is understood as: a) a generative force, b) an evaluative force and c) a way of life. This chapter provides arguments that show to what extent philosophy is a generative and evaluative force and how it can be perceived as a way of life.

The **second chapter** is devoted to philosophy for/with children. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, there is an introduction to what philosophy for/with children is. There is also a discussion as to whether children can do philosophy and whether it is genuine philosophy. Philosophy with children is different from academic philosophy but despite the differences, I argue that it is still philosophy. I mostly support my ideas through a literature review drawing on publications located in the field of philosophy for/ with children. It is argued that there is not just one 'philosophy with children' but there are different approaches depending on their different philosophical underpinnings. To explain my position further, I refer to different possibilities of categorising philosophy with children, including my approach and approaches suggested by Maughn Gregory and Clinton Golding, both philosophers with a particular interest in philosophy with children. I argue that the latter models lack viewing philosophy for children from the children's point of view. In the second part of this chapter it is examined what a child is, and whether children and philosophy, as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life, are compatible.

Chapter three is devoted to a literature review of various stimuli that have been used for doing philosophy with children. I divide them into two categories: a) those specially designed for doing philosophy with children, such as Lipman's novels and manuals and b) not specially designed P4C material, which can be textual (e.g. picture-books) or non-textual (e.g. works of art, pieces of music). The stimuli are compared with each

other in terms of their strengths, weaknesses and points of discussion when doing philosophy with children, and it is examined whether the existing stimuli fit into the scheme of philosophy as a generative/ evaluative force and as a way of life. I argue that there is a relationship between the kind of stimuli (specially designed or not) and the facilitator's approach to what philosophy is and the pair of forces either of attraction or repulsion that is created between the stimuli and the teacher who selects them. The chapter ends by identifying the gaps in the literature review in dealing philosophically with questions that concern stimuli, such as what is the role of the stimulus, what makes a stimulus attractive to children and/or the teacher. I leave hints about the element of love towards the stimulus and the need of getting stimuli that come from children's everyday life and are linked to their own experiences.

In **chapter four** the nature of the stimulus is explained in a more pragmatic framework and distinguished from the way it is used in behaviouristic psychological theories (the dualistic model). The engagement of individuals with the stimulus generates forces of either attraction or repulsion towards the stimulus. I argue that people are in a state of *catalepsy* just before the forces of the stimulus come into play. *Catalepsy* is understood as a sense of grasping and immediate perception of a situation. The metaphor that describes *catalepsy* best is Socrates' stingray. *Catalepsy* can lead the person either to *Eros* (love and attraction) or to *Thanatos* (repulsion and abandonment) towards the stimulus. The idea of *Eros* is further analysed conceptually by referring to other key concepts related to it, such as the sense of being hidden, the sense of desire and the sense of the lack of *eudemonia*. Finally, it is examined whether *Eros* and *Thanatos*, as forces, fit with the idea of philosophy as generative and evaluative forces and philosophy as a way of life. I offer reasons for why educators should use stimuli when doing philosophy with children and put forward the idea of the pedagogical triangle (stimulus, teacher/facilitator, and children).

In **chapter five** it is argued that the narrative structure of the stimulus and the narrative understanding of individuals' engagement with the stimulus is an important criterion to explore a stimulus philosophically. For the stimuli that are selected by the teacher and

presented to the children, I argue that the narrative form of the stimuli can be further analysed into concrete characteristics that make them philosophically interesting. My investigation is focused on picture-books with many examples from books by Browne, Sendak, Tan, Popov and others. I identify as criteria the illustration of the book (use of shapes, colours and details), the text (use of metaphors, playing with the words) and the combination of text and illustration, and connect these with philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life.

In **chapter six**, it is argued that *Eros* is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for a stimulus to be philosophically suitable. A stimulus should create moments of *epiphany* which are connected with the narrative structure of the stimulus and the narrative understanding of the individuals engaging with it. Then, I answer the question how stimuli and philosophy as a generative force link together. I explain what the 'opening' of a stimulus means and how it is linked with *Eros*, the moments of *epiphany* and, in general, with philosophy as generative force. I introduce *zymotic* (fermentative) listening as the main way of opening a stimulus. Listening zymotically is understood as a way of thinking. It requires listening creatively, critically and emotionally but it is more than the sum of its parts. It is a fermentative process in which the stimulus excites ideas in people's minds, then these ideas 'settle down', after which people are able to evaluate them and through this process of evaluation self-correct and therefore change. The stimuli play the role of the 'ferments'. I explore here the idea of naivety in approaching a stimulus and letting one's self open to the generation of new ideas resulting from this process. It is argued that *zymotic* listening can lead to developing creative attitudes, the use of creative techniques, the asking of questions, a metaphorical use of language and a building on each others' ideas. The latter making other ways possible of opening a stimulus up even further philosophically.

Chapter seven answers the question how stimuli and philosophy as an evaluative force link together. It is argued that there are two types of evaluations: a) about the stimulus and b) about the person (children or the teacher). The first type of evaluation refers mostly to the selection of the stimulus and what makes it go through a process of *Eros*

or *Thanatos*, as explained in previous chapters. As for the second type of evaluation, through the stimulus the focusing 'in' and 'out' of individuals' thinking is enabled. The evaluation refers to the individuals' engagement with the stimulus which: a) enables the mapping of the individuals' experiences through his/her engagement with a stimulus, b) provokes emotions within the individual and, c) activates the individual's reflective thinking about the ideas generated which can possibly lead to self-correction and to applying philosophy in everyday life. An example has been taken up to illustrate the evaluative aspect found in stimuli. It exemplifies children's self-correction during a philosophical inquiry based on a stimulus that came from children themselves.

In **chapter eight** it is argued that philosophy as a way of life is possible if it is connected with human action and if it develops certain *diatheses* within people, such as being in *Eros*, being tolerant and open to something new and being in a state of alertness. It is claimed that stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life if: a) they can create a sense of *catalepsy* that leads to *Eros* and to moments of *epiphany*, b) are connected with human's (and therefore children's) actions, and c) they enable the development of certain *diatheses* with the people involved (e.g. becoming tolerant and open). The last part of the chapter concentrates on how children's philosophies as a way of life are possible and includes examples which show that philosophy with children goes beyond the classroom.

Chapter nine of this thesis includes a sample of stories that I have written which attempted to combine literature with philosophy. The chapter focuses on how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and philosophy as a way of life match with both my experience of writing stories and the content of the stories. This is illustrated by two examples of stories that concern the philosophical elements they contain and the impact they had on children when the stories were presented to them. The chapter ends with explaining how my stories fit into the field of philosophy with children and in what ways they are different from Lipman's material or from picture-books.

Finally, **chapter ten** wraps up and critically reflects on the ideas of the whole thesis concerning its originality, its strong points, its limitations and the possible interest that could generate to particular groups of people. The thesis gives also directions for further research, both philosophical and empirical.

CHAPTER 1

What is Philosophy?

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to set the framework of what I understand by philosophy. It will be argued that philosophy has generative and evaluative aspects meaningful if seen as a way of life that combines both theory with practical life. This will become the bedrock for the rest of the thesis which examines the role of stimuli when doing philosophy with children.

1.1. Introduction - What is philosophy?

Etymologically philosophy is a Greek compound word that comes from the words 'philo' (φίλος) and 'sophia' (σοφία) and means 'love of wisdom'. It is difficult to reach a consensus in giving a definition of what is conceived as love of wisdom and therefore as philosophy. It is also difficult to agree on which is the best method of 'loving wisdom', or in other words what the necessary and sufficient conditions of the activity of philosophising are.

Much philosophical research is devoted to the reconstruction and critical commentary of the ideas of great philosophers. This is one aspect of philosophy which is mostly of a historical nature. The history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophy as it reflects on ways of philosophising in different periods of time and ways of making sense of the world, others and oneself. The reflective construction of the historic moments of philosophy as depicted in the texts of great philosophers, is what links philosophy with its historical tradition (Markis, 1996). Philosophy, however, should not restrict itself to the university classes of an elite group of people involved in a hermeneutic analysis of the ways of philosophising as they appear in such texts[9]. Instead, more attention should be paid to how philosophy firstly began, as a way of making sense of human actions and the world we live in.

9 It should not also leave the door open to mystic, paranormal and other new age beliefs that are untested and not evaluated to replace philosophy (Barnes et al,2008). Barnes et all (2008) discuss their research about people's beliefs in paranormal ideas.

People's actions include a series of incremental steps, each one being an event (Hornsby, 1980). The purpose of these events reflects a person's everyday philosophy. It answers the 'why' of an action. An action makes sense for a person when s/he knows why s/he chooses to do a certain action rather than another. Choosing means that the person is exposed to different alternatives and has the freedom to think first and then select one action from another. What makes an action meaningful is the underpinning philosophy that reflects the person's subconscious and conscious thinking.

My understanding of philosophy which I will follow throughout this thesis is threefold: Philosophy is viewed as a way of life[10] which has generative and evaluative aspects. Life is practical, as individuals have to deal with everyday procedures and take decisions, but it is also theoretical (e.g. when people think about how to improve their lives, imagine how life can be different, daydream and want to change the way things are). Practical and theoretical life merges together and often it is difficult to distinguish one from another. A mainly practical life can be mechanical and procedural. A mainly theoretical life is not realistic and can lead to isolation. Philosophy also has a theoretical and a practical side which is reflected in its generative and evaluative elements. It is through the generation of new ideas and their critical evaluation that philosophy becomes a theoretical way of life, but it is also in the same way that philosophy becomes a practical way of life. As with life, also these two forms of philosophy are merged together but they are both expressed through its generative and evaluative aspects.

The generative aspect of philosophy is what makes people wonder and ask philosophical questions and what allows them to enter others' 'worlds' (Brann, 1993). What, however, distinguishes philosophical questions from scientific ones? The

10 Socrates was the first who saw philosophy as a way of life and he took it to the extreme by preferring to end his life than living without practising philosophy with young people (Apology 28e4-29b1).

questions scientists ask (excluding the procedural ones[11]) arise from the practical need to answer the big questions that philosophy sets out. For example, cosmology's ultimate aim is to answer questions such as 'what is the universe?' or 'how and when did it begin?' which reflect people's curiosity about the origins of life. This is where philosophy begins; in wonder[12] (Plato, *Theatetus, 155d* Aristotle, *Metaphysics, 982b12*) - as a kind of perplexity about the world as it is and why it is. The first step is to realise our perplexity and form it as a question (Matthews, 2003a). This generative aspect of philosophy is important for giving inspiration and motivation for human action to take place[13]. Science is an intentional human action that applies specific methods so as to answer philosophy's questions.

The second aspect of philosophy is the evaluative one that examines the truth and validity of human action (through science or not), whether this has been achieved and what should have been done differently. After the evaluation of an action, new questions will be generated and new human action will happen. This is an ongoing process where generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy follow each other generating human actions, evaluating them and leading to their progress. In practice, the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy are merged together.

Philosophy as a generative and evaluative force has a final purpose; to give meaning to human action, and therefore life, and make people live in harmony with themselves and others in *eudemonia*[14]. *Eudemonia* is usually translated as happiness and flourishing, but it also refers to being at ease with one's conscience. It is a Greek compound word and etymologically comes from eu (=good) and daemon (=spirit, deity) which can be literary translated as keeping the daemons contented and peaceful. Throughout this

11 By procedural I mean questions that refer to particular methods or instruments that can be used instead of others so as to conduct a scientific research.

12 The Greek work that explains wonder is το θυμάζειν (to thaumazein) Plato, Theatetus, 155d Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b12)

13 It is obvious that basic needs such as having food come first in motivating human action. What philosophy does, however, is to enable the person be conscious and reflective of the action that has already been taken or will be taken in the future.

14 Aristotle in his Nicomahean Ethics (1095a15-22) understands eudaimonia as doing and living well which is the highest good (or virtue) for humans.

thesis *eudemonia* is understood as 'being at ease' with the intrinsic 'daemons' which leads to a mental state of happiness and flourishing. *Eudemonia* is achieved by leading an examined way of life based on reflecting on the decisions made and the way one's life is conducted.

One may question why an unexamined way of life is not worth living[15]. Can one not philosophise and just live? What is wrong with a cat that lies on a comfortable sofa, the heating is on and a plate of food is waiting when she is hungry? Is it not a form of *eudemonia*[16]? It is also questionable whether an examined life is a more flourished life and whether philosophy can make one's life miserable instead.

As a response to the questions in the previous paragraph, it can be argued that the opposite to an examined life is living habitually without reflecting or discussing upon actions. This, however, means depriving ourselves from making choices based on reflecting critically on our life and changing it if necessary. It also means leaving ourselves exposed to influences or, even worse, manipulation by others and following their lifestyle without thinking whether this is morally or otherwise justifiable. Achieving *eudemonia* is possible by being able to examine life and choose between alternatives.

The generative part of philosophy is based on reflection and dialogue with others and it requires freedom to imagine, wonder, contemplate and question. Reflection can take the character of imagining, wondering and coming up with ideas. Dialogue is necessary in communicating these ideas with others and through it coming up with even more. The reason why we need others is that through dialogue with them we can: a) clarify or illuminate aspects of our unclear or opaque thinking by listening to what others think, b) help others understand themselves through what we say, c) create a new

15 There is a humorous dilemma about who is better off between a dissatisfied human and satisfied pig, and a dissatisfied Socrates and a satisfied fool (Mill and Sher, 2001).

16 We do not know what eudemonia for a cat is as we do not have access to a cat's internal thoughts and self examining. We cannot tell for sure if cats have thoughts and if so if their thinking system is similar to human's.

understanding of things due to the combination of our different thoughts and d) plan action that benefits both parts and leads to better communication[17].

The evaluative part of philosophy needs to be justified through the same methods, which are the reflective, self-corrective and dialogical processes. The reflection here does not refer only to a personal re-thinking of what we do. It is also considered as a 'meta-stance' of our actions and our thoughts upon our actions. The Socratic model helps here to understand the philosophical dialogic process (philosophising) through the *Elenchus*[18] and Plato's midwifery method. Wittgenstein is also helpful in understanding philosophy as an activity that clarifies what can and cannot be said through language (Hacker, 1986). Precision in what is said is the common ground between the two philosophers, even if explicated differently. Surely, Socrates did not reflect on language as something in between us as 'thinking beings' and reality. Like Wittgenstein, however, Socrates still craved for precision in his interlocutors, giving arguments to support their opinions, even if he never referred to precision in current linguistic terms.

The diagram below as shown in figure 1.1 summarizes the model of philosophy as a generative force, an evaluative force and as a way of life. The cogs show the interdependency between the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy with living philosophically. The reason that the 'philosophy as a way of life' cog is bigger than the others highlights the importance of connecting philosophy with people's everyday lives and experiences.

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17 Plato wrote dialogues instead of philosophical texts so as to show the communicative character of philosophy in making meaning. Matthew Lipman's novels that are used in doing philosophy for children were inspired by Plato's dialogues and mainly consist of dialogues among the fictional heroes who are children.

18 Elenchus is a mode of argument for exposing inconsistency within the interlocutor's beliefs rather than an instrument which establishes an objective truth or falsehood of a statement (Vlastos,1982). The Elenchus proceeds as it follows: a) Socrates' interlocutor asserts p where p=what the interlocutor believes, b) Socrates tries to elicit the interlocutor's agreement over further premises, for instance q and r. c) Socrates, through questioning make the interlocutor agree that the premises q and r lead to not p, d) thus Socrates has proven that p is false and not p true (Vlastos,1982).



Figure1.1: The Interdependence of the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy with living philosophically

1.2. Philosophy as generative force (creativity and imagination)

Is philosophy an imaginative process? An argument to support this is to investigate if the structure of our conceptual system is imaginative. This structure is reflected in language since language is used when we think. Therefore, if it is somehow proven that language has an imaginative structure, so does philosophy. Our conceptual system is highly metaphorical; the way we think and what we experience is, to a certain degree, a matter of the metaphors we use in our language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For instance, we tend to understand an argument in terms of war which is depicted in our language[19]; we can actually 'win' or 'lose' an argument, 'attack' an argument or have an 'indefensible' argument (see: Lakoff and Johnson,1980, p.4). What a metaphor (or a simile or an analogy) does, according to Richards (1936), is to link a topic and a vehicle through a common ground. The topic is what the metaphor is about, the vehicle is the means by which the speaker refers to the topic and the ground is the sum of possible

19 Another impressive example is that we use spatial prepositions in a very metaphorical way. For instance, conscious is up while unconscious is down (up already/ fell asleep), more is up while less is down (e.g. my income rose last year/ the number of errors he made is incredibly low), good is up while bad is down (e.g. things look up/ things are at all time low) and so on (Lakoff and Johnson,1980, p.15-17).

attributes shared by the topic and vehicle (Williams, 2002). In the sentence "This argument is demolished", the topic is the argument, the vehicle is the demolishing and the ground is what the attributes 'argument' and 'demolishing' have in common (e.g. falling down).

These metaphors can be used as a vehicle[20] for us to transfer from one domain of knowledge to another. Metaphors do not teach us anything new, they just illuminate in a different way something that we already knew, and make us therefore think differently about the object of our thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Owen, 2001). The effectiveness of a metaphor depends on how convincing the criteria of similarity among the things under comparison are. Philosophy also uses metaphors, similes and myths to create meaning which is an imaginative process. Plato's cave simile, Socrates' role as midwifery, stingray and gadfly[21], Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box and philosophical illness[22], Thomas Reid's botanic or mineralogical model as similes of moral thought[23] and Richard Rorty's mirror, are some well known metaphors through which meaning is created and better understanding achieved. Metaphors create images and they serve to penetrate deeper into the reality of experience and a sense of profound depth that sometimes is not described by words (Gregory, 1995). Imagining Socrates as a 'gadfly' (as in Plato's *Apology*) enables someone to achieve a better understanding of Socrates' role in his society as the one who: managed to keep the others alert, was continually 'buzzing' and trying to extract philosophical truths from the others – in sum, disturbing others like a gadfly. Similes and metaphors can be used as stimuli for further imaginative thinking, which could give birth to a new understanding of the world, us and others.

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20 The sentence here uses already the metaphor of a vehicle!

21 In Plato's Theatetus, Socrates describes his method and himself as the one who practises it as midwifery. Applying this metaphor to the teacher is the one who enables children to give birth to the truth. In Plato's Meno the metaphor used for Socrates is the Stingray (79e-80d). Applying this to the teacher, he is the one who numbs everybody including himself (Murris,2009). Finally, Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as gadfly, the one who stirs up people(30e).

22 Curtis (1993) has used this metaphor so as to investigate whether philosophy for children is a kind of philosophy that Wittgenstein would accept. What Curtis achieves with his article is to highlight the generative aspect of philosophy. A new understanding of philosophy with children is achieved when it is examined by wearing the glasses of Wittgenstein's approach of what is philosophy.

23 For more analysis, see Pritchard, 1993.

There are also other arguments to support the imaginative character of philosophy. How new thinking is generated is a mystery. How can we imagine something that does not yet exist? Langer, as quoted by George Kneller, claims that "suddenly we see things that were already there" (1965, p.6). We have called it creativity, imagination, enlightenment, 'eureka' moments and illumination, but still it is not explained how this change in thinking happens. How did Friedrich Kekule reflect on his dream about the snake that seizes its tail[24] and applied it to chemical chains which opened the road to aromatic chemistry that did not exist before? How did Marie Curie discover Radium? What these people seem to have in common is that they all worked hard on their subject, were well informed and open to stimuli that could make them think imaginatively. A human's mind does not simply store facts, but in a complex way memories, information, emotions and intentions curl around a new fact, they blend and merge together making and breaking connections until something new is generated (Egan, 1992). It is like a fermentative process where some basic ingredients merge together but their final product is different from the total sum of all the ingredients together[25]. The more exposed people are to stimuli and information (which prevents ignorance), the more are the chances for thinking creatively and imaginatively (Egan, 1992). What philosophy as a generative process really does is to rearrange ideas by using reason and 'staying within the cultural box' (Haynes, 2005, p.85).

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24 The dream of a snake seizing its own tail helped Kekule discover the Benzene molecule in which organic compounds have a circular rather than a linear structure. That's how Kekule describes his dream: 'During my stay in Ghent, I lived in elegant bachelor quarters in the main thoroughfare. My study, however, faced a narrow side-alley and no daylight penetrated it....I was sitting writing on my textbook, but the work did not progress; my thoughts were elsewhere. I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the atoms were gambolling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by the repeated visions of the kind, could now distinguish larger structures of manifold conformation; long rows sometimes more closely fitted together all twining and twisting in snake-like motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke; and this time also I spent the rest of the night in working out the consequences of the hypothesis'. Rothermich, M and Zipprich, N. NO DATE. Friedrich August Kekulé:A Scientist and Dreamer. http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/chemistry/institutes/1992/Kekule.htm. Accessed on 01/08/2010.

25 There is a great variety of interpretation of humans' creativity and below I give some examples: Plato in Ion traces inspiration-imagination to an external, divine source. Immanuel Kant (1911) links creativity with genius and claims that it cannot be taught because it is unpredictable. Charles Darwin understands creativity as an evolutionary force (Michalko, 1998) and as a cosmic force (Whitehead, 1929).

Philosophy sets the broad question 'what is a child?' Branches of science such as psychology, education, medicine and sociology separate this big question into pieces that can be empirically tested. The questions that remain unanswered by science are either nonsense, poetical or philosophical. Unanswered questions show the boundary of our knowledge. Our imagination is what pushes this boundary further. This imagination can either be nonsense when, for instance, it asks questions that do not make sense (e.g. 'Does the child need a lolomor to exist?' makes no sense because 'lolomor' is a made up word with no meaning[26]), are poetic (e.g. the question 'Oh, child how many times have you crawled towards the paths of neglect?' does not make sense but it can possibly create an aesthetic or imaginative response) or philosophical (e.g. 'What makes this child a child?'). From this point of view it appears that philosophy, at least for its question generating aspect, is an imaginative process. Philosophical questions show which answers do not exist (yet).

The normative character of philosophy can be imaginative. The 'ought' and 'should' questions or statements that philosophy sets are normative. Philosophy suggests how things should be (e.g. how we should live). 'Should' depends on what is considered as ideal and according to this 'ideal', how people 'should' act. However, the ideal is not experienced. One imagines what is ideal therefore the 'should' comes from the 'territory' of imagination. What a 'should - statement' does, is to put imagination in a reasoned frame. 'Should-statements' shape logically the ideal that comes from the realm of imagination.

Furthermore, when a person thinks of something for the first time, s/he creates the logic of thinking about it (Paul, 1993). Aristotle's *Organon,* which explains the different ways of deductive reasoning, was first of all a creative and imaginative task. It was Aristotle who imagined new assumptions and questioned differently the modes of thinking and

26 In this example, the word 'lolomor' could have a meaning if, for instance, it was a code name to refer to something else we would not like other people to fully understand. Therefore, it depends on the context a word appears within and the agreements that have been done over its meaning.

their evaluation afterwards and finally came up with his Aristotelian logic. Similarly, it can be argued that morals are, to an extent, imaginative as a person needs first to imagine the consequences of his/her actions and then act morally (Tompkins, 2009). Even though the imagination of others is insufficient for being a moral agent, it is the first step towards recognising the presence of others in our decision making.

Philosophy is situated at the boundaries of thinking, because it either creates questions or evaluates the action already taken and generates again further questions. What 'punches holes' into the boundaries and allows something new (or a new rearrangement of existing ideas) to occur is not explained yet, maybe because it comes from what people have not yet thought of, or is nonsense. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tr. 7) said that people must pass over those things we cannot speak of as they belong to the world of the mystic or silent. However, imagination is the way to allow part of the world of silence to speak for itself. Imagination is the key to transcend conventional ideas (Egan, 1992). Kieran Egan argues that "accepting conventional representations is to fail to make knowledge one's own, is to keep it inert rather than incorporate it into one's life" (Egan, 1992, p. 48). Therefore philosophy as a generative force is not only the key to moving beyond what is known, but to make what is to be investigated as part of our life. As Felicity Haynes puts it:

> It is the struggle between reason and imagination to present the unpresentable, something that exists just outside the boundaries of knowledge (Haynes, 2005, p.88).

Philosophy does so not only by pushing our thinking, but also our emotions[27] to the boundaries.

Philosophy as a method, reflective or dialogical has an imaginative character. It can be argued that all the paths of human's thinking are "generally possible, but not all are equally probable" (Davies, 1980, p.32). The very imaginative ideas that cannot be somehow accommodated and assimilated with existing knowledge may be left out as

27 Schertz (2007) argues that an effective systematic pedagogical approach to educating for empathy should be based on dialogue and should allow the sharing of affective states among the peers.

ideas 'not equally probable' to happen. Philosophy is the one that creates these ideas as a generative force and evaluates them afterwards. Philosophy examines whether it is possible to describe reality; it has, therefore, a 'meta-stance' element as it accepts that making meaning is a human endeavour. Perceiving reality and reality itself are not necessarily the same things (Rorty, 1980). In the first case reality is filtered through the person who perceives it (for instance philosophy reflects on the language people use when they think about reality) and in the second case, reality is as it is without human's involvement[28] (this means that reality in an objective way can be an 'it is' or 'it is not' but we can never know for certain) (Powell,1998). What people understand as reality is what they imagine reality to be. This is partly achieved through people's reflection, which is a method of philosophy. The different reflective processes show the different imaginative ways people have to understand things in reality.

The dialogical method of philosophy requires imagination to think of other possible ways of understanding something. The way we listen is the first step for creative thinking. According to Gemma Corradi Fiumara (1995), listening is thinking[29]. It is, what she calls, "the other side of language" (Fiumara, 1995). In order to philosophise, one needs to 'listen' to oneself as part of reflection and to others. The listening indicated here is both creative and critical. It is creative thinking because it enables people to link each others' ideas together and produce new ones, and critical because people need to listen well and evaluate what they have listened to. These aspects are merged together in a process of fermentation that enables the person to listen creatively to themselves and to others, evaluate what has been listened to and take decisions that lead to actions. In other words, fermentation of the creative ideas in people's minds and their evaluation afterwards leads to developing a better thinking over time.

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28 There is a big debate whether 'thinking' can be an object of our thinking. Post-modernism rejects the possibility of 'thinking' as an object of our thinking because we already use our thinking to describe what thinking is. We cannot get out of our thinking (Powell,1998)

29 According to Piaget (1929) children in their first stage of thinking development usually answer that they think with the mouth and the ears. It is fascinating how Fiumara's philosophy of listening as thinking is so close to children's perceptions which Piaget would dismiss as not philosophical at all.

Understanding others involves a degree of 'getting into someone else's shoes'. Since we can never be literally someone else, what remains to us is, through dialogue, imagining how things could be from a different perspective. This is what Hall, quoted in Gregory (1995, p.38), names as "imaginative representation", referring to the fact that to communicate our different experiences of reality we need to have somehow the same intuition over what we describe, so as to achieve mutual understanding. For example, when we compare two things as similar we do not base this on an objective characteristic, but on the fact that both people who are involved in the discussion will be able to see things from a similar point of view.

When we exchange ideas, the different philosophies people bring to their ideas and actions need to be 'bridged' – what Splitter and Sharp (1995) call "translation". In our efforts to communicate we try to find common understandings and common contexts. It's not only important how metaphors, analogies or similes are used, but also in which context. It is possible that the use of words is different in different environments. For instance, we use words sometimes in different environments than where we find these words traditionally. It is as if you move an armchair from the sitting room to the kitchen and expect from it to play the same role (Baker and Hacker, 1983; Warburton, 1992). What would happen if the same armchair was moved to a museum and from an everyday used object, it turned into something for an exhibition? It is a traditional philosophical mistake to think that words have the same connotation, in all contexts, everywhere, without taking into consideration connotations changing according to the environment each word is used in (Baker and Hacker, 1983, 229). That's where logic and imagination meet. We first try to imagine what the other says to us and then through critical analysis we explore the logical implications of someone's philosophy and assess its truth and value, which results in a rejection or acceptance of a new idea. This linking of ideas and making sense of different philosophies is one of the imaginative aspects of philosophy. Rorty (1989) claims that imagining what others say is also a matter of idiosyncrasy and how similar idiosyncrasies people who exchange their ideas have is required to understand each other.

Each person, through reflecting creatively and critically can create other logical possible thinking worlds (1st level). Each individual, within a philosophical community of inquiry, can communicate his/her thinking worlds with others. By exchanging, and constructing new ideas other possible worlds may be created (2nd, 3rd...nth level). The more people are participating, the more complex the representation of the different thinking worlds created is. This process takes time and may lead to the transformation or the reconstruction of the actual world (Pickard, 1979). Creativity is both a process and a product. However, the creative process does not necessarily guarantee the creative product (Pickard, 1979).

1.3. Philosophy as an evaluative force

Philosophy as a generative force enables people to wonder and come up with new ideas and questions, but lacks evaluation. It does not tell us whether a question has an answer, whether this answer is true and/or can be applied. Philosophy as an evaluative force does not necessary lead to what is correct but shows the way of how to argue about it and how to distinguish among answers that are more defensible than others (Glaser, 2007). This is how people become more conscious about their justification and making of decisions. The better (in moral terms) the decisions one makes, the more of an impact they have on people's lives (Borg, 1994). This is one way the evaluative aspect of philosophy has a practical impact on people's everyday lives; it enables people to examine their life and make it more meaningful. As Borg (1994) argues the criteria for evaluation are subject to how people conceive reality[31].

The accumulation of different information seems to be one step to understanding more an action or thought. However, this does not mean that the action or thought is necessarily true. Meaningfulness and truth are not necessarily identical; what is true may be meaningless and what is untrue may be meaningful (e.g. telling a lie can be meaningful if this lie prevents somebody from committing suicide). Communicating with

31 A good summary of this concerns 'Truth theories' (pragmatist, coherence, correspondence, redundancy, semantic theory) and how one's perception of truth influences the way one thinks and makes judgements (Borg, 1994).

each other and exchanging different empirical truths may lead individuals to find what is mutually true, even if only temporarily the case. A certain degree of agreement is required even when disagreeing. Gareth Matthews observes that "one cannot do philosophy with someone whose concepts and belief system one does not share-at least in substantial part" (Matthews, 1993, p.159).

Reflective or meta-cognitive thinking, as it is sometimes called, is "thinking about thinking"[32] and has its roots in John Dewey's philosophy. According to Dewey, reflective thinking is an "active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support knowledge" (1933, p.118). Reflective thinking seems to be a critical movement that a person consciously does when s/he deliberately or persistently holds back and thinks carefully again about his/her own or somebody else's thinking with the aim to evaluate it. It interconnects all the other thinking skills[33] (such as giving reasons, listening to others, asking for evidence, offering examples) and makes them meaningful (Splitter and Sharp, 1995). It also checks the validity, function and accuracy of the thinking skills, including the identification of the assumptions and premises they are based on (Laverty and Gregory, 2007; Gregory, 2004; 2006). If reflective thinking does question such assumptions then it opens up a space for correction and improvement. It can lead to self-correction which is part of the evaluative role of philosophy: when it seeks to examine the nature of thinking, especially when it includes matters of judgements or decision-making with the ultimate aim of a quest for meaning.

Reflective thinking is evaluative but not necessarily self-corrective and does not indicate that a person either alone or as a member in a community of inquiry[34] has to change

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32 Daniel et al (2005) understand self-corrective thinking as a metacognitive thinking where one express a statement of changing perspective. Splitter and Sharp (1995) analyse in great detail the idea of self-corrective thinking.

33 A well known example of organizing thinking skills is Bloom's taxonomy. According to Bloom critical thinking is hierarchically structured at different levels. A person first learns (knowledge) then understands (comprehension), applies what have learnt (application), analyse (analysis) what learned into parts -premises and synthesizes (synthesis) into a whole and finally evaluates what has been learnt (evaluation) (Bloom,1956). The final stage of Bloom's taxonomy, the evaluation equates to reflective thinking.

34 Community of inquiry was introduced by Charles Pierce in the context of science as an ideal community of researchers who if infallible they would agree, through inquiring, on what is true. Dewey (1938) introduced this idea in the context of education.

necessarily his or her mind. It seems that reflective thinking is a broader term when compared to self-corrective thinking. If a person holds the same views after being exposed to different ways of thinking, this does not mean that the person is necessarily rigid or unwilling to listen to alternative points of view and change. S/he may have reflected but simply did not find that the alternative views are more convincing than the previous ones s/he had.

Reflecting on "reflecting on reflection" as a meta-cognitive activity is just nonsense as it does not serve people to find what is true and meaningful in their lives. Wittgenstein would add here that the wrong use of everyday language can lead to the creation of philosophical problems that are like a disease and serve no meaning. Reflecting on questions such as "what is truth" or "what is 'is'" is meaningless. Such questions, often seen as fundamental philosophical problems are for Wittgenstein not philosophical problems at all; they lack meaning and are nonsense. According to the early Wittgenstein, the bad use of language can create pseudo-philosophical questions[35]. Most of the sentences of philosophy are products of philosophers' inability to understand the logic of language (Tr. 4.003).

Through reflection one should purify words from anything metaphysical (P.I. 119) which is what we lack and that's why we use mistakenly words in a nonsensical way (P.I., 122). It seems to me that Wittgenstein's main purpose of philosophy has a 'negative' character: it is to clarify what cannot be said through language. Philosophy, through reflection can get rid of grammatical confusions and the misuse of words (P.I. 90). This is where Wittgenstein and the Socratic '*Elenchus*' could have something in common. Even though Socratic philosophy does not have a linguistic focus like Wittgenstein's philosophy, they both care about what meaningfully can be said. Socrates *Elenchus* has a 'negative' character too. Through reasoning people get rid of their false beliefs and when purified they are free to partake in dialogue and find out what is true.

35 Philosophy should not also make its own languages as Rudolf Carnap, and logico-positivist philosophers (Vienna Circle) would agree, as it is another way to create pseudo-philosophical problems instead of trying to solve the ones that already exist.

What is challenging here is to combine a more pragmatic approach about self-correction with the Socratic Method as a way of enabling the evaluative role of philosophy. Firstly, Socrates reassures that philosophising is for everybody, not just an elite minority. According to Socrates *(Apology, 29d-30a),* the only restrictions for somebody to attend a philosophical discussion is that they speak the same language and start the conversation from real beliefs instead of just an hypothesis (Vlastos,1996; *Gorgias, 500b; Plato, Crito, 49d).* Starting from real beliefs[36] serves in: a) finding good reasons to support these beliefs and convince others of their truth, and b) changing our beliefs when there are good reasons for doing so and therefore changing ways of looking at things or living, as knowledge and praxis are connected (Vlastos, 1996). This Socratic idea can be connected with American Pragmatism and particularly with the ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. The later regard knowledge as the product of construction and of agreement between people (who create a research community of inquiry) based on people's justified beliefs through experimentation and observation (knowledge as warranted assertability[37]). However, this knowledge is only temporary and can change when different data prove to be more applicable and suitable for certain situations. One substantial difference between Socrates and the American Pragmatists[38] refers to what is considered as truth. For the Pragmatists, truth is an agreement on something between the people who agreed upon it. For Socrates, truth is

36 Sophists claimed that there are only opinions that can change - knowledge is not possible. Socrates, did not agree with the checking of a mere hypothesis if it lacks interest because it does not reflect how people act (Protagoras, 333b8-c9). He believed that knowledge is possible only if we have a method and both interlocutors seek what is true for both them and the others. («Κοινὸν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο» Plato, Phaedo 63d1).

37 'Warranted assertability' is a term introduced by Dewey to indicate the conditions under which a belief can be checked as true through constant self-correcting process of a group of people (who ideally should be infallible) that consist a community of inquiry. Knowledge is gained by relating logic with experience (Blackburn, 2008). More can be found about children's communities of inquiries in Dewey,1990 and Dewey,1965.

38 (American) Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that was taken up by Charles Sander Peirce, William James and later on by John Dewey who transformed it further. The main idea of pragmatism is that 'efficacy in practical application - the issue of 'which works out most effectively'- somehow provides a standard for the determination of truth in the case of statements, rightness in the case of action and values in the case of appraisals' (Honderich, 1995). A belief is true if the belief works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the world. Truth is temporary, susceptible to change and not final.

the anamnesis[39] of what the soul knew but forgot upon its birth. Through testing and examining people's beliefs, people can find truth again[40]. What comes from the combination of Pragmatism and Plato's epistemology is that one needs to know, even temporary, what is true in order to be able to act upon it. However, this should not stop the examination of what is considered as truth.

Socratic questioning or '*Elenchus*' is a way of checking people's claims to his/her knowledge on a subject or concept as part of the evaluative role of philosophy. Let's take as an example Plato's *'Euthyphro'* dialogue to see how *Elenchus* works in practice. Euthyphro took his father to court with the charge that he did not take care for his workers and that therefore an accident had occurred. The dialogue is about "what is piety?" The Socratic *Elenchus* has the following steps: Euthyphro is asked to give a definition which reflects his belief of what piety is. The first definition that Euthyphro offers is rejected by Socrates as it is only an example of piety (5d). Euthyphro agrees that piety is what is pleasing to the gods (6e-7a). After Socrates ensures that Euthyphro fully agrees with his statement he starts arguing that there are premises Euthyphro did not take into account which contradict his own definition so Euthyphro needs to refine his definition again and agrees that 'What all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious' which makes Socrates ask "Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by gods?" (10a). Euthyphro tries to support himself providing counter arguments which are false until he needs to change again his definition and finally quit as he has another appointment!

The *Elenchus* as a method is helpful to make sure that everyone understands, to a certain extent, what is meant with a particular concept. Another example of *Elenchus* is found in Plato's *Meno,* where a slave boy with Socrates help presents the Pythagorean Theorem. Wittgenstein's philosophy is different from Plato's as he believes that the

39 Plato starts his theory of anamnesis in Meno (86b) and develops it further in Phaedo. He understands the soul as immortal that is continuously incarnated. The soul as incarnated, after birth, forgets the knowledge she had in its immortal state. Knowledge is the result of the incarnated soul's anamnesis (recollection) of its previous immortal state.

40 Socrates' midwifery enables people's soul remember the knowledge they already knew but had forgotten (Meno, 82b-85e). The theory of anamnesis as a way of acquiring knowledge is mostly developed in Plato's Phaedo (72e-77a).

meaning of a concept depends on the context in which it is used (P.I. 43). The process of *Elenchus*, however, could be used as a way of checking people's use of language, even if its result would not be an absolute and unchangeable truth as Plato would have regarded it. *Elenchus* generates perplexity and perplexity is a useful instrument as it helps clarify the language we use in our thinking and communications *(Plato, Sophist 229e-230e).* Perplexity is not just an 'obstacle' that does not allow us to understand something; it is also the starting point to seek solutions (Matthews, 2003a). Through the Socratic *Elenchus* (especially if done within a community of people so that each can learn from the way others think) people realise the implicit beliefs or prejudices they bring to their understanding of a concept. Being aware of the shortcomings of thinking and making an effort to ameliorate them, makes communication with others possible.

In what ways can the *Elenchus* process be linked with the evaluative aspect of philosophy applied in educational practice? The psychological part of the Socratic *Elenchus* needs to be taken into serious consideration, and the educational challenge is to create an environment in which people's beliefs can be explored rigorously without people feeling offended. The feeling of 'being numbed', after 'being touched by a stingray[41]', may discourage children from expressing their ideas at all out of fear that they are seen to have got 'it' wrong. It can also discourage teachers as they may find it difficult to deal with the cognitive uncertainty (Haynes, 2008) and the fear of not being in control of the content of a philosophical discussion (Haynes and Murris, 2008). This is especially important in an educational system that focuses on right answers instead of presenting and representing knowledge as an ongoing process constantly open to revision (Haynes and Murris, 2008). As Albert Kelly (1995) highlights, rationalism belongs to the past and with it the certainty of knowledge: both adults and children need to learn to live in conditions of uncertainty and change and cope with it. The problem is that if the *Elenchus* causes greater perplexity, then how can children and teachers find a way to solve their perplexity? On the other hand, Matthews (2003a, pp.53-55) wonders "if they know how to find their way to solve their perplexity, are they really perplexed?"

41 For stingray metaphor see page 36 and footnote 21

The acknowledgement of emotions as modes of people's thinking and means of evaluating situations (Solomon, 1993; Nussbaum, 1990) can be connected with the Socratic Method. In order to achieve *eudemonia* in a constantly changing world people need to think well. However, thinking well includes being able to sense situations and taking the morally right decisions. Being emotionally sensitive is another way of evaluating situation, solving conflicts, and understanding others. This is what Daniel Goleman (1996) defines as "emotional intelligence". Emotions are linked with everyday reality and are part of how people experience and evaluate the world. Taking emotions into consideration could 'update' the Socratic *Elenchus* in the pursuit of self-correction and the process of understanding others and their motives. Evaluating the philosophical quality of a dialogue is not only checking for the correct use of arguments, but as Thecla Rondhuis claims "philosophy is open to all attacks from the rational as well as from passion, astonishing, and imparting a degree of spiritual and intellectual uncertainty to the researcher" (2007, p.17).

1.4. Philosophy as a way of life

Who would be interested in a philosopher who claimed that philosophy had nothing to do with life? (Romano, 2000). The generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy help people in how they think, speak and communicate through dialogue. This theoretical aspect of both generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy I will link with how to live one's life. Philosophy should not be practised merely for its own sake otherwise it becomes one more activity that only sharpens people's thinking skills (Ennis, 2001). Philosophy as a way of life is something more than the sum total of the evaluative and generative aspects of philosophy.

Since philosophy is the love of wisdom, philosophy as a way of life entails the seeking of wisdom. Philosophy as a way of life is not simply a theory but "a unitary act, which consists in living logic, physics, and ethics" (Hadot, 1995, p.267). The person who

desires to acquire wisdom does not already possess wisdom, as s/he is not a sage[42] (Hadot, 1995). In philosophy as a way of life, the search for wisdom is not for the sake of knowledge as a theory but for the sake of improving oneself and one's everyday life and achieving *eudemonia*. What makes the philosopher different from others is that s/he intentionally justifies her/his experience. S/he lives and at the same time reflects on her/his life. As Hadot puts it:

> It is the love of this wisdom, which is foreign to the world that makes the philosopher a stranger in it (Hadot, 1995, p.57).

How would life be if we all tried to live philosophically? People would:

- act more meaningfully for themselves and towards others,
- be ready to consider other alternatives or imagining new ones and act upon them,
- realise that cooperating and sharing with others and the environment is the best way to ensure well being,
- become more caring and concerning towards ourselves and others by being more tolerant and sensitive to what is different to us;
- develop their higher order thinking[43] which would enable them to see the logical links between generating ideas and reflecting on them (Paul, 1992);
- be constantly, as Pierre Hadot (1995, p.270) states in a state of 'becoming' and committed to change instead of sticking rigidly to fixed ideas.

Philosophy as a way of life is part of human's experiences. According to Dewey, experience is "the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication" (Dewey, 2005, p.22). These two aspects can come to

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42 Diotima in Plato's Symposium, claims that wisdom is not a human state, but only divine as it is a state of perfection. Therefore, the person is in a state of progress towards acquiring wisdom and in a state of becoming.

43 Higher order thinking is a complex thinking that consists of being able to think critically, creatively and also caringly towards the others (Lipman,2003). Higher order thinking is systematic from the point of view that the person's mind does not think aimlessly wasting its energy. On contrary, the person becomes aware of the critical and creative dimensions of his/her thinking and makes an effort to improve them (purposeful thinking) (Paul,1993; Paul,1992).

light through philosophy and art; through living an experience and then reflecting upon it and making it something valuable and distinguished. Dewey claims that:

> Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing condition is involved in the very process of living. Under condition of resistance and conflict, aspects and elements of the self and the world that are implicated in this interaction qualify experience with emotions and ideas so that conscious intent emerges (2005, p.36).

This means that from the whole of experience people have as living creatures, there are parts that can be separated out as distinct events that have physical, emotional and intellectual impact. These moments of experience appear as the result of different emotions and thoughts that act as forces of resistance and conflict. Philosophising is what unifies these forces and makes people understand parts of their experience as particularly meaningful to them. In other words, philosophy enables people to become conscious of their life experiences as a series of what is done and what has been undergone (Dewey, 2005). Art is a way of depicting this consciousness and transforming it into something new, which can become a new experience.

Contrary to Plato, who believed that knowledge is fixed and unchanged[44] (Theory of Forms[45]), knowledge can be understood as a temporary human construction that

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44Platonic philosophy aims at the critique of falsity. Plato distinguishes the world (cosmos) into two levels: a) the world of senses which is changeable and b) the world of ideas which is stable- fixed- unchangeable. According to Plato the world of senses is not true («τα αισθητά όντα ταλαντεύονται μεταξύ του μη όντος και του όντος» Republic,479c-d). On the other hand ideas are eternal and unchanged by time and space. For everything that is found in the world of senses (idols) there is a true idea of it in the world of forms- ideas. For Plato, philosophy is the seeking of truth. Plato elaborates on the etymology of the word truth (aletheia) («α» στερητικό + «λήθη»/ a + lethe), according to which aletheia means the uncovering of lethe (oblivion). Psyche in Plato does not create ideas but discovers them because of the world of senses. The things of our sense are the reflections of the eternal ideas that belong in the world of forms. If psyche discovers the ideas through their reflection on the world of senses, then psyche already "knows" a priori of these ideas, so it can recognise them through their reflection on the world of senses. Plato claims that the psyche remembers the ideas when it recognises their reflections on the world of senses (anamnesis theory). According to Plato, psyche was in the beginning up in the heavens when it came to know the real beings- ideas (world of forms). After birth, psyche was captured in a human body and forgot the real things- forms of the world of forms- ideas. This oblivion was consolidated due to the false impressions of the world of senses. Due to the fact that the real ideas- forms are forgotten, psyche considers as real ideas the world that is perceived through the senses.

45 Plato in Meno and Phaedo refers to his theory of forms in many Socratic Dialogues. Plato also discusses the discovery or "recollection" of knowledge that is hidden in soul. In Republic Plato develops his theory further. In Book III 402a-403e the education

changes as humans are in constant interaction with their social and natural environment (Dewey, 1981). In this case truth is not discovered once and for all. What is true does not refer only to us but also to others as we are not alone in this world, but in a constant interaction with others and the broader environment. In order to communicate we need to find truths in common and vice versa. To find truths in common, we need to communicate and dialogue with each other. Human beings are fallible. This is because: a) they have not reached a consensus on what is true and b) they cannot know the consequences of their actions. What is considered as truth for a person or for a group of people in a certain historical period may change after further information, dialogue and reflection and then ceases to be true. This is especially the case with truths that comes to us subjectively, intuitively or empirically. As for logical truth, it seems that it is not fallible as it reflects the logical structure of our thinking. It is, however, a human construction and if humans are fallible, then so are their constructions. Philosophy as a way of life has the character of a constant conceptual search of what is true, even temporarily. It also involves acting upon it and evaluating the action in terms of its truth and its updated validity.

Human life can be defined as the timeline between one's birth and death (Kazantzakis, 1960). Philosophy does not change this process. What philosophy as a way of life can change is the attitude ('*diathesis*') one has towards this timeline. This *diathesis* can refer either to setting aims or fulfilling them so as to achieve *eudemonia*. Life by itself is not meaningful. It is not even a sequence of facts. People are the ones who understand it as a sequence of facts (e.g. being born, going to school, finding a job, and getting married) and an evaluation of these facts which is reflected in the narrative structuring of people's experience. People understand and explain their experiences in terms of a narrative with a beginning, middle and end. What philosophy as a way of life can offer to people is to make them aware of the narrative structuring of their own life; both concerning its process and the aims they set out and the ethical, political and epistemological evaluation of it. Acquiring a better understanding of one's self and the

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and the Eros which motivates the pursuit of the Forms is discussed. The allegory/ simile of the cave is developed in book VII, (514a-520a).

world does not only come about through thinking, but also through acquiring life experiences and most importantly through narrating and critically *examining* such experiences. Philosophy as a way of life aims at the Socratic "knowing thyself". Self-knowledge is an aim of philosophy that can help justify our actions by making explicit and justify what we want to be and as a result achieve *eudemonia*.

There are many examples that illustrate what philosophy as a way of life can mean in practice. Socrates exemplified with his death that philosophy is a way of life when he refused to stay alive without philosophising *(Apology 28e4-29b1)*. He pointed out that the unexamined life is not worth living *(Apology, 38a5-38a6)*. The central concern of philosophical research for Socrates was not so much nature, but human beings – their self-knowledge and knowledge about how to live a good life morally speaking *(Gorgias, 492d, 500c)*. The *Elenchus* that Socrates put to his interlocutors aimed to give an answer to the fundamental question "how we should live?" (Vlastos, 1996, p.34). Socrates, through questioning, wanted not only to test his interlocutors' ways of thinking, but also their ways of living and how consistent their living was to their thinking (Protagoras, 333b8-c9).

The Stoics[46] gave another example of philosophy as a way of life. Their philosophy was not only a set of beliefs, but a way of life that involved practice (spiritual *askesis*[47]). Therefore their philosophy merely addressed the self and their being (Hadot, 1995). The spiritual exercises that the Stoics offered helped people develop the attitudes (*diathesis*) that were in accordance with the philosophy they perceived. Such attitudes were the attention to the present moment (*prosoche*), careful listening (*akroasis*) to others and self mastery (*enkrateia*) (Hadot, 1995). Like the Stoics, the Epicureans[48] also had an

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46 Stoicism is a philosophical movement of the Hellenistic period that took its name from the porch (Stoa) in Athens, where the members of this school of philosophy met each other and where their lectures took place. However, their name stoic means also calm which is something that Stoics presented in their philosophy. See more about Stoicism in the STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (page edited by Dirk Baltzly) 2010. Stoicism. [WWW]. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/. Accessed on 20/05/2010).

47 Marcus Aurelius (1997) in Meditations give many examples of spiritual exercises that help people live philosophically and learn more about themselves by 'digging within' (Ενδον σκάπτε).

48 Epicureanism is a philosophical movement of the Hellenistic period established by Epicurus

understanding of philosophy as a therapeutic process that focuses on people curing themselves from unnecessary needs in their everyday lives[49]. Epicurus in his *Principal doctrines* tried to answer the big questions that puzzled people, such as what death is. He achieved this by making people not frightened of death as death is not experienced in life and after life one cannot experience death[50] (Bailey, 1926). As Epicurus describes in his *Letter to Menoecus,* Epicureans could enjoy life because he had removed the fear of death through reasoning.

It is obvious that the content of each philosophy described above is different. However, what these philosophies as ways of life have in common is the following: Firstly, they all have a common origin; they begin in love (*Eros*[51]) with a particular way of life that each philosophy proposes as the right one to conduct. Being in *Eros* with a particular way of life involves both a state of passion[52] which attracts the person to a particular way of life and a reasoned awareness of one's choice[53] to conduct a certain way of life (Kierkegaard, 1941; Sartre, 1948). The reasoned awareness and the choice indicate that one is not just attracted to a way of life but one has chosen it, is aware of it and can provide reasons for the choice of a certain way of life. The reasoned awareness towards a particular way of life is necessary because people "do not have instincts enabling and compelling them to be perfect [therefore] virtues are reasoned, reflective, deliberate rather than spontaneous" (Blitz, 2007).

Secondly, they are all embedded into human action. These philosophies are not just theories of thinking or speaking so as to convince others but mainly they present 'an art

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49 What Stoics and Epicureans have in common is that they are not only philosophers who established Stoicism and Epicurean philosophy, but also lived according to their philosophies and as such are genuine philosophers (Hadot,1995).

50 Epicurus argument goes like this: "death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. [Death] does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more" (Epicurus,1926).

51 Eros was the Greek semi god of love and desire. For a more thorough analysis of Eros see chapter 4.

52 Kierkegaard (1941) claims that "it is impossible to exist without passion" and means that only by engaging with people or situations that give birth to passions can people gain sense of their own selves as existing beings.

53 Sartre (1948) claims that the role of choice in human life is fundamental.

of living' (Shusterman, 1997). Since philosophy as a way of life is the product of one's passion and reasoned awareness of one's choice, then one's philosophy reflects one's life. There is a connection between a philosopher's life and his/her theory about life. As Friedrich Nietzsche has said, philosophy is a kind of autobiography that justifies one's vision (Shusterman, 1997).

Finally, these philosophies establish certain attitudes and dispositions *(diatheses)* in people. Through reflection and dialogue[54], people listen to others' ideas, reflect on them, generate new ideas, compare ideas and, if necessary, self-correct and set new standards in living. People change, begin to know more about themselves and evaluate what is important in their life and what is not. In other words, these philosophies provide people with a meaning in life.

1.5. Conclusion

In this chapter philosophy is understood as both a theoretical and practical activity connected with people's everyday lives. The generative aspect of philosophy is what makes individuals wonder and ask questions, which generates further human action. The evaluative aspect is the one that examines the truth and validity of human thought and action. The purpose of both aspects is to give meaning and enhance quality of life. Both aspects are based on human reflection and dialogue.

To justify that philosophy is an imaginative process, it was examined whether the structure of our conceptual system is imaginative. In this thesis it is argued that our conceptual system is highly metaphorical, which is reflected in how we use language. The generative aspect of philosophy develops the wondering nature of philosophy, making people ask questions and pushing their thinking to its boundaries. Philosophical questions show which answers do not exist (yet). Furthermore, the normative character

54 Dialogue is a zetetic method' which could be translated as the method through which one looks for something (Hadot,1995, p.63).

of philosophy can be imaginative as the 'ought' and 'should' statements require imagination to set standards of what is ideal. Logic is also based on imagination. For instance, when something is thought of for the very first time, its logic is established upon imagination. Philosophy as a reflective or dialogical method also has an imaginative character. When people reflect on reality they reflect on what they have imagined reality to be. As for the dialogical method of philosophy, it requires imagination to think of other possible ways of understanding some situation or others' points of view.

Philosophy as an evaluative force does not necessarily lead to what is correct but shows the way of how to argue and how to distinguish between answers that are more justifiable than others and how to take the best possible decisions. The evaluative aspect of philosophy has the character of reflective or meta-cognitive thinking which can lead to self-correction. It also has the character of clarifying what is said through language. In this thesis it is attempted to combine a more Pragmatic approach about self-correction with the Socratic Method as a way of supporting the evaluative role of philosophy. The Socratic idea that philosophy is for everyone on condition that people speak the same language and share their actual beliefs matches with the Pragmatistic ideas of constructing knowledge upon agreement of a community of researchers who are infallible. The *Elenchus* is necessary so as to make sure that everyone understands to a certain extent what is meant with a particular concept. The process of *Elenchus*, however, could be used as a way of checking people's use of language, even if the result is not an absolute and unchangeable truth, as Plato claims it. Through the Socratic *Elenchus* (especially if done within a community of people so that each can learn from the way the others think) people become aware of the implicit beliefs or prejudices they bring to their understanding of a concept and as a result may self-correct. The acknowledgement of emotions as modes of people's thinking and evaluating situations helps to make the connection between adopting a Pragmatist approach about self-correction and using the Socratic Method to do so.

Philosophy as a way of life is something more than the sum of evaluative and generative aspects of philosophy because its aim is for people to live better in moral

and social terms and reach *eudemonia*. Philosophy linked with everyday life could improve individuals' lives in terms of: a) meaningful actions and abilities to think in a higher order, by considering alternatives or imagining different ways that life could be conducted, b) communicating with others so as to ensure well being, and c) becoming emotionally more caring and concerning towards ourselves and others. Philosophy as a way of life is part of individuals' experiences and has the character of a constant conceptual search for what is true, albeit temporary. Many examples from the history of philosophy as a way of life, such as indicated by Socrates and the Stoics, show that philosophy as a way of life requires love (*Eros*) towards a particular practical way of life, is embedded into human action, and its method is based on reflection and dialogue with others and the establishment of certain attitudes and dispositions (*diathesis*) in people.

After setting the framework of how philosophy will be conceived throughout this thesis, there is a need to check whether the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy along with the idea of philosophy as a way of life are possible and compatible with doing philosophy with children. To answer this we need first to check how different philosophical traditions have viewed this possible connection between philosophy, child, and childhood. These will be the main points of discussion for the second chapter.

CHAPTER 2

The child and Philosophy with children:

Epistemological Assumptions

Abstract

This chapter aims to show how philosophy as described in chapter one is connected with philosophy for children. First there is a brief description of what philosophy for children is and how it started. To understand philosophy for children, one needs to look at its epistemological base. However, there is not just one. The different ways of doing philosophy for/with children reflect the different epistemologies that lie beneath. This chapter examines the categorization of these epistemologies according to Gregory and Golding, seeks similarities and differences between them, contrast them with each other and with what is considered as philosophy in this thesis and highlights possible gaps in these categorizations that this thesis aims to cover. Not only do the different epistemologies reflect differences in what is considered as philosophy but also differences in what is considered as a child. The second aim of the chapter is to show what is considered as a child for this thesis and how the child can be linked with philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and with philosophy as a way of life.

2.1. Introduction: What is Philosophy for Children (P4C)?

Philosophy for Children (P4C) was presented as a form of applied philosophy in educational settings, created by Matthew Lipman in the early 1970s when he realised that schools provide children with large amounts of information, but not with the cognitive skills required to think and reason well. Lipman believed philosophy is an appropriate tool to guide children's natural curiosity, through the educational process and develop children's higher order thinking, putting emphasis on the parameters of critical, creative and caring thinking (Lipman, 2003). He introduced philosophical thinking to elementary students through a series of novels (with accompanying manuals[55]) whose main characters are children.

55 See more in chapter 3 of this thesis.

Since then, the idea of doing P4C has expanded, incorporating a variety of either different methods or styles of philosophising with children (PwC), or the use of different stimuli such as picture-books (Murris, 1992; Sprod, 1993) and works of art[56]. There is also a shift from doing philosophy *for* children to doing philosophy *with* children. The preposition *with* underlines the communicative character of philosophy where children are mutually responsible for creating philosophy rather than 'accepting' philosophy made *for* them[57]. P4C is the ideal space where multiple ways of thinking known as critical, creative, caring and collaborative thinking can flourish[58].

'Philosophy for/with children' brings two different concepts together: philosophy and childhood. This coexistence makes room for two questions relevant to the nature and value of philosophy for children:
a) Can children do philosophy?
b) Is 'philosophy for/with children' 'real' philosophy?

The answer to the first question depends on what is conceived as philosophy, what is conceived as a child and whether there are any possibilities for those two different 'parameters' to co-exist. One type of argument against philosophy with children focuses on the 'nature' of philosophy as not appropriate or accessible to children. For instance, Kitchener (1990), White (1992), Wilson (1992, 1993) and Fox (2001) mostly understand philosophy as a practice in academic institutions and as a corpus of knowledge which is not accessible to children[59]. It is argued that 'Philosophy for/with Children' approaches do not teach *philosophy* and tend to identify philosophy with the ability of questioning, enquiring and being critical (Wilson, 1992). Children may enjoy questioning and discussion but this is not the same as doing philosophy. Richard Kitchener (1990)

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56 Alternative educational materials and approaches have been devised since Lipman's original materials. See more about the different stimuli used in philosophy with children in chapter 3

57 Throughout this thesis P4C will be used only to refer to Lipman's material.

58 More about these kinds of thinking see chapter 2 of this thesis.

59 Fox (2001) argues against doing philosophy with children. He claims that children are made for action, do not have the patience for discussion, and questions their ability for thinking abstractly and recognising subtle connotations in meanings. Murris (2001) responds to Fox by e.g. referring to Egan and to the losses of adult philosophers in their thinking (e.g. freshness, creativity, poor listening skills). She also argues that when children find an activity meaningful they are able to philosophise.

argues that children are only able to do 'concrete' philosophy, and they cannot extract one general principle (for instance an ontological one), which they could apply in other situations. For instance, children may discuss about 'cats' or 'computer games' and not extract general principles out of them. What lies beneath these ideas is that philosophy is mostly considered as an academic activity which requires abstract and elaborated thinking that not all people have, let alone children.

The other type of arguments against doing philosophy with children focuses on what a child is and how the 'deficiencies' of children's thinking deprive them from doing philosophy. Jean Piaget's (1926; 1929) developmental theory excludes children from being able to think abstractly which reinforces the thesis that philosophy, viewed as an abstract activity is not accessible to children[60]. To argue in favour of children's ability to do philosophy, White (1992) claims that children should be able to demonstrate not only the ability to think reasonably, but also the ability for higher order reasoning. The lack of children's experiences as necessary for doing philosophy is also pointed out. However, experience is not accumulated necessarily by age and children can have experiences that some adults will never have (Murris, 2001).

Historically childhood has been perceived as: a period which can be characterised by a difference of size and age[61], an incomplete stage, a preparatory stage for adulthood and only lately as a value of itself and as a preparatory stage for adulthood (Friquegnon, 1997; Kennedy, 2006). The child, as conceived by Aristotle is an immature human who has an immature soul *(Politics, Book 1. Chapter 13 1260a4)* is incapable of happiness *(Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1. Ix.10)* and cannot make choices *(Nicomachean Ethics, Book 3. Ii. 2).* According to Aristotle, childhood is the process of becoming an adult[62]. Therefore, a reason that could justify as to why children cannot philosophise is because they are conceived as inferior to adults: children are conceived as immature and underdeveloped, whereas philosophy, as a complex way of thinking, requires maturity.

60 Bruner (1983), however, claims that the nature of infant cognitive equipment has a very systematic and abstract character.

61 In Medieval times children have been viewed as "little adults" that are different from adults in terms of age and size (Aries,1962).

62 Aristotle's ideas as far as childhood is concerned are included in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics (Chambliss,1982).

This model of perceiving children could be characterized as dualistic since it understands children and adults as belonging in two distinctive categories: philosophy is permitted to one category (adults), but excluded from the other (children).

Viewing the child as a 'noble savage' as portrayed in Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* or *On Education (1969),* that is innately good and gradually degenerated by society[63], does not encourage philosophical thinking either. In *Emile* (Book I) it is written that "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man." However, leaving the child to develop without too much parental intervention in the name of allowing children freedom, does not allow the child to learn and benefit from adults' experiences and to take responsibility.

Childhood may be characterized by a kind of dependence which is analysed as paternalism from the parents towards the child and a 'sense of belonging' from the children towards the parents (Schapiro, 2006). Therefore, this dependence does not allow children to do philosophy as it requires independent thinking. Even though Tamar Schapiro accepts that children have this sense of belonging while adults do not, she does not explain that this sense is mainly created by adults since they are the ones that the children see from birth. This dependence is established mainly by the developmental difference[64] between adults and children that prevent children from being responsible for their decisions. Is that dependence sufficient to prevent children from being involved with philosophy? The answer is no. The fact that the child is not totally independent does not make it less of a person who has no "right to inquire" (Lipman, 1993a p.144; Matthews, 1993). Even though children's being is dependent on others to look after them, this does not mean that their thought is dependent too.

63 In Book II of Rousseau's Emile it is suggested that the children should grow up in its physical environment encouraged to acquire experience not through books but mainly through the interaction with the world with an emphasis on developing the senses (Book II)

64 This is possibly due to developmental differences which can be either physical (Adults are stronger than children so naturally they can protect and defend them) or moral (Adults often believe that they are in the best position to tell what is good for their children from what it is not).

There is evidence, both empirical and conceptual, to suggest children can do philosophy. Lev Vygotsky's and Jerome Bruner's theories bring to light contrary evidence to Jean Piaget's theory (Bruner, 1983). Furthermore, empirical research that has focused on the conditions under which Piaget's experiments on children's abilities for conservation of matter and their egocentricity, has given examples of children who can decentre their thinking and think from different points of view (Donaldson, 1978; Gelman, 1969; McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1974; Hughes, 1975). Research in the field of P4C extended to a wide range of children's ages and different educational settings indicates that children are able to dialogue and think abstractly in a critical and creative way (Lipman and Bierman, 1980; Topping and Trickey, 2007; Jackson, 2004; Daniel et al, 2002; Daniel and Michael, 2000; Lebuis et al, 1993; Barry et al, 2001; Palermo, 1995; Morehouse, 1995; Splitter, 2007a; Jenkins and Lyle, 2010). Meta-research in the field of philosophy with children that evaluates the quality of the research done in P4C and the criteria for its evaluation is also available[65] (Tock Keng Lim, 1998; Rondhuis and Van Der Leeuw, 2000; Cebas and Moriyon, 2004; Reznitskaya, 2005; Tozzi, 2009).

Apart from the empirical research, Egan (1988; 1993) reminds us of the 'other half of the child' which has been neglected and forgotten in education: children's imagination and fantasy as a way of thinking. Even before the age of seven, children are able to think in abstract terms as they understand powerful binary concepts (e.g. good/ bad, beautiful/ ugly) and through them make sense of their experiences (Egan, 1993). Children, in order to make sense of a story, need to know where the story goes and also the abstract concepts contained within it. They have a full understanding by the end of the story which shows that children have the ability to understand the whole (Egan, 1993). Children, therefore, are able to think abstractly but also can concentrate on

65 Reznitskaya (2005) refers to methods and tools which could be used in order to evaluate empirical research in the field of philosophy with children. Cebas and Moriyon evaluate the empirical research in philosophy with children in terms of the methodology that has been used, the ways of analysing the empirical data and the deficiencies these researchers have. http://sophia.eu.org/Research/What%20we%20know%20about%20research%5B1%5D.pdf. accessed on 20/10/2008. Ronduis and Van Der Leeuw (2000) also critically examine research done in philosophy with children.

'concrete' details, which shows a great ability for observing and making meaning of things that adults can easily ignore[66].

There is much conceptual argumentation in favour of children's abilities to think philosophically which questions both whether philosophy is really a 'special' activity allocated only to adults and whether children's skills are adequate for doing philosophy. Therefore the arguments in favour of doing philosophy with children point out: a) the benefits that philosophy can have in children's thinking development (Lipman et al,1980; Lipman, 2003; Costello, 1995; Fisher, 2003), b) the kind of concepts that philosophy analyses which are not a monopoly for adults (Lipman, 2003; Splitter and Sharp, 1995; Splitter, 2003; 2006a), c) the ways of philosophising that are most suitable for children (Hand and Winstanley, 2008), d) the imaginative character of children's thinking and how their understanding can enhance philosophy (Murris, 2000a; 2000b; 2001; Haynes, 2008) and e) the reciprocity of philosophy and children and how they can benefit from each other (Gregory, 2002a; Kohan, 1999).

'Philosophy for/with children' is certainly different from academic philosophy, but academic philosophy is not the only legitimate way of doing philosophy (Murris, 2000a; Golding, 2006a; Golding, 2006b). P4C has no correlation with philosophical jargon used when studying the history of philosophy or with learning by heart what philosophers have said and what their answers are to core philosophical questions. However, there is no need for distinguishing between 'formal' (or academic) philosophy and informal philosophy, and there is no good reason why these two 'different' kinds of philosophy cannot co-exist in a way that would be suitable even for very young children to comprehend (Worley, 2009). 'Philosophy for children' is based on collaborative inquiry (Splitter and Sharp, 1995; Cam, 2006a) and it can be characterized as a philosophical pedagogy that can strengthen children's thinking abilities[67]. Its collaborative dimensions could also benefit academic philosophy.

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66 For a concrete example see chapter 5.

67 Cam (2006b) offers a whole pedagogy used as a 'toolkit' from which it is clear that philosophy is viewed as a process that strengthens children's thinking.

Moving to the second question referring to whether 'philosophy for/with children' is 'real' philosophy, an argument that justifies it as philosophy is suggested by Laurence Splitter (2000a; 2000b; 2002) and Splitter and Ann Sharp (1995). According to them, P4C is 'real' philosophy because of the concepts that are involved and the method used. As for the concepts examined, such as 'beauty', 'truth', 'lying', 'good' they are *common*, which means that they can be discussed by anyone and do not require special knowledge; they are *central* to our lives throughout the centuries because they are part of everyday language[68]. They are also *contestable* which means that there is not one way of defining them – they are 'fuzzy' at 'the edges', because of their abstract nature. As for the method, it highlights the activity of philosophising which is what Socrates first claimed philosophy to be. Summarizing, what makes children's philosophy real is the dealing with philosophical issues (concepts), the use of philosophical methods, skills or commitments necessary to philosophise (Evans, 1978).

Clinton Golding (2000a; 2006b) views philosophy in school as a chance for children to get involved with philosophy. Children are given the opportunity to make sense of questions and concepts that are important to them. Golding (2006b) picks out five traits that make philosophy in school a unique educational programme. These traits provide us with a deeper understanding of what philosophy in schools does and can be summarised in five words: aim, content, process, culture and teacher. According to him, the aim of philosophy is to help children make sense of the world around them. Philosophy's content consists of rich concepts, such as the ones mentioned above, along with philosophical questions that children bring to the classroom and are derived from their quotidian life. The process involves delving into philosophy's content through children's thinking as they engage with cognitive activities, such as inquiring, questioning, reasoning, evaluating and reflecting. The pedagogical environment (culture), which makes this possible, is the 'community of inquiry' and the teacher is the

68 Concepts children are sometimes interested in, have not always been the subject of adult philosophy, e.g. what is a 'toy' or what is 'boring'? However, these topics do not make the potential philosophical discussion less philosophical.

one who will instigate a philosophical inquiry by coaching and guiding a group of children philosophically.

The difference between Golding and Splitter and Sharp is that Golding understands philosophy for children as an educational programme (application of philosophy), whilst Splitter and Sharp view it as a genuine form of philosophy. What, however, is not taken into consideration is that there is not just one 'philosophy for/with children' - either as a genuine form of philosophical practice or as an educational programme. There are different approaches to philosophy with children depending on their epistemological assumptions. Therefore, the same term may mean different things.

2.2. Ways of approaching P4C epistemologically

In order to portray the different ways of doing philosophy with children, I will borrow Maughn Gregory's (1995) contrast of three different and broad epistemological positions and consider the implications of each position for philosophy for children. These positions refer to:

- realism,
- first-order non-realism and
- second-order non-realism.

I will also consider Golding's contrast of epistemological positions which refers to:

- dualism,
- relativism and
- critical pluralism.

Although these two different types of categorizations are not exclusive, they are selected because they provide a good understanding of how the different epistemological positions underpin philosophy with children. My attempt here is to find where these positions overlap, what their similarities and differences are and contrast them with my consideration of what is philosophy and how it could be linked with

philosophy for/with children. Therefore, the reader will be able to see where the theory portrayed in chapter one stands within these positions and how it can influence what is considered as philosophy for/with children.

2.2.1 Realism/ First-order non-realism/ Second-order non-realism

Realism

Realism accepts that there is a distinction between the world and people's understanding of it. Therefore, according to realists the world exists and is independent of people's minds and understanding[69]. Since the world is independent of people's understanding, it is objective. The realists differentiate from each other, with the dogmatists who accept their ideas of what is the world uncritically, while the reasoned realists examine and test their views first (Gregory, 1995). Gregory places Lipman in the latter category. As realists rely on what is objectively good, it is easy for them to set goals about what they expect from the education of their children. What is expected of children is to know what is 'good' and 'true' about the world[70]. The aim of education for these philosophers is to rectify children's possible superstitions and false beliefs passed on by their parents. The philosophical community of inquiry is a place for children where they will accept, understand, believe, act upon what is true and develop the reasoning that will enable them to justify their beliefs.

An example of a realistic approach in the field of philosophy for children is introduced with Catherine McCall's Community of Philosophical Inquiry method (CoPI). CoPI is based on using logic and philosophical reasoning to distinguish between what is real and what, sometimes mistakenly, people understand to be real. One aim of the CoPI method is to help children reveal errors in their thinking towards what is real, therefore,

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69 See Realism at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ accessed on 17/04/2010.

70 Realism in education has been supported by many philosophers such as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon and John Locke.

the more and different styles of thinking among children, the better the chances of revealing how a theory can be distant from what is reality (McCall, 2009).

In a realist community of philosophical inquiry it is possible that some members accept different ideas as more reasonable and convincing than the ones they brought with them. This is where a dogmatist would not accept the community of inquiry as an appropriate educational procedure, because certain ideas are true, no matter what is said to the contrary in a community of inquiry. Reasoned realists, however, overcome this difficulty. They do not expect children to accept truth uncritically but they are confident enough that their reasoning about what is true will convince others (Gregory, 1995). The community of inquiry is the place to convince others with reasoning about what are true statements about the world.

How can philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life be associated with a realist practitioner of a philosophical community of inquiry with children? A realist would not accept philosophy as a generative or imaginative process. Imagination is already out of reality's realm; it deals with possibilities (possible realities) rather than actualities. Imagination leaves room to multiple interpretations of what is or could be real, which do not match with a realist's ideas. As far as the evaluative aspect of philosophy is concerned, it is more likely that it would be accepted by a reasoned realist, but only in terms of evaluating whether something is objectively true. Philosophy as a way of life could be understood by a realist as a pursuit in everyday life of what is true and living accordingly.

Non-realism

Contrary to realism, non-realists believe that what humans understand as reality is not necessarily what reality 'really' is. Non-realism makes a clear distinction between what is *understood* as real and what *is* real. Reality for non-realists, as Gregory (1995) claims, is always illusive. This means that non-realism tries to prove how humans can

be fallible in understanding the world as it is, due to certain conceptual structures of people's thinking, the language constraints, the value laden systems people use to organise what they perceive as reality and their experiences (Gregory, 1995). There are differences within non-realists which distinguish them into two different subcategories[72].

First-order non-realism

The first-order non-realists agree that people's conceptions may be limited, but they do not distort human understanding of reality. Therefore, first-order non-realists accept that the world exists and that it is independent from human understanding. Borrowing Rorty's mirror metaphor about the apprehension of what is reality; first-order non-realists can open a window to the world and have a different point of view from what they had before opening it. The more windows opened, the more light gets into the room and the more broader and deeper their understanding of the world is (along with accessing the world from different points of view) (Rorty, 1980). This presupposes that the first-order non-realists accept an existing reality independent from human understanding[73]. What distinguishes first-order non-realists from realists is that the first believe that "complete comprehensiveness is practically, if not theoretically, unattainable" (Gregory, 1995, pp.31-40).

The community of inquiry method, in a first-order non-realists group, has a more pragmatic character as shown by pragmatist philosophers such as Peirce, James and Dewey. The community of inquiry becomes a place where children change from being passive learners of what is considered as objectively true to active researchers who do not take things for granted (Gregory, 1995). This presupposes the acceptance from first-order non-realists of two different systems of reality, the private one which contains

72 For similar categorization of non-realists to first and second-order see Realism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ accessed on 17/04/2010.

73 The use of certain terms like non-realism and differentiation of realism such as internal realism can be confusing. Internal realism claims that, "although the world may be causally independent of the human mind, the structure of the world—its division into kinds, individuals and categories—is a function of the human mind, and hence the world is not ontologically independent" (Curtis Brown, 1988, p. 145-155). Even though the name is 'internal realism' it could be characterised as first-order-non-realism.

individuals' experiences, feelings and thoughts (personal reality) and a public one, which is what is agreed by people as objectively correct, therefore acceptable (Splitter and Sharp, 1995). The skills of translating one's reality or interpreting others' thoughts into one's language and thinking system are necessary skills, so as to bring equilibrium between what is public and personally true. The idea of 'self-correction' in this case has not the character that would be present in a realistic inquiry where one corrects one's views according to what is objectively correct, but "incorporating 'personal and partial' views to broader, more public views" (Gregory, 1995).

The first-order non-realist teacher plays the role of the facilitator who asks open-ended questions and creates a supportive environment (Lipman et al, 1980; 1988a). The 'community of inquiry' with its characteristics and values that members of a philosophical inquiry share, such as emotional regulation, non-egocentricity, loyalty, listening to others, building on each others' ideas and self-correction, is the path that leads them to a mutual agreement over what is true (Sharp, 2007a; 2007b). This agreement is temporary and subject to further change. The community of inquiry is the place where an idea accepted by members (public) makes sense if it is close and translatable to one's private truths and vice versa, one's private truth is accepted and recognised in what is publicly regarded as true. In other words the community of inquiry enables both 'thinking together' and 'thinking for oneself' (Splitter and Sharp, 1995; Splitter, 2000a; 2000b). The Pragmatist approach is very popular within the philosophy for children field (Lipman, 2003; Sharp, 2007b; Echeverria, 1993). Returning to the 'window' metaphor, in a community of inquiry people, when expressing their ideas, show the view from their own 'window'. However, by communicating with others they are invited to see the world through the 'windows' of others and by putting all the windows together a more complete picture of the world-as-it-is emerges.

How would first-order non-realists cope with philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects and with the idea of philosophy as a way of life? The ideas of first-order non-realists would match with the generative aspect of philosophy. The idea of openness that first-order non-realists adopt is a core idea in understanding philosophy as a

generative force. Listening to different perspectives and opening different windows to the world is a creative and generative approach of philosophy, as depicted in chapter one. The translation is also a creative and imaginative process as it requires from people to 'get into other people's shoes' and see things from their point of view (window)'. As far as the evaluative aspect of philosophy is concerned, first-order non-realists accept a kind of dualistic system between private and public truth, whereby public truth is the product of agreement among different people's private truths derived from private experiences, thoughts and feelings. Self-correction is a form of evaluation which tries to bring equilibrium between individuals and the public sense as to what is right and true.

Second-order non-realism

What distinguishes first-order from second-order non-realists is mostly a matter of the degree of extent to which conceptual frameworks are commensurable (Gregory, 1995). The second-order non-realists reject the possibility of translation among the different structures of thinking, language, value-laden systems or even cultures. The metaphor of the different spectacles one wears and cannot take off (the spectacles refer to ones style of thinking, language used, value system adopted), not only prevent, but also distort (or misinterpret) an understanding of what reality is (Gregory, 1995).

According to second-order non-realists, the problem of incommensurability is what prevents the understanding of what reality is (Gregory, 1995). Gregory (1995) claims that this is because: a) people with radically different conceptual frameworks fail, even partly, to communicate and therefore to translate, interpret and finally understand each others' ideas and beliefs, b) the process of comparing different conceptual frameworks and examining them through each other's points of view does not guarantee that there will be any synthesis or any meaningful synthesis of the different components, c) the lack of communication and interpretation of radically different ideas leads to the distrust of reason and the acceptance of the idea 'these are the rules we play by' and d) a society with a dominant viewpoint (which could be political, ethical, social etc) may not

understand members with radically different points of view or even give them the opportunity to express these differences (Gregory,1995). What is basically disturbed here is the equilibrium between public and private understanding of what is true.

A philosophical inquiry among a group of second-order non-realists would have the character of exploring different systems of values and beliefs that different people have. As the second-order non-realists have an approach that these are the rules we play by, reason and rationality are only tools for understanding other people's positions, without, however, providing any kind of final authority. Such a community where almost 'anything goes' and 'there are no right and wrong answers' (Stanley, 2004) would be characterised by a high degree of relativism and skepticism which affect any attempt of evaluation. This could lead children to disappointment and passivity as their ideas would only be discussed but never evaluated (Gregory, 1995).

What is written above makes it obvious, that second-order non-realists would not agree with the idea of philosophy as an evaluative force, but would have no problem in dealing with philosophy as a generative force – on the contrary. Communication in an inquiry with second-order non-realists has the characteristic of an imaginative process that enables one to invoke one's same intuition in another person. In this case, philosophy is a kind of inspiration that comes from the use of symbolic reference to describe what is conceived as reality by a person. The metaphorical language and the imagery, and not necessarily *reasons*, become tools that serve to deepen understanding of what is perceived as reality and the words used to describe what is reality. This leads, therefore, to a deeper understanding of the conceptual systems themselves that different people use. As for the stimuli used, in the case of second-order non-realists, it seems that encouraging art, e.g. poetry, fine arts, pictures, photographs, helps to explore each others' frameworks.

2.2.2 Dualism/ Relativism and Critical Pluralism

Dualism

According to dualists, knowledge and values are objective, certain and absolute (Golding, 2009). Since both knowledge and values are objective and absolute, they are universal and unchanging. Knowledge and values are also unquestionable and can be accepted by all as they are assured to be objective. This happens because, by definition, dualism introduces binary and contrary categories that both knowledge and values fall within. This categorization enables dualists to make sense of the world. Examples of dualistic binary categories are right and wrong, truth and falsity and good and evil. Dualism stands also for similar positions such as "dogmatic absolutism" (Paul and Elder, 2002, p.10) and "egocentric epistemology" (Daniel, 2008, p.39).

A philosophical inquiry run by a dualist would aim to correct answers and any disagreement that deviated from what is absolutely true. The process of an inquiry would enable children to get the right answers and the final outcome should be a class with people who all agree with what is correct, right and finally true.

The difficulty that a P4C inquiry with dualists would face is that there is not much room for different interpretations and tolerance of different ideas (Daniel et al, 2002). Golding (2009) claims that dualist students in an inquiry seek for right and wrong answers and they are ready to abandon the inquiry as long as they have got the right answers. This attitude can lead to a superficial, restrictive and sometimes even illusive knowledge of the world. The dualists will not bother to examine the possible 'grey' solution as it is inadequate and not absolute. The fear of relying much on external authorities rather than testing critically what these authorities portray is also evident in a dualist community. Language used among students can prove the presence of dualism. For instance, phrases such as 'tell us which is the right answer' or 'that's wrong' show a dualist behavior, which may lead to the abandoning of philosophy as a waste of time, if dualists understand philosophy as not giving right or wrong answers (Golding, 2009).

Dualism shares similarities with realism as they both adopt a binary categorical system by which they understand the relationship between them and the world. This binary

categorical system for realism is the distinction between what reality is and what one understands as reality. Dualists understand that reality is separate from the person's understanding of it; therefore reality stands unchangeable and absolute. Thus, a realist would accept the binary dualistic categories of right/ wrong, correct/ incorrect and good/ evil as reflecting what the world is like independent of our understanding of it.

Like realists, dualists would not accept the value of philosophy as a generative force. It would seem useless since the right answers are clearly defined, unchanged and absolute. The evaluative aspect of philosophy would have the character of *testing* children's ideas in a community of inquiry towards what is objectively correct.

Relativism

The opposite of dualism, is relativism, and relativists claim that there is no objective knowledge, only beliefs. For relativism there is no absolute truth. Great tolerance over what different people understand as true and reciprocity which is displayed as a tendency of a mutual sharing of ideas is often shown within a relativist community of philosophical inquiry (Daniel et al, 2002). This leads to a wide classification of different perspectives, even contrary to each other, as true since their truth is contextualised. As contexts differ, so are the 'truths' that are generated.

A philosophical inquiry run by a relativist would show great tolerance towards different points of views that each member brings into a discussion. The aim of a relativistic inquiry is the expression of personal opinions and listening to others' personal opinions that reflect different ideas and experiences (Liptai, 2005; Bosch, 1998b). As they do not believe that there is one absolute truth, there is no need for evaluating the different opinions as right or wrong. For relativists, there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers so 'anything goes' (Stanley, 2004). This tolerance could even reach apathy, as people take for granted that people are free to express their ideas no matter whether they stand to reason or not (Golding, 2009). As there is not an absolute truth, truth becomes a

subjective issue ('true-for-me') (Golding, 2009). Any disagreement between the members of a relativistic community of philosophical inquiry could be characterized as a personal attack towards one's freedom to state one's ideas. The language used in a philosophical inquiry shows people's epistemology. Expressions such as 'this answer maybe is right for you but not for me', 'it's all about opinions', 'it was good to hear from you all', 'all our ideas were really interesting' show a relativistic approach towards a community of inquiry (Golding, 2009).

The main disadvantage of a relativistic inquiry is its unconditional tolerance. Being tolerant and liberating children by the constraints of getting something scholastically right or wrong can make them very creative. However, accepting uncritically everything people are saying can lead to apathy and not practising reasoning (testing the ideas of others whether or not they stand to reason) or to nihilism (there is nothing true to believe and act upon). The evaluative aspect of philosophy would not be accepted by a relativist. It is debatable whether philosophy as a generative force would also be accepted. Relativists are willing to listen to other people's opinions so there can be an effort of imagining and getting to another's' position, however, if a relativist is in a state of uncritical acceptance, s/he may just listen to others, without really trying to think creatively.

Relativism could be associated with second-order non-realism in terms of very much emphasizing the importance of creative means of expressing ideas. Second-order non-realism agrees that there is not an external reality and people's understanding distorts what is reality, as they understand reality wearing certain spectacles that they cannot take off. Therefore, second-order non-realism rejects anything that exists objectively and 'outside' of people's thinking and understanding. Since individuals' understandings are not objective and common for all, then there is not a way of evaluating objectively what one believes as true. Therefore, if there is not an objective (even not an intra-subjective) way to evaluate a statement as true or not, then it is relativism, and second-order non-realism is associated.

Critical Pluralism

Critical Pluralism tries to solve the problems that dualism and relativism create in a philosophical community of inquiry. In Aristotelian terms critical pluralism appears to be the golden mean between dualism and relativism. Critical pluralism believes neither in an absolute objective truth nor in a total subjective truth. It aims to help people understand a situation and judge well. This means being open to other people's ideas. The knowledge constructed for critical pluralists is fallible, temporary and plural. It has mostly the character of making meaning and connecting each others' ideas rather than discovering a truth. This meaning, however, is subjected to logic and to inter-subjective perspectives (Golding, 2009).

It seems that the way that personal and public truth link together pass through the process of assimilation and accommodation, as they were perceived by Jean Piaget (1929). Assimilation refers to new knowledge, through new experience, acquired and added into one's current position, whereas the idea of accommodation refers to the transformation of already existing positions, in order to make sense of the new experiences, views and ideas one confronts.

To achieve a critical pluralistic philosophical inquiry is a complex task, but it is enabled when the facilitator leaves aside his/her ideas and becomes as tolerant and neutral as possible, asking probing and challenging questions that make children think, encourage children to listen carefully to others, link their ideas together, disagree with each other and provide reasons for their disagreements or agreements (Scolnicov, 1978; Baumgarten, 1993). This, however, presupposes that the facilitator is not a strong dualist or relativist, but rather neutral or, following Socratic terminology, a good *'maia*[74]. Children with a dualistic approach can achieve a better understanding if they are encouraged to find the answers and solutions by themselves and by listening to others and contrasting their ideas with others (Golding, 2009). On the other hand, relativists

74 Maia in Greek is the one who enables a woman to give birth to her children. Maieutics is Socrates' method which was inspired by the profession of Socrates' mother; she was a maia.

can move towards critical pluralism if they realise that apart from being willing to listen to others and think openly, it is necessary to test answers as to whether they stand to reason or are applicable.

Critical pluralists seem to have similarities with first-order non-realists as they both try to find a way that different ideas can be expressed, but at the same time these ideas are subjected to critical evaluation. Similarly, critical pluralists would accept philosophy as both a generative and evaluative force. The problems with Gregory's and Golding's categorization explained above arise when the facilitator and the members of the community of inquiry have totally different approaches of what is true and real. For instance, what would happen if a realist facilitator runs a community of inquiry whose members are mostly first or second-order non-realists and vice versa. Would this facilitator favour the realist children as their ideas would match with his/her[75]?

Realism and dualism appear to share similarities with each other. Both dualism and realism, comparing to what is defined as philosophy in chapter one, would agree with the evaluative aspect of philosophy, but not with the generative as it would appear to be a waste of time seeking alternative truths that deviate from what is objectively defined as true. First-order non-realism and critical pluralism seem to have the same epistemological base but portrayed in different words. Both seem to agree with philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects. As for second-order non-realism and relativism, they would both disagree with philosophy as an evaluative force.

The epistemology of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force seems to be closer to the epistemology of first-order non-realists and critical pluralists. However, what they both lack or do not refer to explicitly is the applicability of philosophy in everyday life. Both critical pluralism and first-order non-realism do not explain explicitly what philosophy is for. Is philosophy an opportunity to exchange ideas with the aim of

75 Snyder (2006) shows that there is no difference between the teaching style and the philosophy of an experienced teacher. For instance, a constructivist teacher uses more an inquiry based approach in a classroom whereas a teacher with a didactic philosophy tends to create a teacher- centred classroom.

practising critical and creative thinking within the time schedule of a school activity? Is philosophy one more 'lesson' to add to the curriculum[77]?

What differentiates the approach of philosophy as depicted in chapter one from critical pluralism and first-order non-realism is that philosophy does not stay within the school environment but aims to become 'a way of life'. Viewing philosophy as a way of life means that philosophy is more than an effective way of teaching thinking skills, but also has a practical application in everyday life. Philosophy is the activity of thinking about thinking, but philosophy as a way of life also refers to how this thinking can become action, therefore how people move from thinkers to doers or how thinkers and doers are merged into the same person.

Apart from the view of philosophy for children as a mental tool that strengthens thinking; it could become and be seen as a way of life[78]. Children should be able to apply the philosophy they practice in other aspects of their lives in or outside of school. Therefore, children's abilities to think philosophically should apply to many decision-making moments that emerge in their lives. The ability to ask questions, think logically about situations and wonder are not limited within the school classroom. Judging whether a television programme is good enough, reflecting on a bedtime story, or wondering over everyday problems and being allowed to influence the decisions adults make on their behalf are some implications of philosophical thinking outside of the school. Thinking collaboratively and caringly can lead to a lifestyle that can promote peace and progress in every aspect of human life. Caring thinking, for example, prevents strong independent thinkers from becoming arrogant and insensitive to other people's thoughts and needs, but also it includes a distribution of power in society to include the child's voice.

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77 There is a question whether philosophy should be taught on its own or all the subjects of curriculum should be taught under a philosophical perspective. For instance, Brooker (2009) offers an example of how children (Key Stage 3) approach history by following a community of inquiry approach.

78 See chapter 1.

So far we have silently consented in viewing 'Philosophy for/with Children' from the adults' point of view. What I describe above depicts a promising programme or approach which enables children to become better thinkers according to what adults consider as better thinking. Therefore children, through philosophising, adopt tools that adults use, such as asking questions, clarifying, giving examples and counter examples, analysing, finding faults in reasoning etc. so as to resemble adults thinking. But could 'Philosophy for/with Children' mean something more than that?

From the child's point of view 'Philosophy for/with Children' could be the place where children can freely speak and exercise their right to be listened to. Children feel free to express their thoughts and reflections no matter how illogical or unreasonable they may seem, according to adults' criteria. From this perspective, 'Philosophy for/with Children' can be a place where adults listen carefully to children's voices and enrich their own thinking. Adults can find out whether children's thoughts and questions are deeply philosophical (Haynes, 2002), or investigate other ways of thinking that possibly they lack or have forgotten (Egan, 1988). In other words, philosophy with children can be a place for adults to reconstruct their own childhood or access the child they also are, and through it grasp a deeper understanding of what children's thoughts are. Listening 'philosophically' to children (Haynes, 2008) with an open mind and a willingness not only to find what might be potentially philosophical in children's contributions, but also to acquire their understanding enables adults to understand children's thinking and through this enrich the content of philosophy.

Is a commitment to a particular epistemology necessary? Even though my approach seems to bear similarities with critical pluralism and first-order non-realism[79], I would not recommend any epistemological position as more 'correct'. This is because such an act would be a limitation in the possible ways of philosophising. As the epistemological positions outlined above are not exhaustive, this ensures that nothing is excluded in the future in relation to new ways of philosophising that may come into being. Committing

79 See p.76 of this chapter

ourselves to one epistemology would mean blocking possible further research on philosophizing which goes contrary to the spirit of this thesis.

However, the philosophical community of inquiry, no matter what epistemological positions and values its members have, needs to be a space where people will be free to express their ideas, be listened to and listen to others. To achieve this, openness, mutual respect and rejection of indoctrination seem to be already values brought into the community of inquiry, so as to assure an otherwise "value-free" space in expressing and testing ideas (Lipman, 2003; Costello, 2000). These values are self evident since without them a community of inquiry cannot exist.

2.3. Are children and philosophy as a generative force and an evaluative force and as a way of life compatible?

Apart from asking whether children can do philosophy or not there is also another question to answer. Why are we now only interested about philosophy with children? One reason could be the changes in society in terms of economic, political and cultural development and its maturation to accept children as critical and individual thinkers that share the same world and have the right to speak and be listened to (Kennedy, 1994). Karl Marx in his work *Critique of the Gotha programme* argues that "human nature and human society are not fixed once and for all; they are both constantly developing into new forms that are not fully predictable in advance" (Friquegnon, 1997, p.15). The society of the future and the individuals, who compose it, will, to some extend, define themselves by their choices and creative actions (Friquegnon, 1997). It seems that in a constantly changing society children and adults should respect each other's thinking and build on each others' ideas so as to create a better understanding of the world and solution that assure both adults' and children's 'well of being' (Kennedy, 2006) and philosophy is a way to achieve this.

Bearing also in mind Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1964) ideas of exploring the irrational and integrating it into an 'expanded reason', the liberation of children from the

constraints that Piaget noted, Egan's ideas about the losses in adults' thinking and the discussion about freedom, mutuality and children's rights notes a recovery of children's status. Philosophy with children helps in strengthening this status even more[81]. There is no need to view children and adults as binary opposites, but as complementary whose aim should be the mutual understanding of themselves and the finding of solutions that serve both and maintain life in the world[82] (Postman, 1996).

In respect to the generative aspect of philosophy, children's questions such as "How can we be sure that everything is not a dream?" or "Why is it better for three people to be selfish than for one?" are the products of "genuine ignorance and profound naivety", urging children to ask for solutions (Matthews, 1980, p.73). Even if children are not natural philosophers, as Matthews perceives[83], their ignorance and naivety trigger their imagination and make them ask philosophical questions which is the base of philosophy as a generative force.

Children seem not only to understand the metaphorical structure of our language but they are also able to create their own analogies (Vosniadou and Ortony, 1983; Winner, 1997). Children can also learn from metaphors as they provide vivid visual associations between the topic and the vehicle used for a metaphor (Williams, 2002, p.17). Children's memories are improved by metaphorical associations (Buzan, 1995; Vosniadou and Ortony, 1983). If empirical research shows that children are capable of understanding and creating metaphors, then philosophy as an imaginative process

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81 "The idea of learning to philosophise in schools assumes that children only fully blossom in school when encouraged to take active and deliberate steps to seek responses to the questions about existence they raise at a very early age" (UNESCO,2009, p. 14).

82 Postman (1996) portrays the idea of earth as a vulnerable space capsule that human should take care of (Earth caretakers). Saving the planet is ensuring our life on Earth, therefore it is a win-win situation. Global consciousness could be both subject for philosophical inquiry but also an educational aim.

83 There is a strong critique of Matthews' idea that children are natural philosophers. John White (1992) claims that what makes a question philosophical is the intention rather than its verbal form. Children, according to White (1992) ask questions because they want to learn the correct use of English words, however, he seems to deliberately dismisses children's spontaneity to ask philosophical questions rather than asking for grammatical reasons. Michael Hand (2008) seems to provide us with more sound arguments why children are not natural philosophers: He claims that: a) children ask various questions, e.g. about the past or how things work but that does not convert children to natural historians or scientists and b) it is not the asking of questions that make someone a philosopher but mostly the kind of the questions asked, their purpose and the method used.

would be another stimulus to develop their imaginative thinking. Metaphors link with humour and playfulness (Fisher, 2007a), as both are part of children's ways of life.

The generative aspect of philosophy as described in chapter one sets the presuppositions for people who want to practice it. Such presuppositions refer to an open-minded attitude, the ability to think creatively, the willingness for testing, hypothesising, playing with ideas and asking questions. Finally, all these presupposition are based on people's freedom to think and the expression of their thinking. Are all these presuppositions met by children?

The generative aspect of philosophy requires a questioning attitude. Asking questions touches the borders of what is known and links the known and the unknown. This uncertainty forces people to draw new lines in thinking, find new paths and try to understand what is yet unknown. Such curiosity is characteristic of young children. Children ask in order to understand the world around them. Their freshness and inventiveness of mind lead them often to questions that even mature adults do not state so clearly (Matthews, 1994).

Unless influenced by adults, children have no prejudices that could limit their ability to open their minds[84]. Philosophy as a generative force requires the 'opening' of minds and 'thinking outside of the box'; it involves playing with new ideas, testing them, and hypothesising (Haynes, 2008; Fisher 2003, 2007b; Murris and Haynes, 2000b). It is an imaginative process. This is one way children acquire new experiences in their life. Children test ideas, play with them, repeat them, think in metaphors so as to establish habits and think imaginatively (Murris and Haynes, 2000a). Children are familiar with playing with ideas through their play, games, role play and the reading of fairy tales and other stories.

The evaluative aspect of philosophy matches also with the child from the point of view that often evaluation requires imagination. However, critical thinking sets boundaries to

84 Larosa and Bettmann (2000) give more details on how parents can transfer prejudices to children and how to amend mistakes.

creative thinking. If the generative aspect comes close to children's nature, then it is a constraint on their thinking. The evaluative aspect is often similar to what children have been taught mainly by adults. They are already familiar with constraints. Children are also familiar that certain rights do not waive duties. If this is the case then evaluative thinking which entails critical thinking and making judgements makes thinking more rigorous. Children can 'go crazy' with ideas but they understand that not all creative ideas are applicable and that the next step is to critique which of these ideas are to be used or not and which stand to reason. What is important for the facilitator here is to listen to what children consider as reasonable and not directly impose on them what adults regard as reasonable[85].

Children need self-reassurance that they are autonomous enough to do things on their own and can take initiatives and accomplish the tasks they begin successfully[86] (Erikson, 1959). The sense of autonomy and gaining control over taking initiatives and being competitive can be reinforced by philosophy as an evaluative force. Philosophy, in this case, provides children with the thinking tools that can help them take decisions, critique their ideas and judge whether they stand to reason. Taking it further, children that are able to judge well will feel more confident, independent, proud, responsible for their thinking and this will put in motion a virtuous circle, which will also continue to be demonstrated in certain behaviours.

Philosophy as an evaluative force enables children to find ways so as to reflect, express their thoughts into words and check for the validity of what they say. As a linguistic activity it allows people "to agree in the language they use [which] is not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (Wittgenstein, P.I. 241). Especially for children coming from

85 See more about the idea of reasonableness in chapter 6 when I refer to critical listening.

86 Erikson (1959) discusses the different crisis that one faces in different stages of one's life. Thus, the toddlers come through the second stage of being able to assert their will which can either be successful so children become autonomous, or unsuccessful, so children feel shame and doubt . As preschoolers the children come through another crisis, which refers to their ability to accomplish certain tasks. Children who succeed acquire a sense of initiative which makes them autonomous and help them proceed further, whereas children who are unsuccessful feel shame and quilt. For children aged 7-12 the crisis they encounter depends on whether they are successful in showing competence or not. Upon successful overcoming of this crisis the child feels productive while, unsuccessful completion of this stage leads them to inferiority.

lower socio-economic environments with restricted language codes (Bernstein, 1964; 1971) they can amend through philosophical inquiries any linguistic deficiencies[87]. As philosophy does not seek necessarily to find 'nice' words to express thoughts, but is focused on finding the ones that describe one's ideas accurately, philosophy could be one way of bringing equilibrium between expressing thoughts in a much better linguistic way because it uses everyday language. Through it children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds make themselves understood, use the vocabulary that enables them to express their thoughts and finally make them feel that they are accepted not just for their ability to make themselves clear to others. Finally, philosophy as an evaluative force prevents children from becoming nihilists (in the case that everything goes without any judgements) or absolutists (follow uncritically a certain opinion as the only correct one) because both reflect an inability to take responsibility for one's own thinking (Golding, 2009).

Both the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy employ two pairs of forces: assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1929). This is what children do naturally anyway: They get more information that changes their thoughts (assimilation) and at the same time the children change so as to be able to incorporate the new information (accommodation). Is philosophy as a way of life applicable to the lives of children? Can they lead a philosophical way of life? My tentative answer at this stage is 'Yes' but not necessarily in the same way that a philosophical life is understood by adults. We cannot expect children to work and reflect on philosophers' texts. We can expect, however, from them to take action that is meaningful and true for themselves and others. Children can both philosophically reflect on their thoughts and get involved in a dialogue with others. Philosophy with children as a way of life does not necessarily happen in the classroom during an inquiry. It is not simply a discourse in a classroom and has no

87 Bernstein was an educator and sociologist who was interested in the poor performance of students coming from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. He found out that the children's poor performance is due to the different language used in school and their homes. Bernstein (1971) claimed that the way language is used in a specific class of society affects the way people assign significance and meaning to what is said. A linguistic code can show the social identity of the person who uses it. According to Bernstein (1971) this code can be elaborated or restricted. The elaborated code expresses explicitly all thoughts which the restricted code is taken for granted. The elaborate code can secure a better understanding of what is said while in the restricted code misunderstandings may occur as it is not clear that the words are used in the same way to create meanings.

value if it becomes another school subject and not transferred into children's everyday life. However, children cannot live philosophically if adults do not listen to them, encourage them to philosophise by providing stimuli and by taking advantage of stimulating situations that enables wondering (e.g. during shopping, playing computer games or swimming). The role of education is to highlight children's philosophical way of life, which can start in school and continue after that. This is possible by providing a stimulating education, freedom of thought and the chance to reflect on the consequences of their praxis, instead of telling them constantly what they should do and what to think.

2.4. Need for stimuli

Philosophy with children as a way of life can be understood as being both reactive and proactive. Reactive means that children are able to deal with situations they face in their everyday life by applying the skills and attitudes acquired through philosophy. Proactive means that children can predict and solve future situations because of their philosophical thinking.

To establish philosophy as a way of life and to include the generative and evaluative aspects, the role of stimuli is catalytic. The teacher as facilitator needs to be sensitive enough so as to acknowledge and take advantage of the stimuli that children themselves bring into the inquiry. In cases that children are not ready yet to bring in their own stimuli, the facilitator should be able to carefully select the stimuli that could lead to a philosophical inquiry, but also be aware to stop selecting them when the children are able to do so, on their own.

Children need to encounter stimuli that will 'trigger' their thinking and will make it easier to come up with new thoughts or thoughts they had, but never before offered. Stimuli are the 'tools' that can enable children to express their potentials. According to 'Darwinian Theory', it is the use of tools and the cooperative patterns that developed the

technical and social life of humans (Bruner, 1966). Similarly, the stimuli and the discussion about them with others are the ways to make children think better. Stimuli can be dealt with in both a reactive and proactive way. Reactive refers to recognising and dealing with the stimuli that emerge from children and could be philosophically interesting. Proactive refers to offering stimuli to children that will strengthen their ability to philosophise, be more sensitive to problems and take action towards their solution.

2.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was: a) to argue for my conceptualization of philosophy for children, b) to examine the different epistemologies of various philosophy for children and c) to examine whether philosophy as described in chapter one (generative aspect, evaluative aspect, philosophy as a way of life) is compatible with philosophy for children and with what is considered as a child.

Borrowing Gregory's and Golding's categorization helped in highlighting how the different epistemological positions that different practitioners in P4C accept influence what is considered as philosophy for/with children. According to Gregory, there are three different main traditions that influence the aims and the processes within philosophy for/with children: Realism, which accepts that the world exists independently from people's understanding, first-order non-realism that claims that the 'real' world exists but depends on people's understandings, and second-order non-realism which argues that people's understandings may distort what is real. According to Golding, philosophy for children could be based on dualism, which states that there is an ontological separation between people's minds and the world, relativism, which assumes that all opinions are true (personal truth) and critical pluralism, which is a position between dualism and relativism.

I have argued that there is an overlap between the different systems of categorization offered by Gregory and Golding. As far as the relationship of these epistemologies is

with the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy described in chapter one, realists and dualists would accept the evaluative aspect of philosophy, but not the generative one. Relativists and second-order non-realist would possibly accept the generative aspect but not the evaluative. Philosophy as a generative and evaluative aspect seems to share similarities with Critical Pluralism and first-order non-realism. However, another aspect has not sufficiently been considered, philosophy as a way of life, or in other words how philosophy for children can be something more than a reasoned dialogue among children within the confines of classroom walls

In the final part of this chapter I examined in what ways children and philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life match. Children and philosophy as a generative force connect as they both presuppose an open-minded attitude towards the new, a playing with new ideas, the ability to hypothesize and to probe questions, and finally to think in metaphors for establishing meaning. The evaluative aspect of philosophy is what teaches children to think about their thinking and to test their ideas for applicability and reasonableness.

Through the process of assimilation and accommodation, children learn to adjust to the world they live in. Philosophy as a way of life can enable this process in two ways: by being proactive (giving children carefully selected stimuli to encourage philosophical thinking) and reactive (recognising the philosophical ideas that children bring to the classroom from their everyday life). Such stimuli are either selected by the facilitator or by the children themselves.

The chapter ended with an argument for the need of stimuli in order to establish philosophy as a way of life. The next chapter illustrates how a selection of stimuli (also reflecting the different philosophical traditions within P4C/PwC) have been used in classrooms and what stimuli are required for practising philosophy as a way of life with generative and evaluative aspects.

CHAPTER 3

Literature review on stimuli used for doing philosophy with children

Abstract

This chapter aims to answer the question whether the stimuli that have been used for doing philosophy for/ with children in the field share aspects of the philosophy that has been viewed in the first chapter. These stimuli have been categorised into those that were particularly designed for doing philosophy with children, such as Matthew Lipman's novels and those that were not designed with doing philosophy with children, such as children's literature. Particularly, this chapter will investigate whether the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy, along with the view of philosophy as a way of life are reflected in the stimuli as far as their purpose, content and the way they have been used are concerned.

3.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present the main stimuli that have been used for doing philosophy with children and investigate whether generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy are reflected in them, as far as their purpose, content and the way they have been used is concerned. To enable this process, stimuli will be separated into two categories: those that have been intentionally designed for doing philosophy for children, such as what is called the P4C programme, developed mainly by Matthew Lipman and those that have not been intentionally designed, and have been used. The latter category includes children's literature, works of art, pieces of music and various stimuli that come from children's everyday experiences. This broader category could be further separated into subcategories, such as those that are text-based and those that are not.

3.2. Stimuli specially designed for doing philosophy with children

3.2.1 Novels and short stories

There are stimuli purposely written for doing philosophy with children such as Matthew Lipman's novels and manuals[88]. Lipman (2003, p.101; 1996a) and Ann Margaret Sharp (1992; 1995, pp.53-54) view the text of their novels as:

a) a model of community of inquiry which is performed by the characters of the story in a story form, with a text based on Plato's style of dialogues[89],
b) a 'place' which reflects the values and the achievements of past generations,
c) a link between the individual and the culture,
d) a platform for critical reflection on concepts that are meaningful and interesting to children and also subject to philosophical investigation,
e) a 'place' to depict human relationships, especially in terms of logical relations and
f) a process of showing model communities of inquiry with the educational purpose of an internalization of the thinking behaviours displayed by the fictional characters.

Lipman's creative project comprised of philosophical themes and (more importantly) ways of philosophising as portrayed in the Platonic dialogues in a context that could be conceived by children. Lipman wrote firstly *'Harry Stotlemeier's discovery'*[90] and continued with the same children's characters (representing different ways of thinking) in subsequent novels. This gave a sense of continuity and familiarity with the characters, which may help the readers identify themselves with the novels' protagonists.

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88 Matthew Lipman was the first to write novels for doing P4C accompanied by their manuals. Harry Stotlemeier's Discovery was his first novel written for P4C addressed to 5-6 grade children and analysing mainly Logic problems. Other novels followed such as Lisa (concentrated mainly on ethics), Suki (concentrated on aesthetics) and Mark (focused on Social-political issues) for 7-10 grade children, Pixi, Kio and Gus, for 3-4 grade children and 'Elfie' for K-2 grade children. Ann Margaret Sharp wrote novels for younger children such as the Doll's hospital and Geraldo and accompanying manuals which were co-authored with Laurence Splitter.

89 See examples of Socratic dialogues in Meno, Euthyphro, Symposium (2005)

90 This is a creative anagram of Aristotle's name.

The writing of the novels was definitely a creative and generative process for Lipman. Lipman thought creatively because he translated academic philosophy into everyday language that could be used with children. Writing the novels was also an evaluative process, since Lipman had to think critically what to include and what to leave out, taking into consideration children's interests and the possibilities of identifying with the historical and social context in which the children of the novel grew up. Lipman applied philosophy as a way of life by creating a 'world of thinking out loud' for children, who through dialogue would be provoked to philosophise about their everyday life experiences. The characters within the stories are models of thoughtful behaviour for young readers. However, the fact that the writing process of the novels had a creative and evaluative philosophical aspect for Lipman does not necessarily guarantee that it involves a creative process for the younger readers.

Lipman (in an interview he gave to Eulalia Bosch) explains why one should use novels to do philosophy with children:

> **M.L.:** In this way philosophy is more accessible, because stories are easier to read than philosophy textbooks. Narratives create a particular momentum that makes you want to read the next page, something that never happens with a textbook. On the contrary, one's eyes get tired; one's mind goes away... Textbooks do not allow that. Textbooks always add more and more information, while novels have an organic unity. Every element works simultaneously in order to create a characteristic moment of inquiry. The fictitious children in the novels are exploring, they are investigating and inquiring. They try to discover the meanings they need. In this sense, the text is important as a tool which facilitates the inquiry. Children, of whatever age, may want to learn and maybe they do not know how to do it. They need to learn how to learn, and, maybe, for that, they need to be in front of a model which shows this clearly. If the book shows this process, it may be easier, once in the classroom, with real children, that everybody will be able to start to think by himself. And the model, understood in those terms, is an emblem, a standard to which one can refer because it shows and explains and does not just try to tell. (Bosch, 1998a, pp. 1 – 4)

Still Lipman does not move away from the textbook since he is prescriptive about what are the correct ways for reasoning. However, what differentiates Lipman's novels from textbooks is that he introduces this reasoning through narrative (Lipman, 2003); therefore the different ways of reasoning are portrayed by the characters of the novels instead of being given as ready-made products to children. Below are some questions to consider which inspired other educationalists and philosophers to develop Lipman's idea.

Are stimuli specifically designed for doing philosophy with children able to help children view philosophy as a way of life and as a way to unfold philosophy's creative and evaluative aspects? I will use following example from Lipman's *Elfie* to explore this question. When Elfie asks the question "why do we go to school?" (Lipman, 1988c, p.17) one can imagine a real child asking exactly the same question. The same happens with Jess who wonders, referring to her doll "where was Roller before she came to the toy shop?" (Sharp, 2000, p.3). Such a question can provoke discussions about one's origin - whether one is a person or an object. There are other examples of deliberately philosophical questions, such as Kathy's question "Can time go backwards?" and a deliberately given response in the form of a question "What kind of dumb question is that?" (Lipman,1988c, p.9). Lipman had a strong academic philosophical background which is clear by the way in which he deliberately 'injected' philosophical themes and questions into his novels. There is nothing wrong in deliberately posing questions, what seems wrong is the assumption that these questions are the only philosophical ones and that they should be used as a prescriptive guide by the facilitator. Most importantly the facilitator needs to pick the philosophical aspect of the questions that children raise by themselves. The idea of all educational materials is to teach something, however, if this material is aligned with children's interests and needs, then the learning and teaching process is easier and enjoyable for children[91].

91 Even with mathematics that someone can claim they do not come naturally to children, if they are taught embedded in particular examples from children's life, they are better understood.

Lipman's novels and other purposely written materials for doing philosophy for children have been criticised as being artificial[92] and not reflecting children's interests and needs[93] (Daniel, 1998). As for the content, the novels cannot be easily adapted to different cultures with different values, curricula, educational systems and teachers' roles from those in America[94] (Reed and Johnson, 1999; Liptai, 2005; Daniel, 1998). Critical thinking cannot be studied in the abstract and outside children's experiential and cultural context[95] (Sharma, 1995).

Regardless of the deliberate artificiality and cultural specificity, Lipman's P4C novels are still popular stimuli for doing philosophy with children in many parts of the world. This fact indicates that either there is something qualitative about the novels, or that Lipman's novels as a first introduction for doing philosophy with children are so well 'promoted' that people in other countries prefer to translate them (regardless of the possible problems that may occur in translation) and experiment with philosophy for children by using stimuli that are 'tried and tested'. My answer is that there is a need for distinguishing between the novels and the manuals that accompany the novels[96]. The latter are very informative and perhaps less culturally specific than the novels. It might be because of the manuals that Lipman's material is still very popular. Any alternatives that could 'replace' them should be: a) of better quality than Lipman's material so as to find supporters, b) well promoted as an alternative so as again to find supporters, and c) portray a different philosophical perspective from the one that Lipman offers.

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92 Lipman et al (1980) admits that he purposely did not want his work to be a work of literature because he did not want students to be seduced by the literary ways of writing, on the contrary he wanted them to concentrate on good reasoning.

93 Juuso (2007) supports Lipman and suggests that he (Lipman) has created a new genre of children's literature: the philosophical story. Lipman, according to Juuso (2007), aims at returning to the fundamental roots of philosophy through turning children to philosophical concepts that are within their reach. However, later on in his dissertation, he critiques Lipman's narrative style of writing in the third person as if the narrator (Lipman) knows everything.

94 Laurence Splitter (1992), nevertheless, made an effort to adjust Harry Stottlemeier in Australia94, so as to make it updated and current to another social context. Lena Green (2000) also encouraged teachers in South Africa to create their own materials that could be adjusted to African Culture. However, using Lipman's material as an example for African teachers to get an idea of what philosophy for children is can lead to the imitation of Lipman's material as is the case with Green's material. The stories are similar but American names have been replaced for African names. Thus, the material used are not linked to African children's experiences and culture.

95 Lim (2003) has used Asian local tales, comics on Confucius and Lao Tzu as stimuli to do philosophy with children in Singapore.

96 See next section in which it is explained what manuals are.

There are many alternative stimuli used for doing philosophy for children which deviate from the idea of Lipman's novel/manual format. For instance, Cathrine McCall's novels describe the same story[97], the everyday life of a family, from the points of view of children in *'Laura and Paul'* (1992) and of parents in *'Changes'* (1993). Philip Cam's thinking stories is a collection of short stories, not linked together, but each of which can be explored philosophically.

Philip Cam wrote a series of *Thinking Stories 1,2 and 3* (1993, 1994, 1997) which consist of an anthology of short stories specially written for doing P4C and are accompanied by manuals that elaborate upon them. Cam followed the same pattern that Lipman introduced. What is different, however, is that the stories stand on their own, are not connected with each other as is the case with the episodes in Lipman's or Sharp's novels. Cam's idea was to respond to one of the critiques concerning the sheer volume of the P4C programme that may put off educators and children to work with them (Cam, 1995).

97 For instance, McCall's novels (1992;1993) remind one of John Burningham's picture-book Come away from the water Shirley (1977), where one page describes the world of adults that does not change greatly, while the opposite page describes the colourful and instantly changing world of Shirley's fantasy. It also reminds one of Anthony Browne's picture-book Voices in the park' (1998), which presents the same story viewed from four different perspectives but in less space and with rich images. Even though McCall's approach is philosophically interesting as it shows how reality is differently perceived, it lacks immediacy, as one needs to read the two books and think consciously whether there is a kind of connection between the two novels. As the reading of the novels does not happen instantly, this element of telling the same story from different perspectives may be lost.

EXERCISE: What's Possible?

We can make sense of many things that could not actually happen. Take Superman. No one could really do what Superman does, I guess, but we have no difficulty in making sense of him. Yet some things that couldn't happen also don't make sense. You couldn't find a square circle, for instance. The idea of a square circle doesn't even make sense.

So some things could happen and other things couldn't really happen. Some things make sense and other things don't really make sense. This gives us four possibilities.

1 Makes sense and could happen	2 Doesn't really make sense but could happen
3 Makes sense but couldn't really happen	4 Doesn't really make sense and couldn't really happen

In which box (1, 2, 3 or 4) would you place each of the following, and why?

a. A talking turtle
b. A person who wakes up to find that he is 70 years older than he remembers being the day before
c. An old man who becomes a boy
d. A tree that becomes fully grown overnight.
e. A person remembering something that happens in the future
f. Changing the future
g. Changing the past
h. Time travel



34 Tommy and the Time Turtle

Figure 3.1: Exercise from the manual that accompanies Cam's *Thinking stories 1*

The short stories in comparison to the novels: a) can be read in their entirety during one lesson, and b) it is likely to remain fresh in children's memories (Costello, 1988; 1992). Children know the beginning, middle and end of the story which helps them grasp a sense of unity and completeness and make critical judgements since the readers know the purpose of the story (Egan, 1997; Fisher, 2003). Robert Fisher (1995) seems to

agree with Cam's attitude towards creating philosophical material and expands the idea by re-writing well-known folk stories (1996b), poems (1997a) and games (1997b) for thinking[98].

3.2.2. Manuals that accompany novels and short stories

Lipman, Sharp, Splitter and Cam provide teachers with manuals which help them make the most of each story and explore them philosophically with children. The manuals are full of exercises and discussion plans on certain concepts that are embedded in each chapter of the novel. These manuals help the facilitator to: a) ask philosophical questions that are derived from an academically philosophical tradition, b) get familiar with the methodology and discipline of philosophy, c) open the space to philosophical debate by presenting alternative points of view and supporting them logically with arguments, d) focus on specific problems and seek a solution or judgement, and e) examine abstract concepts related to children's interests through the inquiry (Lipman 1996a, p.12; 1996b, pp.64-67). The following table explains roughly how each novel is related to its manual:

98 Folktales and legends are materials not purposely designed for doing philosophy but could be used for philosophy with children. Folktales, fairy tales, proverbs, jokes are also suitable stimuli for doing philosophy from both a philosophical and educational point of view. They offer people moments of joy, ambiguity in meanings (therefore room for multiple interpretations), diversity, provenance (from the point of view that they are expressions of a whole community and not a particular individual), and "a legitimate way to exercise social control and to gain favour in one's community[...] Folktales promote a group's feelings of solidarity and purpose" (Borbo, 2006, p.82-83).

	A manual accompanies a novel and follows the novel's division into chapters and episodes
Novels Divided into chapters-episodes	▪ For each chapter: leading ideas are isolated (e.g. truth, beauty) ▪ For each leading idea: The manual offers discussion plans and exercises ▪ Each discussion plan is a list of questions that explore further the specific leading idea and in a logical order, form easy to more complex. ▪ The exercises explore further the leading ideas in a playful way. For example, a list of statements is given to children and they have to judge them as true/false/ not sure, justifying their answer.

Figure 3. 2: How Lipman's novels and manuals are linked together

Below there is an exercise on the concept of Freedom (Lipman and Sharp, 1982, p.235):

EXERCISE: Freedom
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If you agree, why? If you don't agree, why not?
Agree/ Disagree? 1. We are free if no one tells us how to live. 2. We are free if we make up and follow our own rules for how to live. 3. We are free when nothing gets in our way. 4. We are free if we think we're free. 5. We are free when we can do what we think well. 6. We are free if we are healthy. 7. We are free if we are intelligent. 8. We are free only when everyone is free. 9. We are free if we are ourselves. 10. We are free when all the above statements are combined.

Figure 3.3: Exercise from Lipman's manual: *Looking for meaning* that accompanies *Pixie*

The use of this exercise as a game with children - especially if the subject of freedom is raised by children - is educationally a useful idea; however the use of similar exercises as the only way to do philosophy needs to be questioned. The exercises and the discussion plans are examples of philosophy prescribed to children and not philosophy

that is made by or with the children. Lipman (and not the children) has thought creatively about concepts of freedom. The same critique applies to Lipman's discussion plans that:

> ...consists of a group of questions that generally deal with a single concept, relationship (such as a distinction or connection) or problem. The questions may form a series, in which each builds upon its predecessors, or they may form a circle around the topic so that each question focuses upon the topic from a different angle. We can speak of these two families of discussion plans as cumulative and noncumulative[99] (1996a, pp.65).

Regarding the manuals, they have been considered as too directive and simplistic (Reed, 1999). To illustrate, the question 'what is truth' in the manual that accompanies 'Elfie' is divided into sub questions pre-arranged that claim to analyse further the concept (e.g. is truth a word/ a thing/ a bird/ a colour? Is truth rich/ happy?) (Lipman, 1988c, pp. 325-327). Lipman knows how to approach such questions, but it cannot be taken for granted that teachers would know this as well. If the lesson plans or the exercises in the manual are used as 'recipes' by teachers with no philosophical background or as worksheets for students to complete, then they can lead to a sort of inquiry that is far away from being philosophical[100]. Manuals work as a tool of instruction to deliver philosophy while "philosophy by its nature is not a delivered lesson" (Reed, 1999, p.111). A 'pack of instructions' with exercises and questions are not enough to teach a facilitator how to philosophise. The facilitator, especially the one who has no philosophical background can get ideas from the manuals but s/he has to discover on her/his own what philosophy means to her/him. This can be achieved through personal

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99 An example of a non cumulative discussion plan is given by Lipman when he asks whether a desk/ school/ family/ home/ street/ USA, world, story have a story. A cumulative discussion refers to investigating a specific subject starting with easier questions and moving to more difficult and abstract ones.

100 It's up to the facilitator and the feedback s/he takes from children how the stimuli will open up an inquiry. The pre-made question by Lipman and the options given could lead to philosophical discussions such as the connection of truth with its linguistic expression, the metaphorical thinking of truth in terms of colours, or emotional moods etc. A facilitator with strong philosophical background may direct children to a philosophical discussion that is not of children's interest. On the other hand, a facilitator with no philosophical background may not pick philosophical notions in children's answers that could be explored further.

reflection, reading of philosophy and mostly practising philosophy in one's life, which is possible if philosophy is truly something that the facilitator loves and values.

Lipman argues that the manuals should be used in combination with training. However, the use of manuals presupposes that philosophy is something that can be learnt if certain instructions are to be followed. If philosophy is learnt that means there is someone who already knows (or has learned) what philosophy is and can teach the others how to do philosophy according to what someone or the 'books' say. Lipman knew well that the majority of teachers do not have a philosophical background so his initial thought was that providing teachers with manuals would support them in doing philosophy with children. However, Lipman portrays what is philosophy for him (or for the Anglo-American academic tradition he was educated in), but then adapted for children.

Lipman created material that is value dependent on its type of use. When the manuals are viewed as stimuli that will inspire both teachers and children to think further beyond the realms of their own thinking, then they have a generative philosophical aspect. If, however, they are viewed as manuals that should be followed so as to reassure that this is the proper way of doing philosophy, then each generative aspect of producing new thoughts is simply lost. The evaluative aspect of doing philosophy is also lost if manuals are seen as 'recipes' to follow.

McCall (2009) does not provide manuals as she considers them too restrictive and she assumes that the teacher who does philosophy with children has a previous background in academic philosophy and training in doing philosophy with children. Instead, she proposes her method, Community of Philosophical Inquiry method (CoPI) based on children's use of the formula "I agree/ disagree with...because..." when doing

philosophising[101]. She also insists in teachers' philosophical training before using this method and enriching their philosophical background by on-going personal study.

Specially designed stimuli for doing 'philosophy with children' deliberately lack images that could make them more appealing to children. Lipman et al (1980) have claimed that readily presented images trap children's imagination and creativity from moving in different directions to the ones adults have already thought of. However, there are images that could act as stimuli and create in children a sense of puzzlement and inquiry (Murris and Haynes, 2000a) because meaning is not only found in words but also in images[102] (Murris, 1994).

3.2.3. Other intentionally designed textual material

Yim Pyoung Kap (2003) has created comics for doing philosophy, considering that comics appeal to children because of their form (images and texts that flow quickly). However, Kap's images are used less philosophically as they are used mostly as a way to illustrate the characters of the story. The basic characters are four members of a family, Socrates (who seems to escape from a frame on the wall and come to life whenever a philosophical issue can be raised), a Sphinx, a robot and a pet dog. Therefore the philosophical stimuli come mainly from the text, which often tries to deliberately elicit further philosophical discussion. Even though it can be argued that young people are familiar with the medium of comics and can easily take to it, they can lose their interest in reading it if the comic does not serve the role that comics do (e.g. entertainment). Below there is an example from Kap's comics:

101 Recently, McCall (2009) has reformed her formula to the model "I agree/ disagree with..(name of the person) .who said. (reconstruction of what has been said)..because..(providing reasons)." This model requires listening carefully and remembering well what the others have said, reconstructing what has been said as accurately as possible and providing reasons.

102 Murris (1994) argues against Lipman that there is a confusion in equating 'imagination' with 'imagery'. She argues that the pictures do not limit children's imagination, on the contrary they give food for further thought and analysis.



Figure 3.4: Sample of Yim Pyoung Kap's philosophical comics

The robot gets a virus and is taken to hospital. The first eight frames describe a really amusing story which could lead to philosophical discussion without the 'extra philosophical injection' of the last three frames. "Hey, by the way, can it happen our mind be virus-infected?" says the Sphinx and Socrates takes up the challenge to give

an answer: "Why not? Haven't you guys heard about the mental viruses? That's not all! We may need vaccinating against". The discussion about viruses could occur without any need to force it. The fourth picture with the robot's head open in front of the doctor could be a stimulus on its own for critical and creative thinking: can robots have expressions when their heads are open? Are robots' viruses the same as humans'? What would a special hospital for robots look like? How would it be different from a normal hospital[103]?

Michael Ende (1993, p.283) does not believe that "significant children's books have ever been written out of educational considerations" which questions the quality of Lipman's work. Ende (1993) argues that artistry is the only criterion to judge children's books which reflects the author's integrity of heart, mind and senses and therefore speaks about the integrity of people. He also claims that many books written for educational, political or sociological reasons usually reflect the tendency that adults have to discard whatever they consider as useless of children's literature. Lipman's novels cannot be considered as a 'by product', according to Ende; Lipman's intention was to help children reason well which is honest and welcome. However, I agree with Ende only to the point that the specially designed materials for doing philosophy for children lack the children's input as they are produced by adults and aim to be consumed by children. Philosophy appears as a product that adults make or select and children supposedly consume. In this way philosophy is something given from outside and not coming from children's

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103 What might work better is the use of existing comics that are not specially designed for doing philosophy but philosophy is already infused in them. These cartoon serve both philosophy and enjoyment. Philosophy appears as a way of life and not as something 'technical' and 'artificial' attached to it. Such comics could be The Simpsons, the American TV animation created by Matt Groening for the Fox Broadcasting company have been used as an alternative stimulus for doing philosophy. This comic describes satirically the everyday life of a working class American family that consists of five members (Homer, Marge, Bart, Lisa and Maggie) and reflects not only American culture and society but many traits of human nature that could be considered as universal (Conard and Skoble, 2001).

Another comic that could be excellent for doing philosophy with children is The Moomins (in Swedish: Mumintrolls), a series of comic books written and illustrated by Tove Jansson that describe the everyday life of a bohemian, eccentric and very tolerant to diversity family and other characters related to the family. The main three family members consist of Moomin Papa, Moomin Mama and Moomintrol, they look like hippopotamus and live in the Moomin valley. The different ideas and approaches the whole family has towards the external world could give raise to many philosophical dialogues (Jansson,1961).

experience, but what adults imagine or recollect from their own childhood as children's experiences.

A stimulus is appropriate when the child can identify with it, in a genuine and not imitative matter (Stevenson, 1993). Furthermore it seems too naïve to assume that children who read novels will necessarily imitate the type of reasoning that fictional children demonstrate (Van De Leeuw, 2006, p.29). A stimulus is appropriate when it initiates in children questions not yet articulated or expressed. This is how philosophy can be linked with children's lives and experiences; not by artificially imitating a way of philosophising, but by involving children to ask philosophical questions that can be connected with their lives. A narrative text either in the form of a philosophical story or an ordinary story should provide a cognitive/effective experience which stimulates fruitful philosophical discussion by giving children a sense of the contingent complexities of a 'tangled' human life (Nussbaum, 1990, p.140).

3.3. Non-purposefully designed material for doing philosophy with children

This broad category includes whatever is not purposefully designed for doing philosophy with children but could be used for such an objective. These stimuli can be further divided into two subcategories: the text-based stimuli and non text-based stimuli. This division serves a methodological reason: to investigate whether these stimuli enable or can 'teach' children to think about their life philosophically and philosophy as a generative and evaluative force.

3.3.1. Text based stimuli

Karin Murris (1992) introduced doing philosophy with existing stories[104] and more specifically picture-books[105]. Her book *Teaching philosophy with picture-books* inspired other P4C theoreticians and practitioners, such as Robert Fisher, to combine picture-books and philosophy. The illustration in children's books plays a mainly decorative role (Reeder, 1997) however, in picture-books text and image work together so as to make meaning for the story. Murris prefers picture-books as they are usually short stories and children can focus not only on how the story ends, but also on other details within the story such as the illustration which can give totally different messages comparing to the ones derived from the text (Murris, 1992). Picture-books do not 'spoon-feed' ready-made philosophical questions. On the contrary engagement with them offers "thought provoking ideas with no prescriptive content" (Murris, 2008b, p.107). This means that the ideas which will emerge cannot have been predicted in advance. Also, there is always a possibility through engaging with the fictional characters, their dilemmas and the dealing with particular situations, that abstract truths are to be disclosed (Murris, 2008b). Furthermore, the young non-readers can benefit from doing philosophy by listening to someone reading the story and getting the additional information from the pictures of the book (Scheinkman, 2004). Reading short stories to children prevents them from getting bored and enables them to remember more about the content of the story (Costello, 1992).

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104 For more about enabling teachers to do philosophy with children by using stories see Sprod, 1993; Stanley, 2004; Glueck and Brighouse,2008; Fisher 1995. Sutcliffe and Williams, 2002; Murris and Haynes, 2000a. There are also more approaches that link picture-books with developing thinking skills but do not focus on philosophy (Polette,2007; Sipe,2008).

105 Burns (1997a&b) finds it difficult to define what a picture-book is and whether it is a separate genre or a format. Picture-books distinguish from children's books which are simply illustrated books. These books are not too rich for doing philosophy because there is no interaction between the two different systems: pictures and text. The word 'sophisticated' has been used for picture-books to imply that there are refined connections between pictures and texts which could be interesting not only for children but also for adults (Burns, 1997b; Weller,1984). In picture-books philosophy starts when the reader has to pay careful attention to both images and text, and use his/her critical and creative thinking so as to derive meaning from the book. Sipe (1998) argues that text and images of a picture-book create a new entity that it is more than adding its parts. In picture-books, words and images do not tell the same story; the pictures can be complementary, enhancing, contradictive, or counterpointing to the text (Wolfenbarger and Sipe, 2007). Picture-books are multimodal texts where meaning is portrayed through different sign-systems: text and image (Serafini,2010). Sipe (2000) argues that these asymmetries make children readers to want to explore picturebooks more. This is out of readers' hermeneutic, personal and aesthetic impulses towards the picture-books (Sipe, 2000).

In many picture-books, such as the ones written by John Burningham (1978; 1985), Anthony Browne (1985; 1997; 1987; 1994), Oram and Kitamura (1986; 1987), Maurice Sendak (1963; 1981) and David McKee (1980; 1982) both the text and the illustration are interdependent[106]. Illustration stimulates children's critical thinking[107] rather than preventing them from imagining[108] (Murris, 1992; 1994). Pictures often enrich the story narrating other aspects of it which can be in accordance with the text or contrary to it. It is one of the points where literature and philosophy meet. Murris, referring to Egan, (1988; 1993) considers picture-books as an ideal place to present abstract binary concepts, such as love and hate, beauty and ugliness and odd creatures, like witches and monsters[109]. For example, through the abstract binary concepts of love and hate children could engage into a philosophical discussion that can lead to different

106 For more examples about how meaning is derived from the connection of texts and images in picture-books, see chapter 5.

107 The Dyfed County Council project (1994) carried out a one year research that was focused on children aged 5 years and used 'Teaching Philosophy with Picture-books' (Murris, 1992) as the stimulus for discussion with the whole class. There were two experimental groups and one control group. One experimental group of six schools used two interventions (P4C- 1 hour session per week and a reading activity), and the other experimental group of six schools used only the reading activity with a small group of children 'at risk' of reading difficulty. There was no intervention on the control group. A total of 229 children yielded data. The teachers received training and ongoing support by the project team. Data collected from: a) teacher questionnaires b) a measure of student attitude to reading, c) a reading analysis procedure, d) reading comprehension questions, and e) two tests from the British Abilities Scales—the Word Recognition Test (reading) and the Matrices test (nonverbal reasoning). According to the outcomes of the standardized tests no significant differences among groups were referred. However, from the other measures it appeared that the first experimental group had the greatest gains in terms of thinking, listening, language skills, and self-confidence.

108 Egan (1992) does not approve of the pictures in books because their artists portray their personal view on how facts described in the story should be depicted. Lipman avoids also illustration in his novels as he thinks they capture children's imagination. Murris (1993;1994) critiques Lipman's argument, as she claims that he confuses 'imagination' with 'imagery'.

109 Egan (1997;2005) argues that the imaginative aspect of children's thinking "the other half" has been forgotten in education, which centres too much on the logical-scientific 'side' of the child's mind. He recognises three different stages children's cognitive development goes through: a) the mythic, b) the romantic and c) the theoretic stage (Egan, 1997;2005). The first stage refers to the children aged 4-7 who understand the world in an imaginative – mythic way. The use of stories, metaphors, binary opposites, jokes, rhyme patterns, mystery and play are tools that match with the characteristics of children's understanding at this age and help them develop their understanding further (Egan,1997). The second stage encompasses children aged 7-12 approximately. The mythic layer of how children understand themselves and the world is replaced by a romantic one (Egan,1997). Children's cognitive characteristics that are displayed change so different that tools could now serve as their 'cognitive needs'. The use of heroes that gives the opportunity to children to identify with the sense of wonder, the need for reaching the limits of reality and experience, the narrative understanding (where things make sense in the context of a story) are some of the tools that can help children's cognitive development at this stage (Egan, 1997;2005).

directions, such as what causes love and hate, whether love can transform into hate and vice versa, what is similar and what is different between the two concepts.

McKee's book '*I hate my teddy bear*' (1982) is an example of such a puzzling book. The plurality of worlds that are demonstrated in McKee's book make the readers struggle to make meaning through the opposition of the text's simplicity and the imagery's complexity (Moss, 1992).



Figure 3.5: Picture from McKee's *I hate my teddy bear*



Figure 3.6: Picture from McKee's *I hate my teddy bear*

The two children (shown by the sides of the ice cream kiosk) have been sent out to play with their teddy bears. After abandoning their teddies somewhere in the park they now begin their imaginative talk about what a teddy could do (e.g. counting). The text describes mainly the children's imaginative dialogues about their teddies. The images leave room for multiple interpretations, forming questions that may lead to philosophical discussions. Beginning with questions that come from the observation of the images such as:

- 'Why is there a kettle in the middle of the road?'
- 'What does the huge black statue of a hand represent?'
- 'Why is it black?'
- 'Why is there a man painting a rainbow?'

Children can move to more abstract and philosophical questions such as:
'Is life a game?'

- 'Does the hand symbolize the order given by others to follow?'
- 'Does the hand represent the heritage of the cultural past?'
- 'Are adults free?'
- 'Are nature and art connected?'
- 'What is the nature of art and what is the art of nature?'
- 'Can humans change (or create) nature?'
- 'Should things in life make sense?'
- 'When do adults stop being children?'
- 'Is life inexplicable, discontinuous, incomprehensible and strange?'

The type of philosophy that is celebrated here matches well with the generative aspect of philosophy as it makes children wonder, generate questions and try to explain the symbols embedded in the images. The images invite multi-layered narratives that hold more than one meaning (May, 1995; Moss, 1992). The narrative lines that occur here, no matter whether they are fulfilled or not, open up a space to different philosophical interpretations, for instance about the confusion of male/female relationships (Moss, 1992). It is also linked with the evaluative aspect, as it provokes reflective thinking and thinking about abstract concepts.

Are these picture-books aligned with philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects and philosophy as a way of life? As they have not been produced for doing philosophy with children, they lack the intention of adding purposeful ideas for the sake of doing philosophy in an academic and often artificial way[110]. Picture-books do not force 'philosophy', but often have 'philosophy' embedded in them[111]. Children's books have

110 Picture-books often reflect the authors' moral issues and perception of how the world is or could be (Stuart,1998, p.14). What makes it different from intentionally designed stimuli for doing philosophy is that picture-books show rather than deliberately tell what might be philosophical.

111 The writer and illustrator Shaun Tan (2006) claims that 'a successful picture-book is one in which everything is presented to the reader as a speculative proposition, wrapped in invisible quotation marks, as if to say 'what do you make of this?' This is a form of philosophy that comes not intentionally but one is genuinely interested to find meaning in one's illustration. See also chapter 4 where there is a short philosophical analysis of some of the books illustrated by Tan.

been written primarily for giving joy to children[112] and authors. Furthermore, the text and the images of a book reflect the author's: a) thoughts, b) imagination of how children could think and act, c) observations of how children react, and d) recollection of the child the writer once was (or still is). This is genuine as it comes from a genuine interest the writer has and it is not directed towards a purpose: to do philosophy. The non-linear reading of both text and images offers a re-presentation, not of the world, but of the world as already organized in discourse (Paul, L. 1992).

The writing of a story reflects the writer's philosophy from its generative point of view: creating something new. The same happens with the reader as beholder and re-constructer of the stimulus in a new way through questioning, inventing new analogies and metaphors, attempting to understand the writer's initial motivation and pushing thinking into new directions[113]. The generative aspect of philosophical thinking is evident with the linking of ideas amongst people who discuss the stimulus and its characteristics. For instance, bridging the gaps between text and image is a creative process that can be "experienced differently as we grow older and as we bring our established habits of thought to the reading of the narrative" (Murris, 2008b, p.108).

Reading picture-books are usually part of children's experiences either in school or out of school (e.g. bedtime stories) and it helps naturally and spontaneously children to deal with emerging (and not forced) philosophical concepts. Philosophy can be infused in children's everyday life. It can start as a simple dialogue and gradually lead to

112 There are, however, many books that have more aims than just offering pleasure. For instance, there are books that offer enable children to: a) cope with their feelings or difficult situations (such as death or a divorce) (Jalongo,2004), b) become more creative in their thinking (Meador,1999)), c) enhance their critical skills (Graham,2000). There are two possibilities here: Either to have books that deal with certain subject but implicitly and in a literal way as it happens with Tan's The red tree where he shows rather than tells humans' loneliness and alienation from each other, or in Michael Rosen's The sad book where he deals with depression, or have books that are more prescriptive and provide particular ways of how to deal with such problems. Regarding the second case, the books might be useful but they are far away from being considered as works of literature. They seem to resemble with philosophy books specially written for children; both of them try to 'guide' people's behaviour or thinking. Strasser and Seplocha (2007) give a good distinction between picture-books and children's books: in the first case both picture and text are equally important in the second case there is simply text and illustration that are not connected together.

113 Mallan (1999) adopts the idea of 'critical aesthetics' which combine the pleasure of reading with practising critique in this reading which seems to describe partly the role between philosophy and literature. Mallan's idea of 'critical aesthetics' is restricted to aesthetics whilst philosophy is broader ; it includes aesthetics and does not end with it.

questioning, reflecting, pointing arguments and counter arguments, learning to observe and listening to others. Philosophy becomes a lived way of life. Children's books with metaphors and the poetic style of writing can give way to children's imagination to generate ideas and questions, which is aligned with viewing philosophy as a generative force. The evaluation of thoughts generated and their possible application in everyday life comes as a consequence. Picture-books do not provide models of thinking at least in the same way that happens with the specially designed stimuli for doing philosophy with children and it is up to the facilitator and the group as to how they will infuse the evaluative aspect of philosophy in the use of picture-books.

3.3.2. Non textual material

Matthews (1993) also prefers existing stories as stimuli for doing philosophy along with questions[115] that come directly from children's genuine interest and wonder (philosophical whimsy). In his book *'Dialogues with children'*, he gives many examples of philosophical discussions about happiness, desire, time travel and many other concepts that started after having read a story to a child or a group of children (Matthews, 1984). Matthews seems to add philosophy (by apt questioning) in children's everyday life or pick up moments of children's experiences[116] that could have philosophical interest and elaborate on them further so as to make children think more philosophically (Matthews, 1980). This is a more applied form of philosophy as a way of life, since philosophy is not only a matter that happens in a school as an activity, but something that can happen in children's real lives not necessarily systematically[117]. It is,

115 Nelson's Socratic method (1993) is an 'updated' method of Socratic method used in philosophy with children. The stimuli for this method are the questions that come from children's genuine puzzlement and are linked with children's experience. The method aims at exploring and analysing children's thinking generated by a question at the greatest depth.

116Matthews in his book Philosophy and the Young Child (1980) refers directly to children's reasoning that comes from their play, the reading of stories, children's moments of puzzlement and naïveté by citing extracts of their speech. What Matthews does is to pick these moments and through questioning encourages children to elaborate further.

117 Adults' careful observation of what children do during their playing, drawing or watching TV could offer many moments of philosophical reflection. Apt questions on children's drawings and listening to the stories that accompany their own drawings give food to instant philosophical conversation (Coates,2004). Williams (2008) encourages children to write their own stories and then use these stories as a starting point for philosophising. The philosophical discussion that comes as the natural consequences of

however, up to adults to recognise these stimuli and encourage children's observations and engagements with them, rather than leaving them to one side. Patrick Costello (2007) takes these ideas a step further. Although he first started philosophy with children by using narratives as stimuli that he had written himself (alongside samples of reasoning to children and diagrammatical representations as e.g. PowerPoint slides), later on he began to write narratives that include the life of the contemporary classroom (Costello, 2000;2007). What Costello did was make stimuli out of children's own lived experiences. Children's experiences were incorporated into stories and consisted of a new stimulus in narrative form for further reflection and philosophical investigation.

Non-text based materials have been used much as stimuli by both Sara Liptai (2005) and Wendy Turgeon (2000) to encourage the use of musical pieces, objects and works of arts. Materials such as a work of art or ordinary objects can be used as stimuli as they include the "sociological, cultural and historical concerns that are attached to a specific object" (Liptai, 2005, p.4).

Drama has also been used for acting out the dilemmas philosophy poses (Kaye, 2006). According to Hannu Juuso the use of drama within philosophy aims at "presenting philosophy in such a way that it provides an opportunity for philosophising which in turn generates educationally important aspirations" (2007, p.63).

Similarly, photography (Williams et al, 2003; Liptai, 2002) and pictorial arts have been also suggested as fine stimuli for doing philosophy (Wilks, 1995; Turgeon, 2000, Slade and del Gigante[118] 1997). The question I raise again is whether these stimuli could be

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children's activities with stimuli can be considered as philosophy lived within children's experience. Williams idea seem to go further with the journals Questions and Journal "100" (Folman and Heesen,2000). They are both of philosophical content written and edited by children from different countries. As long the children write because they really need to express their philosophical ideas, then journals can be part of children's experience. Writing also helps children to express their ideas in a form that can be revised whenever children want to. Therefore, children's texts can be stimuli that children can access and discuss (and open them further) at their own time.

118 Slade and del Gigante presented children with art stimuli, such as a painting. The children had first information about the work of art. Then they were presented with a stimulus and invited to look at it carefully (or explore it with senses when feasible), ask

viewed under philosophy as a way of life, highlighting its generative and evaluative aspect. Eulalia Bosch (1998b) introduced the 'mystery creatures' and how abstract works of art in museums can be perfect stimuli for PwC as they can create aesthetic responses to children (which are philosophical). Bosch used painting or sculptures that are abstract. The sculptures are 'mysterious' for both the facilitator and the children which makes everyone start from the same creative hypotheses of what the sculptures could be and their critical reasoning to support their ideas. The 'mystery creatures' are:

> ...objects with their own life that contain a mystery - knowledge and doubts- which can only be discovered by attentive contemplation. Aesthetic perception, the perception of an object's artistic qualities, is an act of seduction. We see many things, as we see many works of art, but we only look at some of them. We look at those that have held *our undivided attention for a given moment,* and have generated an inner supplication, born within us and addressed to us, a plea for further looking, listening, touching. This reflexive and reflective concern - reflexive, because it is a means of concerning ourselves with ourselves; reflective, because the sensation continues through the act of pondering - is what turns the perceptive act into an act of intellectual seduction (Bosch, 2001, p.168).

What Bosch demonstrates here, but not explicitly, is the importance of the attention people pay to a stimulus and their connection with the stimulus through the senses, their reflections and later on the dialogue with others. In her book, '*The pleasure of beholding*' she states that one must feel attracted by "the silent dialogue the object inspires" (1998b. p.69). Bosch seems to reflect upon the idea expressed in the first chapter of philosophy as a generative force, where the mystery creature is there and sets a force upon the people, who will set a force to 'open' the stimulus further and along with it understand themselves (philosophy as a way of life). Works of art do not mimic external reality, but mostly the moment of inspiration[119] and the experience that the artist had when he created the piece of art (Bosch, 1998b). It is as if a 'hidden force'

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questions and then think about them. The question raised here is whether the information about the work of art should come first or last. Leaving children first free to have a fresh look with no specific relevant knowledge might lead them to more creative responses.

119 The moment of inspiration reflects also the whole environment that surrounds the artist at the time of his/her creation of a work of art.

is transmitted by the artist into the object of work, waiting to interact with the force that the beholder will set upon the object.

Even though this type of stimuli exists in a non-verbal medium (Liptai, 2005), children have to verbalise their thoughts no matter whether the stimulus is textual or not. Liptai (2005) argues that a work of art should be used for discussion for its own sake and not as a medium for discussing something else. Even though this kind of discussion would be more concerned with aesthetic values, I would argue that since aesthetics is part of philosophy, then an aesthetic inquiry has also a philosophical character. The philosophical investigation of a stimulus could be an end in itself but could also be the means for moving to another field of knowledge not necessarily directly linked to the stimulus.

The non-textual stimuli lack the verbal expression of ideas. This, however, does not indicate that only through language ideas are expressed, as language can be considered in a broader sense and can include images, sounds and whatever else can activate people's thinking[120]. However, the textual stimuli provide already the language as a medium to build on whilst the non textual stimuli require from children to find the right language to express their thoughts.

3.4. Stimuli and the facilitator's attitude

The specially designed stimuli for P4C reflect a certain way of doing philosophy which often assimilates the academic way of doing philosophy. The construction of material for

120 There is a whole area of research about children researching their environment. Children that learn how to use the necessary technological equipment (such as video cameras and audio recorders), so as to explore their environment, achieve more self confidence and develop further their creative and critical thinking because they have to choose what part of reality they want to depict in their photos (Clark, 2001; Walters,2006). This is an active way of helping children to create their own stimulation and reflect on it. Reflection on what one has created and discussion upon it is usually a form of philosophising. Adams and Lehman (2007) refer to an empirical research of 160 fourth graders who were encouraged to create their own books and these books were professionally bounded and placed in their school library. According to the writers the entire project boosted pupils confidence in using their own skills and sources so as to become writers.

P4C is a creative and evaluative process for the creators of the stimuli (the authors) but not necessarily for the receivers (the children). Children's points of view of what philosophy might mean and their spontaneous contributions seem to be missing. Furthermore, the idea of children creating stimuli or adults creating them according to the children's interests (Laverty, 2002), are also forgotten. This seems to me the reason why philosophy as presented in the specially designed stimuli cannot be viewed as the children's way of life. The novels and the manuals present philosophy as 'one more lesson' added to the curriculum that takes place in a specific school timetable. The manuals can easily become guides for the teachers to follow as if philosophy is not free and logical thinking but a lesson to be 'delivered'. It is not necessary to dismiss the use of novels and manuals. Nevertheless it is necessary, especially for the facilitator, to link critically the novels and manuals with children's interests.

Alternatively, the non-purposely designed written materials for PwC seem to connect with children's experience and way of life. Generating new ideas seem to come easier when children have to combine and process different operational systems, such as the images and texts from picture-books[121] (Harris and McKenzie, 2004). The risk with this category of stimuli is the philosophical value of the discussion that may be generated. There are many chances that the dialogue will not be philosophical, especially if the teacher does not have an academically philosophical background to distinguish what could be philosophical and of children's interests.

The use of intentionally or non-intentionally designed stimuli for P4C is related to what is the facilitator's[122] attitude towards philosophy. A facilitator who feels confident in finding

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121 Simpson (2005) claims that there is a need for 'visual grammar' which will enable people how to make the most of 'reading' pictures. It can be argued here that 'visual' grammar, which would put children's thinking over a picture into a specific 'thinking box', could be replaced by philosophy which gives room for multi- interpretations of the pictures (Harris and McKenzie, 2004).

122 Facilitator is the term used to describe the role of a teacher within a philosophical community of inquiry. The facilitator is the one who enables children's philosophical thinking. The facilitative role is complex, as the facilitator is often at the same time the provoker who stimulates students, the modulator who reassures the cohesion of the discussion, and the supporter (Santi,1993).
However, there is a disagreement over the use of the term facilitator. For instance, Splitter (2003) does not agree with the name of 'facilitator' as the one who 'delivers' philosophy. Borresen and Malmhester claim that the facilitator should be called 'hardener'

what could be philosophical in everyday life is likely to be: a) attracted by using non-intentionally designed for P4C stimuli and b) repelled in using directive and prescriptive material. On the other hand, a facilitator who is not in tune with philosophy and does not feel confident with finding philosophy in everyday life is likely to be attracted by the intentionally designed P4C materials. Less confident facilitators might prefer stimuli that 'guide' those on how to do philosophy rather than exploring by themselves what philosophy for themselves and children could be.

The philosophical background of the facilitator (and the philosophical community of inquiry) may also influence people's preferences for particular stimuli. For instance, tracking back to chapter two of this thesis, dualists or realists may be keen on using stimuli that are specially designed for philosophy as these stimuli show better what philosophy is in a formal and distinct way. On the other hand, second-order realists or relativists may prefer the non-specially designed stimuli and the ones defined by children, as they are more open to different interpretations. Critical pluralists and first-order non-realists may be keen on both categories, providing that they examine them critically and they are willing to 'open the stimuli up' further to what they have been designed for.

It seems that a possible tension might occur between the control and input of the facilitator as the selector of the stimuli and the notion that a philosophical inquiry consisting of children is free to go with what is chosen. To what extent is the philosophical dialogue constrained by the facilitator's choices? It must be admitted that most of the philosophical inquiries in a classroom start by an adult who either introduces a stimulus to the children or highlights the stimuli that children bring into the classroom and deal with them philosophically. To resolve such tension it is essential that the facilitator's role will gradually fade and the selection of the stimuli will become the children's responsibility.

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instead as s/he should intellectually push children to think more philosophically, Lectures from Philosophy in School- Summer School, Oslo University College, Oslo, Summer 2010.

3.5. The lack of a theory behind the stimuli

So far there is no clear identification of what the purpose is of using a stimulus. Is the stimulus necessary for a philosophical discussion to start? Can it start without a stimulus? Do people use the stimulus so as to generate a discussion about the particular stimulus (and therefore 'open' it)? Is it just a starting point to move to a subject that is not necessarily connected to the stimulus? Brenifier (2005) claims that there is often no need for a stimulus (text) as there is no interaction or 'confrontation' with what the text really says. I would agree that such situations described above can happen especially when a community of philosophical inquiry is still quite inexperienced and not yet so sensitive as to observe and make the most of stimulus. However, a stimulus is there either for somebody to work on and discover what it might mean, or to move away from it altogether and invent something new. One might wonder whether there is a specific way of approaching stimuli. If so, would a specific approach lead to an instrumentalisation of philosophy for children and a potential loss of originality in children's philosophy (Vansieleghem, 2005)?

It was claimed by Lipman (2003) that stimuli present certain types of philosophising which could act as models for thinking for young readers. Counter arguments refer mainly to the artificiality of such an attempt and suggest replacing these stimuli with children's literature. Both approaches agree, even if they do not mention this explicitly, that these stimuli can work well with children and develop their philosophical thinking if they are aligned with children's needs and interests. However, in both approaches the necessity for stimuli to share similar characteristics with children is not analysed in depth. The ideas of spontaneity, flexibility, originality, playfulness, emerging activity from children are not fully explored[123] as characteristics that stimuli should have. The

123 Ghanotakis (2006) constructed a board game 'The game of Wisdom' purposely for doing philosophy. It is a board game that consists of a four-coloured wheel each colour of which represents different kind of questions (logical reasoning, ethics, creative imagination and discovery) and speak tokens for the players to use when discussing. The game is a way for Ghanotakis to apply his WRATEC method (adaption of professors Thomas Jackson "Good thinker's toolkit: WRATEC". The WRATEC is the acronym that stands for (W)hat is the meaning of...(R)easons providing, (A)ssumptions detecting, (T)rue verifying, (E)xamples providing and (C)ounter examples (Ghanotakis, 2005). The game is so much 'philosophical' oriented that itmisses its primary functioning role as a

connection between the stimulus, the facilitator and the children has not yet been explored to a great extent. The forces of attraction or repulsion that can develop between people and the stimulus need to be further investigated. Furthermore, there is a need to explain where these forces originate from. What makes a teacher or a child attracted towards one stimulus, repelled by another or perhaps disinterested altogether?

Nowhere in the literature has the role of love towards a stimulus been mentioned as yet. There must be a kind of love towards a stimulus, which will force both children and teacher to want to further expand on it. There is need also for a kind of passion, which is a form of love towards the stimulus, which is also not referred to in the literature[124]. Could love, or the lack of it, be a key to the forces between people and the stimuli when doing philosophy? Facilitators that: a) do not love doing philosophy and b) are not passionate in finding stimuli and exploring them philosophically should not even attempt it. It is preferable not doing philosophy[125] than doing it because it is obligatory. It stops being philosophy as by its nature philosophy is not something to force on others. Doing

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game and that is to entertain. Also, the way in which philosophy is delivered is far removed from been linked to children's everyday experience. Philosophy is seen here more as developing children's thinking skills. On the other hand, the Would you rather card-game that was inspired by John Burningham's picture-book is a game that entertains but at the same time it offers children or adults many opportunities to think on hypothetical bizarre situations creatively, and critically.

124 Karin Murris (2009) in an interview was asked what the difference between doing P4C in summer schools and doing it in formal courses was. Murris (2009) explained that "it depends on the type of the summer school, but they are often voluntary, so the motivation of one's students is different" Analysing her statement further it seems that the words 'voluntary' and 'motivation' play a key role. Voluntary entails the idea of freedom to select or reject something offered to a person. Motivation, if internal, is connected to the passion and desire. Murris refers mainly to students but I think that this should be broadened so as to include teachers who get involved with philosophy for children. This statement shows also that any attempts to introduce philosophy with children in schools as necessary could possibly jeopardise both children's and teachers' 'voluntarily motivation'. http://www.p4c.ir/index/e-ver/Intreview/karinmurris-inter.htm accessed on 16 March 2010.

125 One might wonder that if philosophy develops good educational aims, such as thinking skills and moral imagination, teachers should do it whether they like it or not. However, if philosophy is practised mechanically or in an authoritative way by someone who does not love it, it may influence negatively children's attitude towards philosophy. If philosophy is in a state of Thanatos for the teacher, then how is it possible to create Eros to children? A second objection would be that this is the same not only for philosophy but also for maths. Why should a teacher who hates maths have to do it? My answer would be that ideally the teacher who hates maths shouldn't teach it and be substituted by another one who could do it. There are many students who are afraid of maths only because they had bad teachers who couldn't teach it properly. These students deprive themselves from a whole world of thinking in symbols and this could go on if there is nobody else to inspire Eros towards maths and change their attitude. Why should this happen with philosophy too? Philosophy, like mathematics, reflects an even more expanded way of thinking and living upon thinking which should not be restricted to a particular set of questions and answers.

philosophy as if it is a 'duty' gives children a false impression of what philosophy is. The need for loving somehow a stimulus and be attracted to it is not explored and this needs to be investigated further.

Philosophy as a way of life is possible only if children's lives are viewed philosophically. Philosophy is not only the hourly session in the classroom generated by a particular stimulus, but the viewing of stimuli philosophically whatever the place or time. For example, wondering out loud when going for a walk in the park with a child, or commenting on a drawing that a child has made and is willing to talk further about, or discussing a TV programme with a child when watching it together. All the thoughts and emotions that such activities may generate can be stimuli for further philosophical reflection in search of the meaning of these activities, either as activities for themselves, or as practical applications in people's lives. Giving stimuli is not philosophy genuinely derived from children unless it encourages children to offer or create gradually their own stimuli and think about them philosophically[126]. Children's stimuli and the ways they are used, reflect children's philosophical perspectives and attitudes to life, which, possibly, is not fully translatable to adults. What is missing is the in-depth conceptualisation of children's stimuli as a way to understand a philosophical way of life. The fact that children's experiences are not referred to by children as philosophy, does not make their experiences less philosophical. Is philosophy only what adults understand as philosophy? Would it not be important to see what stimuli children bring into a philosophical discussion and what children understand as their philosophy even if they do not use the word 'philosophy'?

Another gap identified is that the use of stimuli should not be considered only as children's, but also as the adults' way of philosophical life (Goering, 2008). The use of stimuli should mutually involve adults and children in generating more ideas out of a stimulus and evaluating them afterwards. The differences in the approaches do not de-

126 Brewster (1997) claims that children who can make their own picture-books can master two systems: the linguistic and the visual, which can increase their self confidence. Enabling children to create their own stimuli can have also a philosophical application that is to their benefit.

value the stimuli; on the contrary, they show the great potential stimuli have for being differently interpreted and open-ended.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, stimuli for doing philosophy with children were critically evaluated. For methodological reasons, the stimuli were divided into those that were deliberately created for doing philosophy with children, such as novels, short stories and the accompanying manuals, and those that were not intentionally created for this reason, but have been used for doing philosophy with children. These include picture-books, objects, works of art and children's everyday experience.

It was argued that the different kinds of stimuli appeal to different types of facilitators according to their philosophical beliefs and frameworks (realists, relativists and critical pluralists) and to their attitude towards what is new (e.g. confident in dealing with something unknown, or having a preference in support through substantive guidelines). It was claimed that there must be forces of attraction or repulsion working between the stimulus and the people engaging with it, which so far has not been fully explored as yet in this thesis.

Other gaps were also identified, for instance the lack of a theory about what is a stimulus for philosophy with children and the absence of exploring love towards a stimulus and towards philosophising with children. Such subjects and questions like 'Are the stimuli necessary for doing philosophy?', 'How are stimuli connected with children's philosophical way of life?', 'Is there any link between adults' and children's appreciation of the stimuli?' These questions will be further explored in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 4

Theory of stimuli

Abstract

This chapter aims at identifying what a stimulus is. It is argued that a good stimulus for doing philosophy is linked with the concepts of 'catalepsy' (grasping) and 'Eros' (love). Particularly, the stimulus shares the same characteristics with 'Eros': It creates in people a sense of lacking (aporia) which drives them to discover what the stimulus 'hides'. It is claimed that 'Eros' is what frees the stimulus to reveal its generative and evaluative aspects and become a way of life, which involves the children, teacher and stimuli in a pedagogic triangle. It is also argued why there is need to use a stimulus when doing philosophy and what the stages are.

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was suggested that a stimulus could be almost anything[127]. It can be material specially designed for doing philosophy with children such as Lipman's novels to a single piece of a puzzle used in a PwC session with the year six pupils at Gallions Primary School[128]. The stimulus is usually perceived as whatever is used at the beginning of a PwC session (Lipman, 2003; Haynes, 2008). The same idea is reflected in Gregory (2007a) who recognises the "offering of the text" [129] as the first stage of an inquiry and in Staricoff (2007) who calls them 'starters'[130]. Wilks (1995) understands it as a normal practice for children to engage in and generate questions from the sharing

127 Pestalozzi (1978) claims that almost anything within children's reach can be an object of a lesson by which knowledge might become useful for them. Similarly Comenius, the 17th century educationalist argues in favour of pampaedia which is a kind of universal learning for everybody, about all things and in all ways (pantes, panta, pantos) (Mulvaney,1993a).

128 GALLIONS PRIMARY SCHOOL. 2007. Thinking Allowed. Philosophy for Children at Gallions Primary School.(Year 6 inquiry). DVD. London: Gallions Primary School

129 Gregory mainly refers to written texts, like Lipman's novels from which an episode is shared amongst children. Lipman has written novels for different age groups (Elfie K-2 stage pupils, Harry Stotlemeier's discovery for 5-6 Grade pupils, Tony for 6 Grade pupils, Lisa,Suki and Mark for 7-10 Grade pupils). Each novel is separated into chapters and each chapters into episodes. The length of an episode varies but usually is under 4 pages. Children, often, read one sentence each until they finish the reading of an episode, then they have time to reflect on the text and come up with questions that puzzle them (Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan,1980). See more about it in chapter 3 of this thesis.

130 Staricoff identifies more the role of a starter as specially (and occasionally playfully) designed for triggering emotions and permitting creative and inspiring thinking and philosophising to children

of the stimulus. None of them, however, explains what a stimulus is, what is its nature, its purpose when doing philosophy. Is the stimulus necessary for doing philosophy? Is it just a 'starting point'? These questions will be answered in this chapter which is the beginning of forming a theory according to which stimuli are aligned with the evaluative and generative aspects of philosophy and in the long term can assist in establishing philosophy as a way of life.

4.2. A non-behaviouristic understanding of the stimulus

One clarification that needs to be made is that the interpretation of the word 'stimulus' throughout this thesis differs from behaviouristic accounts of stimulus-response[131]. Even though the stimulus is used in order to create a kind of response in the children, for instance generating questions, this is not done reflexively and automatically. The person is already in a sense active towards the stimuli (Dewey, 1896; Dewey, 1930). This means that children's conscious reflection on the 'stimulus' and the discussion it generates with others is a necessary condition for the stimulus to create responses: thus what behaviourism rejects as a process. While behaviourism is conceived as a dualistic model (stimulus-response), stimulus in this thesis is not 'clearly cut off' from the person who perceives it. Knowledge is neither located in the stimulus (objectivism) nor in individuals' minds (subjectivism) but in the transaction of those two and in the balance acquired, which is temporary (Biesta and Burbules, 2003). A stimulus is relational – it can be located in the space 'between'. A stimulus may be physically present prior to discussion but it is acknowledged as a "real" stimulus only when individuals draw their attention to it and open it up. This will be explained further later.

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131 Behaviourism operates on a stimulus-response' principle ' and claims that behaviour is shaped due to external stimuli and there is no need to take into consideration consciousness or internal cognitive processes. This theory is also known as a stimulus-response theory (S-R). It was first introduced by Ivan Pavlov who conducted experiments with dogs so as to study how their behaviour changes if connected with certain stimuli. Pavlov showed with his experiments that dogs can learn and demonstrate certain behaviours that are activated when certain stimuli influence them. Behaviourism was further developed by J. Watson, B.F. Skinner (operant conditioning), E.L. Thorndike (connectionism) Bandura (social perspective) and Tolman (moving towards conditioning).

Contrary to behaviourism that is interested only in people's observed behaviours and not the processes (mental life) that lead to them, in this thesis what matters is children's thinking and emotional processes when they engage with a stimulus. The stimulus used in doing philosophy with children does not lead to a certain response which is the same for everyone: On the contrary, children are encouraged to see different aspects of the stimulus and come up with creative ideas or questions that really matter to them. Also, the stimulus, as perceived by behaviouristic theories, remains the same, whilst in this thesis the stimulus is each time differently appreciated. The interpretation of the stimulus does not remain the same; it 'opens up' because of people's cognitive, emotional, imaginative interpretations, and because of the connections people make with their own personal experiences.

4.3. The Nature of the stimulus

If the stimulus does not bear resemblances with the behaviouristic pattern of stimulus - response then what is it? Susan Gardner (2004, p.2) claims that the word stimulus is another type of jargon used to express 'value'. She perceives a stimulus as a value that determines all animate behaviour and that a change in animate behaviour can only occur as a result of a change in perceived value. This is a less behaviouristic approach and reflects Vygotksy's ideas of the internalization of a stimulus, or in other words, how the environment affects the way people think (Vygotsky, 1986). I agree with this and will explain that a stimulus and children's engagement with it is one way that can help them achieve a better understanding of their self, others and the world.

If the word 'stimulus' sounds so behaviouristic, why do I use this term? As Dewey claims, the transaction between a person and the environment is an active, adaptive process through which the person accomplishes temporarily a balance with their ever changing environment (Biesta and Burbules, 2003). It is not the stimulus that reveals itself, but it is through the interaction a person has with the stimulus that makes it 'open' up differently each time. Biesta and Burbules (2003, p.33) elaborates that John Dewey

instead of using the dipole 'stimulus and response' distinguishes between: a) a situation that the connection between the person and the stimulus has already been established and b) a situation where such a connection is not yet there. However, this explanation does not solve the problem of the dualism between 'stimulus and response'; it only changes the name of a 'situation that the establishment is there' and a 'situation that the establishment it is not'. It seems that the word stimulus should not be replaced, as it highlights the starting point of a dynamic 'movement' both from the stimulus to the person and from the person to the stimulus.

In order to understand what a stimulus is we need to locate it in a children's life and investigate its form. Dewey writes:

> Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of, tension. There is in nature, even below the level of life, something more than mere flux and change. Form is arrived at whenever a stable even though moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock and sustain one another (2005, p.13)

In Dewey's passage, the tension comes through people's engagement with a stimulus. In the flux and change of everyday life, it is possible that something will stand out and will catch people's interests. This 'standing out' is a way to locate a stimulus as something that makes human life 'an experience' (Dewey, 2005). The stimulus can be an object, an experience, an idea or something else. For this to happen, a pair of forces is needed to be adjusted to the potential stimulus. Dewey (2005, p.15) calls these forces 'rhythms' as they appear to ebb and flow or "systole and diastole". It seems to me that the term rhythm is very much aligned with harmony, which is not the case with stimuli. Stimuli break the harmony so as to make people create a new one. Therefore, 'forces' is a more suitable term to use, as they are more dynamic than rhythms and have the potential to either grow or decrease.

The stimulus is what breaks living in a state of "blissful totality" where everything is in harmony (Nussbaum, 2001, p.185). Martha Nussbaum (2001) refers to Hesiod's 'Golden Age' where people live in a state of blissful totality because everything is

provided for them; therefore they do not need to think more. The stimulus is what tempers this blissful harmony and puts people in a state of imbalance that makes them think, reflect further and take decisions, so as to reach another state of equilibrium and restore totality and omnipotence (as found in the Golden Age) (Nussbaum, 2001).

The form of the stimulus is recognised by people who are interested in it. It is understood as a synthesis of attributes that people give to a stimulus in a way that shapes it harmoniously (Dewey, 2005). Even though the stimulus breaks the harmony, it should have a kind of harmony on its own. This is understood as a physical or cognitive shape that is recognised as a stimulus. This does not mean that the stimulus should be necessarily pleasant to the senses (even though it often helps as people prefer working with something that brings pleasure to them). The harmony of the stimulus refers to people's abilities to perceive it as a distinct stimulus coming from their own experiences and having the potential to alter it. In this way, the stimulus obtains its own reality (Dewey, 2005), which becomes meaningful by people's engagement with it.

As mentioned before, reflecting on Dewey's ideas, people are active but their action is located into stimuli making them kind of 'active'. Action is generated by forces[132]. There should be a kind of 'force' that makes people want to either investigate a stimulus further or not at all. In chapter three, two types of forces that may occur between a person and the stimuli were mentioned: attraction or repellence. The existence of forces

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132 By action I assume motion. Objects can either be stationary or in motion, and this means any object in the entire universe. When an object is in motion, it is either moving at a constant speed (velocity) or its speed is changing (acceleration or deceleration (the term deceleration is used often for slowing down, but actually in proper Physics acceleration means changing of speed (velocity) either faster or slower)). Newton's 1st and 2nd of his 3 laws of motion, are helpful here. In the 1st Law he states that an object moves at a constant velocity unless a force acts on it (it also means if an object is stationary, it does not move until a force is applied). In his 2nd law he states what affects or defines the force. So, a force is always needed to be applied to change an objects' motion, whether it is stationary or moving ("Newton's laws of motion" A Dictionary of Physics. Ed. John Daintith. Oxford University Press, 2009. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. University of Wales, Newport accessed on 14 October 2010 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t83.e2055>).In terms of Quantum Mechanics and relativity, really I think these other branch of Physics do not, in this case, change the answers significantly. For Quantum Mechanics there would be an uncertainty when determining the positions of the object and in relativity, the mass of the object and so the force required to change an objects motion would increase dramatically once its velocity exceeds about 75% the speed of light.

of attraction or repulsion and their intensity is what makes people either to connect with a stimulus or not.

To sum up, a stimulus makes sense through its relationship with the participants who engage with it. On the one hand, the participants' contributions make something stand out as a stimulus and further "open up", simultaneously and on the other hand, the qualities of the stimulus- its physical or mental form again as it is understood or can be understood by the participants- attract the participants' attention. A pair of forces between the participants and the stimulus is necessary to establish any engagement with a stimulus. For example, a stimulus can be an object. Its physical characteristics may attract the attention of the participants who project on it their thinking and previous experiences, maintaining it as a stimulus that can further open. Similarly, a stimulus can be somebody's thoughts or questions which may lack a physical form; however it has a mental one. The further engagement of the participants with a particular thought or question enables its further exploration and opening. In both cases, a pair of forces between the stimulus and the participants has been established that leads to the further exploration of the stimulus and through it the exploration of one's self. When this pair of forces becomes loose, then the stimulus stops being a stimulus and the participants are no longer interested in it, at least temporarily.

4.4. Ways of engaging with a stimulus

The Venn diagrams can explain the possible connections that could be established among the stimulus, the facilitator and the pupils when forces of attraction bring them together and create an engagement. These three 'elements' comprise to make a "pedagogical triangle" as introduced by Jean Houssaye (2000). Figure 4.1 depicts the potential relationships that emerge and these are analysed below. The circles of the Venn diagram should be understood not as static, but as moving dynamic circles that either move towards or away from each other, depending on the forces (attraction or repulsion) that are created among them. The bigger the intersection, the more the engagement with the stimulus is.



Figure 4.1: The different ways of engaging with a stimulus

Part 1: shows aspects of the stimulus that is explored neither by the facilitator nor by the children. This is the part of the stimulus that is still hidden and secret. Neither the pupils nor the facilitator have accessed this bit of the stimulus yet. This idea presupposes that there are qualities of the stimulus incorporated in it which have not been explored yet. However, they act in a hidden way as potentialities that wait to be discovered. This unexplored part of the stimulus can create a cataleptic power over the people that engage with it as it will be explained later on in this chapter. The unexplored aspect of the stimulus does not reflect necessarily qualities that the stimulus has itself: it may as well reflect the participants' expectations that there is more to discover about the stimulus and themselves if they insist on exploring further the particular stimulus.

Part 2: describes the engagement that some children have with the stimulus but not the facilitator. What would be desirable here is that both the other children and the facilitator

listen to how some children have interpreted some aspects of the stimulus. Listening to others' interpretation of a stimulus can help the rest put themselves in another's position through imagination or seeing the same stimulus from a different perspective.

Part 3: describes the engagement that the facilitator has with the stimulus but not the children. The facilitator should help children discover what s/he has discovered through questioning and dialogue rather than revealing aspects of the stimulus according to the facilitator's interpretation, which may be different from the ones children have.

Part 4: describes the children that have not entered the inquiry and have not engaged with the stimulus yet. The facilitator should find a way to bring children into discussion without, however, forcing them either to participate or to engage with the stimulus.

Part 5: describes the inquiry among some of the children and the facilitator which, however, is not related to the stimulus used. This is probable within a P4C/PwC inquiry. Children may start a philosophical discussion that is not linked with the stimulus. The lack of 'confrontation' with what the text says is not a sign of ignorance towards the stimulus; it is just a transfer of the focus to something else that again is generated by the stimulus. As for the listing of opinions, it is a necessary stage to inform us on what is available before judging or linking them together.

This does not make the discussion less philosophical; it may be philosophical but on a different subject. In that case the stimulus has played another very important role; it has become the bridge to move from one subject to another or the ladder that one can either ascend so as to achieve a higher order thinking or descend so as to gain a deeper understanding on the subject under discussion.

Part 6: shows the part of the facilitator that is not in the inquiry. This can make sense in a mature[133] community where the facilitator can become mostly an external observer of children's discussion. The pupils engage with the stimulus without the need of a facilitator. The 'fading' role of the facilitator is an indication that children can deal with a stimulus without direct engagement from him /her. It could also mean indifference from

133 A mature community of inquiry refers to children that can self regulate when philosophising without the need for constant intervention and triggering by the teacher. In a mature community of inquiry children respect and listen to the others and are able to think well both independently and collaboratively (Splitter and Sharp, 1995).

the part of the facilitator to engage with either the children or the stimulus, or it could be an expression of a relativistic epistemology in the facilitator (see Chapter 2.2.2). This attitude could work with mature and independent children that can regulate a dialogue amongst themselves. It would, however, lead to non-activity in the case of a group of children that are not very familiar with doing philosophy.

Part 7: describes the activity (dialogue) among children and the facilitator based on aspects of the stimulus used. When the intersection becomes broader it means that: a) more children engage with the stimulus, b) more aspects of the stimulus are discussed, c) the discussion based on the stimulus has expanded. The facilitator should try to keep her/himself active as far as asking questions that would help children's discussions to take off philosophically.

4.5. The cataleptic power of a stimulus

The first impression of a stimulus, which refers both to the stimulus and the way it is presented by the facilitator or the children determines whether the forces between will be of attraction or repulsion or neutral (no forces). For instance, in a workshop I had delivered in Ghent with other P4C practitioners, I used Maurice Sendak's picture-book 'Outside over there'[134], the illustration of which was repulsive[135] for many participants (e.g. the pictures showing two faceless goblins kidnapping a baby). However, the forces developed between this stimulus and the participants were of attraction as the participants wanted to investigate it further, reflect more and listen to each others' ideas. If this first impression creates a sense of 'grasping' the attention or the interest of the audience, then this stimulus is potentially good for doing philosophy with children. Good here means that the philosophical dialogue that might emerge will be connected with

134 Outside over there is the third book in Sendak's trilogy that begins with the most popular of his picture-books Where the wild things are and continues with In the night kitchen. The main character of Outside over there is Ida, a young girl who manages to save her sister when she realises that she is kidnapped by the goblins. Lanes (1980) gives more information about Sendak's works and their illustration.

135 A stimulus may be very repulsive for some people, but for others it may seem to be very interesting and worth investigating further. In other words, a person may feel a strong aversion towards a stimulus, but at the same time a force that attracts the person to investigate the stimulus further.

children's interests about the stimulus. Therefore children's reflective thinking and listening to others' ideas about the stimulus may lead to a better understanding of it, and of themselves, in connection with the stimulus.

To explain more the idea of 'grasping' I would like to connect it with the idea of grasping truth or 'cataleptic fantasy' as found in the Stoics (Hegel, 2006). As Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (2006, p.268) mentions the criterion of true knowledge, for the Stoics, is the representation in thought: the 'cataleptic fantasy'. Cicero, as referred to in Cocking (1991, pp.22-23) writes that 'Zeno introduced the notion of 'grasping truth': a truth or cognitive perception[136], fantasy cataleptic (φαντασία καταληπτική), which is like a 'grasp' of what is really there to be perceived[137].

Engaging with a stimulus entails a process of perceiving what is 'really there' and representing it in thought. What is 'really there' means what is in the stimulus that generates thoughts to a beholder often connected with the beholder's experience. A stimulus that captures one's interest shows that there is a true connection between the stimulus and the person; the person finds in the stimulus something that helps understand more of his/herself. This is established intuitively (cataleptically). However, the retaining of this connection relies on the applying of meaning to this connection. Andrej Kalas (2001) with his article 'Cataleptic phantasy in Stoic philosophy', shows that the way from a cataleptic phantasy to cognitive content is not a straightforward one and that it is the logical meaning that makes it possible. This logical meaning comes after the person has been 'grasped' cataleptically. I would add here also the important role of

136 This may seem to be not in line with a Vygotskyan theory of how knowledge is constructed. I mentioned before that the stimulus opens when the person brings experience to it. However, in order for a person to open a stimulus there must be a phase of catalepsy where the person: a) is 'numbed' by the stimulus, b) recognises even intuitively the stimulus connection with the person's own experience and its potentiality to expand both the person's experience and the stimulus 'opening' by their connection. This phase is not Vygotskyan but can lead to a Vygotksyan style of constructing knowledge.

137 Zeno, wrote Cicero, held out his open hand with fingers outstretched, and said that "a presentation [phantasia] is like that. Then he contracted his fingers and said 'assent is like that'. Then he closed his hand entirely, to stand for apprehension or cognition, to which he gave a new name- katalepsis. Finally he brought up his left hand, clasped his first with it, and said that knowledge was like this grasp." (Cocking,1991, p. 22-23).

emotions as forms of judgements[139] that should not be left out. I suspect that 'cataleptic phantasy' has been perceived mostly emotionally and that's why logic is needed afterwards to make meaning possible.

Catalepsy is an 'immediate' perception of a situation just before emotions and thoughts are about to be generated[140]. It is a kind of stingray, using Socrates' metaphor (Plato, *Meno,* 80a-b). It is the sense of 'numbing' that the stimulus creates in both children and the teachers who feel that there is something more to be investigated (Murris, 2008a). *Catalepsy* is located between ignorance and knowledge (Meinwald, 2005). The Stoics say there are three things that are linked together: scientific knowledge, opinion and cognition[141] stationed between them (Meinwald, 2005). The same also happens with a stimulus which creates a sense of grasping; it comes at the linking point between one's ignorance or limited understanding of the stimulus and one's desire to learn more and achieve knowledge, even if this knowledge is temporary and likely to be modified.

Adopting a more Pragmatic approach, *catalepsy* is the moment just before individuals engage with a stimulus. Individuals in *catalepsy* stay passive and overwhelmed by the stimulus. The meeting point of the community of inquiry with the stimulus will show whether the forces that will develop will be of repulsion or of attraction. It also depends of course on how a stimulus is presented. A vivid, l inguistically clear, expressive,

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139 Solomon (2004, p.80) claims that emotions are judgements; emotions "are thoughts, or dispositions to have thoughts, or defined by thoughts". On the other hand, DeSousa (2004, p.62) argues that this is too cognitive a way to view emotions and suggests that emotions are "better construed on the model of perception than on the model of knowledge or judgement". It seems to me that the language provides two different words to describe emotions and thoughts and as a result their similarities in origin or action are lost. Both thoughts and emotions are ways of engagement with something, therefore, types of forces. Emotions and thoughts are always about something (e.g. a stimulus) not in a dualistic way, but as a way of grappling with the world in a Deweyan sense (Solomon, 2004). This idea ties in well with Nussbaum's claim that the "emotions are not simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs - often very complex- about the object. It is not always easy, or even desirable, to distinguish between the an instance of seeing x as y [...] from the belief that x is y." (Nussbaum,2004, p.188).

140 Lipman (1993) acknowledges that the material used for doing philosophy with children should contain intellectual shock and surprise. These elements that Lipman describes are the basic ingredients of catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, is something more than the initial shock and surprise; it is the moment that the person decides consciously to engage further with the stimulus or not. See LIPMAN, M. 1993. Philosophy for children, Thinking children and Education, (ed. M. Lipman). Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt Publishing company

141 Cognition here is the translation for katalepsis.

coherent storytelling that establishes a narrative and encourages students' engagement increases the chances[143] of a stimulus to be appealing for further philosophical investigation (Daniel, 2007).

The ideas presented above benefit from a concrete example taken from a picture of Sendak's *Outside over there*.

Figure 4.2: Image from Sendak's *Outside over there*

The picture where Ida plays her horn without noticing her sister's kidnapping by the faceless goblins and her replacement with an ice changeling can numb everyone in the classroom. Children's first reactions are usually a gasp (open their eyes wide and hold their breath). This is a moment of *catalepsy*. The possible reactions are either lack of interest or engagement.

143 Sayers (2010) in her qualitative research that explores how children build literary understanding confirms that performative responses such as gestures, intonation, mime, dramatization enable children achieve a better understanding of the story presented to it and keep interested and focus in it.

A sign of engagement is the raising of questions of puzzlement such as: "Why did Ida turn her back to the baby while playing the horn?" "Did she not hear the goblins entering the house?" "Why does the picture of the father appears in half the frame?" etc. (Nikolidaki's log, 2009a). Then the interpretations begin such as the 'changeling' made of ice could represent Ida's jealousy towards the baby, or the distance between her and the baby, or her secret wishes to somehow get rid of the duty of looking after her little sister or her fear that something is going wrong. It could also represent the author's feelings at the thought of a baby being kidnapped (Nikolidaki's log, 2009a).

4.6. 'Eros' and the stimulus

The word '*Eros*' is of Greek origin[144] and it refers to the passionate love and desire for another (Santas, 1988). The way *Eros* is connected to *Catalepsy* is similar to the way 'love' is connected to 'love at first sight'. *Catalepsy* is a Pre-*Eros* stage; it is the 'first sight' response that a stimulus creates in people, which, if appealing, can lead to the pursuit of love (*Eros*). *Eros* is a strong force of attraction between the person and the stimulus that forces the person to investigate the stimulus further. This erotic force is the motivation[145] one has to do something and consists of the thoughts and emotions that

144 Eros is translated in English as passionate love but it is more complicated than that. In the Platonic dialogue Symposium there are three different verbs which if mixed can describe Eros: a) erao=to love, b) epithumeo= to desire and c) boulomai= to wish. According to Greek Mythology and as referred in Plato's Symposium Eros was the son of Poros (who is the personification of 'plenty') and Penia (the goddess of 'poverty' or 'deficiency') who seduced Poros when he was drunk and became pregnant. This is why one that is grasped by Eros always desires for more (plenty) but has the feeling of less (poverty). Diotima argues that Eros is neither good nor bad, Eros lies between (metaksi μεταξύ) any two opposites (e.g. poverty and richness, wisdom and ignorance). He is not a god neither a mortal, he is something in between mortal and immortal (Nyrgen,1982, p.175), a daemon (daimonion) and can either move towards god and its completion – reaching beauty (even if never reached by Eros) or towards its deconstruction (Symposium,202e). This idea influenced many later philosophers such as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Freud. There is also another alternative according to which Eros is the son of Aphrodite (goddess of beauty) and Ares (god of war) which also explains the nature of Eros for desiring greedily (like war) what is beautiful.

145 Motivation is a force that makes people do things; it is the 'Eros'. Thoughts and emotions appear to motivate people (DeSousa,2004). One may argue that people may be motivated but not in love with the subject they are motivated towards, for instance, one may be motivated to finish a task even if the person does not like the task. In this case, the motivation (Eros) is still there but it is transferred to something else, e.g. to be motivated so as to experience the feeling of relief upon the completion of the task).

the person develops towards a stimulus. *Catalepsy* is the very moment before the erotic force between the person and the stimulus is developed. It is the numbing feeling coming from the stingray while *Eros* is the itch that comes afterwards. This internal 'itch' that a stimulus can provoke in people is like an interior 'gadfly' that is noisily flying inside and biting people holding them in a state of alertness. *Eros* becomes the force that makes a person's desire to know more about a stimulus[146].

In the Symposium, Plato underlines the two different aspects of *Eros*: the sexual passion and the desire for wholeness and completeness that characterizes the philosophical life[147]. This last cognitive sense of *Eros* is of philosophical interest and implies dissatisfaction with partial truth (Dwyer, 2006). Philosophy, even etymologically, is a kind of intellectual *Eros* since it is the love of wisdom, which also includes the pursuing of knowledge. Philosophy is an "erotic activity consisting more in the quest, the desire for knowledge, than in the completion or achievement of wisdom" (Smith.S, 2009, p.40). A stimulus used in philosophy with children has the potential to inspire the stimulated person to wonder and to think philosophically. As Santas (1988, p.31) explains "the [erotic] object is that from which the attraction emanates or which the lover finds attractive; the aim is that towards which the instinct of *Eros* strives". What Santas does here is describing a pair of forces of attraction that develop between the person and the desired object. It is a pair because the person sets a force upon the stimulus (the person generates thoughts and/or emotions towards the stimulus) and the stimulus sets a force upon the person (the stimulus has something that the person seeks to find). This idea is connected with Ronald DeSousa's argument (2004, p.63) that "emotions

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146 In Greek love can be translated as affection (storgi), charity (agape), passionate love (Eros) and friendship (philia). The love towards a stimulus can have only the identity of Eros. Both affection, charity and friendship are types of love that make sense when referred to living creatures and are either unconditionally given or mutually-reciprocally sought. Furthermore, affection, charity and friendship are 'calm' forms of true, genuine and profound love which would not make sense if established among people and a stimulus for doing philosophy. Eros, on the other hand, can be associated with an object and inspire the person with the desire to learn from the stimulus and through it, learn more about the person's self. Nyrgen (1982) offers a detailed distinction between the concepts of Eros and Agape.

147 Socrates, in Plato's Symposium (199c3-201c9) claims that love cannot both possess and want something at the same time. What Socrates means is that in his youth he was taught "the philosophy of love" by Diotima of Mantinea who was a kind of priestess. Diotima gives more emphasis to the spiritual aspect of love that directs the human soul towards the love of the Divinity as the source of beauty (Symposium,206a-207a).

face both in and out: they reflect facts about the subject but refer also to something outside, to which they typically are responses". These forces are generated amongst people and the stimuli are either thoughts or emotions[148].

Similarly, the stimulus used for doing philosophy with children, even if it is not characterized as erotic, for fear of misunderstanding, is the one that attracts and makes the person be interested in it. It is important for a person to be grasped by a stimulus because through this connection a more important aim is to be achieved: that of wholeness[149], completeness and contemplation of what is beautiful and true, even if temporarily (Cooper, 2001). This sense of completeness could be translated as a need for seeking meaning or *eudemonia*, which as referred to in chapter one is a person's highest goal.

The need for a stimulus to be attractive whether it is a physical object or an experience (e.g. a book with interesting illustrations or a work of art) is usually the first step that stimulates one's senses and is likely to grasp his/her attention[150]. Attractive does not mean necessarily beautiful, but something that can evoke individual's senses and/or critical and emotional thinking (Lorch, 1992). It can be claimed that this criterion is a form of censoring. Censoring[151], however, is always there from the point of view that whenever there is a choice among two or more alternatives, the chosen one acts as a kind of censoring for the others, at least temporarily. This is far truer for children, who according to research need concrete stimuli to draw their attention[152]. Concrete does

148 Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that from the stimuli's point of view the forces that set upon the people could be characterised as emotions or thoughts.

149 "The philosopher's dominating passion is the desire for truth, for knowledge of the eternal order, or the eternal cause or causes of the whole" (Strauss,2001)

150 Nehamas writes: "we love people on account of their features, the psychological, mental and moral qualities that may attract us to them are always apparent in their face and bearing, literally in how they look to us" (2007, p.7-8). Similarly, what makes a person attracted by a stimulus and generate ideas can linked with the stimulus' physical characteristics without which the person possibly would not have come up with new ideas.

151 Haynes and Murris (2008) analyse in depth the idea of censoring attitudes towards stimuli (particularly picture-books).

152 There is a lot of debate whether concrete objects can help children learn abstract concepts. Many great pedagogues such as Comenius (Magna Didactica), Froebel, Pestalozzi, Montessori,Gagne and many others mostly influenced by Locke's empiricism agree that the use of concrete material helps children move to abstract learning. Through the combination of concrete objects and

not mean necessarily objects; it can refer also to experiences as long as they have a clear form (shape) that children can recognise as a stimulus. Dewey gives a helpful example of a poet who claimed that the effect of poetry on him was more for the body rather than his intellect. He referred to the bristling of the skin, the shivers in the spine and the feeling at the pit of the stomach (Dewey, 2005, p.224).

However, the '*Eros*' based only on the physical appearance of an object is not enough. The 'good' stimulus is the one in which a person will identify an aspect of his/herself. This is linked with Rousseau's extension of the meaning of *Eros* so as to include "the desire to extend our being"[153]. The engagement with the stimulus not only reveals aspects of the stimulus to people, but also enhances self-understanding.

This intellectual, emotional and aesthetic appreciation of *Eros* is what allows people to see everything as part of their nature or else to see part of their nature in the specific stimulus. As long as this connection is established, then *Eros* becomes a force of attraction that moves stimulated people from the level of duality to a level of unity, wholeness and completeness and this brings *eudemonia*[154]. *Eros* is ascending love[155] from the point of view that it is active and wants to have more, so it always ascends towards where its fulfillment may be.

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the senses, individuals "penetrate deeper into the world of pleasure" (Lorch,1992, p.69). Musacchio (1992) goes further and categorises the senses into higher and more spiritual ones (sight and hearing) which can perceive objects at a distance and the lower and more material ones which demand more proximity for perceiving objects. However, he acknowledges that the lower senses such as touch are very important in understanding a stimulus more and gives the example that if for the animals touch breaks down then it cannot be or exist any more (Musacchio, 1992, p.95). Recent finding such as Kaminski et all agree that relevant concreteness may have some advantages over children's learning. http://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu/fpo644-Kaminski.pdf . Brown et al, however, based on a growing body of research around the effect of concrete materials in helping children understand abstract issues argue that the use of concrete materials can be either an aid or a hindrance in children's learning if they are the wrong types of materials, or structured in a way that the abstract learning could not follow from the concrete materials. See more at http://www.nd.edu/~nmcneil/BrownMcNeilGlenberg_PersonalCopy.pdf

153 Cooper (2004) provides more information about how Plato's 'Eros', Nietzsche's 'will to power' and Rousseau's 'extension of being' are connected together.

154 Gilson (1995) uses the Greek word "henosis" to describe the connection of two people in love and their completion to make the most out of this union.

155 "Eros is an ascending love, the human's route to God; agape is a descending love, God's route to humans" (Soble, 1989; Nurgen, 1982).

Eros, though, is searching for love, not true love. It is an appetitive desire which can become egocentric[156] or even "vulgar" (Nyrgen, 1982). While love is unconditionally giving, *Eros* is greedy, taking what it can and becoming what Nietzsche calls a "will to power"[157]. In the case of a stimulus, this could be understood as a will from the people to understand what the stimulus is about and take control over the meanings that were previously hidden and not accessible. The more one understands that a stimulus has not been fully accessed, the more desire or *Eros* one has to dominate it[158].

Eros, even if 'possessive' is necessary in exploring a stimulus. A good stimulus is the *Eros*' 'dart' or 'arrow' that creates 'love wounds' for both children and the teacher: a passion that is almost a necessity for them to explore it further, getting the most out of it, even if it causes them simultaneously pleasure and pain. It is pleasure because people can investigate the way of contemplating what is really beautiful and true for them, and it is pain because there is always a need for more, which is not necessarily provided. Alexander Nehamas explains this greediness in terms of possession. He writes:

> Socrates begins his account of *Eros* (200a ff.) is suspect. It calls to mind a wish to dominate, exploit and manipulate, a lack of respect and regard that reinforces commonplaces about the 'acquisitiveness' and 'egocentricity' of Greek ethical thought. The desire to possess, one might say more generally, belongs to the consumer, not the lover; it reveals not love but its absence [...] Possession, though, is not identical with ownership—or, if it is, it is ownership of a different kind: I may possess something as a detachable piece of property, losing which will have no effect on who I am, or as a genuine part of myself, which I can't lose without undergoing a serious change of my own. To possess something as love requires—a person or a work of art I want to treat not merely as a

156 156 Egocentricity is not used derogatorily or in any sense of expressing approval or disapproval. It simply describes the type of love to which Eros belongs (Nyrgen, 1982).

157 Nietzsche refers to the "desire for power" (Machtgelust) in his works The Wanderer and his Shadow (1880) and Daybreak (1881) but expanded it more in The Gay Science (1882) in a section titled "On the doctrine of the feeling of power" and in Beyond Good and Evil (1886).The will to power refers to one's main drive to seek the best possible position in life.

158 Someone may ask whether there are limits to the stimulus. The limits to the stimulus are determined by the people. If people cease interpreting a stimulus then the stimulus temporarily reaches its limits. It is temporary because nothing guarantees a future fresh look at the same stimulus that would open it again. Therefore, theoretically the stimulus has no limits. Practically the stimulus has the limits that are posed by the people who interpret it.

> means but also as an end in itself—I must want possession to be a mutual affair: I want it to be mine as much as I want to be its own as well (2007, p.7).

Nehamas understands greediness in terms of a mutual possession which makes sense among people. However, while being egocentric and greedy and of possible harm, with the stimulus things are different. The greedier one becomes with a stimulus and the more one gets from it, the better the stimulus is because it achieves its purpose of existing: to stimulate and be an 'erotic' object.

Engaging and being in *Eros* with a stimulus is like pregnancy[159]. There is something hidden (as will be explored below) that needs to be brought to life. This 'unborn child' creates pain because of the long time waiting for it and the difficulty in its 'delivery'. The same applies with the stimulus. The philosophical reasoning one has to apply so as to give birth to an idea is sometimes difficult and painful and at other times effortless. On the other hand, the result of a pregnancy is the product of *Eros*. The 'born child or idea' that came from the connection between a person and the stimulus enables them to understand not only the new child but also, through it, themselves and the way they reason. Socrates' midwifery method is the method of reasoning applied to a stimulus, so as to make sure that the ideas that come from the connection of people with the stimulus will be genuine, creative and stand to reason.

4.7. The sense of 'being hidden' and the sense of aporia

For Emmanuel Levinas, Plato in the *Phaedrus* understands *Eros* in two ways: a) as a person's desire towards the other and b) as a person's desire that the other will remain untouched by the person[160] (Webb, 2006). What Levinas suggests here seems

159 In Plato's Symposium the function of love (Eros) is to "give birth in the beautiful in relation both to body and to soul (τόκος εν καλό)".

160 Simone de Beauvoir illustrates this contradictory nature of Eros in her writings. She states: "he wants his mistress to be absolutely his yet a stranger; he wants her to conform exactly to his dream and to be different from anything he can imagine, a response to his expectation and a complete surprise" (Beavoir, 1997, p.674-675).

contradictory. On one hand, I desire the other and I want the other to be mine, but on the other hand, I want the other to remain untouched because if the other is totally revealed to me, then my desire (*Eros*) towards the other will cease. This is *Eros*'s contradictory nature. Being untouched is used metaphorically and indicates retaining a sense of 'being hidden', as it happens when the first time a person desires the other. Nussbaum explains the contradictory nature of *Eros* as follows:

> Erotic love [...] involves characteristic ways of viewing the beloved person, who is seen as radiant and wonderful, and also as necessary for the lover's happiness. Finally, the beloved person is also seen as independent- as uncontrolled and unpossessed, not simply a part of the lover, or submissive to his will (2001, p.470).

If in this passage the word 'person' is replaced by the word 'stimulus', then one can get a taste of the philosophical nature of a stimulus. This 'erotic' relationship, which at the same time requires the desire to discover and the 'desire to leave something untouched', applies to stimuli used for doing philosophy with children. A stimulus continues to be a stimulus as long as: a) it retains an aspect of itself that remains hidden (secret, not yet discovered therefore desirable which leads to *Eros* towards the stimulus) and b) it encourages a person to be curious and have a desire to know what this hidden aspect is.

The hidden aspect of the stimulus is essential so as to keep the perceivers' *Eros* towards the stimulus alive. If a stimulus becomes totally explored by a perceiver then the stimulus ceases being a stimulus. A poignant analogy is the following: "A stimulus fully discovered is like a philosopher whose 'subjective certainty' of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution" (Strauss, 2001, p.196). In both cases neither the stimulus is a stimulus not the philosopher, a philosopher.

The sense that there is something secret is what can make '*Eros*' towards the stimulus more intense and therefore encourages further exploration. The sense of 'hidden' is similar to the sense of lacking something that may be important to us. The hidden element is a kind of '*aporia*'[162], of not having something which we want to have[163], or not being able to move through a process due to difficulty in access. This is the ingredient that keeps '*Eros*' alive. The more a stimulus is explored, the more understanding a person gains for both themselves and the stimulus. The more a person investigates, the more hidden areas - possibly not previously considered - may be discovered. The accomplishment of understanding brings to the person content emotions of completeness, but if this continues then the person may possibly lose interest for the stimulus.

What connects a person with a stimulus is a sense of 'lacking' (*Penia*) and a desire that through it, the person will gain more (*Poros*). Therefore, behind the lacking, there are needs to be covered. These needs could be various. It could be the need for enjoying and appreciating something that is given through the stimulus, or the need for learning something that is considered as important. What all the needs have in common is people's desire to feel complete and whole through satisfying them, and therefore achieving *eudemonia*. The reason why a person is connected with a stimulus lies on the possible common alignment between the secret aspect of the stimulus and the unconscious or hidden aspects of a person's personality[164].

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162 Aporia (απορία) is a Greek word and etymologically comes from a = not + poros= go through/ having wealth). It has double meaning: a) it means perplexity and the inability to pass through and, b) it means lacking resources. Poros in ancient Greek mythology was the god of abundance and wealth. A+ poros= Aporos (άπορος), the one who does not have resources, the poor.

163 Ryle (1993) claims that "thinking cannot be given" and there is need for that when there is a gap in one's education. However, only when the gap is perceived as a lack that needs to be filled does the gap reflect a true lack. The engagement with the stimulus is what highlights the gap (e.g. in knowledge) and opens the way to seeking for ways to fill this gap (Ryle,1993).

164 Plato in Phaedo, argues about the immortality of the soul but in Republic he gives a more elaborated and unified model of the soul (psyche). The tripartite model of the soul divided into three parts: the rational element (λογιστικόν), the appetitive element (επιθυμητικόν) and the spiritoual (θυμοειδές). Plato uses the metaphor of the charioteer and the horses to describe the person who takes control over the 'horses' (the three parts of Soul). See Plato (2000) and Plato (1998). When a person is attracted by a stimulus and feels 'Eros' towards it, its because a part of the person's soul, the appetitive, is aligned to certain characteristics of the desired object.

The good stimulus retains secret aspects or makes people believe that there are secret aspects yet unexplored. Therefore, people are triggered to look for these aspects of the stimulus, resulting in the following paradox: the more one investigates a stimulus, the more one learns about it but at the same time the more hidden aspects of the stimulus that at first sight were not even conceived as possible are revealed. This is much aligned with Dewey's idea that stimuli and the environment they are found in are not detached. However, this cannot be easily shown in a Venn diagram unless one would use a perforated circle showing the interaction of the stimulus with its environment and its potential to grow bigger.

A stimulus that is very difficult to explore may be left aside. When a stimulus is ignored it is because someone could not find a connection with it, either because the stimulus is too easy, or too difficult to comprehend, or perhaps because it leaves someone indifferent. It is a temporary death (*Thanatos*[165]) of the stimulus, a 'dive' to non-being[167] because of repellent forces. *Eros* is generated between a person and the stimulus when, as DeSousa describes, "the cognitive or visual representation and the emotional "signature" [are confirmed]. If the signature fails, the visual presentation is deemed fraudulent" (DeSousa, 2004, p.68). It can also be argued that when someone cannot fully understand a stimulus, they may emotionally suffer because it is this force that makes the person either pursue further meaning or abandon any further effort. In the latter case the person may hate a stimulus only because s/he cannot fully possess it (Nussbaum, 2001).

Sigmund Freud (1923) refers to *Eros* in terms of libido which is a 'drive': the desire to create life[168]. The often oppressive sexual drive and people's resistance to act upon

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165 The word 'Thanatos' is of Greek origin and means death. It has not been used in Freud's work; it was introduced later by Paul Federn, Freud's secreter. I keep the Greek word 'Thanatos' as it makes more meaning when contrasting it with the Greek word 'Eros'. In the present thesis Eros/Thanatos work together as opposites

167 There is a correspondence between what philosopher Martin Heidegger understands as an opposition of being and non-being and what the psychiatrist Sigmund Freud understands as the tension between Eros and Thanatos or love versus the death instinct (Olds,2007, p32-34).

168 Freud (1905) claims that the sexual drive is present even in children. Freud has argued that the way children's sexual and aggressive desires are treated by their parents determines the further development of their personality. He describes the stages

their impulses, led Freud to introduce the concept of 'sublimation', which is the direction of the inner 'drive' from the sexual activity to other activities (including philosophising), so as to gain pleasure and fulfillment (Freud, 1925a; 1926b). This kind of 'cognitive libido' is a desire to produce and construct. The oppression of the sexual drive and the failure of its sublimation to a constructive activity can lead to the 'death drive' (or *'Thanatos'*) which is the opposite of *Eros* and leads the person to return to a state of calmness. Going back to figure 4.1, parts 4 and 6 are types of '*Thanatos*' of the stimulus for the pupils or the facilitator, which, however, can be temporary.

The use of stimuli when philosophising is found between the two contradictory forces of attraction and repulsion: *Eros* and *Thanatos*[169] and its up to how people connect with the stimulus as to the direction that will be followed. When people engage with the stimuli, there is a sense of puzzlement and wonder, a desire to generate questions and further elaborate on them and the direction that is followed is towards *Eros* and philosophising which is a constructive activity[170]. When stimuli do not create *catalepsy* and *Eros* then they move towards their death (*Thanatos*) at least temporarily as in future this may change. The discussion about a stimulus and the sharing of ideas is a way of not letting the stimulus die.

4.8. The generative and evaluative aspect of the stimulus

A person's *Eros* towards the stimulus has an evaluative aspect: to discover and understand the stimulus and through it others and themselves. It also has a generative

through which children's sexual development occur: a) the oral where children's pleasure comes from sucking or putting things in their mouth, b) the anal where the focus is transferred over the child's success or failure to control going to the toilet, c) the phallic where the focus is transferred on the stimulation of the genital organs , d) latency which refers to a period that children seem to have no sexual interests and e) the genital stage which is the beginning of the sexual activity. Repression or maltreatment of any of these stages may lead to developing complexes and confusion of children's personality when becoming adults (Freud,1905;1925).

169 It is interesting to see how Eros and Thanatos apply in literature and particularly in Shakespeare's works of art such as Romeo and Juliet (Panagopoulos, 2007) and Hamlet (Olds, 2007).

170 See more about the combination of Freud's ideas with Karl Marx's in Marcuse (1956).

aspect, which refers to the stimulus as the beginning of creating something new (an idea or philosophical discussion) or reinvention of the stimulus. Both the evaluative and generative aspects often merge together and it is not always easy to identify whether the stimulus is discovered or reinvented.

The 'opening' of the stimulus[171] as a result of human's engagement with it is a form of generation, which could have the character either of a discovery or an invention. It is a discovery from the point of view that aspects of the stimulus that were so far hidden or neglected come to light. It is an invention from the point of view that the stimulus becomes stimulus for something new to be created, which is not necessarily linked with the initial stimulus. Both discovery and invention of the stimuli are acts of creation: the generation of something new, the allowing of 'not being' to becoming 'being'. Even words such as "building" and "constructing" are often attributed to the creative aspect of the stimuli; both allocate a process and its finished product (Dewey, 2005, p.53). Creation (*ποίησις*) requires from people who engage with stimuli to think creatively so as they can both 'open[172]'. Thinking creatively means thinking originally, independently, holistically, expressively and imaginatively (Lipman, 2003; 1995, p.66). What comes before this is the establishment of a desire *(Eros)* for the person to embrace a stimulus.

The stimulus provides the person with the 'raw material' for thinking. It is there to be explored either as a whole, or by focusing on separate parts of the stimulus and possibly linking them together afterwards. It is there to be discovered through the senses and through the actions the stimulus generates. Stimuli generate thoughts, questions and wonderment. The stimulus opens as people reflect and examine it from different points of view, either independently or through inquiry, in collaboration with

171 When talking about emotions, Nussbaum makes a relevant point in the context of the 'opening of the stimuli. She argues that what distinguishes antithetic emotions such as love and hate from each other is not so much "the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way the object is perceived" (2004, p.188). Similarly, with the opening of the stimulus, it is not the stimulus as a form of an object or lived experience that changes; what makes the stimulus 'open' is the way it is perceived, or in different words, the experience one brings to it.

172 'Open' has a double meaning: The stimulus 'opens' which means that it reveals its characteristics to people. People also 'open' their thinking to new ideas and become more sensitive towards the stimuli they engage with

each other. The stimulus reveals a whole imaginary world which is linked with the imaginative capacity each person has.

Eros is also aligned with the evaluative aspect of philosophy. By engaging with the stimulus, people learn much about the stimulus, but also about themselves and the way they think and apply meaning to their life. People can reflect on a stimulus and at the same time recognise the tools they use to reason or/and their emotions that are involved when they reason. After people listen to other people's interpretation of a stimulus, which is an imaginative process, they have to evaluate the thinking generated by the stimulus. This evaluation requires the ability of a person to think critically about the ideas generated in terms of their soundness and applicability, and also empathetically (caringly) which refers to whether the ideas produced are offensive to some people.

4.9. Stimulus as a way of life: Stimulus, children and teacher. The erotic pedagogic triangle

People interact with the world and encounter stimuli. Thinking is generated when a person engages with a stimulus. This thinking is not necessarily philosophical but it gradually 'opens'. In a situation that the person is grabbed by the stimulus, it is difficult to distinguish between the stimulus and the person. It seems as if the person moves, through the engagement with the stimulus, from a state of duality to a state of unity with it. Stimuli become a way of life when people are able to: a) recognise the stimuli in the world b) align them with their thoughts and c) learn more not only about the stimuli but also about themselves. Therefore, the sensitivity towards stimuli aims at finding meaning in them but also in ourselves through them. The engagement with a stimulus can happen individually, but requires individuals who are sensitive to the stimuli around them and who are willing to find ways so as to align their thoughts and experiences with them. The role of a facilitator who is already sensitive to the stimuli would help children establish the sensitivity required to engage with stimuli that matter for them and

contemplate. The engagement with the stimulus by both the teacher and the pupil can generate new, collective thinking.

4.10. Why should we use a stimulus when doing philosophy with children?

I will pose a Euthyphro-like question[173]: Do we use a stimulus when doing philosophy because it is necessary or is it necessary because we use it? So far there is an extended reference to the nature of a stimulus, but there is no answer as yet to the questions whether a stimulus is necessary for philosophising, and whether philosophy, children and *Eros* are compatible with each other.

Plato refers to pedagogic *Eros* which is a cognitive loving attraction between a teacher and the pupil (Burch, 2000). The pupil admires the teacher's beauty of mind and the teacher sees the potential of a beautiful young body to acquire a beautiful mind too through the teacher's contributions. They both share the desire (*Eros*) for beauty and through their attraction they both achieve completion and contemplation of perfect beauty (*eudemonia* of mind and body). What activates both teacher's and pupil's attraction[174] is a stimulus that will bring both the final aim of *eudemonia*.

Dewey (1913) argues that when children's interests become educational aids, children learn what they are interested in quickly and efficiently. Children's interests are another way to refer to children's '*Eros*' towards certain activities or objects. The stimuli that emerge from children can have educational value as they are both pleasant and effective: pleasant because children are happy doing the activity that involves the certain stimulus and effective because children gain benefit from the specific activity

173 Euthyphro is one of the early Platonic dialogues that takes place among Socrates and Euthyphro and try to identify what is piety. The Euthyphro dilemma is the question that Socrates poses to Euthyphro: "Is the pious (το 'όσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by gods?" (Euthyphro, 10a).

174 To avoid any misunderstanding and misconception whenever I refer to attraction between teacher and pupils I exclude the sexual one. I refer to cognitive and emotional attraction.

(e.g. through philosophising children acquire skill in thinking critically, creatively and caringly). Teachers only need to recognise the stimuli that come from children (or the philosophical comments that children make) and enable the further elaboration on them (Matthews, 1993).

The underlying assumption in using stimuli here is that activating children's thinking is desirable especially if this is increased and quickened (Murray, 1961). The sooner children are able to think well, the better. This is a two fold assumption: a) the child that can think quickly and well feels capable of thinking and therefore s/he possibly can adapt smoother and sooner into the society where s/he grows up[175], b) the society needs children to think well as soon as possible. Gregory (2002a) argues that philosophy and children are good for each other because on the one hand children can get experience of collective inquiry, pursue meanings for them and self-correct, and on the other hand, philosophy gains more practitioners who are often more prone to philosophical wonder than adults, and gains meaning through investigating children's points of view and expands[176]. The common ground for this meeting of minds is the presence of a stimulus.

Using a stimulus is a way of avoiding boredom (Guilford, 1959). Boredom is a 'disease' where people perform less and less, because there is no call upon them to think constructively, take decisions or generally find meaning in what they do (Guildford, 1959). This is also applicable to education. The lack of finding meaning in educational material and processes can lead to boredom or to a cognitive and emotional "*Thanatos*". The use of stimuli, in general, but also for doing philosophy, is what can create in children a desire (*Eros*) to learn more towards what matters for them and find beauty in it.

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175 See chapter 2.

176 Gregory's linking of philosophy with children reassures the immortality of philosophy as it familiarises children with philosophy's past and through children's philosophising, philosophy reassures its existence in future.

One of the aims of doing philosophy with children is making sense for ourselves and for the world we live in (Lipman et al, 1980). Stimuli can help children be motivated and search for meaning in two ways; a) by appreciating and analysing further the stimuli that come from children and are expressed in the form of questions or puzzling statements and b) by providing stimuli that are aligned and make links with their interests and experiences (Golding, 2004). The stimuli, as they do not lack content, can provide children with concepts or even hints of concepts that could be discussed philosophically and could serve the aim of making meaning. They can also help children in their search of an end *(telos)*, which is a greater meaning of acknowledging what children are and what they could become[177] (Kennedy, 2004).

Stimuli and the community of inquiry are inseparable and they create together an open system that is characterised by a dynamic, fluid process that is non-sequential, relatively unpredictable and irreversible (Kennedy, 2004). As 'lovers' will discuss matters relevant to their shared interests, the same happens with a community of philosophical inquiry when sharing a stimulus. The stimulus works as the 'loving object' which draws the attention of the 'lovers' who are not to fight over the object but to discover it further through the different perspectives from which they view the stimulus[178]. The stimulus is what brings both teacher and children in a unity as they learn from each other. They contemplate the beauty of other people's ideas generated from the stimulus, make sense of themselves and others and finally achieve a sense of being complete, even if only temporarily.

Finally, the stimulus can be used by the teacher as a trigger (Kennedy, 2004 Splitter, 2003; 2006a) to achieve the goal of motivating children and seeking meaning and also to offer an education that is enjoyable (since children learn better when they enjoy the process) and reflective (we assume that the stimuli are the bases to reflect on them and also for teachers to observe which of the stimuli work and why).

177 See chapter 2.

178 See Golding's epistemic positions as displayed in chapter 2.

4.11. Conclusion

In this chapter I characterised stimuli as non-behaviouristic, and showed how they can be connected with the concepts of '*catalepsy*' and '*Eros*'. *Catalepsy* is the state of 'grasping' people's interest towards a stimulus. If this 'grasping' is firm then the *catalepsy* gives in turn to '*Eros*' (love). *Eros* can be identified as a desire that leads a person to learn more about the stimulus and through it learn more about themselves. It is a constant demanding for more, as it is the product of *Penia* (poverty) and *Poros* (plenty/ richness) and has as a final aim a person's *eudemonia*. A good stimulus is one that keeps aspects of itself 'hidden' and creates a sense of puzzlement (aporia). That way *Eros* is kept alive and forces the person to constantly seek for meaning. It is possible, however, that a stimulus does not trigger a person's interest, which can be considered as a temporary '*Thanatos*' of the stimulus.

Eros is aligned with both the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy. By engaging with the stimulus, people learn not only a lot about the stimulus, but also about themselves and the way they think and apply meaning to their lives. People can reflect on a stimulus and recognise the tools they use to reason and make sense of both the stimulus and themselves. Stimulus becomes a way of life from the point of view that people become sensitive in recognising them in the world, aligning them with their thoughts and exploring them (and at the same time themselves). The 'pedagogic triangle' that involves the engagement of children and teacher with stimuli is an application of recognising stimuli and learning through them in our everyday life and as such find meaning. The chapter ends with the finding that a stimulus is not only a starting point, but something that develops and changes throughout a philosophical inquiry .

There is a need to investigate what the specific criteria are that make a stimulus suitable for doing philosophy with children. The analysis of the concrete characteristics of some stimuli such as their text, their image and their combination will be the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Criteria for selecting stimuli (the case of picture-books)

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to explore the criteria that make a stimulus suitable for doing philosophy with children, if selected by the facilitator. In order to identify these criteria one should focus on the concrete characteristics of the stimulus such as text and images. The analysis focuses on picture-books as they combine images and text. The findings of this investigation can be applied to other types of stimuli that refer either to texts, or images or both. These criteria will be further analysed and connected with the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy, along with the concept of philosophy as a way of life in the following chapters.

5.1. Introduction: What are the criteria that make a stimulus good for doing philosophy with children?

In the previous chapter it was claimed that a phase of '*catalepsy*' and '*Eros*' towards a stimulus is necessary for the stimulus to be further opened and discovered philosophically. It was also mentioned that what makes a stimulus philosophical is not only in the stimulus, but in the space 'opened' between the stimulus and the people involved. Forces of attraction develop among the stimulus and the people involved and have a bidirectional character: people approach the stimulus, but also the stimulus with its certain characteristics attracts people. Therefore, there must be some characteristics which are not universal for all stimuli, but 'stimulate' individuals.

Lipman (2003) and Sharp and Reed (1992; 1996a) claim that the stimuli used for P4C should give the 'know what' (the concepts to think about) and 'know how' (the ways of philosophising). The stories should be philosophical in nature, depicting the complexities of moral actions and people's communications in everyday life (Sharp, 1995), along with creating a sense of philosophical whimsy (Matthews, 1980; 1984). Particularly the stimuli should give: a) the concepts (topics) that will be the content of the philosophical inquiry and b) various ways of thinking (process: reasoning and

inquiring skills) through the characters in the story (Fisher, 2000; 2003). Splitter and Sharp (1995), as mentioned in chapter two, also agree that the concepts should be *common*, *central* and *contestable*. These criteria can be met in purposely written stories and in children's literature as well. However, if children do not engage with the stimulus, they will not pay attention to it, therefore it will not work. Before the children move to the concepts there must be something else in a stimulus that 'grasps' them cataleptically[179].

Cam, reflecting on Lipman's ideas, highlights philosophical themes, dialogical format and the openness to inquiry as the basic criteria for selecting a story. In opposition to Lipman, he is not dismissive in selecting stimuli with pictures as he believes they inspire philosophical dialogue (Cam, 1995). It seems that Cam is aware of how images make a stimulus more engaging. This becomes clearer when picture-books are introduced as a stimulus for doing philosophy for children: an approached pioneered by Karin Murris (1992). Haynes and Murris (2000a) give examples of picture-books that have rich images and texts[180]. Images and texts create a 'duet' or, according to Sipe (1998), a 'synergy' and should be 'read' together in order to allow them to complement each other and create meaning. The pictures are not just artistic decorations, but they also raise opportunities for dialogue (Bosch, 1998b).

It is claimed that the stimulus should be of children's interest and of the right length in duration, as children's attention spans vary according to their age (Haynes, 2008; Daniel et al 1999). As for its form and content, a stimulus that has the following characteristics has more chance of appealing to children's intellect, imagination and emotions (Stanley, 2004; Murris, 2001; Murris and Haynes, 2000a, pp. 8-9):.

- visual - with rich images,
- thought provoking,
- not presenting just a single theme or moral,
- complex,
- highly ambiguous,

179 See chapter 4.

180 See chapter 3 for particular picture-books that have been used for doing philosophy with children.

- puzzling,
- not patronizing or moralizing

Particularly, picture-books have a great potential to be used philosophically because of the asymmetry they display: their text is usually ruled by the logic of time, whereas the images by the logic of spatiality (Kress, 2003; Serafini, 2010). This asymmetry provides picture-books with textual and inter-textual characteristics, such as the parody, the non-linear or non-sequential plots, the multiple narrators, the changing perspectives, the unresolved endings, words and images interacting together which are prone to further philosophical analysis (Pantaleo 2004; 2007; 2009b). What the writers referred to above do is to clarify in more detail how a stimulus is connected with children's senses or experiences, either factually or imaginary.

However, such criteria are still too abstract. What is puzzling in an image? What is ambiguous? My argument is that a stimulus can be used philosophically if it can first create a sense of '*Eros*'. The goal of exploring a stimulus further is the achievement of *eudemonia*, even if only temporarily. *Eudemonia* is the state of contemplation, pleasure and happiness about a person's life and has two aspects: one refers to what is important for individuals' goals and ends and the other refers to the values that the stimulus posses and without it, individuals' lives are incomplete[181] (Nussbaum, 2001, p.47).

These intrinsic values are like 'qualia' of a stimulus that distinguish it from others as far as its philosophical use is concerned. The reason why there are no unanimous criteria in selecting stimuli for philosophical use is that there are differences in what is evaluated as *eudemonia* for different people (Nussbaum, 2001). These differences refer to the intensity of a stimulus (e.g. its potential to go beyond the threshold of what is considered as a stimulus for each individual), its quality and the way it is linked with a person's cognitive or aesthetic aims.

181 This sense of incompleteness can be translated as not achieving in keeping the daemons happy, therefore not achieving eudemonia.

The physical features of the stimulus or the conceptual that are attributed to it create the *catalepsy* that grasps children's interests. The connection between the children and the stimulus is established when the stimulus 'forces upon' the children's whole being (senses and mind). This is mainly achieved through the *narrative form* of a stimulus which is again applied to it by the participants. The reasons why narration is a criterion for selecting a stimulus are:

1) Narration has the same structure as the emotions. According to Nussbaum, "emotions have narrative structure. The understanding of any single emotion is incomplete unless its narrative history is grasped and studied for the light it shed on the present response" (2001, p.236). The same happens with a stimulus when doing philosophy with children. If a stimulus already has or creates a sense of narration, then children's thoughts and emotions can be aligned to it[182]. This narration could happen with stimuli that are textual, imagery or are connected with events and ideas from individuals' experiences. What images generate are aesthetic responses accompanied by a sense of pleasure and happiness (Laverty, 2002) and therefore a sense of *eudemonia*. Images can achieve this 'cataleptically'. A stimulus that pleases children and can be connected to their experience, either factually or imaginary[183] has the right ingredients for philosophy with children.

2) Narration is a source of freedom which is the power to imagine; it provides a 'potential space' in which to explore life's possibilities (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 238, p.515). Freedom in narration is expressed at least in three different ways:

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182 Busselle and Bilandzic (2009) offer ways of measuring narrative engagement of people when watching a TV program, which, however, could apply to stimuli used for doing philosophy with children. They focus on four different dimensions: a) the narrative understanding which refers to the viewers' comprehension of the situations of the story in a way that is meaningful to them, b) the viewers' emotional engagement (e.g. showing sympathy for the characters of the program), c) the attention focus on the program, and d) the narrative presence which refers to the transition from the actual world to the story world.

183 I understand as factual experience children's everyday life but their imaginary experience may be even more important to them and often merges with their factual experience. An example of imaginary experience is when children use (or not) tools of everyday life, but altered by their imagination so as to serve other reasons. Children's imaginary play allows them to e.g. use a stick as a horse. When children are evolved in their imaginary play they experience themselves as heroes, princesses and warriors and not only as if they are heroes, princesses, warriors or anything else their imagination create (Piaget,1962).

- The freedom of the author (or creator) to give birth to a stimulus. This stimulus could be, for instance, a particular narrative plot with characters whose lives have their own causality, often unexpected twists and turns, in other words, their own *peripeteia* (adventure which includes sudden reversal in circumstances), as Aristotle explains in *Poetics* (Murris, 2009).
- Narration opens the space to the imaginative interpretation of a stimulus by the beholders and its connection to their life with the final aim of their *eudemonia* (Egan, 1992). The stimulus is not necessarily created by someone but recognised as something that stands out in a person's experience. The stimulus, therefore, used for philosophical inquiry is the transitional object which can be manipulated by children (often without the help of the adults) and enable them to generate ideas and philosophical questions that matter for their lives.
- The freedom of the narrative product as an independent 'object' or 'lived experience' to be each time differently perceived and interpreted.

3) Narration is what can connect stimuli with children's experience. This links to Rorty's idea that we cannot know what the real world is but only descriptions of the world as narrated through our language (Rorty, 1989). The world does not intervene in our stories, but it is through this narration that we understand this world and connect it with our experience. This is what Rorty means when he claims that 'we live in story after story' (Calder, 2003, p.9). Narrative is a "coherent representation of a series of events" (Barwell, 2009, p. 49). Egan writes:

> The ability to follow stories stimulates and develops the narrative mode of the mind and its sense-making, meaning- making capacities. Many and varied stories can help to make more sophisticated our grasp on, and use of, metaphor, which is itself the connecting logic of narrative and a central component in the causality which holds stories together. The causality of stories involves both logical and emotional components together. That is, in stories the sequencing of events that are intelligible, that make sense, is not simply logical, through it has to be so in part, but it involves as well an affective pattern (1992, p.63).

The different ways of narration demonstrate the different thinking styles of the writers and offer the opportunity to children to link their ways of thinking with the writers' through the particular stimulus (Sprod, 1995). On a second level, what is achieved is the linking of children's experience with the narration that often is an imaginative way of portraying the different experiences and appreciations of them by the writers and with the others' through discussing the stimulus. This is a way of making sense of our life's experiences and understanding the world.[184] On a third level there is a possibility of children's self-correction, reconstructing identity of oneself and, therefore, transformation (Sharp, 1995) as the children internalise ideas that come from their engagement with a stimulus in narrative form.

To achieve this there must be some kind of 'deep structure' found not necessarily within the stimulus but in the way people engage philosophically with it. Bruner (1986), in answering the question what it is that makes a story a story, identifies the 'deep structure' which seems universal[185]. In the case of the stimulus the narrative form is the 'deep structure' which refers both to characteristics that the stimulus has and to the ability of people to interpret them in different ways (to make narratives). People's abilities to create narratives can be explained through Jungian ideas about collective consciousness and finding archetypes. McKee points lout that "[t]he archetypal story unearths a universal human experience, then wraps itself inside a unique, culture specific expression" (McKee, R. 1999, p.4).

In order to understand the narrative form of stimuli, I suggest to dig not only deeper, but also at a more concrete level, trying to shed light on the 'deep structure' of the narratives concerning both the characteristics of a stimulus and the way they are interpreted. There is a need to clarify that this chapter mostly focuses on concrete stimuli usually selected by the facilitators. A large category of essential stimuli is partly left out, that is, the stimuli that come from children's everyday experience and have

184 Ideas takes from Karen Murris' lectures on "What is a narrative" (8/1/2008).

185 The deep structure does not imply a kind of scientific understanding that is context free. On contrary, the understanding is always context sensitive, particular and concrete.

narrative form[186]. However, this category will be the main topic in chapter eight. Therefore, I narrow my investigation to a particular selection of picture-books. The reasons for selecting picture-books are mostly practical. Picture-books:

- combine text and images, thus whatever mentioned for text, images or their combination applies to other textual or non-textual stimuli (e.g. paintings, sculptures, videos, drama),
- are resources easy accessed by the facilitator or the children,
- link to children's everyday experiences as they are often part of children's lives in and out of school,
- have narrative form and encourage new narratives created by children.

To investigate more the narrative form of 'picture-books', I will focus on the concrete ingredients that comprise them, such as the text, the image and the paper used for the book (Doonan, 1993; Eubanks, 1999; Poole, 1996). Both text (the words, their syntactical connection between them and the use of metaphors) and images (colours, shades, shapes, lines, and textures) are potential carriers of meaning (Doonan, 1993). It is up to the beholders whether or not they will apply meaning to the stimuli. To make this easier, it is a requirement that there is some experience about the basic ingredients of art and composition, how pictorial symbols represent or refer to the real world and how abstract ideas are connected to concrete experiences (Doonan, 1993).

Below, the *concrete* characteristics of a stimulus that open the space to narration and to the connection of the stimulus with children's experiences will be investigated. Such concrete criteria are: the selection of words, of combinations between images and words, the colours which are used (hue, tone, saturation), the arrangement of shapes and figures, the use of perspectives and textures, the close study of the small or large scale patterning found in the pictures along with the art medium that the artist uses (Doonan, 1993). Illustration and text will be further analysed and their combination in

186 The voice intonation, the body action and the music have their own narrative (not necessarily translated into texts or images) which, however, will not be further explored in this chapter.

selected picture-books. Particularly, there will be a focus on how both illustration and text created to me as a researcher and to children who engaged with the particular stimuli narratives.

5.2. The illustration

There are many aspects worthy of analysis when seeing an image, such as the arrangement of colours, shades of light and dark, shapes, lines and small and large scale patterning (Doonan, 1993; Poole, 1996). For instance, with lines and textures, a painter can produce delicate or wavy lines that indicate different ideas of sharp lines. The use of faint pastel colours creates different responses than the matt ones. According to Doonan, pictures have two ways of referring to things: a) denotation and b) exemplification (1993). In the former, a picture represents an object, refers and denotes it. For instance, if individuals know how symbolically with lines a real object like a table is depicted, they can recognise it when they see it in a picture. The exemplification means that

> pictures show, by example, abstract notions, conditions, ideas that cannot be pointed to directly but may be recognised through qualities or properties which the pictures literally or metaphorically display. Meanings do not come attached, as they do to symbols that denote (Doonan, 1993, p.13).

This is a matter of using prior knowledge to give meaning to what is seen or else it refers to archetypical ways of exploring the 'deep structure' of the narration and reflecting anew on social norms under the safe environment that picture-books offer (O'Neil, 2010).

5.2.1. The (deliberate) use of colours

The quality of colours used in illustration, their different intensity, texture and nuances, their changes from page to page do not only create certain aesthetic responses but also

become stimuli themselves for asking further questions. Below, I will give some examples of how the colours and the way they are used in picture-books can provoke questions and lead to further reflective thinking.

When I used David McKee's *'Not now Bernard'* (1980) with a mixed age group[187] in an after school philosophy club in Newport, I asked the children to discuss their first impressions. They were fascinated by the colours. Here are some moments as notes from my research-log referring to the pictures displayed from the book[188].

> Children noticed that dad's face in pages 13-14 of the book changed from white to purple when the monster bit him. "The father's face turns to purple, maybe he becomes a monster" was Hilary's reaction. When I asked her why she thinks so she responded that "maybe the poison passed from the monster to the dad". I asked other children to state their opinions and these are some of the answers:
>
> "When you are angry you are like a monster" (Jake).
> "Maybe the monster is angry and makes the father angry too. That's why they have the same colour" (Louka).
>
> Later on Louka flipped through the pages and made another comment that he associated with the change of the colours. "Look the man on the TV is transforming into a monster" Louka said. When I asked him to elaborate more on that he said that his body is purple and round like the monster's. Then he added "Maybe the programmes Bernard sees on TV turn him into a monster" (Nikolidaki, 2010a).

187 The group consisted of 6 adults, two girls aged 6 year, a girl aged 11, and two boys aged 9 and 12.

188 For more examples of analysis of the colours in picture-books see appendix 7



Figure 5.1: Picture from McKee's, *Not now Bernard*



Figure 5.2: Picture from McKee's *Not now Bernard*



Figure 5.3: Details from *Not now Bernard*



Figure 5.4: Details from *Not now Bernard*

The fact that Louka noticed the purple colour on the man on TV and associated it with Bernard's monstrous behaviour shows both critical and creative thinking along with a great sense of observation of colour details. It also shows that the stimulus enabled

children to create narratives out of the images (for example, when Hilary explained how the purple colour passed from the monster to the dad). The association of colours (purple) with emotions (anger) that Jake made is a good example of thinking in metaphors. Hilary's imaginative thinking that a purple monster must have a purple poison that when released colours the victim, is another example of children's metaphorical thinking. The assumption of a certain colour representing a given emotion is more a convention than an observation. As Dewey points out "it stands in the way of acute sensitivity of response" (2005, p.159). What is important to notice here is that the 'purple' colour is an intrinsic quality of the stimulus so it is what the stimulus 'does' to the children. On the other hand, the interpretation of what this colour might mean is a process of 'undergoing' or what the children do to the stimulus (Dewey, 2005)

Let us move to another example. In the book, *'Once upon an ordinary school day'* (2004), Colin McNaughton and Satoshi Kitamura use black and white for the first seven pages to symbolize the dullness of the routines at home, in the neighbourhood and the school until a 'different' teacher arrives at school and things change. There is no need for much text; detailed images in black and white tell their own story about the child's dull everyday life (even in the child's dreams). Gradually the black and white images are replaced by colourful ones which depict the change in the child's mood due to the new teacher's influence. The following pictures depict aptly what is described above.



Figure 5.5: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura 'Once upon an ordinary school day'. The black and white monochrome dreams: The child is depicted curled up as if he is not free even during his sleep.



Figure 5.6: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura Once upon an ordinary school day

The first time the colour enters the book (after seven pages in black and white) is when the teacher with his 'strange equipment' enters the classroom. The main character is depicted in colours illustrating his connection with the new teacher (and the educational approach he represents).



Figure 5.7: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura *Once upon an ordinary school day*: The child writes his essays and enters into the colourful world of his imagination.



Figure 5.8: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura *Once upon an ordinary school day*: The classmates communicate their imaginative ideas. They are all colourful now!



Figure 5.9: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura *Once upon an ordinary school day*: The book ends with the dreams of the child that are colourful. The child is not curled up, but flies and so do the rest of the birds.

The colours add to the philosophical meaning of this story and create lots of questions such as: Why are the new, the different and the unknown colourful? Is the ordinary always boring? Is the world of imagination a world of vivid colours and a place where all the unordinary things could happen? Does the communication of ideas (when children share together their imaginary stories) and knowing people through their imagination make them more colourful to us? The last pages of the book depict the child dreaming and flying among a group of white birds all looking alike. Is this an indication that what is new, colourful and extraordinary in the beginning will become soon ordinary and possibly black and white in the future? What makes a person wonder is his/her attempt to create a new narrative out of an image.

The use of colours to make meaning is even more important in wordless[189] books. To

189 Wordless books offer a developmental sequence of pictures that tell a story (Jalongo,2002). However, the key question here is what differentiates the wordless books from a mere collection of pictures? What is in the pictures that make the people think that there is a logical development? It seems that the repetition of the same scenes and heroes with slight differences that can be reasoned gives a sense of continuity. However, the picture-books require people's involvement so as to acquire meaning. The different meanings for the same wordless book are due to the different perceptions of what is in the pictures and the different experiences that people bring to them. The wordless books are perfect stimuli for doing philosophy with children as they activate both their critical and creative thinking. Critical thinking because children need to find the logical sequence and how the pictures link together to tell a story, and creative thinking because they have to construct a verbal story that is not provided in advance. Empirical research confirms these claims. Research on children's attitudes and attributing meaning when they read wordless picture-books

give an example, Nikolai Popov's *'Why?'* (1996) shows the depressive effect of a war and its catastrophic elements. While in the beginning of the book the colours are in tones of green, as the story proceeds green is mixed with brown until the end of the story where the tones of black are very intense. The colours tell their own story (narrative) of a war. The black colours are indicative of death, sadness and loneliness that come after a war. Even before the mouse's appearance, which starts the war, the illustration appears to give a precursor of what may continue. The flowers look as if they have violently exploded and the black colour in tiny bits at the beginning indicates that something sad will follow.

Figure 5.10: Picture from Popov's *Why?*

shows that children follow a similar process as they do with print-based texts (e.g. reading from right to left and top to bottom) (Lindauer,1988). Children construct meaning using prior learning, focus attention to the inter- textual clues and the sequence of the pictures, consider multiple perspectives, develop their oral and written language skills, implement humour and playful behaviours as part of their reading process (Crawford and Hade,2000 ; Whalen, 1994). Wordless books are challenging both for children and adults; this is important for doing philosophy as both adults and children can enjoy wordless picture-books and be puzzled by them (McGee andTompkins,1983).

Figure 5.11: Picture from Popov's *Why?*

Figure 5.12: Picture from Popov's *Why?*

The brightness and clearness of colours can also be interpreted philosophically. In Shaun Tan's *'The red tree'* (2001). The images are executed in gouache, oil and water colour and in collage. They can create a moving, humorous, puzzling and uplifting mood in the reader.



Figure 5.13: Picture from Tan's *The red tree*



Figure 5.14: Picture from Tan's *The red tree*

There is an intense use of dark colours to indicate depression and alienation, red colour to create a tension and yellow colours to indicate all the wonderful things which the protagonist can only see behind a glass and being in a dark room with locked windows where there is no chance of approaching the world outside. Interpreting this picture philosophically, it could be argued that it depicts the Platonic distinction between the real and the ideal world.

Figure 5.15: Picture from Tan's *The red tree*



Figure 5.16: Picture from Tan's *The red tree*

Most of the colours are dirty and dull and only when the protagonist goes back home

and sees the bright side of life is the room depicted in a warm and clear red colour that spreads into the room. The tree that grows is red, bright and clear. Why do we associate the bright clean colours with positive thoughts? Lakoff and Johnson (2003) would argue this is one way of thinking metaphorically and attributing meaning, which is not attached initially to the colours, but influences people's understanding. It is also again an example of the Deweyan process of 'doing' and 'undergoing'. The curve of the lines and the intensity of the colours belong to the stimulus (the intrinsic material of it) but not their meaning; the stimulus cannot be separated by the way it is interpreted and experienced by the perceivers (Dewey, 2005, p.87, p.91, p.93). The creative and critical vision of the readers modifies the meaning of the picture-book.

5.2.2. The image details

Apart from the colours, other image details can tell their own story which can either enhance the story told by the text (in case the stimulus includes text as well) or be different from the story. To illustrate this point I will give two examples: one from Anthony Browne and one from Maurice Sendak.

Anthony Browne's picture-books are good examples of illustrations rich in strange details such as parts of animal's bodies - usually gorillas or things associated with animals that replace other details or are found in unexpected places) that provoke questions. For instance in *Zoo* (Browne, 1992), Browne tells the story of a family that visits a zoo. People 'turn' increasingly into animals and dad and the children behave like animals themselves. Some of the people have animal characteristics such as animals' feet, horns, beaks, animal print clothing and expressions which some readers do not notice immediately because people are so familiar with what they expect to see[190] (see figures 5.17- 5.18).

190 Our senses (and particularly vision) tend to recognise whole forms and figures rather than a collection of simple lines and curves. Uncompleted shapes or different details in an image that are not expected may be ignored. These are examples of Gestalt theory. See more at:



Figure 5.17: Picture from Browne's *Zoo*.

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PhlN945ORCYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Gestalt+theory&source=bl&ots=8d8B5qOgzG&sig=oDfDnomDunbQuJU8cqPO2kThc1w&hl=en&ei=87O1TM7hGZe8jAf-gs22Aw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false accessed on 10 December 2009.



Figure 5.18: Details from the picture above

Figure 5.19: Details from the picture above

When I used Zoo with a mixed aged group aged between 4 and 65 in Newport, children were better than adults in finding humans with the animal details in the image. Only when I encouraged them to pay attention, not only to the text but also to the images, did adults notice the animal details, which made them wonder whether animals are more dignified than humans, or whether humans are really animals since they have animal characteristics. Some of the younger children seemed puzzled whether animal features or animal prints in human clothes make them animals[191]. What, however, is important to mention is that many children paid attention to details of the illustrations and made some thought provoking comments. Below, I cite some of their statements.

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191 This is part of the dialogue whether people are animals or not.

Judy: Are we animals?

Facilitator: What do you think?

Judy: I think we are animals. Look the gorilla hides himself and the boy is in the cave and hides himself as well. (She refers to the page where the child has the strange dream of a child in an animal's cage.)

Facilitator: Does that similarity makes you think that they are both animals?

Judy: Yes.

Facilitator: What do the others think about that?

Paul: The gorilla hides himself. He is so lonely.

Christopher: Maybe he is scared if the people knock the glass.

Jean: He does not have anytime for himself but people have when they are in their houses.

Judy: I think we are animals. Look, children are fighting like animals…mmm the animals don't fight.

Karla: Yes we are animals. We came from the monkeys and we do things like the monkeys. We eat, climb, walk, mock (Nikolidaki, 2010b)



Figure 5.20: Picture from Browne's Zoo.

1) There is a snail at the top of an image that depicts the traffic jam before the family goes to the zoo (Zoo, p. 4).

Judy:	Why is there a snail? Why does it fly?
Louka:	Maybe it is a spy?
Barbara (a):	Or because there is too much traffic and even a snail goes faster?
Louka:	Yes, but why it is on the top of the page?
Hilary:	If it was at the bottom we wouldn't see it.
Louka:	We would. It could be next to this pink car that has a pig's tail!

2) There is an image of two giraffes in an enclosure. Their colour and pattern blend in with the wall (Zoo, p.9).



Figure 5.21: Picture from Browne's *Zoo.*



Figure 5.22: Detail from the picture above

Judy: The giraffe licks the black paint because she does not have any food or water!

Facilitator: Why do you think so?

Judy: Because there is no black colour, she has already licked it!

3) There is the image of a tiger in a cage (*Zoo, p.11*).

Louka: Can you see the little butterfly at the bottom of the page? She has the same colours with the tiger. But the butterfly is free to fly. The tiger is in a cage.

Barbara: Did you see that there is only a little square on the top of the image from which the tiger can see a bit of the sky?

Louka: And it is cloudy.

Paul: The sky looks as grey as the wall.

Louka: Look at the grass. Outside it has a vivid colour, but in the cage it is pale.



Figure 5.23: Picture from Browne's *Zoo*



Figure 5.24: Detail from the picture above

Figure 5.25: Detail from the picture above

What is fascinating is that the children were able to pick up details and create narratives focusing on their imagination and previous experiences[192]. Louka pointed out such a small detail (the butterfly at the bottom of the page) which was hardly noticeable as it had the same colours as the tiger. He also pointed out that the grass had more vivid colours outside than inside the cage. Even if he did not elaborate further on freedom, and maybe this is an omission from the part of the facilitator[193], the child understood even intuitively the difference that freedom makes to the animal's behaviour, and the environment in and out of the cage. These responses seem to align Styles and Arizpe's findings of their case study (2001) on reading Browne's Zoo to children aged 4-11. They found that children, even if not confident yet at reading print, demonstrate impressive capacities for analysing images[194].

The details gave the opportunity for children to apply imaginative thinking as it happened with Judy and the giraffe's licking of the black colour on the wall, or Louka who perceived a snail as a spy on top of the page[195]. Children were free to open the books during the discussion, get more ideas and show others how they shape their thinking based on an image. Children seeking meaning, offer opinions, flip the pages, laugh, play and create their narrations. They bring to the pictures meaning carried from their past experiences or their imagination and in this way, they add expressiveness and emotional excitement to the stimulus. Dewey quoting Barnes says that:

> a vast number of emotional attitudes, feelings [are] ready to be re-excited when the proper stimulus arrives, and more than anything else it is these forms, this residue of experience, which fuller and richer than in the mind of the ordinary man, constitute the artist's capital. What is called the magic of the artist resides in his ability to transfer these values from one field of

192 Empirical research also confirms that children's understanding and interpretations of the picture-books provide evidence of their experience and learning (Yu, 2009).

193 As a facilitator I could have asked questions in order to help them connect the concrete image with abstract ideas. For instance I could have asked "Why do you think the butterfly has more vivid colour than the tiger? Or "What makes the butterfly have more vivid colours than the tiger? Then I could see what answers children would have given. For instance, they could have said that butterflies are genetically made to have vivid colours so in this case we could have move to a discussion about what is determined and how free we are when things are already determined for us.

194 For more about children's ability to interpret Anthony Browne's books in multiple ways see Pantaleo (2004)

195 See previous page of this chapter.

> experience to another, to attach them to the objects of our common life, and by his imaginative insight make these objects of our common life and by his imaginative insight make these objects poignant and momentous (Dewey, 2005, p.123).

What Barnes claims happens twice in the case of the picture-book: First with the writer and the illustrator who put their ideas and images into words, and second with the perceivers who create their own meanings and link the stimulus with their experiences and lives. Some of the traits of the stimulus may express the writing skills or the illustrator's abilities (kinds of technique), but for the perceiver these skills as depicted in the stimulus acquire content if linked with the perceiver's experiences or imagination.

The unusual use of motives or symbols in illustration is routinely used by Maurice Sendak in his books and can raise many philosophical questions. Sendak's 'Outside over there'[196] is also full of metaphors, symbols and images, with multiple interpretations.

Focusing on the images, there are many symbols used which also creates a sense of wonder and consequently, new sets of questions that show puzzlement, ambiguity and uncertainty. Below, I display some of the symbols found in the book and the ideas they generated within me. They show potential philosophical paths that open up in the reader. Following the sequence of pictures in Sendak's book, the sunflowers face and grow into the side of the room when in reality the opposite should happen. They also tend to grow too quickly while Ida is playing the horn. Could the flower's growth be

196 The main character of 'Outside over there' is Ida, a young girl who manages to save her sister when she realises that she is kidnapped by the goblins. The story starts with Ida, her baby sister and her mother being in the arbour, while her father, a sailor, has gone to sea. Her mother seems to be very absent minded and Ida takes on the responsibility for looking after her baby sister. While she is playing the horn to rock the baby still (but without looking at her), the goblins come and kidnap her sister. Ida goes mad and decides to look for her lost sister 'outside over there'. Wearing her mother's coat, and holding her horn, she embarks on a journey. Finally she finds the goblins who have been transformed into babies, similar in appearance to that of her sister. Ida charms goblins by playing her horn till they churn into a dancing stream. Only one baby behaves as a normal one and that is Ida's sister. Having found her sister, Ida returns home where she finds her mother holding a letter from her father who counts on Ida to look after the little baby.

interpreted as a threat, as Ida's growing anger and despair or her maturity to take on more responsibilities and grow faster than her age? (Nikolidaki, 2009b).

Figure 5.26: Picture from Sendak's Outside over there

Figure 5.27: Picture from Sendak's Outside over there

In the same sequence of pictures, the scenes out of the window[197] change as the story unfolds from a meadow to a calm sea, then to a rough one with the ship sinking. Do these scenes represent Ida's changing moods? Do they hint at her father's possible death? Do they represent her father's potential frustration of Ida's inability to take care of her sister? Is the ship a metaphor of how to handle difficulties? Is there any correlation between the difficulties that her father faces as a sailor at sea and Ida's attempt to save her sister from the goblins? Does the change from storm to calm show the different emotional states Ida goes through? Could it be a deeper philosophical thought referring to the ups and downs of human lives? The 'changeling' made of ice could represent Ida's jealousy towards the baby or her fear that something is going wrong. It could also represent the author's feelings at the thought of a baby being kidnapped (Nikolidaki, 2009b). All these questions and many more are potential starting points for a narrative and further philosophical dialogue.

Sendak depicts Ida's feelings artistically by using certain lines to form anger in her glance and determination in her motions. Even the drawing of the room environment (e.g. the flowers) is in accordance to the feelings that Ida has when she realises her sister's kidnapping (Graham,1990). It may be this reason Ida's view from her room changes from a meadow to a sea and then to a terrible storm that sinks the ship[198]. The changes in the sizes of the image frames help the narrative as it matches with the changes of Ida's and the readers' emotions[199] (Poole, 1996). All these recordings are depicted with colours; textures and lines creating sentiments in the reader that are unusual[200]. The sensitive reader dives into the story and follows Ida's moods. The

197 Certain images in Sendak's work recur from book to book. The image of the windows represents the borderline between what is inside (safe place) and what is outside (unsafe and discomforting place) (Lanes,1980, p.248).

198 What does this ship represent? Ida's fears? Her father's expectations of her? Does the window represent a window to her inner world?

199 The change in the sizes of the frames of the images is seen in other books by Maurice Sendak's such as In the Night Kitchen (1970) and Where the Wild Things are? (1963).

200 Doonan underlines that Sendak "promotes a dreamlike quality by using multiple viewpoints so that we may float about with Ida when she goes journeying" (1993, p.17).

facilitator can encourage children to read the text, but also pay much attention to the images. S/he also should be open to follow the philosophical inquiry where it goes[201]

5.3. The text

The poetic language with the careful collection of words[202] can create an aesthetic response: a Deweyan experience not only for children, but adults too. Creating images in one's mind and generating ideas from words artistically joined together is what philosophy as a generative force requires. The use of metaphors, rhymes, playing with the sound of the words, the humorous use of language, the grammatical and syntactical structure of the sentences and the ambiguity (e.g. misinterpretations because of the use of homonyms) helps focus the children's and adults' attention on the stimulus.

Sendak uses poetic language in a way that may startle the readers. Why does Sendak use unusual words and a strange word order? For example, he writes: "'What a hubbub', said Ida sly, [to the goblins] and she charmed them with a captivating tune" (Sendak, 1981, p.26). The use of unusual words such as 'hubbub', the odd word order and the sophisticated selection of some words (e.g. captivating, charmed) may create a sense of bewilderment not only in children but also with adults. The poetic style of language can captivate the attention and even move to a more meta-cognitive analysis of why such style has been selected.

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201 The multiple use of the horn either to rock the baby still or to charm the goblins had been a stimulus for discussion when I had a P4C session with a year 6 class in a primary school in Cwmbran, South Wales. Some of the children were puzzled how and why the goblins were charmed when Ida started to play the tune with her horn. Some other children could not understand how Ida knew in advance that the horn would be of any use. I personally thought of the horn's connotation as a symbol of apocalypse or the similarity with Mozart's magic flute, as a parallel story which is also identifiable in Sendak's book. Children had an inquiry about music and its role in affecting people's behaviour (e.g. melancholic music, loud heavy metal music and being aggressive, music that calms you when you're stressed). I finished the inquiry with children listening to the different music pieces and drawing according to the mood that music created for them (Nikolidaki, 2009a).

202 Sendak started writing 'Outside over there' in February 1975, but finished early in June 1979. It is a three hundred and fifty nine word story, but it took Sendak almost a year and a half to write and more than one hundred drafts to complete. As Sendak himself said "I have a hostility towards books which are not well written...A true picture-book is a visual poem"(Lanes, 1980, p.229).

How is ambiguity portrayed by words? In Browne's *Zoo,* Dad says that the best bit of the visit was going home, whilst the mother's response is "I don't think the zoo really is for animals...I think it's for people" (Browne, 1992, p.22). This statement on its own can provoke further philosophical discussion by simply asking children's opinions about it and, according to children's interest move the discussion for instance towards human and animal rights. Mother's particular response is ambiguous and can relate to

> the notion of the purpose of the zoo as entertainment rather than conservation or (a reading more consistent with the imagery of *Zoo*) to the idea that people are metaphorically caged by speciesism" (Bradford, 1998, p.88).

Staying with the picture-book *Zoo*, a careful analysis of the vocabulary, the incomplete sentences and the repetitions can give rise to many issues that could be discussed philosophically. Father's humour seems out of place, however the child's response "Everybody laughed except mum and Harry and me" is humorous and shows the child's grasp of sarcasm. Irony and humour is depicted in other places, such as when the mother sees two monkeys fighting and at the same time her children fight. She does not tell them off, she just says "They remind me of someone [...] I can't think who."

When I used *Zoo* with a mixed group of adults and children[203] both groups spotted the family members' different attitudes towards the animals. They were based both on textual and illustrational evidence. Louka (aged 10) noticed the chocolate that is thrown on the ground as a sign or disrespect. Judy pointed out the brand name of the chocolate (Cadbury) and Barbara commented on the father's use of the word 'pussy' for the tiger[204]. Children seemed to get the message of the father's disrespect from the images, whereas adults stick to the language used[205].

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203 The group consisted of 6 adults, two girls aged 6 year, a girl aged 11, and two boys aged 9 and 12.

204 Louka: "There is chocolate on the floor. The family does not respect the zoo. They should not throw it" (regulative thinking) Judy: It's Cadbury's! (Nikolidaki, 2010b)

205 Bradford writes:"In Zoo, the narrator's discourse is relatively unembellished, having the vocabulary ("boring," "really smelly," "stuffing its face") and syntactic range ("we just wandered round," "just stood in a corner") of a voice limited as to expressiveness and betraying the boy's lack of an empathetic understanding of the plight of the animals" (1998, p. 87). I agree with Bradford



Figure 5.28: Picture from Browne's Zoo.



Figure 5.29: Detail from the picture above.

It is necessary for adults to engage with picture-books as they are usually the ones who pick and read the stories to children. Often they pick the ones that adults also enjoy reading. The stimuli that are most successful are the ones that are subjected to different interpretations and can be read in different levels so both adults and children can enjoy

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analysis and I just draw attention to Mum's silence or responses to what she sees (e.g. Her expression "Poor thing" indicate both a caring attitude towards the animals' non natural life that transfers them to...things displayed for people to see them.

(Trivizas, 2010). Adults can learn from children's fresh and imaginative approaches towards a stimulus and how to observe the images better and get information out of them (Nikolidaki, 2010b).

5.4. The role of the explicit and implicit questions in the text

Not all stimuli that provide ready made questions are equally ideal for doing philosophy. '*The Philosophers' club'* (Philips and Doner, 2001) is a book specially written for doing philosophy with children. It does not tell a particular story, but only contains questions that academic philosophers could recognise as philosophical. Questions such as "is change a kind of violence?" are thought provoking because they encourage children to think metaphorically on changes as violence. However, most of the questions seem to be a simplistic and artificial 'translation' of academic philosophical questions at a level that children would be able to understand. As for the illustration, it imitates the ancient Greek dress code, which appears more as a role play than an attempt to think philosophically.

Figure 5.30: Picture from Philip's *The philosophers' club.*



Figure 5.31: Picture from Philip's *The philosophers' club*.

There is no narrative, too many questions and possibly some of which are of no interest whatsoever to children. The questions, if directly imposed, should be the ones that children would possibly be curious to know about. On the other hand, in her book, 'Mummy never told me', Babette Cole (2003) asks a lot of taboo questions, which could give rise to many philosophical questions, as children may feel free to ask what really matters to them. A question like "why do some women prefer to fall in love with other women and some men with other men?" could lead to a philosophical discussion over individuality, self identity or people's sexual choices and preferences. However, such issues are usually categorised as inappropriate to discuss.

Figure 5.32: Picture from Cole's *Mummy never told me.*

Figure 5.33: Picture from Cole's *Mummy never told me.*

There are also stimuli that give questions which are more closed as far as their format is concerned, but could lead to a very open philosophical discussion. In contrast, John Burningham's *'Would you rather...'* asks questions in the form of a series of choices. For example:

> Would you rather...an elephant drank your bath water, an eagle stole your dinner, a pig tried on your clothes or a hippo slept in your bed?
>
> Would you rather be lost in the fog, in a desert, at sea, in a forest or in a crowd? (Burningham, 1978)



Figure 5.34: Picture from Burningham's *Would you rather...*

Figure 5.35: Picture from Burningham's *Would you rather...*

It is up to the community of inquiry as to how these questions will be used as P4C is also a *democratic* practice. The book could be read all at once or each question could be dealt with separately. A philosophical discussion could occur by analysing one particular question[206]. Each question is a stimulus within the stimulus[207] and encourages both children to think creatively as they have to think in hypothetical - imaginary situations. It also involves critical thinking as they have to evaluate their answers and then reject the alternatives. Children, being inspired by these questions can create their own hypothetical dilemmas or link them with actual dilemmas that children never had the opportunity to express before. In that case, a stimulus is further linked with children's experience which finally becomes the focus of further philosophising.

206 When I tried this book with a group of year 5 children, I presented to them only one question: where they would prefer to get lost. Children had to give reasons for their choice. Then they created small groups of people who had similar ideas and were encouraged to find arguments that support their idea and arguments that weakened the other's. Then children presented their ideas and they were free to move from their group to another one if the ideas of others convinced them to change their mind (Nikolidaki, 2009a).

207 When I say that each question is a stimulus within a stimulus I mean that each question can each time be interpreted differently. Therefore it is as if we have one stimulus but as it is unpacked it releases many other stimuli in form of questions.

Apart from the books that mainly consist of questions, there are also some that do not contain ready made questions specially designed for educational use. However, they easily generate questions from children or adults.

5.5. Combination of image and text

The particular combination of image and text of a stimulus can create an aesthetic response similar to what Dewey (2005) calls 'an experience'. Linking it with the idea of *Eros*, individuals' *Eros* towards a stimulus leads them to have 'an experience'. Image and text are incorporated into a unity, where they do not lose their identity; but on the contrary are enriched. When texts and images do not replicate each other but work complementary, the most creative works emerge (Graham, 1990). This is because the gaps of the text are filled by the illustration and vice versa and by the interpretation of the reader (Bainbridge and Pantaleo, 2001). There is not a necessary beginning with aesthetics or with logic that interprets the aesthetics (Bosch, 1998). The unity of an aesthetic experience is divided up into intellectual, emotional or practical qualities. These qualities are not only joined together but also merged, creating a new underlying quality, which is the aesthetic experience. This 'whole' aesthetic experience is temporary and dynamic since it keeps changing and opening up.

According to Sendak, a picture-book is a special mixture of text and pictures with each complementing the other. Pictures add to the text. Reading picture-books involves reading the text, contemplating the pictures and 'reading' between the lines (Murris, 2008b). In a picture-book both pictures and text are equally needed to convey the message of the story (Lanes, 1980). One can look at the pictures and read the texts irrespective of whether this feeling is the same the artist had when they created their piece of art (Warburton, 2003).

The crucial moment that Ida in *Outside over there* discovers her sister's kidnapping and its replacement by a melting changeling would not be so powerful if text and image

where not combined together to reinforce each other[208]. "The ice thing only dripped and stared and Ida mad knew goblins had been there" (Sendak, 1981, p.15). The words rhyme, the syntactic disorder (Ida mad) matches perfectly with Ida's disordered mind. The environment also 'goes mad'. The changeling is just a 'thing' while in the previous page Ida is holding it in the belief that it is her sister. Ida's change of perception nulls the baby's fear of 'being unnoticed' which the changeling could represent (Kushner, 2003, p.24).

Picture-books deal with two sign systems: the visual and the textual. The visual compels the reader to ponder; the textual pushes the reader to continue with the text. The combination of colours, textures and lines in the pictures as well as the words in the text create a significant form which is different from any other just form, under which the whole story unfolds (Doonan, 1993). The combination of the two different systems can generate even more questions than what each one could do separately. This is aligned with philosophy's generative aspect. The contribution of both image and text in making meaning and how well this is achieved, comes after children's reflection and critical dialogue with each other (philosophy's evaluative aspect).

5.6. Conclusion

A stimulus that is puzzling, ambiguous, thought provoking, subjected to multiple interpretations and able to make people raise questions is often appropriate for doing philosophy with children. However, the criteria listed above are not necessarily qualities that the stimulus has but in the 'gap filling' it provokes. There are two basic characteristics that make a stimulus appropriate for doing philosophy: a) it creates '*Eros*' in the people that engage with it and b) has a narrative form or can make people create narratives when engaging with it. To explain further the narrative form of the stimuli, it was argued that there must be some concrete characteristics in the stimuli that grasp people's attention and make them fall in '*Eros*' with the stimuli and attribute to them the

208 See figures 5.26 and 5.27

criteria above.

In this chapter some picture-books were analysed for their appropriateness for doing philosophy with children. The narrative form of the selected picture-books was further analysed with more concrete characteristics, such as the text, the imagery and their combinations. As for the text, the selection of the words, their combination, the possible rhymes, the use of metaphorical language, the allegories, the odd word order that is possibly not grammatically correct, the use of words (e.g. homonyms) can set the presuppositions for further philosophical discussion[209]. As for the images, the colours, the shapes, the textures and the details are the characteristics that will be interpreted by people as puzzling or thought provoking. The nuances of the colours, the differences in their brightness or textures create aesthetic responses that can capture children's interest and make them explore the stimuli further. The more details are depicted, especially if they do not necessarily match with the rest of the book's concept, the better for generating puzzlement and ambiguity. The combination of text and image requires the involvement of people who approach the stimulus: a) to recognise what messages both writer and illustrator try to convey and b) most importantly to re-construct the stimulus and combine afresh images and text so as to create new meanings.

When further analysis does not seem to make any sense, it is required the synthesis of the parts. This synthesis opens the space to interpretation of criteria such as humour, playfulness, ambiguity and the need for both adults and children to be trigged by a stimulus. This synthesis refers to the stimulus, the person and the in-between engagement. It will be explored in the following chapter under the understanding of philosophy as a generative force, an evaluative force and a way of life.

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209 The facilitator is also encouraged to pursue the 'illogical way' and insist in finding out what is the thinking behind children's mistakes. The 'silly' answers may be very logical and miss a kind of prior adult knowledge. Investigating how children come to a certain conclusion can be philosophically interesting as we learn more about the way we think (Fields,1995b).

CHAPTER 6

Stimuli and the generative aspect of philosophy

Abstract

This chapter explores how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a generative force. It is argued that people's engagement with a stimulus is what 'opens' the stimulus and generates new ideas for them (the generative aspect of philosophy). The 'opening' of the stimulus is possible if there is a strong attraction (Eros) from the person towards the stimulus, which will enable the person's reflection about the stimulus. It is also claimed that a stimulus opens easier and more effectively through discussion with others in a philosophical community of inquiry. This is a way of linking the stimuli with the pedagogy of c.o.i. Finally, it is suggested that the generative relation between the stimulus and philosophy lies in listening to one's self and to others through a process of zymotic (fermentative) listening.

6.1. Introduction

As implied in chapter four, I follow a more Deweyan direction according to which individuals already find themselves in the environment they live so they are not cut off from the stimuli, but involved in a constant dynamic process of doing something (to a potential stimulus) and undergoing (the influence they have from a stimulus) (Dewey, 1963). However, there are some experiences that are perceived as events with a beginning, middle and an end that are of more importance for individuals (Dewey, 2005). These experiences can become stimuli for further philosophical investigation. The same can happen with an object, often unnoticed in the environment, which becomes a stimulus. This process of something *becoming* a stimulus is the beginning of the 'opening' of the stimulus. In this chapter I will explain how people are engaging with a stimulus and how its 'opening' is linked with philosophy as a generative force.

The idea of philosophy as a generative force shares similarities with Whitehead's creativity which is also understood as a force. Whitehead in his book *Adventures of ideas* writes:

> The initial situation includes a factor of activity, which is the reason for the origin of that occasion of experience. This factor of activity is what I have called "Creativity" The initial situation with its creativity can be termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be termed the "actual world" relative to that occasion. It has a certain unity of its own, expressive of its capacity of providing the objects requisite for a new occasion, and also expressive of its conjoint activity whereby it is essentially the primary phase of a new occasion. It can thus be termed a "real potentiality". The "potentiality" refers to the passive capacity [...] This real potentiality [...] is active with its inherent creativity, but in its details it provides the passive objects which derive their activity from the creativity of the whole. The creativity is the actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is an occasion of experiencing. Thus viewed in abstraction objects are passive, but viewed in conjunction they carry the creativity which drives the world. The process of creation is the form of unity of the Universe (Whitehead, 1964, p.181)

The idea of passive potential for creation within an object is applicable to the stimulus. It is passive, because it requires human engagement, but it can transform into something new. It can expand. As for the process of actualization in Whitehead's passage, it can be parallel to the thinking process that allows the stimulus to expand and give birth to something new. However, Whitehead understands creativity as innate while it can be argued that *Eros* is the cause of creativity. Without being interested in something no generation or creativity comes from it. Creativity is itself erotic or as Nussbaum suggests "it is only through love, and bodily love at that, that human beings can find an exit from solipsism and loneliness to the reality of another life" (2001, p.692). How is this opening for oneself and the stimulus achieved?

6.2. What does opening of the stimulus mean?

The 'opening' of the stimulus is the generative process by which people create new ideas and thoughts from it. I can depict the 'opening' of the stimulus as follows:



Figure 6.1: The stages of the stimulus' opening

Stage a) describes the state of the potential stimulus which has not yet become a stimulus. The individuals have not yet reached the threshold potential of opening the stimulus. The stimulus has not yet been perceived as a stimulus; it's not something that stands out from the ongoing activity of the one who experiences it. This idea is clarified further in Jackson when he refers to Dewey and writes:

> prior to becoming perceived as objects and events, they were but brute existences, things whose bearing of the course of behaviour was either unperceived or non existent" The threshold potential refers to the moment that the individual begins to be 'stimulated' (Jackson, 1998, pp. 22-23).

What bridges stages a) and b) is the moment of *catalepsy* in a person, which may develop into *Eros*. Dewey would describe it as a state of immediacy, the "felt relationship between doing and undergoing as the organism and the environment interact" (Dewey, 2005, p.217). It is at this crucial moment that something becomes a stimulus or not. Stage b) describes the gradual 'opening' of the stimulus due to forces upon it. This opening has its origin in people's falling in *Eros* with the stimulus and desiring to explore it further. This desire or *Eros* is what will unfold people's creative, imaginative and critical thinking which not only will enable them to understand a

stimulus but also reconstruct through imagination their own experiences[210]. Stage c) (see figure 6.1) shows the stimulus's potential to open as a whirl even more. This shows that the same stimulus is 'multiple' and can create different responses each time one is occupied with it. Bruner (1983) claims that children become in tune with making a lot out of a little, by combining a small set of elements to create a larger range of possibilities. Young children try out all their motor routines on a single object (e.g. grasping, throwing, and banging it) and metaphorically this attitude is what enables a stimulus to open up. Bruner (1983) also claims that when children stop being interested in a particular way of using an object they may be interested again if there is a twist in its use, a different way of approaching it.

Chris De Haan, referring to Dewey, explains further the gradual opening up of the stimulus:

> We are creatures of imagination [...] Philosophy arises from imagination and desire. Employing imagination we reconstruct experience. Knowledge is active and operative, our ideals... "a collection of imagined possibilities", our ideas instruments of action. In deliberation we experiment imaginatively in what Dewey called "dramatic rehearsal", following possible courses of action in imagination. Imagination is the way in which meanings find their way into present interaction (De Haan, 1995, p.5).

The process of 'opening' of the stimulus is possible through the interpretation of the stimulus by people. What 'opens' the stimulus depends on the different ways people view it. Therefore, at this stage the stimulus enables people to raise questions, make observations about it, test and experiment its properties, explore further details of the stimulus that previously were ignored, move thoughts to different territories not necessarily linked with it, think of possible situations or probable scenarios that involve the stimulus, think in metaphors, and share ideas about the stimulus with others (Dewey, 1938).

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210 Serafini claims that "we attend to what we notice, and what we notice depends on what we understand. Readers cannot interpret that which is not perceived, and what is perceived can change based on what is understood" (2010, p.93). What, however, she does not explain is what makes us in first place notice what we will attend to afterwards.

All these are ways of interpreting the stimulus that enable its 'opening' and also the understanding of oneself. Let's suppose that the initial stimulus is a spoon used for stirring tea. It starts 'expanding' if someone starts contemplating its use, its craftwork, whether it has been a gift and if it has been used by a very important person (Jackson, 1998). If questions such as 'what makes a spoon a spoon?', or 'what makes a spoon a piece of art?' or 'Does the fact that the spoon has been used by an important person add something to the spoon's existence?' are added, then the stimulus can 'open up' philosophically. As Dewey highlights:

> The singular object stands out conspicuously because of its especially focal and crucial position at a given time in determination of some problem of use or enjoyment which the total complex environment presents (1938, p.72).

The opening of a stimulus is always contextual. It depends on the community of inquiry and how people will engage with the stimulus so as to open it[212]. The experimentation with a stimulus, the playful disposition towards it, the building on each others' ideas when interpreting a stimulus, are ways that transform the stimulus to something more than an initial object. It becomes, 'an experience'. Especially with young children, the opening of the stimulus should be done by involving more the senses and imagination, which are often philosophically neglected (Garrison, 1997). In this way, children engage with the stimulus not only pedagogically, but also ethically and aesthetically[213] (De Haan, 1995).

This is because children who engage with a stimulus try to find something within it that appeals to them. Paul (1993, p.35) claims that figuring something out involves "constructing a logic which matches the logic of the thing to be understood". This indicates that individuals not only try to find structures of their thinking in the stimuli they engage with, but they create them in case these structures are not yet available. This

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212 As the children's community of inquiry matures, the selection of the stimulus should come from it instead of the facilitator. In this case, the control of the facilitator is reduced and both the stimulus and the discussion that follows reflect the children's genuine interests. See page 128 of this thesis.

213 "Not for a moment is an art (music or poetry) conceived of by itself, but exclusively as what produces satisfaction for the senses" (Lorch,1992, p.70).

brings to mind Piaget's position that to understand is to invent (1976). For children, the more senses, emotion and thinking that are involved, the more possibilities are to be motivated by the stimulus physically, ethically and aesthetically. The ability of someone to ask a new question about a stimulus and point at a new frame of reference for the stimulus is what 'opens it up'. The questions raised here are: Is the process of opening a stimulus always connected with philosophy?

It is not enough for the stimulus to open philosophically if it only 'grasps' people's attention and throws them into a moment of *catalepsy* and then to *Eros*. It needs to create for the person a moment of *epiphany*. *Epiphany*[214] is a sudden intuitive perception of insight into the essential meaning of something, usually initiated by some simple or common place experience. Whereas *catalepsy* is a moment of grasping, *epiphany* is a moment of illumination not expected that pushes people to think deeper about themselves and the big questions of life.

Dewey would possibly classify an *epiphany* moment as an 'experience' and would highlight its unifying of emotions, its uniqueness, and completeness as major characteristics (Jackson, 1998). As a stimulus opens it can create this kind of experience for a person. This 'experience' that the engagement with a stimulus can offer is unique for each person and it does not mean necessarily that it happens for everyone. It is a rare event. It happens suddenly and uncommonly, it is memorable and it involves a kind of *epiphany* different to each individual (Jackson, 1998).

Moments of *epiphany* can occur also through discussions with others which enable further elaboration about the stimulus and its illumination through other people's experiences. The community of philosophical inquiry is necessary as the sharing of the ideas about the stimulus open the stimulus up. This process is a kind of recreation of

214 Epiphany (επιφάνεια) is a Greek word that comes from epiphainesthai, which means to appear/ to show. Epiphany means an appearance or manifestation (especially of a deity) and it is also used for celebrating Christ's manifestation on 6th of January. The word Epiphany is used to show a sudden, intuitive perception of the reality or essential meaning of something, usually initiated by some simple, homely, or commonplace occurrence or experience (Collins,2003). In literature Epiphany is used symbolically to indicate a moment of revelation and insight. See at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Epiphany.

reality according to people's cultures and experiences (Freire, 1972). As C.S. Peirce said, "one man's experience is nothing, if it stands alone. [...] It is not «my» experience, but «our» experience that has to be thought of; and this «us» has indefinite possibilities" (1995, p.259). This is a broader version of the stimulus which incorporates the stimulus and the experience created by it in a certain cultural environment[215].

Egley and Foulston (2010) give an example where the experience of a stimulus becomes a new stimulus for a philosophical inquiry[216]. The stimulus is people's lived experiences. This is an appropriate example of where all types of philosophy (generative and evaluative) become a way of life[217]. How does this happen? People have an experience and then they reflect upon it from a certain distance (time and place) since it took place. Through philosophising, the lived experience is further illuminated (Lebuis et al, 1993). Costello (2007), as mentioned in chapter three, writes narratives from children's experiences in their classrooms, which also accomplishes connecting children's experiences with narrative forms of expressing them and reflecting a new upon them. This is the new generative element; the stimulus comes from people's everyday lives (experiences) and is linked with the temporal way of life (examining life).

Does the stimulus remain constantly open when opened once? Theoretically the stimulus can open unlimitedly. Practically, what hinders the constant 'opening' of a stimulus is the lack of time, loss of interest or ideas for the particular stimulus and the borders of the language, e.g. not being able to find (or construct) the words that describe our thoughts, emotions and experiences about the stimulus in a way that will be understood by others. What actually stops us from engaging with a stimulus further is our choice to discuss a particular aspect of it rather than another. When we change our mind, what happens is a selection change, which 'opens' again the door for further

215 Apart from this, the experience of a stimulus is linked with philosophy as a way of life, as not only can a stimulus be used for a philosophical inquiry and reflection but also the experience of the certain stimulus.

216 Egley and Foulston (2010) run philosophical inquiries with adults based on experiences that they have lived (e.g. visiting a place and then having a philosophical inquiry inspired by this experience).

217 See more at chapter 8.

interpretation of a stimulus (Davies, 1988). A second 'reading'[218] of a stimulus can lead to a change of perspective under which the stimulus is viewed (May, 1995). This generates again *Eros* for the person to explore it further. That is why the limits of a stimulus are always 'temporary'.

Nevertheless, a stimulus in its process of opening is the 'object' plus the memory of the experience that the person had connected with this 'object'. Even if the person forgets the main characteristics of the stimulus (e.g. details in the illustration of a picture-book), there is still a kind of "emotional" memory that reminds the person of his/her engagement which can be named as its 'history'. This is not just recalling a memory that can stimulate anew the person to think. The person does not only recollect the thinking done over the stimulus some time ago, but s/he generates new thinking[219].

6.3. How does the stimulus open?

The stimulus 'opens up' when the person engages and reflects on it. This presupposes that: a) the person has the freedom to recognise a potential stimulus and to think about it, b) there is time available for the person to spend on the stimulus, c) there is a state of a *catalepsy* for the person that can move to a state of *Eros*, d) Individuals have attitudes (emotional states) that enable them to recognise and reflect upon the stimulus and e) there is potential of something to become a stimulus. Below, I will explain how listening is essential in 'opening' a stimulus further.

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218 Usually a second reading of a 'stimulus' is done when the stimulus was very captivating and individuals liked it or when it is not captivating at all but individuals give it a second chance in case they find something captivating into it (May, 1995, p. 181).

219 One may ask, if the stimulus opens temporarily and the chances are that we will forget many things about it, then what's the point of bringing so much attention to the stimuli? Each time a stimulus is used, people's creative thinking is activated. Each time there is a new opportunity for many ideas to be generated. The writing down of these ideas enables the stimulus to remain open for longer and recall in memory of the experience felt. The use of the stimuli enables children's practice in engaging with stimuli and generating questions and ideas. Opening of the stimulus enables people to learn how to 'see' the stimuli. This does not indicate that there is just one way of seeing but that there is seeing and not ignoring.

6.3.1. Listening: The idea of '*zymotic* listening' as a special way of opening a stimulus

In what ways are listening and the opening of the stimulus connected philosophically? To answer this, it is necessary to clarify first what is understood by listening. Fiumara (1995) argues that listening has been philosophically ignored. Listening is part of language; in the sense that it is the 'other side of language' (Fiumara, 1995). She claims that listening is thinking because it requires active participation from the one who listens, through focusing, thinking and creating meaning from what others say by connecting with the ideas and beliefs a person already has (Fiumara 1995). Listening is not just *hearing* sounds but involves a process of understanding these sounds and creating meaning. Understanding listening as thinking, as Fiumara suggests, means that there is not a clear division between them. People listening to others and to themselves and at the same time they reflect on what they are hearing. This process does not take place fragmentally.

Stimuli and listening are mutually linked together. Without a stimulus there is no listening and without listening there is no further exploration of a stimulus. A stimulus is necessary for capturing our attention and listening to it and similarly listening to oneself and the others is necessary for linking the different ideas together and 'opening' the stimulus further. This means that a person often listens when there is a stimulus to activate the generation of ideas and listen to them. This is often achieved through *deixis* (to show intentionally). I will give an example from my research log:

> I had a meeting with my supervisor about what makes a stimulus a stimulus when she took the case of her sunglasses, opened it and placed it in front of me. 'Here is a stimulus', she said. Her movement to make something that was already on the table, but never noticed before, transformed it into a potential stimulus. An object was thrown into my attention. At that moment there was silence. I was surprised because I didn't expect her to do this and somehow a moment of catalepsy was created. I had some reflection time and suddenly I started generating ideas about the sunglasses' case. About its use and its reason of being, about the idea of emptiness (since the glasses were not there).Then I

> thought metaphorically and suddenly the sunglasses' case became an open shell which was lacking something valuable (pearl). I thought of relations (e.g. sunglasses and cases). I was grasped by the stimulus only because my supervisor brought it into my attention and within the context of a meeting about philosophy. Possibly, I wouldn't do the same if I was sitting in a bar and a friend of mine just placed her case in front of me. I brought my thoughts and emotions to the observation of the object. It was an experience to me when this happened; now I am only describing this experience without feeling my first excitement of making the case of glasses a stimulus when before it was just an unnoticed object (Nikolidaki's log, 2010a).

From the example above it seems that the intention to see something as a stimulus and the particular context in which something appears as a stimulus are two other reasons that explain how a person engages with a stimulus. It is what Bruner (1983) says, referring to John Lyons, is *'deixis'*. It is not just *'tagging'*, but locating something in context and bringing something to one's attention. *Deixis* is a way of making others 'listen' intentionally.

On the other hand, in order to open a stimulus, it is necessary to listen both to oneself (what the individual thinks and feels about the stimulus) and to others (what the others think and feel about the stimulus). This two-way 'listening to the stimulus' (through listening to oneself and to others) is a *'zymosis'*[220]. *'Zymotic or fermentative listening'* is the long-term result of the synthesis and fermentation (*zymosis*) of listening to others (through the inquiry) and listening to oneself (through reflection) when interpreting and therefore opening a stimulus.

What is *zymotic* listening and why is it connected with philosophy as a generative force? When children and the facilitator enter a philosophical inquiry which begins with a stimulus they are unaccustomed with, they do not know the direction the discussion will take. One could argue whether it would be different if they knew the stimulus in advance but in this case, if something is already known to its full extent then it is not a stimulus. According to Zeldin (1998, p.9) a conversation is a "meeting of minds with different

220 I borrow the Greek word which can be translated as fermentation.

memories and habits." When different people enter into a conversation they not only share a stimulus, but they also transform the way each one views it. Zeldin (1998) claims that a conversation has the potential of changing a person's point of view. This kind of transformation is a *zymosis* because: a) the person transforms his or her own self through the different ways of appreciating and understanding a stimulus as it happens with the *zymosis* of the initial ingredients to something different and new b) the transformation does not happen immediately but takes time. As it happens with fermentation, there is a state of agitation and a state of settling down of the ingredients to allow them to mature[221]. The same happens with the opening of the stimulus; there is an agitation of ideas generated, but it takes time both to listen to these ideas that others offer and to settle down through reflecting critically on them.

The *zymosis* of ideas takes time and requires an emotional safe environment for children's ideas to brew. When doing philosophy with children in the classroom, there should be enough time available both in the short and long term. *'Short term'* means that the facilitator of a philosophical inquiry gives time in each session for children to listen carefully and thoughtfully to others and their ideas. *'Long term'* means that *zymotic* listening is practised continuously and as the members of the inquiry become more experienced in philosophising, they can practice more their listening. Ideas that ferment from the early sessions until the later ones will lead to something new. *Zymotic* listening is mostly a long term process. It does not happen immediately during the first philosophical inquiry, but gradually: it 'matures' with time and practice from both the members and the facilitator of a community of inquiry. The children through listening *zymotic*ally benefit in two ways; in terms of process (becoming more creative thinkers) and of product (producing creative ideas).

The idea of *zymosis* is illustrated in Dewey when he writes:

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221 The states of creative process are identified as follows: preparation, incubation, illumination and verification (Goswami,1999). Fermentation shares many characteristics with incubation as they both require a phase of idleness (doing nothing) till the idea comes. However, the fermentation is not located only before the illumination (when the idea comes) but it is a process that takes place even before the evaluation of the ideas produced.

> The turmoil marks the place where inner impulse and contact with environment, in fact or in idea, meet and create a ferment [...] Hence it is not mere excitement that is expressed but excitement about something; hence, also it is that even mere excitement, short of complete panic, will utilize channels of action that have been worn by prior activities that dealt with objects (2005, p.69).

It is important to highlight two things here. First, the idea of excitement about something refers both to the engagement with the stimulus and to listening both to oneself and to others about this listening. Secondly, the idea of prior activities can work as 'yeasts' that enable the fermentative process of thinking to take place. Listening *zymotic*ally and engaging with stimuli does not happen immediately, but it is the process of becoming more sensitive to the stimuli, listening to one and others and being open and evaluating the whole experience[222]. This is a dynamic fermentative process or as Dewey says it is "a growth" (Dewey, 2005, p.57).

Zymotic listening incorporates the exchange of ideas between what others say and one's personal reflection, but it is more than a simple accumulation of the different ways of listening[223]. Dewey (2005, p.63) would understand both listening to others and to oneself about the stimulus not only in terms of quantitative accumulation of ideas, but of qualitative too, "a transforming of energy into thoughtful action, through assimilation of meanings from the background of past experiences". *Zymotic* listening causes agitation and excitement in children and teachers which is not necessarily translated into physical excitement, but a mental brewing of ideas that mix with each other as something new. This kind of *zymotic* listening can cause a disturbance and resistance, especially with adults. This is because adults interpret it as not listening. For many adults (and teachers) listening requires a silent audience which does not happen in the case of *zymotic* listening. There is an agitation of ideas in the head. The diagram below shows schematically what counts as *zymotic* listening:

222 See more about these ideas at chapter 8.

223 The verb 'ferment' comes from the Latin word 'fevere' which means "to boil".



Figure 6.2: Zymotic listening

Zymosis is a constant transformation, changing, mixing and stirring of ideas that come from the different ways of listening. The arrows in figure 3 show how these tensions for the different ways of listening merge with each other and synthesize into *zymotic* listening. The quality of this '*zymosis*' depends also on the environment. A community of philosophical inquiry that takes place in a safe and trusting environment where occasional silence is not considered as a gap but as thinking time enables the ideas of children to brew (Haynes, 2008). Nevertheless, inquiries that take place in a physical, cognitive and emotionally unsafe environment either do not allow *zymosis* to happen or the ideas generated are of low quality. When ideas are fermented, they can be completely different from what the person initially received from the others, or had already in mind.

The stimuli play a double role: They are the 'ferments', or the 'yeast'[224], that evoke people's *zymotic* listening and often they are also the focus point that the fermentative listening leads to. The ideas that are generated from listening to oneself and to others often go back to the stimulus to help people attain a different, wider, understanding of what they had before. This is a way for the stimulus to open. *Zymotic* listening (fermentative) is at the same time creative, critical and emotional[225]. But what does it mean to listen creatively, emotionally and critically and how are these linked to a stimulus? To understand *zymotic* listening in more depth, it is necessary to understand its ingredients.

Listening creatively refers to the ability of listening with a "beginner's ear" (Brady, 2009) and is "ear- initiated" rather than "mouth-initiated" (Pinney, 1970). What is implied here is that a stimulus opens when we 'clear' as much as possible from what blocks us from listening. Laverty (2004, p.196) interprets this 'cleaning' as *naivety* which "allows for the realization of what is non self". Naivety enables the deeper exploration of a stimulus because the stimulus is viewed afresh as if never perceived before. It encourages the creative listening to what others have to say about a stimulus. It also enables asking thought provoking follow up questions (Haynes, 2008; Kneller, 1965).

Listening creatively can enlighten the members of a philosophical community of inquiry to come up with follow up questions that they possibly could never imagine otherwise. These questions can help children and adults acquire a better understanding as to the aspects of the stimulus through probing, instructing, checking eliciting information, airing and opening new aspects of it that were almost ignored or explored (Robin, 2004; Whalley, 1993). Pe ople who allow space for naivety and hold back their previous knowledge or biases can come closer and even attain what is not articulated or

224 According to the Oxford English Dictionary "Fermentation is a process of the nature of that resulting from the operation of leaven on dough or on saccharine liquids. In Alchemy fermentation was the name of an internal change supposed to be produced in metals by a 'ferment', operating after the manner of a leaven." (Murray,1961).

225 The creativity in opening the stimulus is not found in its 'ingredients' but in the way they are used (Dewey,1966).

understood[226]. What is accomplished with naivety is the further understanding of a stimulus and through it the further understanding of oneself. Naivety should not be considered as a lack of experience, but as looking afresh as if there was no previous experience which creates the curiosity to learn. Children have this kind of naivety[227] which naturally allows them to think and listen creatively to a stimulus (Matthews, 1994). Therefore, listening in the company of children helps adults to listen more creatively.

Listening critically tests creative listening which has been generated after a stimulus has been introduced. Its role is more of an '*Elenchus*' based on reasonable criteria; it is a kind of practical wisdom that Aristotle called phronesis, which helps to check whether an idea generated is rational and/or virtuous to apply in everyday life (Garrison, 1997). Being reasonable is not only being logical[228]; it involves striving for objectivity, accepting fallibilism, maintaining a pragmatic attitude and judiciousness which are virtues very much linked with listening critically (Burbules, 1995). Elaborating on Burbules's ideas it seems that striving for objectivity involves being tolerant to different views, listening carefully to others and acknowledging the intrinsic worth (or biases) of each point. Accepting fallibilism means being able to admit mistakes and correct them. This attitude is a sign of caring for oneself and others since the person admits mistakes so as to improve both his/her thinking and illuminate others. It also has a creative aspect as "the shock of the new" that an error reveals, enables the testing and possibly the changing of our assumptions (Popper, 1959). Maintaining a pragmatic attitude, people may get frustrated in their attempt to get answers for their philosophical questions which is

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226 Slade (1998) moves a step forward and suggests as an aspect of creative listening the ability to listen to what has not been said yet or could perhaps never be said. Slade seems to give a broader meaning to creative listening which includes non verbal communication and silence. The silence often created when a person engages with a stimulus is the crucial time where Eros towards the stimulus is to be established or not.

227 Can an adult become naïve? Can life experience and knowledge be pushed to one side? Laverty presents naivety as if it is something that the facilitator can decide to allow space to it or not. It seems that being naïve is something that the person can control either to be or not. But is that possible? Even when adults think creatively with a playful attitude does that make their thinking naïve? Instead of naivety I would suggest appreciation of children's naivety and sharing it with adults' experience.

228 "A person who is reasonable wants to be careful and prudent in the adoption of important positions in life, is willing to admit when he or she has made a mistake and so on. These qualities are not exhibited simply by following certain formal rules of reasoning. They are enormously more complex than that, since they are manifested in a broad range of situations that are not governed by formal rules" (Burbules,1995, p.86).

acceptable and expected. As for judiciousness, this refers to the limitations of reason and the appreciation of other forms of expression when taking decisions (e.g. tonal utterances and gestures may convey certain meanings) (Burbules, 1995).

Critical listening is careful listening that aims at:

- gathering information on children's previous knowledge which becomes apparent in the questions they ask, but also their attempts to give answers to problems and make meaning of their world (Rinaldi, 2006, p.14) and the assumptions they bring to their reasoning,
- building cognitive links between the facilitator's and children's knowledge,
- recognising the intentions behind objections and any possible interference from the facilitator's part (Myhil, Jones and Hopper, 2006, p.96; Bee and Bee,1998, p.23; Daniel and Delsol, 2005;Daniel et al 2005; Daniel 2001),
- listening with care (care–fully). All good thinking already has moral responsibility attached to it.

Listening emotionally is listening empathetically (Sharp, 1997). Empathetic means trying to understand a stimulus from another's point of view or 'hearing through their ears' (Wegerif, 2006, p.63). Listening appears as a form of understanding that occurs through empathizing with what learners say and the emotional situations they find themselves in. This emotional situation may alter or even block the perception of the stimulus to something new. Empathetic listening helps in recognising others' sense of biases through thinking about them the way others do (Thayer Bacon, 1998). Rather than critiquing any prejudice or bias in thinking, it helps through empathising to really understand the way others perceive a stimulus and the reasons why they have such biases. Listening empathetically enables leaving aside the "habits of mind" and understanding others' views and premises when interpreting a stimulus (Murris, 2008; Murris and Haynes, 2000a).

Zymotic listening is a complex mixture of creative, critical and emotional listening. It is more than the accumulation of these types of listening. It is similar to creative listening

because both lead to the generation of new ideas and both require a phase of incubation of the generated ideas, but also different from it as it is broader and includes the critical judgement that creative listening on its own lacks. *Zymotic* listening is:

- emotional as the creation of ideas can lead to a wide variety of emotions such as enthusiasm, wonder and passion, but also requires 'reading between the lines' which means being aware of how these emotions influence thinking,
- critical because the ideas generated are judged for their reasonableness and application to everyday life,
- Similar to reflective listening as it is based on rethinking both what others and oneself says, however, it describes better the complexity of the inner process of listening that takes place.

Zymotic listening is what is required so that all the ideas generated by one's interpretation of the stimulus can be translated to others[229]. *Translation* means the ability "to absorb what other members have said and to translate and put other members' thoughts into a meaningful context both for the listener and the speaker" (Swanson and Hornsby, 2001). The stimulus can enable the translation of the ideas as it is the source of reference for the members of a philosophical inquiry. Can a stimulus, however, be ever totally translated as Lipman suggests, because (referring to Bakhtin) "there is no potential text of texts" (1996b, p.110)? In this example, the text is the stimulus, which can be much broader than words. Still, though, the stimulus's total translation is impossible. This is because there is no complete access to the stimulus by a person who can never know what a stimulus really is in itself (Nagel, 1974). The reason for this is that the person who chooses a stimulus always has a particular perspective. There is 'no view from nowhere' as Nagel suggests. The accurate translation of a stimulus is inhibited because there are gaps in the translation of the

229 Kennedy comes close to zymotic listening as he understands active listening as a sequence of reflective moves which can be verbal or non verbal, done by the facilitator or others, such as listening in order to seek for clarification, summarize ideas, find connections among statements, identify proportions, similarities, differences. Kennedy (2004) considers these moves as equivalent to active listening on a logical-linguistic level equating 'active listening' with 'translation'. 'Active listening' or 'translation' is critical but at the same time creative as it aims to create a common language of understanding between the facilitator and members of a c.o.i.(Cannon and Weinstein,1993).

stimulus from one person to another. Thus, listeners can never be sure of a speaker's intentions, so a 'gap' in translating of what was said to what is understood may occur. Also people are different and have different ways of listening and decoding what they are listening to. This does not reassure that what one listens to is what the other meant.

Since accurate translation is not possible, at least partial translation (with all the possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations that hinder communication) can happen through creative listening and trying to imagine what the other may want to say[230].

6.3.2. The consequences of *zymotic* listening and the further opening of the stimulus

Zymotic listening enables other ways of 'opening' further of the stimulus as described below:

a) Establishing creative attitudes and using creative techniques

One of the ingredients of *zymotic* listening is creative listening. As listening is identical to thinking, then the techniques for creative thinking that look for fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration (Torrance and Safter, 1989; Guilford, 1971) can 'open' the stimulus further. This means that the more ideas are displayed, the more opportunities that some of these ideas are good enough (fluency of ideas) (Getzels and Jackson,1962). The more flexibility in moving from one stimulus to different fields in thinking and linking them together, the more the stimulus 'opens'. Kim (1990) refers to vertical and lateral thinking which can apply to the 'opening' of the stimulus. Vertical thinking enables the analysing of the stimulus and its components. The lateral thinking is moving away from the stimulus to new fields that could be connected to the stimulus.

230 This idea is aligned with Gregory's first-order non-realism and Golding's critical pluralism. See chapter 2.

The more deviated and original the ideas are, the better the stimulus is explored (originality). The more elaboration and dialogue over the ideas generated from a stimulus, the more the stimulus opens (Vernon, 1970).

The opening of the stimulus matches with an opening attitude[231] that people who listen creatively have towards it (Cam, 1995; Kneller, 1965; Freire, 1972; McKinnon,1983; Goswami, 1999). Being open indicates selflessness on the part of the person to hold back his/her ideas and give a fully open ear to others and their new ideas (Rawling and Rich, 1985; Murris and Haynes, 2000b).

The stimulus and its possibility of multi-interpretation link playfulness with philosophy. This is mostly governed by the "pleasure principle" (Kennedy, 2006, p.60). Playing and experimenting with new ideas is part of children's lives and the way children get to know the world they live in (Bruner, 1960). Doing philosophy playfully awakens children's imaginations to generate ideas and make it a pleasant activity that helps them be more open-minded. It results in people finding pleasure that derives from their emotional state when engaging with and exploring the stimulus. Apart from pleasure, play is also seen as an activity. Children's play is children's work (Froebel, 2009). Philosophising is also the practice of philosophy and if done regularly, it strengthens people's reasoning skills. Philosophy can be playful, even mischievous and therefore lots of fun (Cam, 1995, p.26). It can be cognitive play and "cognitive fun" (Lipman, 1996b, p.36).

b) The metaphoric use of language

The use of metaphoric language is a consequence of listening creatively and having a playful attitude which can lead to a new understanding. This goes through the use of language. The more different vocabulary we use (and so metaphors) to describe a stimulus, the more different descriptions and understandings people get from it[232].

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231 See chapter 8.

232 See Rorty's describing of metaphors as "a way of grabbing hold of causal forces and making them do what we want, altering ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations" (1991, p.81)

Thus, the metaphorical use of language triggers re-descriptions which allow further progress (Calder, 2003). Below, I will give an example of how the metaphoric use of language can enable us to acquire a different understanding of what a stimulus could be. The following passage from Dewey's *Art as an experience* is illuminative:

> The juice expressed by the wine press is what it is because of a prior act, and it is something new and distinctive. It does not merely represent other things. Yet it has something in common with other objects and it is made to appeal to other persons than the one who produced it (Dewey, 2005, p. 86).

Adapting Dewey's description and speaking metaphorically, the stimulus could be the 'wine' and the 'juice' expresses the new ideas and the moments of *epiphany* that people have when engaging with it. Dewey underlines the prior act which is essential for the stimulus so that something new can be generated. The more one recognises and analyses a stimulus, the more probable it is that one will be able to get something new out of it. This new 'juice' out of the stimulus is what links the person who produced it with the ones who will appreciate it. The appreciation of the stimulus and its 'products' is an act of creation. Dewey claims that "for to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent" (2005, p.56).

What Dewey implies is that a stimulus is the medium, connective point between the people who generate ideas and the ones who appreciate them and, in turn, generate new ideas. Using a new simile, the stimulus, in this case is the link or the scaffolding of new ideas. Myhil, Jones and Hopper describe "scaffolding" as a way to facilitate and enable one process (2006, p.10). They describe it as a temporary state that supports one piece of work until it is finished, non aesthetically but in a handy, strong and safe way which provides the platform to walk on, enabling access to an area of knowledge that otherwise would be out of reach and providing structure to work as it is carefully constructed and flexible to allow changes and improvements. This is exactly what the stimulus does. It is the platform that will help children generate ideas whether these ideas go back to the stimulus and to its further opening or not. For instance, the text

and the images of a picture-book are types of scaffolding on which children can rely and think of questions and ideas that matter for them.

Staying with metaphors, the stimulus could be the 'gadfly' for doing philosophy with children and this is a metaphor deliberately used to show in practice an example of the generative aspect of philosophy in constructing new understanding. Murris (2009) clearly prefers the stingray metaphor (Plato, *Meno*) instead of the gadfly because it is not only the children that are perplexed and numbed but also the teacher. In this case both appear equal in a philosophical inquiry. I agree with this point, but the gadfly metaphor can more accurately link the use of a stimulus with philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects than a stingray. It is a matter of finding attributes in common between the 'gadfly' and the stimuli used for doing philosophy with children.

For instance, the gadfly is a pollinator of flowers. In this case children's thinking is the flower which in order to flourish needs to be pollinated. The noisy buzzing of a gadfly could symbolize the creative phase when a stimulus is presented and the reactions children have towards it. Buzzing noisily indicates an active, lively, energetic classroom where noisy discussion takes place. Similarly, the itching of the gadfly's bite could symbolize the children's irresistible desire to generate more ideas but also test them as they need a relief from the itching. All these different interpretations of the gadfly metaphor are samples of the generative aspect of philosophy in its attempt to achieve an understanding of the world[233].

Similes such as 'wine', 'juice', 'scaffolding' and 'gadfly' as ways of describing the 'opening' of the stimulus are creative uses of our language. The use of metaphors, analogies, similes and descriptions is another way that helps people engage with a stimulus and 'open it up'. The creative use of language which could happen even through mistakes or misinterpretations may create moments of *epiphany* suddenly making the same stimulus to be differently viewed. It is as if the stimulus appears in a

233 For these reasons and many more that will be explored throughout the thesis, stimuli and the teacher's role would be investigated under the prism of the gadfly metaphor.

different form which "marks the way of envisaging, of feeling and of presenting experienced matter so that it most readily and effectively becomes material for construction on adequate experience" (Dewey, 2005, p.113). Some stimuli, such as picture-books or specially written stories for doing philosophy with children, have a narrative form[234], which incorporates metaphors and other ways of creative use of the language (Nussbaum, 2001). In primitive inquiries the metaphors given by the text (or the images) may encourage children's creative thinking and generating of new ideas as part of the generative aspect of philosophy.

c) Questioning

Questions are basic keys of 'expanding' a stimulus providing that *zymotic* listening has fully taken place. They seek further clarification and exploration of a stimulus so they open it and can become stimuli in themselves. Often a question can be so fascinating and it seems that the stimulus is left aside. This is true only if the stimulus is viewed as a starting point. If the questions are conceived as an expansion of the stimulus, then it is obvious that the stimulus is not lost, it can only have transformed into a question and can always transform into a new one later on. In practice, many facilitators when doing 'philosophy with children', probe children to ask questions which can be connected or not to the initial stimulus. What is misunderstood here is that the questions emerging are aspects for potential analysis of the stimulus, or a new stimulus that can lead to different paths of knowledge.

Aristotle in *Poetics* describes the twists and turns in a plot of a character in a tragedy as *peripeteia*. The same is applicable to the stimuli. The different engagements with a stimulus and the different questions that occur can be described as different *peripeteia* that the stimulus 'throws us in'. There are many different categorizations of the questions. Whether questions are categorised as closed, textual, open or

234 See chapter 5.

philosophical[235] (Stanley, 2000; Cam, 2003; Fisher, 2007a; 2007b), or as ordinary, rhetorical or inquisitive[236] (Splitter, 1994), they all enable a new exploration and a better understanding of a stimulus and beyond it[237]. This understanding of the stimulus can have a psychological, sociological, historical, etymological, scientific, philosophical, theological, physiological and literal character, but not necessarily a philosophical one.

The stimulus opens philosophically when the questions that follow are not 'canned'[238] and push a philosophical inquiry. Golding (2007) moved this idea further by connecting the types of questions that can emerge with the types of philosophy (e.g. ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics and phenomenology[239]). He proposes questions that enable children to explore the ideas further that are generated by a stimulus through questioning that is evaluative, conceptual, metaphysical, phenomenological and epistemological. He gives examples of questions that are, for instance, evaluative or conceptual and he suggests how to use these questions in order to explore a subject, such as beauty or culture, in a more holistic way. Comparing the different ways of categorising the questions I think Golding's approach is more effective because: a) it focuses on the creative 'opening' of a stimulus and b) questions do not need to be mutually excluded from the categories.

d) Building on each others' ideas

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235 The closed questions have one right answer, the textual ones are literal or informative and can be researched or ask an expert to be sorted out, the open questions have more than one answer and the philosophical are conceptual and favourite thinking in the abstract (Cam, 2003; Stanley, 2000; Fisher,2007b; Jackson,2004).

236 Ordinary can be understood as closed or textual the answers of which can be found empirically, rhetorical are the ones that the person who asks knows the answer but wants to check other's people knowledge and inquiry are the questions that require further research (conceptual or not) to be answered without guarantee of finding answers (Splitter,1994).

237 Another categorization of the questions is according to the moment they were raised. There are some pre-story questions where the teacher tries to connect children's experience with the story that will be used as a stimulus, post-story questions which they aim in the better understanding of the stimulus, transfer questions that enable the children's thinking moving from the stimulus to another subject linked with children's experience (Vallone, 2004).

238 Gardner refers to 'canned' questions to indicate the ones that occur mechanically without adding anything new to people's understanding. It is not enough to ask for an example or for a clarification only for the sake of asking a question (Gardner, 1995).

239 Ontology refers to the study of Being, epistemology refers to how we have any knowledge, logic refers to how to reason well, ethics refers to what is right or wrong and phenomenology refers to the study of our experience (Golding,2007).

Finally, building on each others' ideas is another way to generate ideas. Children realise that through communicating with others (e.g. by participating in group games and working together), their thinking is further creatively stimulated (Dewey,1916). Felicity Haynes (2006), referring to Julian Baggini and Peter Fosl (2002), argues that only when we discuss our ideas and respond to the challenges that others make are our ideas really developed. The creative ideas come as more than the sum total of individual efforts. The linking of ideas is a kind of synthesis; thoughts are conceptualised and connected together to produce meaning (Kant, 1929 B103). The linking of ideas is a creative synthesis which occurs due to a sudden interlocking of ideas previously unrelated (Koestler, 1964). This connection of ideas is not for the sake of accumulation, but for the sake of finding meaning (Bosch, 1998b). A practical tip here could be the 'mapping' of the stimulus[240] used for doing philosophy which can offer visual representation of the opening of the ideas (Sutcliffe and Williams, 2000; Bruce, Knight and Barnes, 2008).

6.4. Conclusion

The opening of the stimulus is a generative process and begins with the interaction between the stimulus and people. What 'opens up' the stimulus is the different ways people view it rather than a literal opening. However, it is not enough for the stimulus just to grab the interest of people, it needs to offer them moments of *epiphany* or what Dewey calls 'an experience'.

As a stimulus opens it creates a new experience for each person. This new experience becomes part of a person's life which can be used anew as a stimulus (e.g. reflecting on the experience people had over a particular stimulus). This is a broader version of the stimulus which incorporates the stimulus and the experience created by it in a certain cultural environment. The 'temporary' limits that the stimulus reaches refer to the

240 See more about the mapping of the stimulus in chapter 7.

moments that the further investigation of the stimulus stops at due to the lack of time, ideas or interest to explore it further.

Listening *zymotic*ally (which can begin after a *deixis* of a stimulus) is a necessary condition for 'opening up' a stimulus. Listening is understood as thinking. Stimuli and listening are reciprocally linked together. In order to listen, a stimulus is needed to activate people's generation of ideas, and in order to open a stimulus, it is necessary to listen both to oneself and to others. The stimuli play a double role: They are the 'ferments', or the 'yeast' that evoke people's *zymotic* listening and often they are the focal point that the fermentative listening leads to.

Zymotic listening is more than the sum of listening critically, emotionally and creatively both to oneself and others. It certainly shares characteristics with listening creatively (e.g. need for naivety and pushing back previous experiences so as to listen to what is new), critical listening (evaluation of the ideas generated by the opening of a stimulus) and emotionally (empathizing and looking from another's perspective). *Zymotic* or 'fermentative listening' is the long term result of the synthesis and *zymosis* of listening to others (through the inquiry) and listening to oneself (through reflection) when interpreting and therefore opening a stimulus. *Zymotic* listening is what enables the translation of one's ideas to others. However, the stimulus can never be translated in itself, that's why theoretically it always appears as a source open to generating ideas.

The consequences of *zymotic* li stening that can further open up a stimulus is the establishment of creative attitudes and the use of creative techniques that look for fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration of the ideas offered when reflecting or dialoguing philosophically, the metaphoric use of language as a way of generating different understandings of a stimulus, the raising of questions that 'dig' vertically or laterally and the building on each others' ideas. The stimulus opens more if more than one person is involved and they are dialoguing with each other. This is where the community of philosophical inquiry can play a significant role.

It is not enough just generating ideas out of a stimulus. Their evaluation in terms of truth and applicability should also been taken into account. The next chapter will explore the evaluative aspect of philosophy and how it is linked with a stimulus.

CHAPTER 7

Stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy

Abstract

In this chapter there is an attempt to investigate what is the connection between stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy. To do so, it is first explained in what ways philosophy has evaluative aspects. It will be argued that they are linked with people's ability to self-correct (within a philosophical inquiry). It will be argued that stimuli are linked with the evaluative aspect of philosophy when children engage with them within a philosophical c.o.i. in different ways. The chapter closes with an example that shows a dialogue using a stimulus and with children making efforts to self-correct.

7.1. Introduction: In what ways is philosophy evaluative?

The main reason for evaluation is the achieving of *eudemonia* which is a state of temporary equilibrium that makes people feel calm, relaxed and happy about the decisions they have made and the impact they have had on their and others' lives. Philosophy entails the search of what is considered as wisdom, which usually refers to what is true, right and correct to do. Hence, it has not only a theoretical but mostly a practical character as pointed out by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics (Book VI, 1143a31)*. As humans lack access to incorrigible sources of truth that could serve as "external" judgers, evaluators and correctors of 'human being's thinking', they have only themselves to evaluate the situations they confront and through them to self-correct. According to Peirce, who argued against Descartes and other rationalists, there is not a God of science or philosophy who could be the external corrector of humans' knowledge (Scheffler, 1974). The ability to self-correct shows also the ability to self-direct towards change which is a kind of autonomy necessary within a philosophical community of inquiry (Heron, 1989).

The facilitator can enable children's evaluating situations, reflecting on them and possibly self-correcting by:

- providing or recognising the stimuli that children bring to inquiries, which can be used as starting points of philosophical inquiries and the point of constant reference and reason for reflective thinking,
- asking the questions (as Socrates did when implementing his midwifery method) that will push children's thinking further and
- making sure that people listen to each other.

The *zymotic* listening[241] to others and to oneself when a stimulus is explored is one connection between the generative and the evaluative aspect of philosophy. On the one hand, one needs to listen creatively, emotionally and critically to the others so as to be inspired and build on other's ideas and come up with new questions and ideas. On the other hand, through listening children manage to evaluate their own and others' opinions and take decisions and further plans for action. For the early stages of philosophical inquiries, the stimulus on its own may not be sufficient, so children might need further motivation by the teacher to be sensitive in recognising and requiring a stimulus. The role of the teacher is to help children be evaluative without saying explicitly how they should evaluate the situations they face, their thinking and their experience.

Lipman (1980; 2003) highlighted the self-corrective character of thinking in philosophy for children. Self-corrective thinking means that a person reflects on his/her own thinking, discovers weaknesses and rectifies them. Lipman claims that the conditions for self-correction are optimal when building communities of inquiry where members correct each other's methods and procedures (Dewey, 1938; Splitter and Sharp, 1995). According to Lipman (2003, p.219), "each participant is able to internalize the methodology of the community as a whole, each is able to become self-correcting in his or her own thinking". What Lipman describes above brings to mind a constant process of evaluative "focusing in" and "focusing out" of the *zymotic* process that describes what happens within a philosophical community of inquiry at a communal and individual level as far as thinking is concerned. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the

241 See chapter 6.

inquiring process and the collective seeking of good reasoning is what someone as an observer sees in a community happening as s/he "focuses out". "Focusing in" enables the investigation into what happens to each person's thinking separately and how the inquiring process helps each one reflect and possibly self-correct.

The *'focusing out'* is a way of looking on the thinking that happens within a community. Cam (1995, p.51) calls this 'focusing out' as "thinking together" which is viewed as a collective process of correcting mistakes that may happen when exploring ideas within a community of inquiry. Cam (1995) claims that the more a person is used in the philosophical inquiry process, the more s/he learns how to correct mistakes by listening to others, exploring other alternatives, testing the premises each thought is based upon, and being open to find and correct mistakes[242].

Figure 7.1: The Bride and the old woman

242 Cam also identifies behaviours that show children's self-correction such as children's re-stating an opinion by choosing carefully the right words, having second thoughts, meeting the criteria of their remarks after they changed their mind (Cam,1995).



Figure 7.2: Duck and hare

The optical illusions above (the young-old lady and the rabbit-duck illusion) are only some examples of the same stimulus perceived differently each time[243]. The stimulus cannot be seen simultaneously in a different way, but through changing perception and looking from another point of view its different aspects are revealed (Brann, 1993). This is an example where the community of inquiry and 'thinking together' can help. However, in the end it is a matter of each person to select what s/he will see (Goswami, 1999). The self-correction in this case has the character of being able to see more and different perspectives than what we could see before. The stimuli in a philosophical inquiry are much more complicated than the illusion because they open even more space to interpretation and afterwards to evaluation.

The dependence of self-corrective thinking both in a person's ability to recognise mistakes in thought and in the community of inquiry that provide alternatives ways of thinking is highlighted by Eugenio Echeverria when he defines self-correction as the situation

> when other members of the community of inquiry offer sufficient and appropriate evidence to challenge a point of view that I made, I have the capacity to recognise that I was mistaken and even in some cases to be

243 In the first picture the item in the circle can be perceived as the ear of the young lady or the eye of an old lady, whereas in the second image the item in circle can be perceived either as a bill of a duck or the rabbit's ears. See figures 7.1, 7.2.

> grateful that thanks to their observation I was able to grow cognitively by transforming my way of thinking (Echeverria, 2007, p.130).

Echeverria assumes that the starting point of self-corrective thinking is challenging people's thinking and ends in a state of thankfulness to the others for our self-correcting. This challenging includes a degree of what Piaget (1929) calls disequilibrium in one's thought. When a person realises that s/he may be mistaken or that there are other alternatives available, there is disequilibrium in his/her mental state (Dewey, 2005). There are new data for the person to analyse which finally may change the way s/he thinks. The *'focusing in'* can be identified as thinking for oneself. 'Thinking for oneself' is an independent kind of thinking which hints at a sense of a person's freedom to question their own attitude, experiences and situations in the world (Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p.16). It also involves applying reliable criteria before making any judgement and examining one's thinking (or else self-correcting). The 'community of inquiry' provides the person with other members' ideas to think on, evaluate and self-correct if necessary[244]. It seems that the person is inspired by others, but still corrects his/her self. This is how personhood (thinking for oneself) and citizenship (thinking together) can link meaningfully together (Splitter, 1997).

The person does get a lot from others' thinking but s/he has to make the final decision of what her/his thinking will be[245]. Splitter claims that:

> Meaning is not something which can be dispensed or handed from one person to another, even where the former- the teacher, say- has a greater degree of understanding of the subject than the later. Meaning, like knowledge in general, has to be constructed and while the process of construction can, and should, be a collaborative one, there is a sense in which each person is obliged to make sense of things in his or her own terms (2000b, p.21).

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244 Splitter (2000a) distinguishes that "a community is not necessarily a community of inquiry, but inquiry necessarily presupposes an element of community". This strongly shows that an inquiry is a collective process. This inquiry becomes philosophical when the participants apart from the subject they discuss, they also think on the process of thinking, or else "thinking about thinking". Through this meta-level process of thinking one can identify himself and possibly self-correct (Splitter,2000b).

245 Popper, as cited by Splitter and Sharp (1995) argues that a scientific inquiry must be communal but "there is nobody but himself to check his results, nobody but himself to correct those prejudices which are the unavoidable consequences of his peculiar mental history...what we call "scientific objectivity" is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method.

Therefore, "thinking together" has meaning only as a collaborative process that takes places in a certain place and time, and among certain people each time they share opinions. However, the practical decision-making is done individually. In other words the person incorporates new ideas from others, which to an extent form who the person is and becomes. Nevertheless, it is up to the person whether s/he makes the new ideas his/her own (Glaser, 1993).

Part- whole and whole-part relationships[246] within a c.o.i. reflect the "focusing in and out" described above. They are central in philosophy with children and reflect influences of George Herbert Mead, Bruner and Vygotsky. Consciousness and internalization are key concepts in Vygotsky's philosophy and in philosophy with children (Vygotsky, 1986). Vygotsky (1986) claims that thinking is the internalization of speech and that the connection between language and thought is important in learning to think. Bruner (1983) adds to this idea by favouring the using of culture as necessary to master language. What Lipman does is to combine these ideas by showing that the community of inquiry is the place where different cultures meet and each individual can internalize them, make meaning and shape their own opinions. The communicative interactions that both Bruner and Vygotsky suggest match with the pedagogy of the community of philosophical inquiry (Lipman and Pizzuro, 2001; Lipman, 1996b).

Mead (1934) also states that a person can self-correct and develop thinking through the capacity to talk to himself/ herself. Mead understands thinking as an internal dialogue in one's head. This "internal" person's talk is a kind of self-reflective thinking that presumes an internalisation of the forms of thinking that others display in a community of inquiry. What is indicated here is that listening to and building on each others' ideas within a community helps each person individually get more ideas and effective thinking skills to think for him/her self as an inter-dialogue with themselves, therefore the chances of self-corrective thinking increase. Vygotsky states this idea as follows:

246 Part- whole relationship is the relationship each member has towards the other members that form the community of inquiry. Whole-part relationship is the way the whole community reacts with each person individually. These kinds of relationship act complementary.

> Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (inter psychological), and then inside the child (intra psychological) (1978, p.27).

What Vygotsky indicates above, links to a great extent with the idea of self-correction within a philosophical community of inquiry. The person listens to others' opinions expressed in the community of inquiry, internalises the process through reflecting on what happens in the community and then possibly incorporates ideas discussed and ways of thinking within the community. The person through the internalisation of the thinking process that takes place might find that some ideas or ways of thinking that came from others work better for him/her. In that case the person self-corrects his/her previous ideas or ways of thinking with the new ones that possibly work better for him/her.

Self-correction seeks for a "better – truer" knowledge. What each individual does when s/he thinks reflectively is testing his/her beliefs and reconstructing them because of either the emergence of new evidence that comes from a stimulus or, most importantly, the implementation of reasonable epistemological criteria to his/her thinking of both the old beliefs and the new evidence coming from others (Gregory, 2006). At a communal level, self-correction seeks ways of improving the inquiry's processes and the thinking skills that the individuals demonstrate.

7.2. How are stimuli connected with philosophy as an evaluative force?

The link between stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy is differently viewed depending on the philosophical school one is influenced by. As mentioned in chapter two, realists, relativists and critical pluralists have a different appreciation of what philosophy is, therefore they have different perspectives on what the role of the stimulus is. Even though it is not stated clearly what the evaluative role of a stimulus is (as usually the stimulus is considered as the starting point of a philosophical inquiry that

needs no further investigation), I will try to imagine its role within the different philosophical traditions.

Realists tend to perceive an objective reality separated from people's understanding of this reality. The stimulus for a realist is external, distinct and independent from people's interpretation. A realist would probably use for a philosophical inquiry a stimulus that is already evaluated as worth being explored philosophically. An evaluative statement for a stimulus such as "this book does not have meaning" would make sense as the particular book would not meet the criteria that a realist sets in advance when s/he defines what is its meaning. A stimulus within an inquiry with realists would probably be accompanied with a manual of how evaluation should be done - objectively speaking. The main criterion of evaluation would be in terms of the truth and validity of the stimulus and of the ideas that have emerged as a result of it the stimulus.

On the other hand, a relativist would appear much more open in evaluating a stimulus for an inquiry positively. The chances are that any stimulus could be used philosophically as you cannot predict what meaning children will attach to the stimulus. Relativists would be much more open in exploring and interpreting a stimulus, however, they would struggle with evaluation as it would be difficult to define the criteria for such evaluation. They might even skip the evaluation altogether[247].

Critical pluralism seems to be the 'golden mean' as it allows for experimentation with any stimulus but at the same time encourages critical evaluation. Adults and children can both participate in such a dialogue providing both can give good reasons for reviewing a stimulus positively or negatively. The dialogue among children and adults does not exclude anybody or anything, except indoctrination (Costello, 2000) and at the same time sheds light on some aspects of a stimulus that would have remained unknown otherwise to both adults and children. Bearing this position in mind, I will try to explain below how the stimulus could be connected with the evaluative aspect of philosophy in two different ways.

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247 See figure 2.1

Firstly, there is an evaluation about the stimulus itself and an evaluation that comes from the engagement of the person with the stimulus[248]. In the first case, the evaluation refers mostly to the selection of a stimulus either by the children or the adults which can either go through a process of *Eros*, or *Thanatos*[249]. In the second case, the stimulus is the point of connection between focusing 'in' and 'out' of an individual's thinking. The evaluation refers to the individual's engagement with the stimulus which:

- enables the mapping of the experience generated through the person's engagement with a stimulus,
- provokes emotions in the person that either enable or prohibit the further evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion that emerged through the engagement with it, and
- activates the person's reflective thinking of the ideas generated and possibly leads to self-correction and to applying philosophy in everyday life.

In all cases the gadfly metaphor used for the 'stimulus' in chapter six is applicable here again, to help us achieve a better understanding of the evaluative aspect of the stimulus:

- The traces left by the gadfly's flight create an imaginary map of the aspects of the stimulus that were discussed.
- The gadfly persistently flies and provokes emotions and requires patience from the participants to make judgements bearing in mind the emotions generated,
- The constant presence of the gadfly keeps children's thinking alert. The stimulus as a 'gadfly' can create a shared perplexity between the children and the teacher and therefore the beginning of a philosophical inquiry (Matthews, 2003a).

248 I will not refer to the evaluation of the stimulus itself as it concerns mainly the criteria of selection of a stimulus which is the subject of discussion in chapter 5.

249 See chapters 4 and 6.

It is very important to highlight that the engagement of children with a stimulus may lead them to self-correct without the intervention of the facilitator[250]. In other words the stimulus can indirectly help children become better in evaluating situations and self-correcting. This gives children the sense of being an agent instead of being acted upon (Pestalozzi, 1898). The child becomes more autonomous and capable of controlling their own thinking without being directed by the teacher (Freire, 1972). It may also resolve the apt dilemma that the facilitator often faces: shall s/he let the dialogue go on expecting that its quality and depth within a c.o.i. will improve or intervene and nudge students to think critically (Splitter, 2007a). A good stimulus does most of the work, keeping children busy thinking and leaving to the teacher a secondary, facilitative role. In this case the facilitator needs only to push children's thinking further by asking for further clarification when necessary, make sure that children's ideas are listened to by all and give hints about aspects of the stimulus that could be further developed (Haynes, 2008). Thus, the dialogue has more chances of focusing mostly on children than on the teacher, or as Splitter highlights changing from "T-S-T-S-T-S-T[251]..." to " T-S-S-S-S-T-S-S-S-S-T-S..."[252] (2007a, p.217).

The more complex the stimulus is and the more heterogeneous the community of inquiry is, the more difficult and challenging the evaluation is. An inquiry that consists of a very homogenous group of members who share the same perspectives, have the same aims and think similarly may help them think in more depth and reaffirm their beliefs and agree to what they know but it may not challenge them to identify different aspects that would be worthy of discussion. On the contrary, a very heterogeneous group of individuals whose thinking displays huge differences, a very complex stimulus

250 The cycle according to which the teacher asks a question, the student answers and the teacher evaluates the answer does not work because it puts off children to think creatively about ideas that the teacher would not approve, it does not allow children to learn from each other, and there is no connection between the questions' and children's past and future interests and experiences (Sprod,1995).

251 T stands for teacher and S for student. T-S-T-S model is the traditional educational process in the classroom where the teacher asks a student and the student replies to the teacher. Instead, a T-S-S-S-T-S-S-S model gives emphasis to students' questioning and talking to each other. In this case the teacher is just one member and not the centre of the educational process. Students have more opportunities to express themselves.

252 See an empirical application of Splitter's idea in Korean preschool settings (Seon-hee Jo and Park, Jin-whan, 2001)

or a combination of the above may be disruptive and make it difficult for the facilitator to facilitate.

7.2.1. The stimulus as a way of mapping the children's experience with it

All the questions, diagrams, comments that the children make about the stimulus within a community of inquiry, if recorded[253], can create a potential, but not exclusive, 'map' of the stimulus[254]. This 'map' is potential because it can be different each time it is made for the stimulus, as it represents the different aspect of the stimulus that each time is discussed[255]. It's not exclusive as it does not 'capture' all children's reflective thinking; for instance the thinking that has not been verbally expressed. However, even if not totally accurately, this mapping enlightens further the initial stimulus and shows to the community how it has philosophically proceeded[256]. It shows its 'history' and also the dynamics of the community of inquiry during the analysis of the stimulus (e.g. who spoke often, what were the responses in certain questions etc) (Splitter, 2003; 2006a; Lyshyn, 2002). The mapping of the stimulus is not only on its own an evaluation of the process followed and captures the progress the philosophical inquiry, but is also a point of reference for the evaluation (not necessarily in the classroom or during a certain timetable). Mapping or recording children's philosophical experiences by writing their ideas in personal logs or audio-recording them, enables children's self-correction no

253 For instance, children's questions and comments can be written on the board or in a logbook which can be communal or for each individual. Children's thinking can be visualised in many ways such as: a) by using charts, diagrams and mind maps of their ideas (Buzan,2003), b) by writing down positive, negative or interesting points concerning the under discussion subjects or identifying the obvious and not obvious premises underlying as if the subject under discussion is an iceberg (Margulies and Valenza, 2005; Durham, 2006). Their ideas can also be audio taped or videotaped (Kyle,1993). The interactive whiteboard can show graphically the relationships and the connection between the ideas and the gaps in knowledge that occurred through engaging with a stimulus (Bruce, Knight and Barnes, 2008).

254 Costello's three-fold programme of Philosophy which is based on the use of short stories, diagrams and modes of reasoning depicts somehow the mapping of children's experience when doing philosophy with children (Costello,1996).

255 See for instance appendix 4: Questions that emerge spontaneously in the classroom. The writing down of children's ideas captures, as a map, the progress of a philosophical discussion at this particular moment. However, this works as a stimulus that can open in future. Children can always see their ideas written, revisit and open the dialogue again by evaluating what they have already written and adding new ideas that again are open to further evaluation.

256 See the idea of 'focusing out' analysed before and the idea of improving the techniques of thinking at a communal level.

matter what drawbacks may be demonstrated[257]. This process works also as a memorandum or as an 'extension' and 'expansion' of the initial stimulus: Children can 'visit' their ideas, test them in terms of their validity and applicability in life and either abide with them or reject them (Kyle, 1993). Sharp's analogy of a community of philosophical inquiry with "Going Visiting" or differently "travelling to a new location" would be useful here (Sharp, 2008a; 2008b). A person who participates in a community of inquiry and differentiates him or herself from others is like a visitor at a new place who views stimuli as a tourist without letting them change his or her way of thinking or behaviour. On the other hand, when one self-corrects his or her self for the sake of self-corrective thinking it is like the refugee who migrates and is totally assimilated into the new environment and its stimuli to the extent that the person forgets oneself and one's origins. I would say that those two different attitudes set the limits and the range of self-corrective thinking.

The mapping of the stimulus, although it is not exclusive, serves as a mapping of the children's experiences through their engagement with the stimulus. Dewey writes:

> The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. This unity is neither emotional, nor practical, nor intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse about an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. In going over an experience in mind AFTER its occurrence, we may find that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterizes the experience as a whole (2005, p.38).

This passage highlights the evaluative role of the stimuli: on the one hand, children live the experience by engaging with the stimulus and on the other hand, they evaluate it

257 There are drawbacks though which I summarize below: a) when the facilitator summarizes in a few words what children said s/he mostly bases this on his/ her interpretation and understanding of what children might have thought. Children may not comment on the teacher's possible wrong interpretation for many reasons, such as wanting to please him/her that they have understood correctly or because they want to avoid arguing. b) it can be impractical as the facilitator has to listen carefully as to what the children say and write down their thoughts. S/he may lose the track of children's thoughts or her/his own thoughts, c) in case somebody else does the mapping, there may be a three way translation gap between what the pupils think, what the facilitator understands and what the writer maps.

afterwards[258]. This opens the way for further meta-cognition and evaluation of children's whole experiences. Again, the role of the facilitator fades as it is not him/her that evaluates, but children themselves by referring to the stimulus and the way they opened it within a c.o.i. The comments made, the questions raised, the ideas written down in personal log books become a lived experience that afterwards can help children evaluate their thinking, their progress, their attitudes towards the philosophical dialogue and the ideas they came up with.

7.2.2. The stimulus as a way of provoking emotions and making children aware of them when evaluating situations

Children need to be aware that they think not only logically but also emotionally. As argued[259] earlier, emotions are judgements (Nussbaum, 2001). Therefore, rather than trying to push them away or pretend that they are not involved when taking decisions, it is better to accept this, be aware of one's emotions and try to understand how they influence and inform thinking and the decisions children make. Stimuli, as they provoke emotions, can help children recognise how their thinking is emotionally influenced. Through the stimulus children can realise their individuality in terms of the emotions generated by the stimulus. As Nussbaum argues the "emotions contain an ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is *my* scheme of goals and projects" (Nussbaum, 2001, p.52). Children realise that their judgements reveal their ways of thinking and feeling, therefore aspects of themselves and how they evaluate themselves and others. Their likes or dislikes for a stimulus can influence their attitude towards it.

The engagement with the stimulus leads to emotional response from the members of the community of inquiry which is an aspect of what is often described as caring thinking (Sharp, 2007a). This emotional mood, part of *zymotic* listening, affects people's self-correcting and evaluating of their ideas. Sharp in her article "The other side of reason"

258 See chapter 6 and the example given by Egley and Foulston (2010).

259 See chapter 4 and 5

builds on Lipman's ideas and expands on self-correction as *emotions* which are a form of thinking[260]. For Sharp, self-correction makes sense when children are able to identify certain emotions that influence their thinking and manage them in a way that helps them adjust in their social environment and communicate more effectively with the other members (Sharp, 2008a). What Sharp denotes is a kind of meta-thinking which consists of a deliberate awareness and a conscious concentration about the way children think and feel so as to self-correct.

Thoughts and emotions (if not considered as thoughts) are about something - they have an object (Nussbaum, 2001). According to Nussbaum this object is intentional:

> that is, it figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person whose emotion it is. Emotions are not about their objects merely in the sense of being pointed at them and let go, the way an arrow is released towards its target [...] Emotions are active ways of seeing and interpreting/ not being given a snapshot of the object, but requires looking at the object, so to speak through one's own window (2001. p.27 -28).

What Nussbaum highlights above has a direct application to stimuli. The stimuli are about something and can provoke emotions that are subject to multiple interpretations. Also the way stimuli are evaluated is not so much because of them being objects, but because of the different ways they can be viewed. The stimuli can offer children a two fold opportunity: a) to make them emotionally moved and engaged in a dialogue that can allow children a Deweyan experience, b) to allow space for meta-cognition about the stimulus used and the experience created which allows children to deliberately concentrate on them. Hence, children become more sensitive about their thoughts and emotions and can evaluate certain situations.

Through their involvement with a stimulus children can also become aware that their thoughts and emotions are localised: they refer to the particular stimulus or experience

260 Goleman (1996) understands emotional intelligence as a person's ability to recognise one's feelings and others', motivates self and manages well the emotions either for him or in the relationships the person is member of. This ability is necessary to be developed among the members that participate in a community of inquiry as it can enable members to self-correct their thinking.

that the children have rather than the general meaning of the particular emotions in the universe as a whole[261] (Nussbaum, 2001, p.31). Such a thesis was the basic argument against philosophy with children which was perceived as "concrete philosophy"[262] (Kitchener, 1990). However, talking in general about what is an emotion is philosophically empty if first of all emotions are not recognised in concrete examples. Focusing on concrete situations enables a deeper understanding of the nuances that emotions take in particular and concrete situations. For instance, there are different nuances of disgust for a stimulus. Children may be disgusted by the same stimulus but for different reasons they may express their disgust in different ways. Being able to distinguish these different connotations of an emotion and evaluate it for a particular situation is much more important than simply generalizing about what is an emotion. But even if an abstract discussion about what a stimulus is important, it makes sense only if firstly children have empirically or conceptually experienced emotions in particular situations or with certain stimuli. The role of the facilitator is to make sure that the inquiry does not turn into a therapeutic session that is consumed by a psychological analysis of children's emotions connected with their previous experiences (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009).

Emotions are not only created through the engagement of children with the stimulus; they are often imbedded in the stimulus (Sharp, 2007a; Murris, 2009). Murris (2009) highlights the emotional dimension of a narrative and how this affects dialogue among members in a community of inquiry. Through the narrative (as found in picture-books or P4C novels), children become aware of their emotions towards the characters of the narrative, explore them further, discover new meanings, and possibly correct themselves (Nussbaum, 2001). It may be argued that such stimuli, being already loaded with emotions, may create a skewed view towards the stimuli or even block children's objective evaluation. I would argue that as long as these stimuli do not provide emotions that impose or direct towards certain ways of how the readers should feel, they are even

261 See appendix 4: The classroom labels: How do I feel today? Children talk about their own emotions which keep changing during the day and soon elaborate by asking rather complex questions such us "is Georgia's anger the same as mine?" which can be discussed further philosophically.

262 See chapter 2.

richer than other alternatives available for doing philosophy with children. They add to the multiple interpretation of a stimulus and widen the range of possible evaluations.

What is hinted at here is that the stimuli can offer models of thinking that are subject to children's evaluation[263]. These models that the stimulus offers work better within a c.o.i. and when they are discussed further. An inquiry about a stimulus enables children's see the emotions others have for a stimulus which may vary from their own. Listening to different ways of others justifying their emotions towards a stimulus, children can grasp a deeper understanding of the aspects of the stimulus that might have never been considered before. Splitter (2000a; 2000b) indicates that "inquiry presupposes community". He highlights the asymmetry between community and inquiry: community can be independent without inquiry but inquiry needs community. Therefore, a person may change her/his thinking when s/he is exposed to different ways of thinking. The stimulus, in this context, offers the field for experimentation with ideas and the reason for the community to start discussing. The children have a starting point to refer to so as to possibly 'change their minds' and self-correct.

The stimuli should support the maintenance of a balance among "resilience, courage and flexibility" in children's thinking while they address philosophical issues and think of how to work out plausible responses in a community of inquiry (Matthews, 2008; Haynes, 2008). Children changing their minds, shows openness in their thinking which sometimes adults lack for fear of giving the impression of being weak. On the other hand children may change their thinking only because they are considered to be prone to influence. The stimuli and the engagement with them within a c.o.i. give the opportunity for children to be:

- resilient to changing their mind only when there is a good reason for that,
- courageous either to accept that they are mistaken and change their mind or hold their previous ideas, and
- flexible to listen to new ideas and accept new ways of thinking.

263 See chapter 3 the discussion about Lipman's novels

7.2.3. The stimulus as a way of enabling children's reflective thinking which possibly leads to self-correction

In chapter six, it was argued that the stimulus enables children to generate ideas through *zymotic* listening. There is a phase of excitement about ideas but as the fermentative process goes on, the ideas settle down. This settling down enables the evaluative process of the ideas that were generated as it allows time for them to be tested critically. The stimulus is the *topos* (place) where children and philosophy as an evaluative force meet. Without the initial stimulus and the constant presence and reference to it, ideas would neither be generated nor tested afterwards. Even though the stimulus itself is passive, the engagement with it is what makes it powerful. This is why the role of the teacher and the community of inquiry are important: it is through them that a stimulus can be explored to its maximum potential.

The constant reference to the stimulus makes children more sensitive to the context of the discussion around the stimulus. For example, the special limitations and the exceptional or irregular circumstances that are indicated by the stimulus or described in it (Lipman, 2003; Lipman, 1996a). Therefore, when children try to find reasons and arguments to support their ideas they have to think and evaluate whether these ideas could be applicable to the specific context of the dialogue about the stimulus. They have to be flexible in their thinking, experiential and personal (Murris, 2008b). Even though this could be characterized as 'concrete thinking', it can be argued that it's a form of practical reasoning. Decisions in everyday life are usually made for particular concrete situations and children need to have the skill of evaluating these particular situations[264] in a spirit of phronesis, as indicated by Aristotle. According to Fields (referring to Evans), children have the opportunity to think about relevant criteria that meet the situations given by the stimulus, be consistent in their thinking, but also be flexible to change their minds when there are good reasons and express their ideas comprehensibly (Fields, 1995a; 1995b).

264 For an example see appendix 4: The scale of responsibility and children's discussion that being perfectly responsible is not necessarily a very good thing.

The stimulus, apart from being a concrete example, opens up to the world of possible situations that could be safely investigated. Safely, means that children can experiment with ideas without real consequences, in the sense of having any negative effect on their lives. However, children's engagement with the stimulus can help them evaluate possible situations, imagine how things would be if they were different and possibly apply some of these ideas to their own life. The engagement with the stimulus allows children to develop certain behaviours and skills that show this, such as identifying errors in thinking[265] or that of others, pointing out ambiguity, vague, obscure or non clarified expressions, demanding further elaboration on reasons or criteria that have been used to support arguments, seeking inconsistencies or fallacies in reasoning, examining the premises and their hidden assumptions on which an argument is based (Lipman, 2003; Fisher, 2008). These behaviours and skills can be transferable into other situations (Winstenley, 2008) and this is one way that the evaluative aspect of philosophy can be linked with philosophy as a way of life[266].

The question "What would happen if..." opens the space not only for children's creative thinking but also for its evaluation. Stimuli such as those specially written stories for P4C or children's literature can help the readers:

- think actively by organizing what the thoughts and the emotions of the fictional characters are, building on the ideas of the fictional characters adding at the same time their ideas and the ideas of the other members of the c.o.i.,
- think affectionately by acknowledging the emotions of the fictional characters and trying to justify them, and
- think normatively about how the characters should act and if there are certain obligations given by the stimulus.

The Socratic Method can be a way of exploring a stimulus further with the implicit help of the facilitator or the other members of a mature community of inquiry that can self

265 See appendix 4: Children's discussion and need for practical critical thinking about how to adjust the fake bear on their faces in their pretending playing of being Ancient Greek gods.

266 See chapter 8

direct without the facilitator's intervention. Briefly, the process of Socratic *Elenchus* comprises of the following stages:

- concept clarification by giving a definition of it,
- checking the premises upon which the definition is based,
- offering of counter examples that contradict the definition,
- critique the reasoning and searching for alternatives and finally
- the final evaluation of the reasons that support the initial definition[267] (Creel, 2001, p.45).

In the Pragmatist context Socratic method could be used as a method of hypothesising and understanding knowledge as a justified true belief even if temporarily (Matthews, 2003). It remains to be asked, however, how this process is linked with a stimulus in philosophy with children?

Socrates would start with a question that was truly puzzling his interlocutor (an aporia), for instance, 'what is love?' was the main subject in Plato's *Symposium*. Such a question might emerge from children's engagement with the picture-book of Max Velthuijs' '*Frog in Love'*.

267 See the example of Euthyphro in chapter 1, p.18.

Hare thought hard, just like a real doctor.
"I see," he said. "It's your heart. Mine goes thump-thump too."
"But mine sometimes thumps faster than usual," said Frog.
"It goes one-two, one-two, one-two."
Hare took a big book down from his bookshelf and turned the pages.
"Aha!" he said. "Listen to this. Heartbeat, speeded up, hot and cold turns...it means you're in love!"
"In love?" said Frog, surprised. "Wow! I'm in love!"

Figure 7.3: Picture from Velthuijs' Frog in Love

Children might try to define what love is. The stimulus used could be a source either for children finding reasons to support their ideas, or to test arguments that might be offered by the stimulus itself. When, for instance, Frog goes to the doctor and it is diagnosed that he is in love because his heart goes "thump-thump" the facilitator may ask the children to assess this premise as to whether it is a good argument in favour of being in love. Children may find counter arguments, for instance the heart also thumps when one is anxious (due to taking an important examination or going to the dentists). Heart rate can also be highly increased in the case of a claustrophobic person trapped in an elevator. Therefore, the 'thumping' criterion is not a necessary condition to explain what it means to be in love. However other children may have different arguments (e.g. there are special ways of thumping!) and elaborate further on them. This is where the Socratic method can be used to check the validity of children's arguments.

7.3. An example of self-correcting thinking: Is it good to throw fireworks at Easter?

Below, I present an example of a dialogue among children aged 4-6 years old that shows how the use of a stimulus may lead to children's self-correction. The discussion began when a child brought in to the class the photos of fireworks (stimulus) that his family had taken during Easter. He shared his photos with us because children were encouraged in my classroom to bring things that they would like to discuss or show to others. There was no intention of expanding the discussion philosophically until a girl said that the fireworks made her scared and some other children agreed with her. Some others, however, insisted that fireworks were 'good fun'. I asked them to give reasons why it is good or bad to throw fireworks[268].

Children were invited to think of the consequences of certain actions. After the presentation of the children's ideas, which I wrote on the wall so as not to forget, children wanted to go on and think what is morally correct or wrong to do. Below, I present a passage of the dialogue that took place during the presenting of the children's arguments.

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268 Arguments in favor of throwing fireworks during Easter because:
We like them (Ntinos)
We throw them up to the sky, they are noisy and they make us laugh (Elpida)
We threaten all the 'babies' (Mike)
They have nice colours (Gina)
It's just one day a year and it is fun (Minos)
Arguments against throwing fireworks during Easter because:
A bullet may explode close to people and smash them into a million of little pieces (Kostis)
The church may catch fire (Kostis)
Somebody may get burnt (Eui)
A bullet may lose the way and get into our ears and destroy the drum and then we will not listen to the others (Vasos)
Our hands may got burnt when we light the fireworks (Gina)
Yeah... a firework may stick into our hands when we try to light them and then it can go off and we will die (Mike)
It may causes damages to the houses and the people who live there (Elpida)
Maybe the light of the fireworks can cause damages to our eyes and we will not be able to see (Vasos)
People who are fast asleep will get up frightened (Rhodi)
Birds will be scared (Mike)

Elpida: I hadn't thought that birds would be scared by the fireworks.(1)[269]

Gina: Mm, yeah...if I woke up by the fireworks in the night I wouldn't like it. (2)

Minos: Yeah...but this night all the people are out, nobody sleeps. (3)

Me: How do you know that all people are out? (4)

Minos: Because it is Easter. You can't sleep, you go to the church. (5)

Ntinos: My grandmother doesn't go to the church because she is too old. Maybe she would be terrified if a firework exploded next to her. (6)

Minos: But it wouldn't. It's still cold and the windows are shut. (7)

Vasos: It can smash the glass so the Ntino's grandmother could be hurt by a piece of glass that would go straight to her neck. She would bleed. Or it would destroy the drums of her ears.(8)

Ntinos: She is quite deaf anyway. (9)

Minos: But it is just once a year. What's wrong in throwing some fireworks once a year? (10)

Kostis: Yeah...once a year is not too much. We shouldn't feel guilty.(11)

Elpida: Now I don't know what to do. Before I thought that fireworks were fun, but then I thought that poor birds may suffer and now Minos says that once a year is not too much. I am not sure (12)
(small pause)

Gina: Mmm...it's not only once a year. There are fireworks when there is a wedding. And there are many weddings every summer (13)

Mike: I will tell my father off next time that he will throw fireworks anyway (14)

Elpida: Are there fireworks with no sound but with colours? (15)

Ntinos: Pf.... Fireworks without sound are not fun.(16)

Vasos: The colour can still make the birds blind. It's very bright.(17)

Minos: Come on! It's just a quick flash. (18)

This dialogue shows how the engagement with a stimulus can activate children's a) creative thinking which takes place at the beginning when the children think of

269 I number the sentences so as to use the numbers to refer to certain sentences later instead of repeating the sentences.

arguments for and against using fireworks and b) critical thinking, when children test the validity and applicability of the arguments offered before by applying their own a version of Socratic *Elenchus* and testing it within the community of inquiry that children have created. Children's discussion shows an immaculate coherence and focus on the stimulus, as well as on the question that came from it. This is because children disagreed with each other about a stimulus that matters to them and they tried to provide arguments to support their opinions and undermine the opinions of others.

Minos was the one in favour of the fireworks and offered a counter argument to Gina's argument about people being asleep. He generalized by using the word "all". His argument was that this is a specific night: all are out/nobody sleeps. This made Ntinos test the word 'all' and provide counterexamples that not all people go to church (e.g. his grandmother did not). Minos ignored Ntino's counter example and seemed to forget the issue of noise. He argued that the firework cannot affect his grandmother because the weather is chilly and does not permit people to open the windows. Vasos supported Ntino's counter argument by exploring it further and offering some alternatives. The discussion went on with a sequence of arguments and counter arguments that illustrate how philosophising can be evaluative within a c.o.i.

Elpida's attitude is an example of reflection and an attempt to self-correct. She seemed to have carefully listened to what the others said and realised parameters that she had not thought of before, which made her questioning whether it is bad or good to throw fireworks (1). She seemed to decentre from herself and think over other people's or animals' points of view, which is a necessary skill for evaluating. Later on Elpida was confused with the arguments in favour and against as to the use of fireworks, however she was able to summarize the basic arguments to such an extent that she constantly changed her opinion (12). This is a sign of *zymotic* listening: listening to others, reflecting on what has been said and trying to form her own point of view. However, it seemed that both sides of the argument were well supported, so she was still puzzled.

How did the stimulus keep being a point of reference throughout the inquiry? One way was by thinking of other occasions than Easter when fireworks are also used. When Minos gave a second counter argument, i.e., referring to the rarity of using fireworks (Easter is once a year) so as to justify their use, Kostis was persuaded, but Gina knocked Mino's argument down by providing another counter argument: that fireworks can be used to celebrate.

Another more imaginative way, was by visualising the effects of throwing fireworks. Vaso's descriptions had strong elements of thinking hypothetically as to what the consequences of an action could be which not take placed at that moment. This could be either due to previous direct or indirect experience (e.g. through films he has seen and books he has read) that Vasos had, or due to his ability of thinking creatively and evaluating as to the possible consequences of each hypothesis. Vaso's contributions are genuine examples of both creative and critical thinking. The same thing was also the case with Gina who tested Elpida's argument about irritating people who are asleep by imagining herself in this position and how she would have felt. Gina agreed with Elpida's point because she could visualise her thinking and her possible reactions based mostly on her previous experience (2).

A third way was by building on the stimulus and opening it for further thinking. Elpida's attempt to keep the fun of fireworks but eliminate their bad effects activated her creative thinking (15). This enabled others to evaluate the new idea (16, 17). Colourful but mute fireworks were a new aspect of the initial stimulus to be explored. This is where the c.o.i. is important: it provides its members with new ideas to evaluate further. Elpida 'opened up' the initial stimulus by offering an imaginative version of it and by stimulating others to imagine the consequences of the expanded stimulus.

The evaluation of the arguments did not take place for the sake of the arguments, but for the sake of what action children should take in the future. Mike's statement -he would say to his father not to use fireworks again- shows: a) evaluation of a situation by its consequences and b) a type of action that could take place and is now connected

with children's well being. Children were puzzled whether it was good to use fireworks or not and tried to come up with an answer they could apply. It seemed as if Elpida was looking for general rules, in her attempt to find out how one should act (12).

Therefore, the evaluation of the arguments was not only done for the sake of the argument, but also for the sake of how one should live. This dialogue is an example of how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force links with children's experiences and their understanding of how they should live (philosophy as a way of life). The children kept discussing this for a long time because this issue was linked to their experiences, so it mattered to them to explore it further. It's worthy to mention that this dialogue emerged from children's genuine interests (the stimulus was offered by the children). What the facilitator only did was to identify the initial disagreement over the use of the fireworks and bringing it closer to children's attention to explore it further.

7.4. Conclusion

In this chapter it was argued that the evaluative character of philosophy is mostly connected with individuals' self-correcting. The stimulus and philosophy as an evaluative force are linked together in two different ways. There is an evaluation towards the stimulus itself and an evaluation that comes from the engagement of the person with the stimulus. In the first case, the evaluation refers mostly to the selection of a stimulus whereas in the second case, it refers to the person's engagement with the stimulus which: a) provokes emotions in the person that either enable or prohibit the further evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion that emerged through the engagement with it, b) activates the person's reflective thinking of the ideas generated and possibly leads to self-correction and to applying philosophy in everyday life and c) enables the mapping of the experience generated through the person's engagement with a stimulus.

1) The emotional response that the stimulus offers and the emotional mood it creates within the community of inquiry is essential for people's self-correcting. The stimuli can offer children a two-fold opportunity: a) to make them emotionally moved and engaged in a dialogue that can allow children a Deweyan experience, b) to allow space for meta-cognition about the stimulus used which allows children to deliberately concentrate on how they feel, what they think about the stimuli they engaged with and how they can evaluate certain situations better. The stimuli and the engagement with them within a c.o.i. give the opportunity for children to be: a) resilient and change their mind only when there is a good reason to do so, b) courageous either to accept that they are mistaken and change their mind or hold their previous ideas and c) flexible to listen to new ideas and accept new ways of thinking.

2) The settling down of ideas generated through *zymotic* listening is a kind of evaluative process where the ideas are tested critically in terms of their validity and applicability. The stimulus is the *topos* where children and philosophy as an evaluative force meet together. This is because without the initial stimulus and the constant presence and reference to it, neither ideas would be generated nor would they be tested afterwards. However, it is the people's engagement with a stimulus; no matter what it is or who brings it (children or adults) that activates their reflective thinking which may lead to their self-correcting.

3) The mapping of the stimulus, including children's comments and questions, enables children's self-correction independent of the possible drawbacks. Moreover, it serves as the mapping of the whole experience children had through their engagement with it. This opens the way for further meta-cognition and evaluation of children's whole experiences. The role of the facilitator fades as it is not him/her that will evaluate, but children through referring to the stimulus and the way they opened it within a c.o.i.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the link between the stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy is differently viewed depending on the philosophical school one is influenced by. Realists would find it easier to identify what counts as a stimulus and how

a stimulus should be perceived whereas relativists would appear much more open in evaluating a stimulus for an inquiry, positively and uncritically. Critical pluralism seems to be the 'golden mean' as it allows not only the experimentation with any stimulus, but at the same time the critical approach of it.

The generative and evaluative role of the stimuli is not enough to link them with philosophy as a way of life. How this is possible is explained in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER 8

Children, stimuli and philosophy as a way of life

Abstract

This chapter focuses on two parameters: a) What is philosophy as a way of life and how it is connected with the stimuli used for doing philosophy and b) how children's lives and philosophy as a way of life can be connected. Philosophy as a way of life is understood as linked practically with human's action. This link is reflected in individuals' diathesis (attitudes) towards examining their lives. It is claimed that stimuli's narrative nature enables the linking of everyday experience with philosophy. The last part of the chapter concentrates on how children's philosophies as a way of life are possible, including examples which show that philosophy with children goes beyond the classroom. Children's actions are further analysed, the necessity of dialoguing with children at any occasion and the process of building children's diathesis that favours philosophy as a way of life.

8.1. Introduction

There is a failure of philosophical programmes when they are reduced to mere thinking skills, or to the history of intellectual thought (Gazzard, 1996). This is because the programmes are inadequate to generate desire for making meaning connected with children's lives and fail to develop a reflective habit of mind in children that will be transferred in other aspects of their life. Philosophy is about the whole person and not just developing thinking skills (Robinson, 1995; Lamb, 2000). Philosophy is not only "philosophy of something" but "a living attitude and living this attitude" (DelNevo, 2001). Another reason that philosophical programmes may fail in the long term is that the philosophical discussion that occurs within a c.o.i. does not have any practicality. This means that the ideas generated are not tested in actual situations (Bleasby, 2004). Philosophy in education should be considered as an embodiment of lifelong learning (Burgh and Brien, 2002).

Philosophy with children and education should go together. There is no education without an underpinning philosophy and no philosophy with children without pedagogical character. There are two basic philosophical questions that emerge and determine the aims of the education: a) what person I want to be and b) in what world I want to live (Echeverria, 2007). Both questions are theoretical and practical. Theoretically they seek the criteria of what is a person, if the person is ever likely to become something different, and what is the ideal world to live in. Practically, education through its curriculum and its stimuli aims at bringing into reality what is ideally considered as the best person and the best world to live in. Therefore, one basic aim of education is to incorporate practicality (Dewey, 1966), or in other words to link the philosophical theory with philosophical action and make the theory a potential way of a philosophical way of life.

8.2. How are stimuli connected with philosophy as a way of life?

Developing one's thinking skills is necessary but should also be embedded into everyday life. Philosophy as a way of life incorporates thinking skills to the extent that it helps a person 'know thyself' and his/her connection with the world and others. The philosophical inquiry is worthy when it aims at understanding and making meaning of experience (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). This is the practical orientation of philosophy towards examining life and assuring people's *eudemonia*. What makes philosophy as a way of life distinctive and more than the sum of its generative and evaluative aspects is its connection with individuals' *diatheses* and *actions*. Stimuli emerge from everyday life and can be explored philosophically. However, in order to connect stimuli with philosophy as a way of life there is need to see whether they are connected with *diathesis* and human action.

8.3 Diathesis

Diatheses refer to people's attitudes and dispositions towards life[270]. They refer to the person as a whole being that has thoughts and emotions, acts in many ways and tries to place him/ herself in the world. They reflect people's 'philosophy' and 'narration' towards life. *Diatheses* can either be positive and reinforcing further exploration and thinking upon the stimuli life gives to us, negative which could lead to the abandonment of life and its stimuli (temporary or permanent *Thanatos* of them) or mixed and unclear. Being in *Eros*[271] with the idea of improving oneself and the world one lives in (especially if such attitude becomes a necessity and a habit) is what establishes positive *diatheses* that can link philosophy with practical life. As Johann Wolfgang Eckermann claims we learn only from those (or what) we love (Moorhead, 1971). One way to achieve this is through the matching of the stimulus's narrative form[272] with individuals' narrative understanding of the world (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).

Becoming open and tolerant but also in a state of alertness (*prosoche*) seems to be two fundamental *diatheses* that enable individuals to communicate and achieve reasoned agreements with each other in everyday life (Benhabib, 1992). Being open and alert can be understood also as 'values' that we bring into a community of inquiry to reassure it as a place of further intellectual research which is free from indoctrination. These *diatheses* are also both linked with *zymotic* listening[273]: the first one enables creative thinking, whereas the second one allows critical and emotional thinking. Both *diatheses* make the person open in finding stimuli within life that are worth exploring and tolerant with the idea that *zymotic* listening takes time.

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270 Splitter (2010) analyses philosophically what a disposition is by clarifying first whether they are physical or mental and identifying later their relationship with abilities, habits, beliefs, desires and values.

271 There is a need for "love to occur" (Philei ginesthai) as Marcus Aurelious claims (Hadot,1995, p.198). See also chapter 4 for a more thorough analysis of Eros.

272 See chapter 5.

273 See chapter 6.

8.3.1. Becoming tolerant and open

Laverty (2007, p.125) suggests a type of listening within a community of inquiry that "is receptive, open, and self-eclipsing". The parameter of self-eclipsing, presupposes that the listener is selfless, holds back his/her own ideas, and prioritises listening to others instead of speaking first (Rawling and Rich, 1985; Murris and Haynes, 2000b). This *diathesis* is a moral virtue necessary to maintain a democratic society[274] and a true listening community in which "we" becomes more important than the "I" (Freire, 1972). Both adults and children need to have it because it allows *zymotic* listening to take place. Thus, respect and care towards others, admitting pluralism (Daniel, 2001; McLeod, 2005), understanding others' views and consequently constructing new meanings are secured (Waksman, 1998).

Tolerance refers also towards the stimulus which means avoiding censoring it immediately in case it does not meet our preferences. It also means dealing with the uncertainty of exploring the ideas of others which may be different from ours (Murris, 2008b). This last parameter is often not welcomed by teachers as they either fear how to approach ideas never thought by them before, or do not want to appear cognitively 'weak' in case they are not able to deal with a question or idea.

Openness allows listening *to* others but also, according to Levin (1989, p.83), listening *for* something, such as ideas that can come out of a stimulus. I disagree with Levin's listening 'for' something and I will stick to using the preposition 'to'. How can one be open when one listens for something? It is as if the person has already put a censoring filter and listens selectively to particular ideas that come from a stimulus or from the others talking about the stimulus.

Openness both to what others have to say and to one's own reflections is a necessary attitude for exploring a stimulus further. Levin (1989, p.48) referring to Heidegger

274 Being open means being able to think both independently and collaboratively, aspects of which are the willingness to review matters under other people's perspectives and the reasoned responses to disagreements or differences with others (Cam, 2009).

understands openness as a process of "letting-go and letting-be" which ensures that the listener focuses on the stimulus or what the speaker has to say. The idea here is "to flow with the stream" (Humphreys, 1977, p.71) not as a follower of a flock but as a way of being inspired by the stimulus and letting oneself be free to imagine where the stimulus takes us. This is not only an attitude that can be adopted during a dialogue but an attitude that is applicable in life. Rinaldi (2006) gives a 'broader' openness to include, apart from ears, all human senses. Openness is receptiveness, willingness to make the strange familiar and learn from it, allowing creative listening and afterwards critical thinking to happen.

8.3.2. Being in state of alertness/ *prosoche*

Being open minded means being alert and willing to receive information, test any ideas one hears, check for precision, seek more effective alternatives and abandon them if there are good reasons for that (Ennis, 2001; 1993). Openness implies acceptance that truth alters and is only temporary (Sharp, 1993). No matter how important tolerance and openness are, people should keep a balance between being unconditionally tolerant and totally intolerant. Tolerance is welcome up to the point that people do not reveal their vulnerability to peers (Haynes, 2007). Accepting any view in the name of tolerance can lead people to lower their expectation for themselves and others. Since people know that others are tolerant they may not bother to reason well so as to support their views further.

According to the Stoics *prosoche* means concentration in the moment which is always bearable and controllable (Hadot, 1995, p.85). Preston finds similarities between the Stoic's philosophy and the philosophy of the Samurai (referring to Tsunetomo) and gives the following understanding of the *prosoche* of the moment:

> There is surely nothing other than the single purpose of the present moment. A man's whole life is a succession of moment after moment. If

> one fully understands the present moment, there will be nothing else to do, and nothing else to pursue (Preston, 2003, p.49).

This attention helps people respond immediately to stimuli and events in the world as it enables people to connect with each other (through listening to others and thinking upon what they say). Being in a state of alertness ensures focusing on listening to others with the attempt to make meaning from what they have said (Rinaldi, 2006) and use effectively the *Elenchus*[275] (Socratic Method), so as to evaluate the ideas generated by the engagement with stimuli.

8.4. Human action

Practising a certain way of life may lead individuals to be in *Eros* with it. However, examining it may make people realise that they do not agree with it. This is not necessarily negative; on the contrary, it shows that one's philosophy is flexible and it can change. Self-correction and a changing attitude always reflect changing one's philosophy (or perspective of understanding the world and his/her self).

Pierre Hadot explains in more details how philosophy presents a form of living.

> First of all it is the memorization and assimilation of the fundamental dogmas and rules of life of the school. Thanks to this exercise, the vision of the world of the person who strives for spiritual progress will be completely transformed....can lead to an exercise of the imagination in which human things appear of little importance in the immensity of space and time. It is necessary to try to have these dogmas and rules for living 'ready to hand' if one is to be able to conduct oneself like a philosopher under all of life's circumstances. Moreover, one has to be able to imagine these circumstances in advance in order to be ready for the shock of events (Hadot, 1995, p.59).

Hadot gives here an example of how philosophy can merge with life. The comparative example of the importance of things in the immensity of space and time requires

275 See chapters 1 and 5

imaginative thinking and an open-tolerant *diathesis* as mentioned before. Imaginative thinking done in advance gives its turn to evaluative thinking which puts individuals in a state of alertness *(prosoche)*. This prevents people from being shocked by the consequences of their deeds as they have already imagined them. This imaginative and evaluative thinking is what Hadot describes as assimilation. As for the consciousness that people acquire through this process, it could be associated with the transformation of oneself which is a *zymotic* process.

Hadot (1995) understands that every philosophy is based on some dogmas which are methodological principles for each philosophy. Without some standard dogmas, there can be no further action and progress towards life. If everything is constantly questioned, practical decisions cannot be made. However, when the dogmas remain constantly unquestioned and untested then philosophy ceases. Philosophy, by definition, questions even its dogmas with the only aim to test their truth and its applicability in a constantly changing world. Philosophies change because life changes.

The intention (or in some cases intuition) of the action is the generative force that makes the action happen. What happens during or after the action is its evaluation through individuals' narrative structuring. These are the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy. When they become a habit, which means that people constantly generate new thoughts and consciously evaluate them and incorporate them into their life, philosophy becomes embedded in one's life[276].

Finding stimuli and appreciating them (which means leaving them to generate thoughts then evaluating them) is something that children and philosophers do. The only difference is that children do this naturally as an attempt to adapt and explain the world they live in and therefore its stimuli. Genuine philosophers are somewhere in between as they still possess the child's new and fresh way of looking and interpreting stimuli,

276 Of course one can argue that a psychologist or a religious person do the same thing. However, a religious person is usually reluctant to challenge his/her faith or be open to new ideas. Psychologists also personalizes their ideas without bothering to seek general rules for truth. On the contrary, philosophy, looks for creating ideas, examining them and incorporating into life even temporary, bearing in mind that these should serve not only oneself but also others' well being.

but they usually have enough training in using their media adequately. However, the training in using certain media may, occasionally, prevent them from directly locating themselves within the world and its stimuli.

The *diatheses* of openness and alertness enable individuals to identify stimuli in place and distinguish them from the flux of their experience as outstanding (or as 'an experience' according to Dewey). The more 'unclassified', 'absurd' or *'atopos'* (not in place)' a stimulus is, the more room it leaves to multiple interpretations and therefore to narrations. The more out of place *(atopos)* a stimulus is, the more individuals are forced to think 'out of the box' and allow different narrations to take place. The more places (*topos*) individuals find for their thinking, the better understanding they achieve for themselves and the more choice they have to adopt one or more in their life. Stimuli provide the place for multiple narrations and the dialogue within an inquiry is what picks them out.

So far, the stimuli have been located by referring to the *topos*. Time is another way to locate stimuli and people's actions in the world. There is an *epiphany* moment (time) where one reveals a new aspect of the stimulus. The ancient Greeks had two words for time, '*chronos*' and '*kairos*'. The first refers to chronological, sequential time, whereas the latter signifies a not necessarily determined time in which something special happens[277] (Freier, 2006). *'Chronos'* is the 'objective human way of counting time', whereas *'kairos'* is another way to refer to time subjectively (Sharp, 1997). The stimulus that has not influenced a person belongs in *'chronos'*. In contrast, when a person is grasped by a stimulus due to the *Eros* towards it and starts generating thoughts, then time stops being objective for this person. The person is totally absorbed by the stimulus and does not realise the time spent on the stimulus. In other words, the person moves from *'chronos'* to *'kairos'*. Philosophy as a way of life takes place mostly in *'kairos'* rather than in *'chronos'*.

277 Mark Freier (2006) Time Measured by Kairos and Kronos, at http://www.whatifenterprises.com/whatif/whatiskairos.pdf accessed on 21/05/2010.

Human action is located in space and time. The philosophical interpretation of the stimuli derived from human actions leads to a tuning that can be expressed simultaneously in three ways. In particular, when the person engages with a stimulus then: a) s/he experiences living in *'atopos'* and passes through different places *(topos)* and different opportunities of narration in each of them, b) s/he lives in *'kairos'* rather than in *'chronos'*, and c) s/he connects him/herself and the world together and acquires a good understanding of both. This is achieved through narrative. This narrative reflects, according to Rorty, how people understand the world under their descriptions (Calder, 2003). People express their descriptions about a stimulus, such as ideas, stories, memories in a narrative way through which they achieve the communication of these ideas with others. Those narratives which combine the lived experience with people's imagination and critical thinking become their own stimuli that educate and enhance understanding for both oneself and others (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). Through the narratives and the philosophical inquiry, thinking and doing are unified.[278]

An attractive stimulus can capture children's attention, whereas a rather dull stimulus can affect negatively every potential for a philosophical dialogue. Ende claims that if something is well written it always "comes from an integrity of heart, mind and senses and hence speaks according to the integrity of people" (1993, p.283). Similarly stimuli that come from children's actions show children's tuning with their *'topoi'* and *'kairos'*. Adults, mainly parents and teachers, should be able to recognise the stimuli that children find attractive because these stimuli possibly reflect their interests and needs and come from children's praxis and experiences.

8.5 Children, stimuli and philosophy as a way of life

No matter what philosophical underpinning underlies the different ways of doing philosophy for/with children, philosophy has been associated with the dialogue that occurs among children in the classroom after sharing a stimulus (Lipman et al, 1980;

278 See ideas of Schon, Oakeshott and Johnson as referred in Clandinin and Connelly (2000).

Gregory, 2007a; McCall, 2009; Murris and Haynes, 2000a). It is too restrictive to limit philosophy with children only to a classroom or to an after school philosophy club. Philosophy may start in the classroom but its use needs to be expanded[279]. It should also help children to become aware that philosophy can be part of their thinking, making choices, and living. In chapter three it was mentioned that children are welcome to select the stimuli for doing philosophy but also create their own. Any initiative of children's expressing their ideas verbally, written or non-verbally should be welcomed[280]. For instance, children could write their philosophical ideas in a journal[281] or the school's newspaper[282]. This way apart from the spoken inquiry in classroom space, a written expression is opened, which is part of philosophy and a further stimulus for discussion later (Foleman and Heesen, 1999).

Are children expected to show the same kind of awareness when they generate ideas or evaluate them as adults do? Are children expected to reflect on their choices and live consciously and philosophically? These questions are invalid as they presuppose an unnecessary comparison of adults' and children's narrations. Children are often expected to grow up so that they can make decisions the way adults do; however it is forgotten that children are brought up in an environment with adults so they have already experienced adulthood even if they have not lived it (Flay, 1978). Philosophy as a way of life is not a particular model that either children or adults follow. It is the awareness of one's life and the changing towards what seems to be better for both the person and the others. Children's philosophical ways of life have meaning only if linked with their everyday experiences and their thinking about it[283]. Therefore, philosophy in children's lives helps them: a) to discern what matters to them (Splitter and Sharp,

279 See appendix 4. It offers a variety of examples that show how philosophy can be incorporated into children's (age 4-6) everyday school life. Many of these examples can take place into children's houses and parents only need to be informed by the teacher about what children do at school.

280 See appendix 5. It offers examples of works produced by children which could be used philosophically within a community of philosophical inquiry.

281 As long as this happens because children really want this and not because the teachers in a school want to impress others, it is linked with children's philosophical way of life.

282 "Journal 100" is a European philosophical magazine that publishes children's thoughts on particular matters (Foleman and Heesen,1999).

283 For more examples see appendixes 4 and 5.

1995), b) resolve daily dilemmas that answer the question 'how should we live' or 'what should I do' (Haynes, 2008) not only in the classroom but in every aspect of their life. Philosophy enables children to discuss all the issues that are not well managed in public life and may suspend or mislead children's development (Glueck and Brighouse, 2008). The role of adults is very important as it is them who should welcome the stimuli that come from children and encourage their further philosophical investigation (Matthews, 1993).

8.5.1. Philosophy that comes from children versus stimuli given to them

Children's everyday life can be connected with philosophy through the stimuli that either are given by adults to children or, even better, emerged from children[284]. Referring to philosophy, there are stimuli designed by adults for doing philosophy with children such as the specially written material for P4C, stories, paintings etc. Adults often choose the stimuli so as to encourage children's philosophical thinking. There is nothing wrong with this as long as it is not imposed upon children what adults understand as philosophical thinking and as long as it does not become the only way of doing philosophy with children. Instead, adults should be helped to recognise how these stimuli given to children (such as picture-books) are explored by them and link with children's own experiences and narratives and their understanding of the world. They also should offer stimuli that encourage afterwards children to bring their own stimuli[285]. Activities for creative thinking, such as drawing, guided imagery, creative writing, philosophy camps act as a change of pace and a fresh perspective (Yule, 1992). These activities can become stimuli since they provide children with new experiences and can be linked with their own previous ones. These stimuli can enable children's expression of ideas and reflective thinking.

284 See appendixes 4 and 5

285 See chapter 5 and appendixes 4 and 5.

However, priority should be given to the stimuli children bring into a discussion. There is an assumption here that what children bring as stimuli is what matters to them and that they have genuine questions to ask (Dewey, 1913). Sears and Hilgard highlight that "what keeps the pupil performing is also likely to keep him learning" (1964, p.182). It can reflect their special interests and needs. These stimuli come through children's observation of how the world appears to them, through their games, the stories they choose to read, the TV programmes they watch and so on. They generate questions for the children which reflect their philosophy and understanding of the world. Therefore, it is important that these stimuli are explored philosophically not only in the way that adults would do (e.g. by linking children's ideas with existing philosophical matters), but also in the ways that children might indicate. That means that children could offer new methods of exploring stimuli philosophically, only if adults were open to listening to them. In this case, children's philosophy could refresh adults' philosophy and the way adults think about themselves and the world (Gibbons, 2007). It is not claimed here that there should be a distinction between 'children's philosophy' and 'adults' philosophy'. It rather means that children should not be excluded from philosophical thinking and from inventing new methods for doing so.

Kaye and Sexton (2004) view philosophy as a search for meaning that is based on the relationships among the pupils themselves and the wider community. Following on from this, children may incorporate a philosophical approach in viewing life which they can transmit to a wider environment, e.g. to their parents. Therefore, instead of having only adults altering children's lives because of their choices and their greater experience, the opposite can occur: children can show to adults philosophical ways of life that possibly are forgotten due to the rituals followed in everyday life[286]. Research on children's ways of reflecting on concrete or abstract ideas e.g. through drawings[287] or through stories

286 See more about children's interpreting picture-books through their life experiences in Pantaleo (2007)

287 Children's drawings and discussion of them should be taken into philosophical consideration as they enable adults to get a better understanding of children's representing and making meaning of the world (Soundy and Drucker, 2010). For instance, children through their drawings show how certain concepts and activities make meaning to them, such as their school experience (Einarsdottir et al, 2009) the planet earth children live on (Ehrlen, 2009). See also figures 8.1-8.5 of this chapter and also children's representations in drawings of their ideal houses in appendix 5.

that children write themselves[288] should be taken philosophically into account. This can be translated into questioning, being more attentive observers, dialoguing with others, taking decisions that affects themselves and others and they may alert adults to re-examine their own life and see what is worthy in it[289].

Gareth Matthews's dialogues with children (1984) seem to be close to what I describe as the connection of children's action with philosophy as a way of life. Matthews is willing to begin a conversation with children whenever there is a stimulus for that. Therefore when the children come up with a question that could be philosophically interesting, Matthews shows a way of how to continue the dialogue and enable children to think deeper. He gives examples of philosophical dialogues that he had with his children during bedtime stories, walks or over lunch/dinner time. What he points out is that the stimulus could appear whenever and wherever, and it's up to the adults to listen to it and enable children to elaborate on it further. However, what Matthews merely does is to link children's stimuli with already known philosophical problems and push them further, so as to investigate children's thoughts towards existing philosophical problems. What I suggest is paying also attention to the 'opposite' direction: how children's stimuli can create new philosophical considerations that adults have not yet thought about. This is possible by observing children's monologues, dialogues, playing alone and with others and all the aspects that form their experience[290]. It is also possible by observing adults attitudes towards children and how their voice can 'silence' children's voices (and potential philosophical thought).

One could argue that Matthews is a philosopher, so it is easy for him to identify potential philosophical ideas in the stimulus. A counter-argument would be that because

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288 Pantaleo (2009;2009b) focuses her research on children's reactions to picture-books' devices (see chapter 5) and how these are incorporated into the stories children create. She provides an ecological perspective on how children's understanding of the picture -books (which is socially constructed) affects their reading and writing. Such findings very much link with doing philosophy with children and viewing it as a way of life.

289 This process is a reminder of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed where the oppressed show to the oppressors more authentic ways of life and society changes from down to up instead of up to down (Freire,1972;1997).

290 See appendixes 4 and 5

Matthews is a philosopher, it can lead children's discussion towards a direction that is acknowledged by adults as philosophical. What happens, however, with ordinary teachers and parents who usually do not have a philosophical background and are also very busy with the practicalities of life? Adults need to recognise, understand and support children's actions through discovering first philosophy for themselves. Their life, as it is conducted, is based on some philosophy (could be hedonism, materialism, idealism, romanticism or a mixture). The sooner parents and teachers are aware of this the quicker they can understand children's action[291].

The first step is for adults to distinguish that philosophy is not the history of ideas that great thinkers have provided, and realise how they conduct their lives and how it is different from other ways of life experiences[292]. Of course, reading what great thinkers have written is usually useful as it helps to open the mind, look at things from different perspectives and examine afresh our own life. When Socrates said that the unexamined life is not worth living (Plato, *Apology, 38a*) he meant that people need to be conscious of what they do and why. The next step is to realise that there is no such thing as one way of 'correct' living. Therefore, there is a variety of different styles of living and thinking. Children's styles of thinking and children's experiences might be different from adults', but they are worth exploring. The third step requires both openness to listen to what is new and different and spending time doing so.

It may sound that such an approach is difficult to put into practice. However, if children's welfare and wellbeing is both the adults' aim, then it turns out that the whole of education (received formally in school and informally outside school) needs to be linked with philosophy (Postman, 1996; Cole 2010). This is not something new: different

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291 Empirical research (mostly based on questionnaires) shows that teacher recognise the positive effects that P4C has on children's cognitive and social development, their impact on children's motivation for further dialoguing and collaboration with others (Jones, 2008; Baumfield and Mroz, 2002). Furthermore, teachers who focus on developing children's thinking skills tend to change their overall pedagogical practice and behaviour towards children (Baumfield et al.,2005).

292 For an example from my personal experience where philosophy as a generative and evaluative force becomes a way of life, see appendix 8.

educational aims always reflect different underpinning philosophies and also different understandings of what a child is[293] but not necessarily teaching philosophy to children.

8.5.2. Observing children and dialoguing with them on every occasion (not only in class)

Stimuli for philosophical investigation can emerge at any time as long as adults pay attention to what children offer. Below, there are some examples from my experience as a teacher and as a listener that gave rise to philosophical discussions with children. However, many more examples are included in appendixes 4 and 5 of this thesis.

Example 1: What is the last number?

My five year old cousin was playing with three other boys of his age when suddenly one of his friends started to show off about how high he could count. I was washing the dishes and at the same time as I was listening to Nick counting to 100 without leaving any number out. Kimon, who was a bit jealous of Nick, said that he could count even further. This competition led Vasilis to ask a very philosophical question which seemed to be stimulating for the rest of the children. Below, I represent the dialogue that took place (I wrote it down as I remembered it after it had finished).

Vasilis: What is the last number?
(Small pause)
Manos: It must be one million.
Kimon: No, there are two millions also.
Nick: Then we must have million millions.
Kimon: Yeah...million million million millions.
Vasilis: What is the name of the number million million million millions? (He turns to me) Sofia what is the last number?

293 More about what is a child, see chapter 2.

Me: What do you think?

Manos: If I start writing a number in a line writing lots of *zeros*, this must be the biggest number.

Kostas: If we write a number not in a line but to cover all the floor, then that must be the biggest number. And if we write tiny numbers we will write even more (digits). Then this will be the biggest number.

Nick: If we could write a number that could fill all the room?

Kostas: Or fill also the next floor?

Nick: Maybe go up to heaven.

Vasilis: There is always a number bigger than the one we can think. Is there a last number?

(Pause for a while/ thinking)

Nick: My brother says that the numbers are infinite. He writes it like that

(He shows how it is written).

Manos: What is infinite?

Nick: That numbers do not finish.

Vasilis: This is not infinite. This is an eight that is lying. This is not a number.

Me: Do numbers have a beginning?

Kostas: That's silly! Of course, they start from zero.

(Nikolidaki's diary, 07/08/2006)

This dialogue began during their play which is part of their everyday life action. This is an example that shows how children incorporate philosophy in their playing even without adults intervening. It also shows that a philosophical dialogue may take place not necessarily within a classroom philosophical inquiry. The stimulus here was a question generated by children's counting. Vasilis statement that there is always a bigger number than the one we can think is very philosophical as he: a) implies that numbers are infinite and b) can distinguish between what can be thought and what cannot. Vasili's puzzlement whether there is a last number has become the subject of

discussion among philosophers and mathematicians (Clapham, 1996)[294]. The children tried to answer the question based on their experiences and their thinking. Somehow, they used an *Elenchus* process when offering and rejecting the different possibilities for the last number. What they did during their dialogue was providing counter arguments that disproved the previous given answer. This shows that children can think critically about very abstract concepts as long as they matter to them. What is not needed is adults' intervening with comments of the type "that's nonsense?" or "how cute!" (Brenifier, 2003).

I am not sure whether I should have intervened to ask whether numbers have a beginning. Maybe I should have left this question for later and witnessed how children would continue. I thought that I would make them question whether numbers have a beginning but they all agreed that zero is the beginning. None thought about negative numbers because they are unaccustomed with them and possibly not within their experience[295].

The next example is linked with children's everyday life but it did not come so naturally. It shows how the teacher can enable children's philosophical thinking, that otherwise would possibly not take place.

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294 He refers to David Hilbert's, example of the hotel with the infinite rooms. In the example of the hotel with the infinite rooms all the potential new guests can be served by moving the rest one room. Hilbert shows in a hotel with finite number of rooms the number of even numbers of rooms is less than the number of all the rooms. However, in the case of a hotel with infinite number of rooms, the infinite number of even rooms is not less than the numbers of the rooms as they are infinite as well. What children do in the dialogue in their effort to find the last number is accommodating ways of creating a larger number each time (e.g. a number that fills the surface of the room, a number written with smaller digits so as to fill the surface of the room, a number that fills all the dimensions of the room. What children realise is that writing many digits so as to fill the room by making them smaller is an infinite process.

295 They also live in Crete that hardly ever has very low temperatures (below zero), so there is only a slight chance of having heard about negative numbers and linked them with the research of what is the last number.

Example 2: How does my mind work? (Children describe in their drawings how their mind works)

The drawing of how children's minds work began in my classroom when two boys started fighting and one of them said to the other 'Stupid! Your mind does not work at all'. The offended one was just about to punch the other back when I intervened and asked them that I really would like to know how a mind can or cannot work. The children looked at me quite puzzled as they expected to be told off. "I know how the mind works" said Kimon. "I can draw it for you". Vasilis responded that he knew too. Many other children were also interested so I welcomed their drawing too[296]. I also suggested that they could use the books we had in the library if needed. What followed was an activity that brought children into a state of *kairos* rather than *chronos*. Children had their time to express their ideas through drawing their thoughts and explain them verbally to me.

Below, are some of the children's drawings along with the short conversation I had with each one individually so as to understand what they had drawn[297].

Maria thought that the mind is like a ball. She was aware of books that show the brain's physiology and she explained how the mind works. There is a place where the ideas we have in the mind are situated. She distinguished a certain location for the 'good blood', which is the 'clean blood' that enables thinking correctly without mistakes. The blood is cleaned in the triangular place of the tube before it enters the mind! When people do not think correctly it is because this part of the tube does not function properly! Maria also identified little holes. When they are full of blood the mind works faster (Figure 8.1).

296 See also appendix 5 for other drawings that children have produced regarding their ideal house, along with constructions using other materials such as blocks. See also appendix 6 which suggests how the facilitator can run discussions and activities that are philosophically enhanced.

297 The comments on the drawings are in Greek as this is material that came from my teaching experience there (April, 2007). I need to comment here that I find it inappropriate from my perspective to write on children's drawing and I am convinced that from now on any comments I will ever write will be on post it notes. I feel I have violated children's drawings.



Figure 8.1: My mind is like a ball

Odysseus had also drawn his mind, inspired by the brain's physiology. He separated the mind into the mind that is thinking and the mind that tell us what to do. He also needed a tube which enabled the blood to come into the mind. He depicted the veins in purple. The red part was the blood and if it totally filled the mind then the person died! He seemed to distinguish between mind and soul as he stated that 'the soul is as if there is a second head in your mind' (Figure 8.2).



Figure 8.2: "The soul is like a big head into the mind"

Less inspired by the physiological conception of how brain is constructed, Martha drew a girl, a mechanism that allows the mind to get into the girl's head and a big representation of what is the mind. The green colour is for the mind's skin and the red bits represent the blood in the mind. The circles are for certain activities that we do (Figure 8.3).

Figure 8.3: "The mind is born by the ears" (Martha, 6 year) versus "Listening is Thinking" (Gemma Corradi Fiumara, Italian philosopher)

Hellen drew a house for the mind and she insisted that within the mind there is another one that makes it work (Figure 8.4). As for Rodi, the mind was out of the head positioned up in the heavens so as to be able to see what happens everywhere! (Figure 8.5)



Figure 8.4: "The mind is out of my head"



Figure 8.5: "The house of the mind".

Children's drawings leave room for plenty philosophical comments. There were 'physicalistic approaches' in their drawings (where the brain is identical to the mind) possibly because many children took into consideration the books available in the library[298]. Explanations that the soul is on top of the brain as a kind of 'qualia' were also given. 'Platonic' approaches of the mind were evident in Rodi's drawings in which the mind is out of the head so as to inspect the things as they are. Animistic and imaginative approaches where the mind has its own home were also given. Children's comments such as where the ideas we have are situated within the mind, or whether there is a need for a 'second' mind to activate our mind to work (and then what activates the second mind?) or what the soul is, leave plenty room for further philosophical discussions that kept children thinking for days. Children's drawings not only raise philosophical discussions that push their thinking further, but also give adults the opportunity to understand how children think and refresh their own thinking.

Example 3: Adults and children discussing together

As part of my research and personal development as a facilitator of doing philosophy with children, I ran voluntarily philosophical inquiries once a week with a mixed group at a local library in South Wales. The group was a mixture of adults and children of various ages and was characterized for its diversity[299]. I saw it as an opportunity of linking philosophy and everyday life together. Philosophy should be open to all ages and this mixed group was a challenge to see how children's and adults' thinking could merge together. Throughout the inquiries, both children and adults showed respect for each others' ideas, felt free to link their ideas together, agreed and disagreed with each other by providing reasons and found ways to link ideas together (Splitter and Sharp, 1995).

298 I could have asked for distinguishing between using the word brain and mind and if these two words indicate different things or can be used interchangeably.

299 It consisted of children and adults that were considered as people with low self esteem or low performance in school (for the children), who received once a week for two hours extra support from adults who were willing to help them voluntarily. I ran philosophical inquiries to this group from January to June 2010.

Some moments of an inquiry with adults and children are presented below. The stimulus used was the pop up book "Mummy?"[300] The discussion led to the dilemma whether the child finds his mother at the end of the story and whether this mother is the 'real' one. Participants were split into three groups: the one who agreed that the child found his mother (yes group), the one that believed that this was not the baby's mother (no group) and the undecided group (maybe group). All groups gave reasons for their decisions.

'Yes' group Arguments

Laura (a): The child is maybe dreaming and in his dream his mother appears as a monster.

Joan: If it was not his mother she wouldn't say baby. Look, she also smiles because she recognises the baby.

Paul (a): The mum is ready to hug the baby. The baby has its hands open too.

Hilary: *(pointing to the last picture)* I think these two are family (she points at the monster with the dummy and the little creature in his pocket) and these two (child and mummy) they are family too because they are people and not monsters.

'No' group Arguments

Barbara (a): If it was recognition then the child wouldn't keep asking. There is a question mark after mummy.

Judy (a): And the child holds back.

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300 Mummy? (Yorinks, Sendak and Reinhart, 2006) is a pop up book with complicated images getting out of the book and giving a sense of a 3D dimension. It is a book about a child who looks for its mummy in a neglected house situated close to a cemetery. The house is full of well known monsters that have been seen on TV or the cinema. The child seems totally unfrightened by the monsters. The end of the story is ambiguous as it is not clear what happens. According to how much the reader opens the book, there is a different effect in movement which possibly creates different reactions to the readers. Taking into consideration that before Mummy? the writers of the book had used the same characters for a theatrical play titled "It's alive" that was on October 1994 at the Tribeca Performing Arts Center in New York, maybe the choice of a 3D book was closer to the effect that the theatre creates to the audience.

Lena(a): If the mummy recognised the child she would say 'my baby' or the child's name and not just baby.

Mina: It's his mother. The child is alive and the mummy is dead.

Me: How do you know she is dead?

Mina: She is white, pale! She is connected to this machine. She is a zombie.

Maybe group Argument:

Christina and Judy: There is not a clear conclusion in the book. There is not an answer so we stay in the middle.

Later on Joan added the following:

Joan: The mum speaks like a vampire.

Me: How do you know?

Joan: Because the letters are like thunder. So she says it like that...I can't do it but it must sound scary.

Me: So, do you think that this is not his mother? Have you changed your mind?

Joan: No. She has big teeth and that's why she can't say 'baby' properly!

In many cases adults' and children's thinking was critical (e.g. finding examples to support ideas, to agree and to disagree with others) and creative (e.g. when both adults and children associated meaning to the illustration of the book or thought in metaphors). For instance, Hilary's grouping of the creatures into a family according to their species[301] is reasonable and at the same time creative (she points out a little detail of the monster having another monster in his pocket). Joan interpreted the font of the written word ("like a thunder") as something that should sound scary (critical and imaginative thinking) which is an example of thinking in metaphors. Mummy's scary voice due to her 'big teeth' (anatomic issue) is a creative way for Joan to support her argument.

301 According to Hilary monsters together make a family. Mother and child are a family because they are the only humans.

There are similarities and differences between adults and children in the way they approach and cope with the same stimulus. Children, usually, have a more imaginative approach towards the stimulus than the adults. Adults need to 'listen to the children' and their different approaches because they usually reflect a type of logic which can be noteworthy[302]. Children, also, were very able in observing details that could have easily been ignored. The observation of details give food to further philosophical investigation and activate both children's and adults' thinking. These findings reveal "the other half of the child" as Egan (1993) highlights. The discussion with the mixed group can show to adults what the losses in their thinking are as they grow up (Egan, 1988). For instance, adults can always enhance their thinking by observing children's ability for thinking imaginatively, observing details, looking at the world as if it is for the first time and thinking divergently. What the children bring into philosophy is their zest of life, their fresh imagination and the element of playfulness (Mulvaney, 1993b, p.349). Children also bring to philosophy a lively interest in questioning which adults often lack (Matthews, 2008). These elements reflect in the most direct way children's philosophy from which adults can benefit. On the other hand, adults' experiences in thinking can be helpful to children as they listen critically to what adults have to say. What is more, philosophical *diatheses* of being open and critically alert are encouraged to develop further through the engagement of both adults and children into a dialogue.

Finally, there was evidence that the stimuli and the philosophical inquiries had an impact both for the children and adults which is essential for viewing philosophy as a way of life. A week later a girl was still fascinated by reading "Mummy?" I sat next to her and started flicking through the pages of the book. As she turned the pages she saw a picture and said: "Oh, that's a bag full of hands! A handbag! Cool!" A cataleptic moment occurred for me as it was the first time I noticed the linguistic connotation of a handbag literary and metaphorically. Mina also claimed that it was unfair to have on the front page only the protagonist's photo. She offered to draw a new version including all the

302 According to a report provided by Age Concern North Tyneside (2010), P4C sessions have been running with a mixed group of adults and children with huge benefits for both adults and children. It has been reported that the two different aged groups match well together and could benefit from each others' ideas. For instance, adults had the chance of communicating with younger children and understanding their way of thinking more.

monsters (see figure 8.6 below). Such statements show children's philosophy towards life (e.g. equality of all the monsters). This 'one to one' discussion is another way to practice philosophy daily between parents and children and make both understand themselves.

8.6. Conclusion

This chapter aimed at exploring how philosophy is linked with stimuli and becomes a way of life. It was argued that philosophy as a way of life is more than the sum of its generative and evaluative parts: It is connected with certain *diatheses* and human everyday action. The *diatheses* refer to individuals' attitudes towards life and are positive if inspired by *Eros*. It was argued that being open, tolerant and in a state of alertness are *diatheses* that enable people to connect philosophy with life and appreciate the stimuli found in life.

Human action, when examined, can change if there are good reasons for this and this is an indication of self-correction. It is located in space and time. As individuals engage with a stimulus, they: a) experience living in different places (topoi), b) live in kairos instead of chromos and c) connect themselves with others and the world acquiring a better understanding and transforming their life. This is achieved through narratives which combine the lived experience with people's *zymotic* listening and thinking.

Children's ways of life are not necessarily the same with adults and it was argued that adults need to follow a three step process to realise so: Apart from having the *diatheses* mentioned above, they first need to identify what is their philosophy and be tolerant with philosophies that are different from theirs (including the ones of their children) be open to understand them. It was also argued that adults can offer stimuli to children but the best ones are the ones that children bring into discussion.

The examples at the end of the chapter illustrate how philosophy can be linked with children's lives. They also show that the best stimuli and the best philosophical dialogues are the ones that emerge from children's experiences in or out of the school and are linked with other activities, such as playing or drawing. The role of adults is to identify these philosophical moments and enable children to make the most out of them.



Figure 8.6: All the Protagonists from the "Mummy?" Unfinished drawing

CHAPTER 9

My stories as stimuli for doing philosophy with children

Abstract

This chapter is mostly a practical illustration of the ideas described already in this thesis. It attempts to show how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life can be linked with: a) the process of my writing of stories which can be used for doing philosophy with children and b) the content of the stories and children's engagement with them. It also shows how my stories are situated as stimuli in the field of philosophy with children and what are the major similarities and differences they have comparing to other stimuli already used. It will also be argued that my stories: a) serve philosophy as good as picture-books in case that the facilitator picks the stimuli for doing philosophy with children and b) can motivate children to create their own stimuli for philosophical discussion as argued in chapter eight.

9.1. Introduction

The motivation for writing stories is an intrinsic force that pushes me to write something that needs to be spoken out. Foster (1993, p.159) describes it as a "boiling up in the interior". I would connect this with a *zymotic* process where the excitement of ideas inside the mind is like a boiling that seeks for ways out. Writing stories is also a way to put somebody into the writer's imagination (Foster, 1993). Narrating them is a way to communicate with others. This communication is possible if there is a match between the story's narrative form and people's narrative understanding. It is also possible due to the individuals' need to "seek in art a sense of completeness: a "sense of an ending", not available to us in life" (Banville,1993, p.110).

The stories under the process of writing are in a state of a Deweyan 'doing' and 'undergoing'. The 'doing' refers to the actions[303] that I take so as to create a story with unusual plot and atmosphere which captures the audience (Highsmith, 1993). This

303 Moggach has said that "novelists are actors-luckier than actors actually, because we can become our own characters and make up our own lines" (Moggach, 1993, p.135). What Moggach describes is a deliberate action taken from the part of writer which allows him/her do things and create a new world of phantasy.

'doing' could be reflected in questions, such as: 'how can I say the same thing using simpler vocabulary', 'how can I make the stories less wordy?', 'can a story draw a picture that summarizes the story?' and 'what do children do with these stories and what do the stories do to them?'. The 'undergoing' refers to the changes that I experience: 'how do children's ideas influence me?', 'what do I learn from them and what do they learn from me?', 'how does the narrative form of the story match with children's different narrative ways of understanding?', 'do I have *epiphany* moments and how do they change me?' Through this constant doing and undergoing, both I and children learn about ourselves and the world around us. The 'mapping' of the different experiences from discovering different aspects of a stimulus are just tiny stops of temporary states of equilibrium that refer both to our understanding and to the form (and content) of the stories. Below, I will first try to illustrate how the process of writing stories and their content match with philosophy as a way of life, with both generative and evaluative aspects.

9.2. Connecting my experience in writing stories with philosophy as a generative and an evaluative force and as a way of life

Writing stories is a *zymotic* process which involves thinking creatively, emotionally and critically. It requires a *diathesis* of being open to the new stimuli that come from experience, observations, and the dialogues with others and the imagination which turn into a story. It also requires being in a state of alertness to decide which possible threads of thoughts will transform to a story. The fictional story that comes out of this process is not a created harmony (Gardam, 1993). It is mostly an arranging of thoughts and feelings that aim at giving a temporary shape to the chaos that comes from the blending of my experience with imagination. Below, there is a brief description of how the writing of my stories is connected with philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life.

The writing of the stories matches with my understanding of philosophy as a way of life. Through writing stories I achieve a state of *eudemonia*. Writing does not happen daily, but when it happens it is fun, a pleasure of blending together experience and imagination, a joy to see in front of your eyes a little world to come to existence and a game of experimenting with different possible ways of a story's existing. As Mackay (1993, p.79) says "there are days when all the world is paper and all the seas are ink". These particular days writing a story means living in subjective time (*kairos*) instead of objective time (*chronos*). I may start writing at lunchtime and stop only when the only light that comes to me is from the computer screen. In *chronos* it is dark and there is need to switch the lights on, but in *kairos*, it takes longer to realise that this light is not enough for working and not good for the eyes[304].

Experiencing a moment of *epiphany* is often necessary for me to write a story. It provides a reason to write and communicate with others. A funny incident, an annoying situation, a journey where unexpected things happen, queuing to pay bills, dreaming, attending a boring conference, making a spelling mistake or grammatical error[305], waiting for the doctor and observing things that usually remain unnoticed can always be the stimuli that offer moments of *epiphany*. Some of the *epiphany* moments convert into stories. It depends on how strong my desire (*Eros*) for writing a story is. It takes time until the *epiphany* moments transfer into the story. This often requires a process of writing that is two steps backwards and one step forwards (Moore, 1993). The agitation

304 It is claimed that the writers and the illustrators live at the same time in two worlds; the real one and the imagined world they create (May, 1995). They both create utopian worlds.

305 For instance, my 'mosbuito' (instead of mosquito) story, a story written in Greek emerged from a spelling mistake. Mosquito is translated as kounoupi in Greek. My story is about a kounoupi that is born with a chromosome anomaly and instead of having a p in the word kounoupi it has an f (kounoufi). This anomaly influences not only the appearance of the kounoufi but also its behaviour and character. What I tried in this story is to think of words in Greek that begin with p and can be attributes of a mosquito and replace them with other words that begin with f and are completely opposite to the attitudes a mosquito has. When a friend of mine said to me "Mm Sofia, I think you can't do that very quickly (in Greek there is a certain collocation for very quickly and it is called 'sto pi kai fi') he just gave me another expression where the two letters I was looking for 'p' and 'f' blend meaningfully together. This stimulation that comes sometimes accidentally is what makes me transform my stories. It is as if you have two or sometimes more people thinking on the same subject in a lateral way that can only benefit the story.

of ideas needs to settle down and usually this takes time and much redrafting of the initial story. It is a *zymotic* process.

The attending of modules for creative writing helped me familiarize with the techniques of writing fiction. Some of the classroom activities encouraged the brainstorming and writing of our first thoughts for a potential story in limited time. Even though inspiration cannot be forced, the discipline of thinking and writing for a limited time turned out to be effective not only for writing stories, but also for brainstorming other tasks. It is a blessing to allow deliberately even a short time for thinking imaginatively as ideas might emerge and later on transfer them into complete stories. The pressure of completing a not so interesting task was another stimulus for writing stories. Often the creative ideas for a story were an escape gateway for tasks that I didn't particularly like.

The process of writing and the content of the stories reflect my understanding of reality blended with imagination. Experimenting with the story means thinking of and creating possible variations of the same story. Writing a story is a form of creation that brings something into being that didn't exist before. Apart from the initial ideas for a story, a series of imaginative, practical and 'style' questions constantly emerge during the writing process. The practical questions refer to the setting of the story: who will be the characters, what will be the place, the time, the plot of the story, what will be the main character's journey[307]?

The imaginative questions ('What if' type) such as: 'What would happen if the main protagonist lacked one of his/her characteristics or had the exactly opposite one?' 'What would happen if the place of the story was different?' 'What if the time of the story changed?' 'What if the sequence of the facts of the story changed?', 'what if I had to restrict the story to 600 words?' provide different possibilities for resolving the practical questions. The imaginative questions also encourage the use of creative techniques

307 Aristotle Poetics give a lot of practical instructions about how to create an interesting plot and a meaningful hero's journey which starts with an exciting incident, moves through conflicts and complication to a climax and then reaches its reversal and resolution without leaving out a last moment of suspense.

that activate further thinking creatively. For instance, picking random words and joining them together in a meaningful way or throwing a random word in the story, when stuck, and trying to incorporate it into the story may generate more ideas that shift meaningfully the plot of the story (DeBono, 2007; Rodari, 1996; Lamb, 2001).

The 'style' questions refer to the language of the story and to how I can play creatively with the words, their rhythm, their sounds and their metaphorical and literal meanings. Writing in a second language has its positives and negatives. As for the positives, cliché expressions are less likely to be found in the stories as they are unknown to me. I also make creative use of English language as it is new for me, so there are less taboo areas in writing in a way that could be non-conventional. As for the negatives, I am not fluently aware of colloquial English that would help me play more with the words. Difficulties with prepositions, the grammatical structure of language and unsuccessful translations of meanings from Greek into English are also problems to confront. Attending the course in creative writing enabled me to stick to the use of simple language, which, however, describes the ideas of the story accurately. Choosing the words for a story carefully is also a critical and evaluative process that requires my full awareness and attention.

The story does not stay static. It constantly changes until it takes its (temporary) final form. Nothing guarantees that the first plot for a story will be executed as initially conceived. New ideas, new observations, new discussions with others alter the story and make me learn more about the story and myself. The writing process with all the changes that occur becomes a live stimulus that gradually opens and alters[308].

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308 When I wrote one version of my Animal Party, a story mainly addressed to adults, the initial thought was a party with people dressed as animals who gradually behaved like the animals they were dressed up as. I needed a motive for a party. The idea of rich people rising money for a charity was a good answer. But now I needed a 'silly' reason for raising money that could appeal to an avant-garde society. Discussing with friends, one suggested raising money so as to save sturgeon and keep the caviar! I found this idea fascinating but I had to abandon it as I needed to reduce the dress code to sea animal costumes and some animal behaviours that are used to describe also human characteristics (such as eat like a pig etc) would be lost. The idea of raising money for supporting animals' art came in a flash when attending a lecture about animal rights. This contribution was possibly a latent stimulus for writing my story. The idea of raising money for animals' art made a perfect contrast with the lack of money raising for saving children who suffer from cancer. To my astonishment, I found out later that animals' art really exists which gave me further ideas of

Discussing with others my stories in their first complete draft is a form of evaluating and understanding them through listening to other people's points of view. This is a social event accompanied with a little meal and a glass of wine when possible. It is usually a nice time for communicating with each other and having fun. Often I check previous versions of a story with children and I observe whether they match with their interests and whether the narrative of each story can match with children's experiences and narrative ways of understanding themselves and the others. These observations enable me to see whether communication can be achieved and whether my stories can create moments of *catalepsy* that lead mostly to *Eros* and the creation of *epiphany* moments.

Discussing the stories in an informal inquiry enables me to evaluate the aspects of them that possibly need editing, evaluate in what ways these stories can become stimuli that could lead the participants to reflection and possibly self-correction. As for my personal self-correction, it takes place in two ways. Firstly, the writing process functions as a catharsis and a way of communicating ideas that possibly I couldn't express better otherwise (McGahen, 1993). Secondly, people who know me well can find aspects in the stories that reflect bits of my experiences which possibly happen unconsciously for me and only through the dialogue I can point to them, reflect on them and know myself[309]. Having finished a draft of a story, it works as a stimulus to me to see what are my hidden questions and hypotheses that compose my story[310]. Reading my stories is a stimulus to recognise a posterior as to what made me write them. The story becomes a vehicle to discover myself.

The alterations and evaluations that need to be done afterwards are often demanding. Apart from the linguistic corrections, sometimes there is need for further research on a

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how to use the particular story afterwards philosophically and move to matters about what is art and if animals can produce art. The story is still in development as its style of writing needs further work. Also, research on ways bourgeois people talk and behave is necessary so as to make the narrative form of the story compatible with people's narrative forms of understanding.

309 Graham Swift (1993) claims that stories are not prescriptive since they can not direct our living. However, they are postscriptive "by recovering our lost or damaged parts we also simply recover. We strengthen, we go on" (Swift,1993, p.24).

310 Frank Smith (1982) writes that "we can be surprised, confused, or delighted by the ideas we find in what we have written [...]The ideas that we create and represent on paper may not be ideas that we ever had before we began to write, but provided we can find in the text what we wanted to say (even at a very global level of intention) or what we are content to think we have said" (p.129).

topic so as to know more and be able to write a specific part more effectively. At this stage of the story I feel as if I have something to care about. The story becomes a living creature that needs care and responsibility to blossom. Questions, such as 'how do my characters feel?' or 'what shall they do next?' may accompany me even when not writing the story. I am also responsible in choosing which possible variation of a story will finally exist (even though I keep separate files for the alternative 'rejected' versions).

9.3. Connecting the content of the stories with philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life

Below, I will give two examples that illustrate how the content of the stories and children's engagement with them match with philosophy as a way of life with both generative and evaluative aspects.

9.3.1. The example of 'Artistic Dust' as a stimulus for doing philosophy with children

'Artistic Dust'[311] is a philosophical story that can be read literally and metaphorically. The story describes the life of some objects in a storage room of a museum which 'changes' when a photographer visits the room and takes their photos in his effort to capture messiness. It can give birth to discussions about abstract concepts that can be dealt with philosophically, such as the different perceptions and understandings of the world, reality, the problem of existence, the nature of change (e.g. attitudes) and being changed, boasting, being a tool, having fun, the existence of messiness, dreaming, being important, the human's world versus the world of objects, making mistakes, being artistic, possibilities of knowing, appreciating beauty, the role of names and many others.

311 See appendix 1

The generative aspect of philosophy in 'Artistic Dust' is reflected in playing with the literal and metaphorical meaning of the words. The names of the characters such as Holy Cross, Cushy Cushion, Duster Cover, Daisy Floral, Sink Leaky indicate bits of their identity where literal and metaphorical meaning blend playfully together. The extract below shows a creative play with the word 'messiness'.

> The photographer said he would take photos of the messiness. But we don't know of any messiness living with us, do we?" Cushy Cushion leisurely bounced and let a cloud of dust rise (Nikolidaki, 2009c).

There is a double irony here; Cushy is looking for messiness in the room and to reassure that they do not know, she uses the 'do we?' question tag so much used in English! Ironically her bouncing produces messiness without her realising so.



Another example of creative playing with the literal and metaphorical meaning of words is found in the use of the word 'tools'. The extract below explains it clearly:

> "That's really funny," Duster Cover laughed. "You all forget that you couldn't make the slightest move without a human's hand. You could never be important, you are just tools."
>
> They were all silenced. Nobody liked the word "tool" (Nikolidaki, 2009c).

The word 'tool' refers both to one characteristic of the tools' identity: their passivity without human's action and their dependency in humans, but it can also be used metaphorically for tools as 'dummies'. This abstract can also give food to further thought about the metaphorical use of the language. It can also raise questions such as: 'Are people sometimes tools?' 'Can people distinguish when they are treated as tools?'

The questions that are either found in the story or can emerge from it reflect another aspect of philosophy as a generative force. Can we ever know if the objects have thoughts? Is there such a thing as messiness? Can you ever take a photo of something that does not literary exist (e.g. messiness)? Can you ever be 'busy dreaming'? Can a mop dance? Is the cleaning of the rooms a form of dancing for Mary the cleaner as well?

The possible occurrence of *epiphany* moments is another illustration of philosophy as a generative force found in this story. The end of the story provides such an opportunity, leaving the reader further to think about it.

> "We are important now!" they all shouted. All but the Duster.
>
> "It's the photos that are important guys, not us. Nothing is going to change for us" Duster said.
>
> But the 'tools' of the storage room were already busy dreaming how their new important lives would be outside the storage room (Nikolidaki, 2009c).

The story finishes in a way that enables multi interpretations and creating of new narratives and stories. Do 'tools' become important? How is their life outside the storage room? Do the tools like their new life or do they want to go back to the safety and anonymity of the storage room?

There are many parts of the story that encourage evaluating the ideas presented which reflect aspects of philosophy as an evaluative force. The extract below gives the opportunity to critically examine questions such as: 'What makes something important?', 'Can dust ever be artistic?', and 'Does being next to something important make us important as well?', 'Can we ever have a false interpretation of our world?

> Gradually the Mop began to change her attitude. She was boasting that she was the most important thing in the storage room because she knew everything that lived outside it. Lately she asserted that she should move from the storage area and live constantly within the big rooms. She was a dancer after all: a pure artist whom all the paintings and the photographs on the walls were gazing at.
>
> "You are just a messy thing full of dust," Bucket the plastic said one day to the Mop openly annoyed.
>
> "But it is not simply dust. It is artistic! It comes from the important things of the art museum", the Mop flicked a speck of dust from her hair (Nikolidaki, 2009c).

This story is linked with philosophy as a way of life intrinsically and extrinsically. The story is highly political and depicts human's relationships as found in the world. Metaphorically, the storage room could be interpreted as Plato's cave where the 'tools' listen to the 'important' Mop describing the world 'out there' without being able to test the truth of her descriptions. Mop could be a politician, a religious leader, the TV or any

'authority' that thinks she knows how the things really are! Mop is the 'travelled' one who, however, cannot get out of her conceptual system of interpreting the world. What Mop offers is not an account of how reality is but a description of it often prejudiced by her thoughts and emotions.

There could be also other interpretations for the storage room. It could represent human's self defense mechanisms towards new ideas that come from others. It could also represent everyday routine life which changes slightly or more when a Mop or a photographer offer new perspectives no matter whether they are correct or suitable for them.

Human relationships as found in everyday life are projected on the tools of the story. Brushy Brush needs to highlight his importance by clarifying his role in putting colours on the canvas to make all the pictures that enjoy people's admiration in the showing rooms of the museum whereas he remains unknown[312]. Sink Leaky, ironically, brings Brush to 'reality' as he says in a comical way that painting a wall plain white is not the same with painting images that have artistic value. Aren't those situations found in everyday life? Philosophy as a way of life can help readers reflect further on what the story is and examine how it applies to their lives. Does Brushy's need to show off come from a lack of self awareness? How many examples are there from everyday life of people, famous or not, who crave for being acknowledged as important? Is it our role in society what makes us important? Why do we need to be important? Is it an evolutionary characteristic that reassures the continuity of our existence?
It can be claimed that Sink also highlights the difference between the ideal work of a brush (painting a work of art) and the actual one (painting a wall) which can give birth to discussions about potentialities and actualities in human's lives. It is obvious that the interpretations of the story are as many as the different narratives the readers can apply to it. The narrative form of the story matches with individuals' different understandings of

312 "I am the one who puts the colours on the canvas to make all the images, but I am left here. I should be also outside there next to the paintings. Do you know how many paintings I have made?"
"If I remember well you had been used to paint the wall of this room. And you painted it plain white" Sink Leaky said as he was throwing some water to Mop's hair. You are a simple paintbrush! (Nikolidaki, 2009c).

the world. The richness of a stimulus is that the same story enables different ways of individuals' engaging with it and leads to different ways of its 'opening'.

Apart from the content of the story, its process of writing reflects my experiences and views of philosophy. 'Artistic Dust' was written during my stay in Mendham[313] (NJ) for an advanced seminar on philosophy for children. It started as an exercise to produce stories or material for doing P4C in a short period of time. It turned out that some of the stimuli for writing it were:

a) the picture of a tree in the music room with the rubric 'Artist: God',
b) the place I was based at (the retreat's house in a nunnery),
c) my reading of Dewey's 'Art as an Experience' and
d) one of the closets rooms that I opened accidentally and found out that it was full of forgotten things.

However, before starting the writing of the story I had never thought of incorporating deliberately these stimuli into my story. The idea of the museum as a place for the story came possibly from reading Dewey's ideas on art and whether art is found in a museum. As for the idea of importance, I guess it came from my constant observations of people showing off, including myself!

When I started writing the story, my external stimuli became part of the narrative of the story as follows:

> I am not a tool," Daisy Floral said. "And I am beautiful! If I was made by humans I might have been now in the other rooms of the museum, the important ones."
> "God made you," Cross Holy chanted. "God is the greatest artist" he added but nobody replied (Nikolidaki, 2009c)

313 IAPC is the Institute of Advanced Philosophy for Children based on Montclair State University in New Jersey. Every summer it used to run summer courses on Lipman's method training at Mendham (St. Marguerite nunnery) the last of which training I had the pleasure to attend.

The physical painting on the piano become part of my story and potentially a further stimulus for philosophical discussions that could concern natural and human made beauty and viewing God as an artist and/ or a creator.

The philosophical discussion that came from using Artistic Dust

'Artistic Dust' is a good example to illustrate that the individuals' engagement with the story can lead either to a state of *Eros* creating moments of *epiphany* and opportunities for further philosophical analysis, or to a state of *Thanatos*. Once I used this story with a mixed group of children aged 10-11 in a local school in South Wales. The children were curious to know why I picked a mop as the main hero for my story. They were puzzled how one could ever write a story about tools. It seems that the children were more interested on my motives of writing a story rather than the content of the story. This could be interpreted as a temporary *Thanatos* of the stimulus, at least as far as its content is concerned. I was honest towards them, so I explained my motives but then it was my turn to ask why they were so puzzled with the idea of writing for tools. This question became a new stimulus for a philosophical inquiry[314].

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314 Here is part of the dialogue from children that took place concerning my motives of writing about a living mop.

Paul: I have never read a story about...a mop and other tools!

Elias: Me neither. It's a strange story.

Me: What makes it strange?

Elias: That it is about things that are not alive.

Me: Yes, but there are also other stories about things that are not alive.

(some children nodding that this is correct)

Elias: But it's not the same. There are humans in this story.

Claire: There are humans in this story too; the cleaner and the photographer.

Elias: Yea... I mean somebody plays the flute. The flute does not speak.

Richard: Come on, there are stories about toys that become alive when everyone sleeps.

Maria: Maybe the same thing happens in the storage room. How do you know that when you sleep your toys do not speak...Or maybe, the foods in the fridge!

(Some children laugh)

Mark: Imagine! (He laughs) Opening the fridge and finding the cheese arguing with the milk!

Me: Wouldn't that be a nice start for a story?

Ron: Yes, especially if milk could speak and say to my mum that it does not want to be drunk. I hate milk! (children laugh).

(small pause for children to stop laughing)

Paul: For a start, the language is strange.

Teacher: Is it because Sofia's English is her second language? Is there something you don't understand?

Referring back to figure 4.1 in chapter 4 that explains the ways of engaging with a stimulus in chapter four, it seems that the discussion that took place is located in intersection three. This means that the initial stimulus functioned as a bridge to move to a philosophical discussion not directly connected with it. However, children had to go back to the story to find arguments that explain in what ways the story felt strange to them. Therefore, as the discussion was proceeding, children's dialogue seemed to move towards the intersection seven[315].

In another case, children discussed about the moral of the story and moved to subjects such as what is important, whether the Queen is more important than other people, whether appearance is more important than personality, whether wealth makes people important and what could be the criteria for selecting friends[316]. Some of the children's comments were very profound and brought to mind ideas of very important philosophers

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Paul: No, I don't mean that. There are some strange words. Messiness... maybe... And the photographer...why did he want to take photos of the tools? That's strange.

Me: Can you all understand what messiness means? Melissa?

Melissa: When you are messy, filthy and dirty.

Me: Thanks. Any other suggestions? David?

David: I want to say about the photographer. He wanted to take a picture of the tools because no one before had thought of doing this. His exhibition would be original.

Elias: Yea... but you can't be original with photos of tools. You must have nice photos.

Luke: I don't agree. My brother's girlfriend is a photographer and I saw her pictures of rubbish. She got a price for them!



315 The diagram is the same as seen in chapter 4

316 See in appendix 3 the whole dialogue

such as Epicurus[317] discussing about the meaning in life and Kant[318] about treating others as ends and not means. Sophie's idea about "Sometimes less is more" functioned as a stimulus for me to search for it on the internet and find who had said so[319]. Transcribing children's dialogues made me think that some children had linked somehow the discussion with Jacqueline Wilson's *Tracy Beaker* stories, which discuss children's bringing up in foster homes. This example shows how a stimulus can be linked with children's experience from their reading in everyday life.



Figure 9.1: *Artistic Dust* Illustration

317 Sophie: Some people, say they are rich, what makes them happy, say a TV makes you happy, so you need a TV to make you happy, but as long as you have got family and friends these are the things you really need. You can still be happy (Researcher's log,2009).

318 Sophie: Treat everyone as you like to be treated (Researcher's log,2009).

Vana: I think you shouldn't be friends with somebody just because they are important or use them if they are not and not really bother with them. You should like them for who they are and not what they have got (Researcher's log,2009).

319 Ludwig Mies van der Rohe was a German architect who called his buildings "skin and bones" architecture and made use of aphorisms such as " less is more" and "God is in the details". See more at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Mies_van_der_Rohe accessed on 30/10/2010.

9.3.2. The example of 'Save the jungle' as a stimulus for doing philosophy with children

The story titled 'Save the Jungle'[320] describes a state of alarm for the animals of a jungle about the deforestation in an area nearby. The owl calls all the animals into a meeting to think what action they should take but instead, animals seem to fight over who will speak first as the most important. Little ant has some ideas but no matter how much it tries to be heard, it is ignored. Heading back home, something unexpected happens and the ant is found again among the other animals. This time, however, the animals are silent so as to listen.

One creative element of the story is that it does not reveal what the ant's idea was. Even though the animals listened to it, the readers were not too silent to listen so they have to guess. This can give birth to generating lots of ideas which link with philosophy as a generative force. The story, as with Artistic Dust, can be interpreted politically as it implies that in periods of turmoil people still do not combine their power towards preventing a disaster. Concepts such as being important, environmental degradation, leadership, irony, listening, death, silence, freedom of expression and differences between humans and animals can emerge from this story and be dealt with philosophically. The playing with the language is also there and could be used philosophically.

This story is linked directly with my experience (blended with imagination) as it reflects my emotional response for the political and economic situation of my country. Many of the stories written during 2009-2010 reflected my fears, hopes, frustrations, anger and disappointment regarding everyday matters but mostly, the future of my country. Reading my stories I became aware of strong emotions and the impact that had on one of my identities: being Greek. I realised how this identity becomes stronger in a foreign

320 See appendix 1.

country where any negative statement referring to my country was often perceived as if it referred to me.

'Save the jungle', has given rise to different discussions from my initial motives which shows how the same story can become a different stimulus each time used. The engagement with the story is what enables its 'opening up' towards different directions. One inquiry with children aged eight at a local school in South Wales was based only on the last line of the story: 'They were not animals anymore'. Some of the children understood that animals were truly transformed to humans whereas some other said that animals remained animals but they could think and talk like animals. Salina, however, heard 'there' instead of 'they' so she interpreted the story differently. This creative misunderstanding made her offer the solution that animal by the end of the story had already become extinct because the risk threatening the jungle was already there. This was a profound moment for me as it gave me a moment of *epiphany* of looking differently at my own story. I saw the prospect of animals already dead as a possible ending to the story which was never thought during the writing process. A hidden aspect of the story, even for me as creator, was discovered by a child's fresh interpretation. What she basically indicated is that we often spend too much time talking instead of taking quick and accurate action.

For another group of children aged nine to ten and two adults (children's teacher and a student) who attended regularly an after school P4C club the crocodile's tears were a detail worthy for concentration. The question for discussion was whether crocodile's tears are always fake[321]. During this dialogue, children and adults:

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321 Below there is an extract from the discussion about the emotions that occurred after reading the story Save the jungle'

Louise:	Are crocodile's tears always fake?
Mark:	Do crocodiles cry?
Lena (a):	Yes, they do. When they cry they sound like a baby. They do it deliberately to full other animals and eat them.
Me:	Thanks for this. So what do you think, is crocodile's crying always fake?
Gemma:	I don't know. I am confused. People cry not only when they are sad but also when happy.
Paloma:	I have never cried when I am happy. I cry only when I am sad.
Daisy (a):	Maybe you have not felt yet that kind of happiness. Maybe in a few years time you will. I cried in my wedding day. Those kind of events are special.

- exchanged information about crocodile's ability to fool animals by crying like a baby.
- found connections between the discussed subject and their experience
- transferred the discussion from crocodile's tears to human's situations.
- thought creatively about examples of crying without emotions (e.g. onions)
- were confused with cases of crying even because of happiness
- made distinctions by referring to differences between crying due to an emotion or due to non-emotive situations
- debated whether the composition of tears is the same no matter what the reasons for crying are.

Going back to Figure 4.1, intersection 4 would describe this dialogue that moved away from the text of the story to the human's situations, possibly because this comes closer to children's experience. However, this didn't make the discussion less philosophical. Children had time to reflect (and possibly self-correct) about the puzzling situations of crying because of different emotions and make critical and creative distinctions concerning the compositions of tears. The same group of children and adults later on, went back to the story, and jumped to the differences between people and animals in thinking and whether monkeys are our ancestors. The discussion moved to science and DNA as a tool to identify similarities and differences between the animals

As informed by Lena, the children's teacher, some of the children kept mentioning during the week different situations of crying, whereas David looked through the encyclopaedia to find out whether tears composition does really change due to emotions. The differences between humans and animals emerged also a lot that week. This is an example of how a stimulus and an inquiry occurred can link with children's

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Lena (a): Yea...sometimes you may cry from anger! I am so crossed when I try something on my computer and it does not work that I may cry. But then my problem is not really fixed, is it?

Jess: I may cry because of the onions. They make my eyes watering.

Me: Are the emotions important when crying? Is crying because of emotions different from crying because of the onions.

David: I think crying is the same...I mean...tears are the same if you cry for onions or because you are sad.

Louisa: I think it is not the same. When you cry because you are sad, crying is louder. (Nikolidaki's research log, 2010)

everyday life and make them pursue further research, not necessarily philosophical, in order to find answers in their questions. This pursuing of research is a sign of *Eros*, a desire for children to learn more. Writing down children's initial questions, the comments made and all the research that possibly took place afterwards shows a part of the 'mapping' of different aspects of the initial stimulus.

An inquiry about language occurred in a group of gifted children aged nine to ten at a school in South Wales where I used 'Save the jungle'. Some children wondered whether all animals speak the same language, whether all understand 'humanese' and whether the ant was ignored not because of its tiny size but because the rest of the animals didn't understand its language. Some children came up with creative animal languages such as 'elephantese', 'parrotese' and 'lionan'.

What astonished me is that with all groups that I worked this story nobody was really interested to learn what the ant actually said. As it is deliberately not written in the story (so as to leave it open to different interpretations for both myself and the others), I was expecting that somebody would ask. That would give me the opportunity of inviting them to write down what they thought the ant might have said. However, this didn't happen. Is this a kind of *Thanatos* of the stimulus? Is there a main subject in the story that if ignored or not understood influences the whole quality of the story? Shall I feel that the communication with the children through the story was not fully achieved?

Adopting again the Venn diagrams (Figure 4.1) my concerns fall within the intersection 3. Possibly, these aspects of the stimulus that I have discovered are not yet perceived by the children. My role as a facilitator could be either to ask questions that will enable children to see this dimension or allow children time to discover the aspects of the stimulus that appeal to their interests. Had I been the teacher of these children, I would have had the story available to children to read it whenever they liked and made the most out of it progressively. Discovering a stimulus is a process that takes time and requires *zymotic* listening both to oneself and others.

9.4. Where do my stories stand in the field of philosophy with children?

My stories have not yet been used officially by others except me as a recognised distinct stimulus for doing philosophy with children. However, the stories have been used in my philosophical inquiries and have been much appreciated by both children and adults. The obvious question here is whether my stories could have a place as stimuli within the field of philosophy with children. To answer so, it seems necessary to find what are their main similarities and differences to other 'recognised' stimuli for doing philosophy with children

Contrary to Lipman and others who constructed a series of novels with certain characters reflecting certain types of thinking, I avoided doing so. This is because writing in this format would make me deliberately produce stimuli for doing philosophy with children, which does not match with my outlook of philosophy as a way of life where my experiences are blended with my imagination. My stories were never written under the thought 'I have to write a philosophical story'[322], but when I felt that there was an inside need to write something. They are very much linked with my lived experience and my observation of others' people (or children's) lived experience which somehow is incorporated into the stories. This, however, does not happen when I want to do so. It is a *zymotic* process that takes place in my mind, often without me being totally conscious of it[323]. Besides, writing in this way often leads to identifying certain ways of thinking with certain characters of the stories. I prevented students from identifying with some of the characters and possibly adopting their ways of reasoning. The point of my stories is not for children to find fixed and given models for thinking, but to discover their own ways of thinking by setting free their imaginative and critical thinking.

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322 My Artistic Dust was written in Mendham under the pressure of producing material for philosophy with children which seems contradictory with what I support. However, my stay in Mendham was so full of experiences and observation that it was inevitable not to write a story. It just happened the inspiration and the fermentation process required for the story to come out to fall within the time constraints of the IAPC seminar.

323 However, it is obvious that sitting in front of a pc to write is important, otherwise I would have never written anything.

My stories can be used on their own without the necessary need of a manual. I adopt McCall's (2009) position according to whom the facilitator should already have a philosophical background, thus s/he can identify what could lead to a philosophical discussion either provided by the stimulus or by the children's engagement with the stimulus. Nevertheless, my stories could be accompanied by manuals if teachers felt that they needed some extra inspiration of how my stories could be used. In appendix 2, I provide an example of a possible manual accompanying my artistic dust that includes exercises and lesson plans similar to those Lipman, Cam and Sharp and Splitter have already provided. However, what is different with the possible manuals that I could provide with my stories is that they refer to a variety of activities linked with children's experiences. Since I am in favour of a philosophy as a way of life, the manuals for a story should promote exactly this idea; that philosophy is part of life and very much involved in the practicalities of everyday life. The manual suggests activities that could follow from a story and it can be characterized as a 'first' opening of the stimulus (story). The manual also suggests how the stories could be used philosophically without forcing so[324].

In terms of writing I try to use a much more literary style. In the first place, I want my stories to offer aesthetic pleasure. I want the readers to enjoy them and at the same time reflect on them. Contrary to Lipman's view of literature as seductive that prevents children from thinking critically, I aim at this particular seduction. The chances are that if a stimulus creates in children a sense of *catalepsy*, children will reflect on it and possibly think deeper and philosophically about very important concepts in life. The symbolisms, the metaphoric language and the playing with the words that are often used in my stories serve this reason; the possibility of getting children into a state of *catalepsy* and *Eros*. The possible misunderstanding that might occur through the playing with the words could be used as points for a philosophical discussion to take place.

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324 In appendix 6 I put forward a suggestion of constructing activities and discussion plans that fit the stimuli that children bring and could be further philosophically investigated if children are still interested.

I would say that my stories stand between the material that is purposely written for doing philosophy and the textual material that has been used for doing philosophy for children but was not initially designed for this purpose (for example the picture-books). I do not write so as to provoke or push philosophical dialogue as it often happens with both Lipman and Sharp. At the back of my mind, there is always a philosophical perspective of understanding the world which is often reflected in my stories more than it happens in plain literature for children. Still though the stories mostly imply rather than force philosophy. What is unique with my stories is that they combine literature imagination, lived experience and philosophy together without one forcing the other. The stories are also a product of a true enjoyment from the writer's point of view.

There is a preference in writing short stories as Cam does and I would wish, in future, to write even shorter ones. Individuals with short attention spans are more likely to pay attention to a short story than to a long episode. Also, a story that provides a beginning, middle and end (Egan, 1988) has more chances of meeting individuals' expectations for reading something concluded. Contrary to Cam, my stories focus very much on lived experiences blended with imagination. Again, I try to imply philosophy rather than giving it explicitly.

Comparing my stories with picture-books in terms of doing philosophy with children, I would select my stories for their content and the picture-books for their illustration. I am very much in favour of images that either support or contradict the text and in parallel give their own stimuli for further philosophical discussion (Serafini, 2010). One of my future plans is to combine the text of my stories with images that would only enhance the possibilities for further enjoyment, creation of moments of *epiphany* and possibly further philosophical reflection.

One of the reasons for writing stories is to encourage children to find their own voice, to express themselves philosophically either through the stories they create or through other ways (e.g. drawing). Appendices 4 and 5 show some samples of children's

activities (for instance drama activities or free play) and works (for instance drawings, constructions with using bricks or dough, books written by them after being inspired by books that had been read in the classroom) that illustrate their philosophy and can be further used for philosophical reflection. What is important again is to see all the activities as part of life and philosophy also as something that makes this life meaningful and occasionally enjoyable. This is also another difference from others in the field. The priority is not to put forward the stimuli that we create for the children, but mostly put forward what children can create and what reflects their way of life.

To sum up, the answer is positive concerning whether there is a place for my stories in the field of philosophy with children. This is because they combine literature with philosophy without forcing each other, they match with the idea of philosophy infused in life and they promote not only children to develop their thinking abilities but also their production of stimuli that reflect their philosophical ways of life. Therefore my stories, among other stimuli such as picture-books, could be a good stimulus for a facilitator to choose as they combine literature, philosophy and my lived experiences. The narrative forms of my stories could match with children's narrative ways of understanding as described in chapter five. Furthermore, my stories can inspire children to come up with their own stimuli that reflect their imagination blended with their lived experience which could be philosophically fruitful for future discussing.

9.5. Conclusion

In this chapter there was an attempt to illustrate how my experience of writing stories and the content of the stories match with my initial hypothesis of philosophy as a way of life, with both generative and evaluative aspects. It was claimed that the stories are always in a state of constant change due to listening zymotically to the ideas that come to my mind and to the discussions with others. It was also argued that through writing stories, reviewing their content afterwards and practising them with children, bits of my

lived experience blended with imagination are demonstrated and occasionally I am led to a better understanding of myself.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Synopsis of my basic arguments

To justify a philosophical theory of the stimuli for philosophical inquiry, I needed to state clearly the perception of philosophy which formed my initial hypothesis. Philosophy in this thesis was viewed as a way of life both theoretically and practically with generative and evaluative aspects. The hypothesis was tested by providing arguments such as the following:

The generative aspect of philosophy was understood as the creative element of philosophy that makes individuals wonder and ask questions, and in the process push our thinking further. It was argued that philosophy as an imaginative process makes sense since the structure of our conceptual system is imaginative as everyday language is imbued with implicit and explicit metaphors – the language people use to think and categorise the world with. It was also claimed that when people dialogue with each other, imagination is necessary to understand each other's points of view (moral imagination). I argued that even logic, and the establishment of rules, is the product of imaginative and creative thinking. The generative aspect of philosophy is what makes people think creatively, that is, rearrange existing ideas and produce new ones.

What emerged was the idea that philosophy as an evaluative force shows how self-correction takes place. This process involves making distinctions between answers that are more and less defensible decisions. Pragmatic and Socratic approaches were theoretically compared and contrasted in an effort to explore what self-correction. The Socratic idea that philosophy is for everyone (if and only if people speak the same language and share their genuine beliefs) has been informed and given new shape through the ideas of Pragmatist philosophers who regard the construction of new knowledge as a matter of mutual, ideally infallible, agreement between a community of researchers. I explained how through the Socratic *Elenchus* (within a community of inquiry) individuals become aware of their implicit beliefs or prejudices they bring to their understanding of a concept and how they may self-correct as a result. The

acknowledgement of emotions as modes of thinking and tools for evaluating situations could be regarded as the connection between adopting a more Pragmatist approach about self-correction and the use of the Socratic Method.

Philosophy as a way of life showed that philosophy is much more than the sum of its evaluative and generative parts. Its educational worth is limited if done only for the sake of fostering skills in thinking creatively and critically. I have argued that philosophy is part of life and aims at improving individuals' quality of life and achieving *eudemonia*. Philosophy as a way of life is understood as a process that enables people to have *diatheses*, such as being open and tolerant but also being in a state of alertness, and therefore also has political and moral implications. These *diatheses* enable individuals to see their everyday actions as meaningful or change them into meaningful ones which is a kind of self-correction. Philosophy as a way of life is an inevitable part of individuals' experiences and has the character of a constant conceptual search of what is true, even if our truth-claims are only temporarily valid. The explicit teaching of philosophy in formal and informal educational settings makes people aware of the conceptual dimensions of their own thinking and educates them not only about the role philosophy plays in their life, but also supports the development of skills, attitudes and knowledge that makes them better philosophers.

After setting the scene of what I consider as philosophy, it was necessary to check whether it was compatible with philosophy with children and children's thinking and ways of life. To explain it further, I referred to different examples of categorising the different philosophy with children approaches. The first example referred to Gregory's epistemic categorization: between 'Realists', 'First-order-non-realists', and 'Second-order-non-realists'. The second example used Golding's distinction between 'Dualists', 'Relativists' and 'Critical Pluralists'. I showed how the different philosophical underpinnings influence the use of stimuli and the different styles of facilitation while doing philosophy with children. I compared these different categorizations with each other and with my categorization of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and a way of life. I argued that my categorization agrees with Golding's Critical pluralists'

approach and Gregory's First-order non-realists, but consider as well the practical aspect of philosophy as a way of life which is what both Golding's and Gregory's categorizations lack. I also argued that these models do not take into consideration philosophy for children from the children's point of view.

Children and the model of philosophy I propose have the following in common: a) the presupposition of an open-minded attitude towards what is new, b) playing with new ideas, c) a tendency to wonder and probe questions, and d) thinking in metaphors for establishing meaning. The evaluative aspect of philosophy is what teaches children to think about their thinking and to test their ideas for applicability and reasonableness. Gradually the *diatheses* of being open and at the same time being in a state of alertness and *prosoche* become more of a way of life and this is a way of incorporating philosophy into everyday issues. There is a need to clarify here that people are always philosophers, one way or another, but developing certain diatheses makes them more conscious of what they value in their lives and why.

The stimulus is a salient connection between children and philosophy. To explore this further, I categorised stimuli that are specially designed for doing philosophy with children, such as Lipman's novels and manuals, and those that are not specifically designed for doing philosophy such as children's literature. It was also claimed that stimuli can be concrete or abstract. An example of the latter stimulus would be a thought that becomes a question. Despite the wide variety of stimuli that are and have been used for doing philosophy with children, there is still remarkably little theorising in the field about what it is that constitutes a stimulus for philosophy with children in philosophical terms, hence the topic and relevance of my thesis. Throughout this thesis, it has been supported that knowledge is neither located in the stimulus nor in individuals' minds, but in the space opened 'between' because of the transaction of the two. The stimulus is a flexible term that has been used to refer to whatever can create not only attraction or repulsion to the individuals, but a whole experience. The experience of individuals itself can become a new stimulus that creates further attraction or repulsion to others.

The analysis of the concept 'stimulus' was distinguished from any behaviouristic use. I view stimuli not as part of the automatic process: stimulus-response. Instead, stimuli were viewed more in a Pragmatic manner. To distinguish a stimulus from a non-stimulus it is a necessary condition for individuals to engage with it and experience it. If someone is left 'cold' towards a stimulus then there is no stimulus for that person, at least temporarily. The engagement requires the development of forces, either attraction or repulsion, between the individual and the stimulus. These forces can become stronger or weaker during the individuals' engagement with the stimulus, which explains the developing of individuals' *Eros* or *Thanatos* towards it.

My conceptual analysis continued through a clarification of these forces and by introducing a new vocabulary to describe key concepts related to the stimuli such as '*catalepsy*', '*Eros*' and '*Thanatos*'. Particularly, a state of *catalepsy* determines whether the individuals' engagement with a stimulus will lead to *Eros* and therefore to a further discovery of the stimulus, or instead to *Thanatos*. *Eros* was identified as the result of a force of attraction between the individual and the stimulus, which creates a desire for individuals to learn more about a stimulus and through it learn more about themselves and others. A good stimulus retains a hidden aspect (*aporia*) which is necessary for creating puzzlement in individuals and therefore, a desire to discover more.

It was examined whether the concept 'stimulus' matches with the initial hypothesis of what philosophy is as outlined at the beginning of the thesis. Stimuli were aligned with the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy and with philosophy as a way of life. I concluded that *Eros* is compatible with the generative aspect of philosophy as it is the desire to push thinking forward. The reflection on a stimulus and the ways individuals use reason, leads to self-correction and increased self-knowledge.

Apart from the novel concepts I introduced to describe the characteristics of stimuli used for doing philosophy with children, it was also necessary to check how these concepts were linked together. The criteria that makes a stimulus suitable for doing philosophy with children are: a) the creation of '*Eros*' in individuals who engage with the stimulus, b)

the stimulus' narrative form that matches with the ability of individuals' to create narratives when engaging with the stimulus and c) the creation of moments of *epiphany* for individuals that engage with the stimulus. In order to explain the narrative form of the stimulus further, it was argued that there must be some concrete characteristics in the stimulus that grasp people's attention and make them fall into '*Eros*' with the stimulus and have moments of *epiphany*. The narrative form of the stimuli is illustrated for instance in the stories that I have written and given examples of in chapter 9, or in picture-books which combine text and image. The analysis of these narratives can move to more concrete characteristics such as words, colours, shapes and details of the images. I also applied my findings to other stimuli that are visual or textual. Finally, in chapter eight of this thesis I have shown how the narrative form is also present in stimuli taken directly from children's own experiences.

I claimed that the stimulus does not remain static; instead it 'transforms' as the individuals engage with it. Its 'opening' is a generative process and begins with the interaction between the stimulus and people. What 'opens up' the stimulus is the different ways by which individuals view the stimulus as a result of the moments of *epiphany* that take place during this engagement. It was argued that the particular engagement with a stimulus creates a new experience for each person, and as I have argued this depends on how we listen. The resulting new experience becomes part of a person's life which can be used afresh as a stimulus (e.g. reflecting on the experience people had as the result of a particular stimulus). This broader take on what a stimulus is incorporates the original stimulus (e.g. the story) and the experience created by it in a certain cultural environment. The 'temporary' limits that the stimulus reaches refer to moments that further investigation of the stimulus stops, for example, because the community is running out of time or ideas or interest to continue the philosophical investigation.

I introduced and developed the idea of listening *zymotically*. This innovative key concept relates directly to the concept 'stimulus' and its particular way in which it 'opens up'. *Zymotic* listening is a way of thinking. It matches with philosophy as a generative and

evaluative force as it involves listening critically, creatively and emotionally both to oneself and others. The stimuli are the 'ferments', or the 'yeast' that evoke people's *zymotic* listening. *Zymotic* or 'fermentative listening' is a long term process that leads to the synthesis and *zymosis* of listening to others (through the inquiry) and listening to oneself (through reflection) when interpreting and therefore opening up a stimulus. *Zymotic* listening is what enables the translation and communication of ideas. However, the stimulus can never be totally accessed and communicated or translated to others; that's why theoretically it always appears as an open source for potential ideas to be generated. It was discussed that *zymotic* listening, if done well, can enable other ways of opening up a stimulus through: a) the establishment of creative attitudes, b) the use of creative techniques (fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration) when philosophising, c) the metaphoric use of language as a way of generating different understandings of a stimulus, d) questioning and e) building on each others' ideas.

It was investigated how stimuli's alignment with philosophy as an evaluative force is evident in individuals' engagement with the stimuli which: a) provoke emotions in the person in favour or against the further evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion followed by it (which again in itself becomes a new stimulus?), b) activate the person's reflective thinking of the ideas generated and possibly leads to self-correction (which is a characteristic of *zymotic* listening) and c) enables the mapping of the individuals' experience with the stimulus. The stimulus was argued to be the *topos* of constant reference when needed by the children to review their experiences and possibly self-correct.

Furthermore, it was claimed that philosophy as a way of life is the searching for individuals' *eudemonia*. The stimuli can offer this through the connection with human action, which is, like stimuli, located in space and time. It was argued that as individuals engage with a stimulus, they: a) experience living in different places (*topoi*) through the on-going discovery of the stimulus, b) live in *kairos* instead of *chronos* and c) connect with others which can lead to better understanding of self and others and therefore transformation. This is achieved through narratives which combine lived experience with

people's *zymotic* listening and thinking. It was shown that appreciating and getting engaged philosophically with the stimuli, cultivates certain *diatheses* to individuals such as being open, tolerant but also alert.

Children's way of life, as shown through the empirical paradigms taken from my previous experience as a teacher (see appendices) and my reflective practice, are not necessarily the same as adults' way of life. Adults can benefit from children's way of life if they identify first their philosophy, acknowledge and tolerate that it may be different from children's and open themselves to listening zymotically and reflect upon it. For this reason, it is possible that adults can provide children with stimuli, however, it is more important to be able to recognise and learn from the stimuli that children themselves generate as they will reflect their own needs and interests, hence they will be motivated to pursue them further.

I ended my investigation with a small sample of my own created stimuli (stories) for doing philosophy with children. I evaluated this material critically by contrasting it with other stimuli used in the field. It was argued that these stories match with the hypothesis of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life. I contemplated that the writing process brings me into a state of "*Eros*" with the stories and in a state of subjective time (*kairos*). What the practical examples show is that the stories work well with children if the *Eros* I experienced whilst writing them is experienced by them as well. My stories reflect ways of: a) producing stimuli based on lived experience that may not just be a source of literary enjoyment, but also provide seeds for further philosophical investigation and b) encourage children to generate their own stimuli and provoke philosophical enquiries.

The originality of this thesis

The originality of the thesis is the offering of an in depth philosophical underpinning of what a stimulus is and does in an inquiry. The choice of stimuli is not simply taken for

granted, or chosen out of practical considerations, but justified philosophically. Moreover, apart from offering a general theory concerning stimuli used in philosophy with children, there are also other new ideas offered in each chapter that contribute to the originality of this thesis as explained below:

The idea of *zymotic* listening is a major contribution to the originality of this thesis. It builds on Fiumara's idea that listening is thinking and describes further that this is a *zymotic* (fermentative) process. *Zymotic* listening is the condition of the possibility of other ways of 'opening up' a stimulus, such as experimenting, being playful with ideas, questioning and building on each others' ideas. The idea of the stimulus as a mapping of children's experiences in a philosophical community of inquiry is also new. It needs however, further empirical testing of how this mapping can take place in everyday practice.

The idea of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life enables a more holistic understanding of what philosophy could be when it blends theory and practice. Much emphasis within this work is given towards the generative aspect of philosophy, as it is often ignored in academia, but it is the one that can push people beyond the existing boundaries of their thinking.

In chapter two, the comparative study between three different ways of underpinning philosophy with children epistemologically is also new and shows that different existing categorizations overlap, that is, between: a) realists and dualists, b) critical pluralists and first-order non-realists, and c) relativists and second-order non-realists. The model of philosophy offered in this thesis matches most with the second category (b). However, my epistemological position also highlights the practical dimension of philosophy which links philosophy with everyday life.

I also explored the link further between the previous philosophical background of a facilitator of philosophical inquiry and how this influences their selection of a stimulus. For instance, it was assumed that facilitators with no strong philosophical background

may select specially designed stimuli for doing philosophy as they provide them with support on how to 'deliver' philosophy, in comparison with facilitators who have had a philosophical education and feel confident enough to find and use stimuli not directly linked with philosophy with children.

I have not come across the concepts of *catalepsy*, *Eros*, *Thanatos* and *epiphany* in the field of philosophy with children. These concepts have shown to be philosophically rich by offering a deeper understanding of stimuli and their role when doing philosophy with children. They have helped me to formulate the persuasive claim that it is the *Eros* that makes stimuli appropriate for doing philosophy with children. There is a crucial point, a state of *catalepsy*, that determines whether the forces that will develop during the individuals' engagement with a stimulus will be either: a) of attraction and lead to a state of *Eros* (love and desire) and further exploration of the stimulus (and through this discovery of various aspects of one's self), or b) of repulsion that lead to a state of *Thanatos* and the abandonment of the stimulus. The moments of *epiphany* are the ones that make individuals think 'deeper' about the 'big' questions in life and reveal other aspects of the stimulus.

A particular use of Venn diagrams also offered a new understanding of the different ways in which a person can engage with a stimulus. It made it possible to visualise a dynamic pedagogical triangle featuring the facilitator, the community of inquiry and the stimulus. I suggested imagining these Venn circles as dynamic thereby illustrating the different, dynamical forces developing between the participants of an inquiry and the stimulus.

I also put forward the idea in chapter five that when the narrative form of the stimulus matches with individuals' narrative understanding of their own experiences, there are more chances for moments of *epiphany* to occur. *Eros* is necessary but not sufficient in opening a stimulus philosophically. It needs to create moments of *epiphany*. The analysis of concrete details, such as colours, image details and text of the stimuli

provide us with some concrete examples of how a moment of *catalepsy* may lead individuals to a state of *Eros* when engaging with the stimuli.

The idea of philosophy as a way of life and its linking with children and the stimuli used in doing philosophy with children is not new but certainly an area that needs much more attention. Of course, it can be argued that philosophy with children is sufficient as a classroom activity. However, in this case philosophy is reduced to another subject in the school curriculum or to one more educational tool used for improving children's thinking skills; it cannot become a way of life. The thesis put forward here is only a beginning. Philosophy as a way of life is linked with children's actions and creates certain *diatheses* of recognising and involving with stimuli whenever they create them.

The inclusion in this thesis of empirical examples of my own practice as a teacher, as a facilitator and as an observer of philosophical inquiries, has helped to ground the theoretical ideas I have offered and have helped connect the theories with the practical dimension of philosophy in life.

Last but not least, my stories for doing philosophy with children add to the originality of this thesis. The stories could be used effectively as stimuli when doing philosophy with children as they combine literature and philosophy and their narrative form matches children's narrative understanding. My stories are also good examples for illustrating how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and philosophy as a way of life blend together. Apart from the originality of the stories, they also serve practical purposes as they can be used directly by practitioners and others interested in doing philosophy with children. What is required, however, is further empirical testing of the stimuli that are proposed in this thesis by means of educational empirical research.

For whom and in what ways is my research useful?

This theoretical and practically grounded piece of writing would firstly be of interest for theoreticians and practitioners of philosophy with children. The theoreticians would have a new field for discussion about stimuli and their role in philosophy with children. The practitioners would firstly acquire a profound understanding of the importance of stimuli in philosophical inquiries and secondly are offered some criteria and philosophical reflections to consider, when selecting a stimulus. For example, what makes a stimulus attractive or repulsive for them and for children? They are also introduced to a sample of my stories that could potentially be used as new stimuli for doing philosophy with children since they are in 'between' existing stories and specially made resources for P4C.

Apart from practitioners or academics in the field of philosophy with children, philosophers, theoreticians in pedagogy and education, developers and designers of educational material, teachers, parents and others working or living with children, could be inspired by this thesis as it describes a profound model of understanding stimuli and how we engage with them. The possible applications of the ideas put forward and claims made go beyond the field of philosophy with children. What follows are some examples of how this research could be of any use.

- The role of *Eros* (love) is important not only in selecting stimuli in doing philosophy with children but in any educational process. The element of *Eros* (desire) to learn or to teach something is often abandoned either because it is mistakenly taken for granted or because it is not considered be measurable or quantifiable. However, for research into motivation or engagement in education, the role of *Eros* is paramount. It is *Eros* that is the necessary motivation for further progress: a) for learning, b) for teaching with passion and genuine interest, c) for selecting or creating educational material that will create children's

and teacher's desires to explore further and d) for using methods that enable children's thinking to develop and flourish.

- Particularly, the discussion about stimuli in this thesis should not be restricted to the philosophy for children field but be taken seriously when considering the creation of any educational material or even curricula. Children need to feel desire for their learning subjects and see them as stimuli for further exploration. All the ideas described in chapter five about the stimuli's concrete characteristics are applicable to other educational materials as well.
- The moment of *catalepsy* has a practical educational impact. What is implied here is that not only the content of the stimulus is important but also the way the stimulus will be presented for creating *catalepsy*. The presentation of a stimulus refers to finding stimulating ways of presenting ideas (e.g. even the most promising stimulus if used as something to "kill time" and with a teacher having no real interest in it will lead children to a state of boredom which is a type of *Thanatos*). Therefore, in the case of a story (picture-book) as a stimulus it is equally important how, when and where the story-telling will take place, to allow a moment of *catalepsy* to occur.
- *Zymotic* listening shows that philosophical thinking takes time. It is useful for both parents and teachers to allow time for ideas to agitate, settle down and shape into temporary conclusions. *Zymotic* listening does not apply only to children, but also to adults and it is necessary for developing inquiring minds and judging what stimuli are worthy for our development and what are not.
- The findings of this thesis link very much with contempory ideas of educational sustainability and dealing with continuous instability and uncertainty. This thesis promotes the idea of viewing philosophy as a way of life where people acquire certain *diatheses* (being open, tolerant and in state of alertness) towards the stimuli around them

Limitations

The limitations of this research can be viewed from a philosophical and pedagogical perspective. From a philosophical perspective this research does not establish concrete and objective criteria in selecting a stimulus for doing philosophy with children. It seems that one of the aims set in the beginning of this research, finding criteria for selecting stimuli, is only partly achieved. This is because no matter how deep we delve in the characteristics of a stimulus (e.g. text, image and their combination), there are always individuals involved and their interpretation of the stimuli. Therefore, the criteria for selecting a stimulus do not lie only with it; they depend also on individuals' interpretations – it is in the relationship. This research opens a space for further consideration of *Catalepsy*, *Eros* and *Epiphany* as important elements not only for the recognition and selection of stimuli, but for their active incorporation in other educational processes.

I discussed the *diatheses* that philosophy as a way of life creates to individuals by highlighting two parameters: being open towards what is new and at the same time in a state of continuous alertness. What, however, is missing is the identification of the balance of these *diatheses*. How is it possible to be open and at the same time in a state of alertness (*prosoche*)? How can you find a balance between openness and alertness? It seems that there is an opening here for further philosophical investigation.

From a pedagogical perspective, in order to link philosophy with everyday life and its stimuli, more empirical research is required along with more data about the stimuli that children can bring to a philosophical inquiry. It is also required that a further empirical investigation on how the diversity of the children in respect to their learning abilities and learning styles affect their perception of the stimuli they encounter and their ability to open them further up. This research makes a step in this direction by using examples of children bring stimuli in a philosophical inquiry, as well as by indicating how my writing of stories connects with philosophy as a way of life and encourages children to create their own stimuli.

The idea of philosophy as a way of life could become problematic especially for someone who searches for unanimity and mutual consensus upon what is the correct or proper way of a philosophical life. As there are different understandings of philosophy, there are also different understandings of philosophy as a way of life. These different ways of life may contradict each other. This thesis does not offer any suggestions of how these differences should be resolved.

Finally, I could have limited my subject to one category of stimuli, as the thesis may be considered still too broad. However, I wanted to approach the topic in such a way that I could generalize from the findings of this research. Still, however, some stimuli were not really discussed in any detail, for instance, art, music and drama.

Further research/ New directions

It has been mentioned already that certain aspects of the research could have been done differently, both philosophically and empirically – in turn this offers suggestions for future research. For example, in the context of the research topic of stimuli for philosophy with children, it would be beneficial to focus on particular types of stimuli. Researching the underpinning philosophy behind Lipman's novels and manuals (and the possible controversies found) or other specially written material for philosophy with children would give us a better understanding of the potentialities of a stimulus. Similarly interesting would be exploring the potential of non-specially designed stimuli for doing philosophy with children.

From a philosophical point of view the conceptual analysis of children's playfulness and humour and their connection with creating and using existing stimuli for philosophising would also open new directions in the research field. The conceptual connection between Heidegger's idea of "Dasein" and the cataleptic moment that leads to *Eros* when engaging with a stimulus could also bring new ideas to light. Furthermore, the philosophical connection of philosophy with children with other temporary trends in

education such as the ideas of sustainability, globalization and lifelong education would be a prosperous field of research. Also the idea of researching, either philosophically or empirically, the methods of presenting a stimulus (e.g. storytelling) and their impact on creating *catalepsy* and *Eros* to children could be educationally worthy. It may be the case that a less potential stimulus for philosophical dialogue can create *Eros* to children if it is well presented.

Conducting, mostly, empirical research and focusing on stimuli generated by children when doing philosophy is a rich area of educational research. The findings of such research could show a lot about what children's interests are and how they can be used educationally. They could also open spaces to conceptual inquiries about who decides what educational resources will be used in the classroom. Children's own experiences as a stimulus for philosophical inquiries are a rich area for further research. Also the theoretical ideas of stimuli explored in this thesis could be tested practically to find out whether the children's engagement with the stimuli (materials/ methods) used in Education would benefit if the ideas of *Catalepsy*, *Eros*, *Thanatos*, *Epiphany* and *Zymotic* listening were practically incorporated.

Providing stimuli for children, to enhance their thinking is necessary as it helps children strengthen their thinking skills. However, adults' prescribing the stimuli is not genuine philosophy *by* children unless it encourages them to offer gradually their own stimuli and think about them and in the process create their own stimuli for philosophical discussion. Another topic generated by my research is the possibility of an empirical research project about teachers' attitudes towards the stimuli used when doing philosophy with children, as I claim in this thesis that teachers' philosophical training and epistemological have an impact on the facilitator's confidence in selecting and using a particular stimulus.

Furthermore, as indicated above more research needs to take place about the possible differences in perception of stimuli between adults and children. Adults and children live together and there is a need to conduct more research in order to find out how,

philosophically, both adults and children can benefit from having common philosophical inquiries, from sharing stimuli and what the implications might be for educational practice. Such an inquiry may possibly lead to a reconsideration of the term 'philosophy for/with children' as this seems too restrictive. Philosophy for/ with children may be seen as marginalising, the smaller version of the 'real' thing. A way forward might be to call it simply 'philosophy' which incorporates also children as people who are able to do genuine philosophy.

Further research should consider the diffusion of philosophy with children in other subjects of the curriculum and in children's everyday life. In the first case, it would be worthy researching how the school subjects can become stimuli for further philosophical investigation that could lead to finding meaning in the curriculum subjects and understanding themselves better. In the second case, philosophy as a way of life is possible only if children's lives and children's way of life are viewed philosophically. Philosophy should not be restricted to one-hourly classroom sessions because then it becomes another subject of the curriculum that can be totally forgotten the very first minute children leave the classroom. Further research could evaluate if and how children regard stimuli philosophically out of the classroom sessions, for instance when they go for a walk to the park, comment on others' drawing, or talk a bout a TV programme. The thoughts and emotions that such everyday events and activities provoke can be points of departure for further meaningful reflection. As parents are in a unique position to recognise stimuli for inquiries with children, research that includes parents could be another direction for future research.

Nevertheless, what in particular needs further empirical and philosophical research is an exploration of what children understand as philosophy. Many questions can arise here such as: 'can children's play be a form of children' philosophising?', 'is children's philosophy their way of approaching the questions adults ask them?', and 'is children's play a form of philosophy which is not fully translatable to adults?' The fact that children's experiences are not referred to by children as philosophy does not make this experience less philosophical. Therefore, more questions arise, such as 'Is philosophy

only what adults understand as philosophy?', and 'Would it not be important to see what children understand as their philosophy even if they do not use the word 'philosophy'?'

Apart from the new directions for research as indicated above I as a researcher could actively get involved with, there are also some more particular plans I have to take my research forward and develop some of the ideas explored in this thesis. In particular, my immediate plans are to further develop materials for doing philosophy with children and to conduct empirical research in the effectiveness of my stories for P4C in a) stimulating children philosophically and b) in modelling for children how they can create their own stimuli without any resemblance to my stories.

Conclusion

The whole process of writing a Ph.D. became an on-going stimulus itself - with many of its aspects still hidden. Conceptual researching, reflecting on my previous experience as a teacher, running or attending philosophical inquiries and writing stories have become part of my life for years now. Many ideas proposed in this thesis came from the combination of reading, writing, *epiphany* moments and creative tantrums that comprise part of my lived experience. The *zymotic* listening and the maturation of ideas is a lived experience. It was what I saw happening not only in mature communities of inquiries, but also in my own practice and studying. This thesis itself is a product of a constant *zymosis* of my previous experiences as a researcher, teacher, student of philosophy, amateur writer with my new acquired experience in practising philosophy with children and adults, reading more about philosophy with children, networking with people from the field, writing stories, attending lessons in creative writing, attending seminars and attending and presenting papers and workshops in conferences. It was necessary to allow time for ideas to emerge and, equally important, to give time for the stimulating ideas to settle down and to mature following their own pace and link with the *diatheses* of being open, tolerant but yet critical. These *diatheses* developed slowly but steadily

and were necessary for being flexible in dealing with the uncertainty concerning the various 'twists and turns' of the structure of this thesis.

Reflecting back on my experience as a teacher (as seen in examples in the appendices), I realise that what I now present as a theory about stimuli for P4C in particular has always been a lived part of my practice as a teacher. It seems that the *zymotic* process of listening to others and me had already started then, however, it needed further time and more 'stimuli' so as to be developed and shaped into a theory. What will make me a different teacher from now on is that I have started 'examining' my previous practice in the light of philosophy with children. Much of my practice as a teacher was philosophical even if I was not fully aware of it at the time. This is because I truly loved (*Eros*) the discussions with children and their viewpoints. Now I know how to recognise the stimuli that children bring with them into the classroom - stimuli that can be explored philosophically. Also, I know now how I can offer children more quality stimuli that can provoke their natural tendency to philosophise.

I entered the field of philosophy with children and this particular thesis as a question mark. I leave this thesis not as a full stop, but as a larger question mark that I want to pursue further. This should be the role of a stimulus when doing philosophy with both adults and children: to create more question marks and in parallel trigger them to 'chase' their further questions. Wittgenstein had said that the aim of philosophy is "to show the *fly* the way out of the *fly*-bottle" (PI. 309). If the stimulus is a sort of Socratic gadfly, then we need to make sure that the fly is not only out of the fly-bottle but also triggers us to chase it. Chasing a stimulus out of true desire (*Eros*) leads to discovering more about the stimulus and ourselves. This opens the space to the unfamiliar, unknown, uncomfortable and not yet discovered territory. Being open and alert are *diatheses* that enable the new discovery not only of the stimulus but also of ourselves.

Glossary of Greek terms

Anamnesis (Ανάμνησις): It is a term used by Plato in *Meno* and *Phaedo* and it means recollection. It refers to the knowledge as the result of the incarnated soul's recollection of its previous immortal state.

Akroasis (Ακρόαση): It means listening carefully

Aporia (Απορία): Etymologically this word comes from a + poros (not going through or having wealth). It has a double meaning: a) it means perplexity and inability to pass through and b) it means lacking resources. A+poros= Aporos and means the one who does not have recources, the poor.

Atopos (Άτοπος): It means out of place or not in the right place. It can have a literal or metaphorical meaning. Atopos can mean also incongruous or absurd.

Catalepsy (Καταληψία): It is an 'immediate' perception of a situation just before emotions and thoughts are about to be generated. It is understood as a sense of grasping and numbing that Socrates' stingray metaphor could describe well. Catalepsy is located between ignorance and knowledge and apart from its initial shock and surprise for the person, it determines the moment that the person decides consciously to engage further or not with a stimulus.

Chronos (Χρόνος): It means time and refers to the chronological, sequential and 'objective human way of counting' time.

Deixis (Δείξις): It is the action that enables someone to draw intentionally someone else's attention about something, usually by pointing at it.

Diathesis (Διάθεσις): It refers to people's attitudes and dispositions towards life. Diathesis reflects people's 'philosophy' and 'narration' towards life. It is subject to change, ranging from being positive and reinforcing further exploration upon stimuli in life, to being negative and abandoning life and its stimuli.

Elenchus (Έλεγχος): It is Socrates' mode of argumentation that aims at exposing inconsistency within the interlocutor's beliefs rather than an instrument implemented to establish an objective truth.

Enkrateia (Εγκράτεια): It means self mastery. It is a compound word (en+ kratw) which means I hold something inside.

Epiphany (Επιφάνεια): It is a sudden intuitive perception of insight into the essential meaning of something, usually initiated by some simple or common place experience. It comes from the word epiphainesthai, which means to appear or to show. It also means an appearance or manifestation, especially of a deity.

Eros (Έρως): Eros was an ancient Greek semi god of love and desire who was the son of Poros and Penia. He has been also considered as the son of the Greek goddess of beauty Aphrodite and Ares (god of war) which explains the nature of Eros for desiring greedily to possess what is beautiful and not yet acquired. Eros is understood as an active passionate love which often involves sexual attraction and is directed to a particular living or non living object. The person who is in Eros desires achieving wholeness and completeness through the pursuit of his/her loving object. (Ancient Greek verb erao=to love).

Eudemonia (Ευδαιμονία): It is usually translated as happiness and flourishing, but it also refers to being at ease with one's conscience. It is a compound word (eu + daemon (=good spirit, deity) It is achieved by leading an examined way of life based on reflecting on the decisions made and the way one's life is conducted.

Kairos (Καιρός): In this thesis it also means time but it has a more subjective character and indicates the time in which something special happens.

Penia (Πενία): In Greek Mythology she was the goddess of poverty and deficiency who gave birth to Eros.

Peripeteia (Περιπέτεια): It has been introduced by Aristotle in his *Poetics* and it refers to a hero's adventure which includes sudden reversal in circumstances

Poros (Πόρος):In Greek Mythology he was the god of wealth and father of Eros.

Prosoche (Προσοχή): It means being in a state of alertness and concentrating in the moment of one thought or action.

Telos (Τέλος): It has been used by Aristotle and it means both the end and the reason within it. This is where teleology comes from.

Thanatos (Θάνατος): It means death, or metaphorically complete lack of interest. In this thesis, it is used in contrast with Eros.

Topos (Τόπος): It means either a physical or a mental space.

Zymotic listening (Ζυμωτική ακρόαση): Zymotic means fermentative. It is a new term introduced in this thesis which refers to a mixture of critical, creative and emotional listening that leads to the maturation of thinking in time through a fermentative process (zymosis). It can be used to explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life with generative and evaluative aspects

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

The stories

1st story
Artistic Dust

The main door of the Art Museum was now closed. The last visitors could hardly be heard as they were walking down the steps. The door of the storage room opened.

"It's my turn," the Mop said as she felt a hand grasping her. It was dancing time with Mary the cleaner. Together they were swinging around the rooms, quickly and slowly, forward and backwards, reaching corners or running along corridors leaving behind the smell of fresh lemons: swishing and swashing, to-ing and fro-ing. It was fun, at least for the Mop.

The Mop shared the storage room with many others who never left the room. The chair with the Duster left on it, the old paintbrush on the table, Mary's mug, the wooden cross on the shelf and the almost withered daisy in the vase were silently listening to the mop's narratives. So did the plastic bucket that accompanied the mop but was always left outside the rooms.

"Tell us, what is outside of this room?" they begged her and the Mop started narrating all the things she could see.

"Oh...there are big rooms full of light, with floors that are smooth and smell of wood. And there are tables but I have never seen what is on them. I can only move towards their legs. There are also stone people that stand still and things on the ground inside boxes of glass. They seem quite old. Mary stops my dancing when we approach them. She says that we should be careful, these things are important! I can't understand why."

"I wish I could be one of these tables" the storage table wobbled its legs every time it listened to Mop's narratives.

"Tell us more" they begged.

"Well...let me see...yes, the most important thing I have ever seen is in the middle of the biggest room in the museum. It is a glass box on the floor lit from underneath. It is a light that...guess what...it changes colours! A fence is around to protect it. There is also a huge white stone with some scribbles in front of it which shouldn't be there!"

Gradually the Mop began to change her attitude. She was boasting that she was the most important thing in the storage room because she knew everything that lived outside it. Lately she asserted that she should move from the storage area and live constantly within the big rooms. She was a dancer after all: a pure artist whom all the paintings and the photographs on the walls were gazing at.

"You are just a messy thing full of dust," Bucket the plastic said one day to the Mop openly annoyed.

"But it is not simply dust. It is artistic! It comes from the important things of the art museum", the Mop flicked a speck of dust from her hair.

"So what?" brushy Brush the painter joined in the dialogue. He had suspected that maybe Mop was only showing off.

"I am the one who puts the colours on the canvas to make all the images, but I am left here. I should be also outside there next to the paintings. Do you know how many paintings I have made?"

"If I remember well you had been used to paint the wall of this room. And you painted it plain white" Sink Leaky said as he was throwing some water to Mop's hair. You are a simple paintbrush!

"That's really funny," Duster Cover laughed. You all forget that you couldn't do the slightest move without a human's hand. You could never be important, you are just tools."

They were all silenced. Nobody liked the word "tool".

"I am not a tool," Daisy Floral said. "And I am beautiful! If I was made by humans I might be now in the other rooms of the museum, the important ones."

"God made you," Cross Holy chanted. "God is the greatest artist" he added but nobody replied. He used to turn every discussion into God, maybe because he came from a nunnery. But Mop was absolutely sure that this place never existed. Mop only knew what the world was like outside of the storage room.

One day something happened that would change the lives in the storage room forever. It was not yet time for the Mop's dancing but the door suddenly opened. A man with black curly hair and a black camera hanging from his neck got into the room. He started moving slowly, looking around carefully. He touched the duster and picked a flick of dust from the table. Mary followed him.

"That's perfect!" he said many times. "That's what I am looking for".

"Should I tidy up first, it's very messy in here."

"No, it is that messiness I want to snap," the man replied and started taking photos.

"I will have an exhibition at the central room of the museum" the photographer said as he took his camera out of the case. "About the objects that you never see in the main rooms of a museum" he added.

Mary nodded her head not sure that she had understood well. She asked whether he needed anything else. He said no and kept taking photos of everything in the storage room. Mary left the room and an hour later the photographer was gone too. The storage room was quiet again.

"Hurrah!" Mop yelled when all had left. "I knew it, I knew!"

"Did anyone understand what happened?" Muggy Mug asked still shocked from the flashes.

"This guy touched me with his wet hands!" Duster complained.

"This guy is a photographer and he took photos of us. We are important. They will move us from here. You see, because of me, luck smiled at you too" Mop raved.

"Really?" Brush cheered.

"It was God's wish" Cross applauded.

"The photographer said he would take photos of the messiness. But we don't know of any messiness living with us, do we?" Cushy Cushion leisurely bounced and let a cloud of dust rise.

"Come on", Table said. "Can you take photos of something that doesn't exist? He must have made a mistake. He was taking photos of us, so it was us that he wanted! We are important now!"

"We are important now!" they all shouted. All but the Duster.

"It's the photos that are important guys, not us. Nothing is going to change for us" Duster said.

But the 'tools' of the storage room were already busy dreaming how their new important lives would be outside the storage room.

2nd Story

Save the jungle

A big issue was raised in the jungle and all the animals were invited to participate in the first discussion animals would ever have. It was the visiting owl's idea. She came from the burnt forest 30 miles away from the jungle.

"We have to take a serious decision and share our ideas," the owl wrote in the invitation that she sent to all animals.

The animals didn't really understand what owl's invitation was about but they decided to go to this meeting at the big tree in the centre of the jungle.

The owl had a big poster on the tree with the issue in large print.

"Jungle is at risk. Next human attack is already planned. Deforestation is on the way. How can we avoid it?"

The owl spoke slowly to make sure that everybody heard and understood and then left the discussion to the animals.

The lion roared first because he was the king so he had to speak first.

The elephant trumpeted even louder because he was the biggest and should be heard first.

The hippopotamus stamped his foot on the ground to show who was the strongest there.

The parrot fluttered his wings and squawked in a human voice "I am the only one who can speak humanise"

The snake bit and hissed at all the members. "My ancestors had beaten the humans once, so we will beat them again"

The laughing hyena was really annoyed and kicked the snake back.

The giraffe was ignored even though she was the tallest and found it a good idea to head butt the others.

The monkey climbed up the tree and then she let herself fall into the middle of the animals circle to show who can draw the attention.

The crocodile showed his teeth.

After a while the animals were roaring, punching, kicking and slapping and the owl in a loud voice screamed.

"Can you stop behaving like animals? There is not time left, we need to save the jungle," But nobody listened.

The ant was sitting opposite the tree reading carefully the issues up for discussion. He was not sure what "deforestation" meant but he was sure it was something terribly bad. Maybe even the death of the jungle! He sat on a

stone and began thinking and thinking until he suddenly came up with a great idea. It was a perfect idea: the idea that would save the jungle.

The ant raised his voice, but nobody listened.

He raised his voice even more and more. He was now shouting, but nobody listened.

He tapped his foot strongly on the floor. Again and again, but nobody listened.

He jumped as high as he could, but nobody listened.

He poked lion's and then elephant's foot and hardly escaped being stepped on.

He got angry and shouted, punched and kicked the air but nobody listened.

He went back home, took out a large yellow leaf and a piece of coal and wrote in capitals:

"I have the right to speak and be listened to."

He held his leaf as high as he could and silently protested. But nobody listened.

"Do I exist?" the ant asked, but nobody replied.

The ant sure that nothing was likely to happen anymore turned his back and went home.

But then something did happen. First the roars, then the punches and the kicks and suddenly a hurricane of dust blew so firmly that the ant lost his balance.

He swirled, then he flew and finally he landed on a big, grey piece of land that was flapping around in the wind.

"Where am I?" the ant asked. But nobody listened.

"Am I dead?" he wondered.

"But I can still move," he said and moved first round and round, then forwards and finally backwards.

"If only they could listen to me" the ant said. "I have the answer" he said and kept exploring the new area. He was approaching a dark tunnel when he listened to a loud trumpeting. Then an earthquake forced the grey land to move.

The ant lost his balance again and found himself sliding on a big slope. It was fun! Then the ant felt going up and up and up till he stopped in front of a black circle. It looked like a huge eye.

"It is an ant!" the elephant said bellowing from his large trunk that made the ant fly again.

All the animals stopped fighting.

"We haven't heard from him yet, have we?" the owl said.

"What could an ant know?" the monkey mocked.

"He is so small, that he can't even be heard" the hyena giggled.

"Let's be silent then" the owl suggested. "Put your ears down on the ground and you will listen to him" she added. So the animals did.

The ant shouted his answer.

"I can't hear" the rattlesnake complained.

"It's because you are not silent. Stop playing with your tale" the owl said.

Then there was silence, a deep silence till the whispered ant's voice was heard. And he said the simplest thing which would definitely save the jungle. It was so obvious but nobody had thought of it so far.

When the ant stopped talking there was still silence.

The animals nodded their heads. The crocodile wiped a teardrop. The owl smiled. She had passed the message on. She could move to other places that were in danger.

The animals sat in a circle and discussed what further action they would take. They were not animals anymore.

Appendix 2

A sample of a possible lesson plan that can be used for a philosophical dialogue with children

Leading Idea:

Things of Importance

Group target: Children aged 4-7

Objectives: The children through the discussion should be able to:

- Listen carefully to what others say.
- Respect rules of the community (e.g. no interruptions when one's speaking).
- Give examples of important things.
- Give reasons for their answers (e.g. why certain things are important).
- Give counter-examples of things that are considered as important when they are not and vice versa.

Warm up activities:

- Role play: Children choose an object either from the story or not and try to act as if they were the objects they have chosen. They are allowed time to explore their character's role and act it out. What objects would they be? Why would they choose to be a certain object? What would the objects look like? How would they move? What would be important to them?
- Children bring (or think of) things that they consider as important. They talk in pairs and each child gives reasons to the other about why his/her object is important. When the facilitator claps his/her hands the children change pairs and give their reasons to another child.

Discussion Plan: Objects of importance

Some of the potential questions that could be the stimuli for discussion are listed below:

- Are the things from the storage room important?
- Why did the Mop think that she is more important than the others? Did she have good reasons?
- Can you think of some important objects? Why are these objects important?
- To whom are these objects important?
- Who decides what is important? (mother, father, teacher, police, the Prime Minister, god?)

- Can a person be important?
- Are all the objects important to all of the people?
- Are there objects that are not important at all? Give examples.
- If one object is not important for anybody, does that make the object not important or irrelevant?
- Is it important for an object to have a name?
- Can an object stop being important?
- Can an object that was not important become important? How?
- Is there anything that is the most/least important thing?
- Can an important thing be unnoticed? (e.g. the air we breath)

Exercise: Objects of importance

The teacher sticks on a large piece of paper some pictures of objects and creates with the children the table that follows. Then children have to place ticks whether they consider the certain objects as important or not and indicate to whom they would be important. They need to justify their choices.

Pictures	Important		Important to whom
	Yes	No	
Dog			
A plate full of food			
Sun			
A golden ring			
Flower			
Spider			
Mickey Mouse			
Baby			
Mop			
Money			
A Doll			
School			
Dust			

Exercise: Naming important people

- What makes a person important?
- Are there some people who are important for everybody?

People	Important		Important to particular people (who?)	Important for everyone
	Yes	No		
My mum				
The Prime Minister				
My best friend's sister				
The Queen				
Einstein				
Britney Spears				
The Pope				
A Baby				
The Teacher				
Myself				
Saint Nicolas				

Exercise: Quantifying the important!

- How much importance do we need?
- Are the important things big? How big?
- Are the important things expensive? How expensive?
- Are the important things famous? How famous?

Making graphs of importance

Geography:

- What makes a place important?
- Can you think of important places?
- Why are they important?
- What is so important about them? Discuss.

History:

- What makes a historical period important?
- Can you think of any period that is historically important? Why?
- Are there historical periods that are more important than others?
- Can we make comparisons? Upon what criteria?

Art:

- What makes a work of art important?

- Is a piece of art important only because you can see it in a famous gallery?
- Are there important works of art not in art galleries?
- Can a child's drawing be a work of art?
- What distinguishes an important painter from a unimportant one?
- Who is to say what is an important work of art?
- Can a bad painting be famous? Why?

Discussing particular paintings, for instance one famous painting and another one which is not famous. What are their differences? What are their similarities?

Taboo Word playing: Say that something is important without using the word 'important'

- Are there any words that are important? Name them. Why are they important?

Imagining:

- A world where everything would be important. How would that world be?
- A world where nothing would be important. How this world would be?

Draw an important: person, place, and thing.

Leading Idea: Messiness

Discussion plan

- Can you find messiness in tidiness? Can you find tidiness in messiness?
- What does it mean to be messy?
- Is being messy a negative or positive thing? Why?
- Does messiness grow bigger?
- Can animals be messy?
- What makes something messy?

Messy versus Tidy

	Messy	Tidy	Why
My room			
A restaurant's kitchen			
A hospital			
My thoughts			
A painting			
clothes			
A feeling			
A bank account			
An idea			
A meal			
A mop			
Dust			

Arts

- We draw the artistic dust. What does it look like? We make a little expedition with our messy drawings.

Messy movies:

- We are filming a messy movie based on a messy scenario we have already written!

Word distinctions and definitions:

In what ways is messy similar or different to: a) dirty, b) filthy, c) untidy, d) unclean, e) mucky, f) muddy, g) chaotic, i) disordered, h) unorganized, k) muddled, l) cluttered.

Music:

- Can music be messy?
- What does messy music sound like?
- How would we compose 'messy music'?

Imagine:

- A messy world: How would that be? Draw it.
- A messy situation.
- A messy feeling/ thought.

Mixed activities for different leading ideas

- We take photos capturing the messiness of the class/ playground/ my room/ our house's storage room.

- Can we capture anything else apart from messiness in our photos? What would that be? (e.g. the curiosity of people/ the intensity of the moment)
- Role play: Acting important/ messiness. How would you use your body/ face/ voice to show messiness? Importance?
- Compare 'Mop' with Frog from Lionni's book 'Fish is Fish'. What are their similarities and differences?

Appendix 3
A dialogue about the morals of 'Artistic Dust'

Questions:

- What made the mop feel so important? Votes: 3
- What made you think of a living mop? Votes: 5
- Why do some people get treated differently than other people? Votes: 6
- **What's the moral of the story? Votes: 8**

Me:	Any ideas, what do you think the moral of the story is? Shall we go for a round of answers?
Emma:	Two morals really. The first is that you shouldn't treat people differently to others. The other one...oh I forgot the other one now.
Me:	We can come to you later
William:	I kind of think the same with Emma because anybody shouldn't be treated differently to other people because this is unfair.
Rachel:	No matter who you are or what you are, you shouldn't be treated differently to anybody else.
Luke:	You have to help each other, like care for each other.
Ron:	I think that the story is about the same as William said, don't treat people differently
Kate:	You shouldn't be treated differently because we think that we are more important than others when we are not.
Lizzy:	The moral of the story is treat everybody the same no matter who you are or what you are.
Sophie:	Treat everyone as you like to be treated.
Me:	A very important philosopher said exactly the same. His name is Kant.
Thomas:	Don't treat anybody differently because inside we are all the same.
Me:	What I can see is that all of you agree that people should be treated all the same as you would like to be treated and some said that we are no more important than the others. But what does it mean to be important?
Lizzy:	Is the queen more important?
Emily:	Like nobody is important because...erm...because for example the Queen, she can have the same things with another rich person who lives here and nobody should be important because everybody should have the same rights as each other.
Rachel:	I agree with Emily, because the Queen is still a person and even though she has a higher standing than us she is not really any more important than us. Royalty is at the same level.
Me:	What do you mean by the same level?

Rachel: Nobody is more important than anybody else because we are really the same. We are not different.

Vana: I think you shouldn't be friends with somebody just because they are important or use them if they are not and not really bother with them. You should like them for who they are and not what they have got.

Me: So it matters who we are, but not what we have got. How do others understand this?

Kate: Erm like for example...me and Lena, we are the same because we are at the same level. The Queen isn't more important than whoever, me and she doesn't have more rights to live than me.

Ron: I like to agree because if there is somebody really poor or really rich. It doesn't matter what you have. It's what you do.

Me: What do the others think about it?

Lizzy: I agree that someone can have a really big house but be really horrible and you could just like them for all their stuff. But there could be a person who is really, really poor and lives in a shed for example, but is a really good person.

Emma: I agree with Sophie, because in Roman times they judged people by what they did and not who they were.

Me: A question to all of you following on from Rachel. You said that it is important who we are and not what we have, but do you think that sometimes what we have might influence who we are? What do you think?

William: Some people might have parents and they have the right to be good and some people don't have parents and they are naughty.

Gemma: I don't really know because if you have too much stuff you can be really spoiled. Sometimes it does matter what you have got to make friends if you are new.

Ron: I don't agree with William because he said that if people have parents they are good but it doesn't work like that. Because you can have somebody living in a foster home and be really good and somebody who has a normal family and they could not care for anything.

Me: William gave an example with which you don't agree. Can you find another example?

Lizzy: If you are poor or say your mum and dad do not earn as much money as other people, so when you go to the shops you don't get the same stuff as anybody else, you might live in the same type of house but have different things and be treated differently.

Gemma: What you have judges what you are. If you came from a different country and you really want to make friends, the things you have could make people want to be friends with you. But then...coming back to what Sophie said if you are a poor person and go to a shop you can't have what others have, like chocolate and like that but you still can be really, really happy with what you have got.

Alice: Going on from what Rachel said, if you are poor and you don't have what everybody else has you may be treated differently.

You should judge somebody on their personality and not on how they look.

Joanna: Following on from what has been said, you should not make friends with people based on how they look because they might have a good personality.

Anna: If somebody looks really horrible on the outside they could be really nice on the inside or look nice on the outside but be really horrible on the inside.

Vana: If someone is new, say from Africa, they can bring their own culture to the new culture. To make friends they could use their old culture.

Me: Is there anybody who has not spoken yet who would like to add something?

Luke: Well, we have this anti-bulling scheme in school so we don't judge people by what they look like.

Rachel: You can still be happy if you don't have many things

Me: Can you find connections between important things and things that make us happy?

Anna: People who are not so fortunate if they have got something which is really good they could be really happy with it, but someone with lots of money just keeps wanting more.

Emma: If you don't have parents you may turn out better than people who do have parents.

Me: What makes you believe so?

Emma: Say you are in a foster home and you don't have any parents, you could be really nice and good and then you get fostered.

Anna: I agree with Emma because if you don't have a family they would want a family. So they can be included in what the family does.

Sophie: Some people, say they are rich, what makes them happy, say a TV makes you happy, so you need a TV to make you happy, but as long as you have got family and friends these are the things you really need. You can still be happy.

Me: So you can be happy with less. We have to wrap our conversation up because it's time for you to leave. Let's have our last thoughts.

Alice: The mop tried to be different. But how would she liked it if the other things were doing that to her and got used more than her?

Rachel: For a poor person it doesn't matter how poor you are but how nice you are. Say you are horrible to others would you like them to do it back to you?

Thomas: I think to judge somebody by their personality and no what they have got.

William: Pass.

Vana: I think it's good to have friends but you should treat them how you want to be treated yourself.

Kate: If you are nice to somebody they will be nice back but if you are horrible they won't be nice back.

Luke: If you are a spoiled brat you won't have any friends.

Sophie: Sometimes less is more!

Emma:	Pass.
Anna:	Don't judge each other by what we have because it is inside what matters.
Joanna:	Pass.
Lizzy:	It's important who you are and not what you have.
Lena:	Pass.

Appendix 4
Stimuli that comes from children's school life and could be used philosophically[1]

1. Children working with games that improve their logical and spacial abilities



Picture 1: Children playing with games that require attention and logical thinking



[1] The photographs are from my personal archive as a teacher in Greece. I had asked for permission from the children's parents for using the photographs, which I used to take only for research and academic reasons

Picture 2: Children playing with games that require attention and logical thinking

2. Philosophical discussions that can occur during children's spontaneous play

Picture 3: A motorbike made from blocks

Picture 4: Role play: Taking care of our babies and sharing responsibilities

3. Philosophical discussions that could occur after visits to new places (e.g. visit to an olive oil factory)

Picture 5: Visit to a local olive oil factory

4. Philosophical discussions that can occur during children's presentations of the books their parents read to them during the weekend.

Picture 6: Presenting to my classmates the book I read at the weekend

5. Art creations as a follow up activity or as an initial stimulus for a philosophical discussion.

Picture 7: Creating Art

Picture 8: Creating Art using a PC

6. Celebrating birthdays

Picture 9: Birthday celebration

6. Observing a little snail



Picture 10: Observing a snail

7. Drama activities



Picture 11: At the hospital

Picture 12: Greek Gods chatting about Persefoni

The children in this photo were wondering how to 'grow a beard' for their dressing up as ancient Greek Gods. There were no knitting needles available so they had to think of alternatives. "What if I use the stapler?" There is always a need for thinking critically. "Because you will start bleeding and you will hurt yourself" answered the other child and finally they thought of using the tape. What, however, would happen if none had foreseen the

consequences of such a deed? What is the facilitator's role and where does his/her responsibility lie between thinking philosophically and making sure that children's dialoguing will not lead to hurting themselves? Shall we ever take for granted that someone can always think critically?

Changing bodies



Picture 13: My new body

8. Protesting

Picture 14: Protesting at the central square of the village

9. Planting and….

Picture 15: Planting flowers

10. ….taking notes of the plants progress



Picture 16: Daily notes on flowers' progress

11. Organizing a school festival

Picture 17: Preparing the scenery for the Christmas school celebrations

Making the preparations for scenes for the Christmas drama play: Working all together and being collaborative led children to make the scenery below

Picture 18: Well…our scenery is not bad. It was very artistically done!

Picture 19: Last preparations for the Christmas drama play

Being collaborative with each other and responsible (children were thinking of what we were doing) would reassure a good final result that would make both children and their families happy.

Picture 20: Arranging the Christmas photos

By the end of Christmas school celebration children had to choose and negotiate which photos they could take to their houses as souvenirs. This activity required:

- Collaboration with each other so as not to start fighting by being greedy to grab the photos for themselves.
- Good observation skills so as to see in which photos each child appeared.
- Negotiating if two or more children wanted the same photo. Children should give good arguments to convince the others. In case the arguments were not persuasive enough children should think of other alternatives (e.g. asking from the teacher to print a photo more than once)
- Being caring and reassuring that all children have about the same number of photos
- Being patient and tolerant.
- Respecting each other.
- Children established their own rules: They agreed that those who are disrupting this process would go somewhere else until they feel better and then come back. It was reassured also that in the phase of picking the photos they all would be there to approve them or not.

12. The classroom labels



Picture 21: Classroom label/ How do I feel today?

Each child had made a petal with their names on it. When children entered the classroom they put their petal on the head of the flower that represented best their emotions (e.g. happy, angry, bored or sleepy, sad, terrified). Throughout the day children could move their petal if their mood had changed.

This stimulus had been used a lot during the school year as a way for children to identify their emotions and recognise others' emotions. Questions that could be treated philosophically had been raised such as:

- Is Georgia's anger the same as mine? (Lena)
- If we change our petal and move it to the happy flower will our mood change and become happy? (Suzan)
- What makes us change how we feel?
- If we forget to change our petal does it really matter? (Mike)

Another option could be to negotiate whether some other emotions are not represented whereas they could have been.



Picture 22: The scale of responsibility

Each step (with the accompanying face) represents a different level of responsibility. From bottom to top: not responsible/ I am trying to become responsible (a little bit responsible)/ I am about to become very responsible (responsible)/ I am perfectly responsible (very responsible). Children had made a cartoon representation of themselves and everyday they placed their cartoon at the level they thought they were, according to their own evaluation but also listening to others opinions. The place for each cartoon on the scale was not fixed and could change during the day. At the bottom of the page were the cartoons of the students who were absent.

This stimulus had raised a lot of questions and led to many discussions often very philosophical. Here are some examples of the questions raised:

- What does it mean to be responsible? (Maria)
- Is it always good to be extremely responsible? (Me)
- Can you ever be perfectly responsible?
- Are the teachers perfectly responsible all the time? (Costis)
- How can I know if I am responsible? (Rhodi)
- Who decides how responsible we are? (Nasos)
- What if the cartoons are responsible but not us? (Rhodi)
- If I lose my cartoon then I am not responsible, am I? (Helen)

- How is it possible one day to be very responsible and the next day to be at the bottom of the scale? (Vasilis)
- Is Miss Sofia responsible when she teases us? (Costis)

We had discussed with the children the positives and the negatives of being responsible and there was an agreement that being extremely responsible is not necessarily something very good. Therefore, it is not too bad not to be at the top of the scale! Below are some of children's ideas about what it means to be responsible and what are the positives and negatives of being responsible

What does responsible mean?

- We tidy up the room before we play with new toys (Helen)
- We don't interrupt others when they talk and we listen to each other (Suzan)
- We help our mother and out teachers (Lena)
- We don't punch and spit on others even if we want it so much (Costis)
- We are not noisy (Maria)

Positives of being responsible

- We can do a lot of things because we don't waste time in shouting (Rhodi)
- We do not have our teachers to pull us together (Costis)
- We feel nice (Helen)
- There is less noise and more work (Mike)
- If people were not responsible then there would be many robberies (Vasilis)

Negatives of being responsible

- It's boring sometimes (Costis)
- It does not have any fun (Vasos)
- If I am ill then it's ok if I am not too responsible (Vasos)
- Sometimes it's ok if there is a bit of noise and the teachers shout at us. It's fun again (Rhodi)

13. Questions that emerge spontaneously in the classroom. Below, there are some examples from questions that have been raised by children aged 4-6.



Picture 23: What if it never rained?

What would happen if it never rained?

- We wouldn't have any water (George)
- We wouldn't need umbrellas but we would need to water the flowers (Rhodi)
- We wouldn't be able to put out the fires (Vasos)
- The plants would get dry and the animals wouldn't find food and water (Georgia)
- People wouldn't have food like lentils, potatoes and fruits (Suzan)
- We wouldn't have water to drink (John)
- We wouldn't have sausages because the animals we get the sausages from would have died (Maira)
- Birds would die (Vasilis)
- People would die also (Vicky)

Note: This is a question that came from the children and allowed them to think critically and creatively. What matters is to write down children's ideas with their names beside. Usually, these questions can be a stimulus for a further philosophical discussion afterwards if children are still interested). Also writing down children's questions and sticking them on a wall functions as a mapping of the initial stimulus that is always 'there' for the children to revisit if they feel so. Therefore, the same stimulus has the opportunity for being further 'opened'.



Picture 24: What was the best deed I have done for someone lately?

- I helped Georgia to cut something that she struggled with (Maria)
- I helped my mother with housework (Maria)
- I helped Costas to tidy up the room after we played together (Nasos)
- That I am a friend of most of my classmates (Rhodi)
- I helped once my grandmother to feed the rabbits (Stella)
- I helped my grandmother to tidy up my room! (Zoe, Vasilis, Viron)
- I helped Gina with her Easter art craft (Lena)
- I taught Leo how to cycle (Linos)
- To look after my baby brother (Helen)
- I always help my mother (Georgia)
- I arranged the pens by colour (Michael)

Note: This activity could be repeated and slightly changed, referring this time to the best deed ever done. A potential philosophical dialogue about what makes a deed good could take place. Still, having written down children's

answers we have created a mapping for the particular stimulus that can always be extended in the future.



Picture 25: What makes the teachers angry?

The teachers of our class get angry when:

- we make a lot of fuss and don't listen to others (many children)
- we fight with each other and cause accidents to others (many children)
- we talk without taking turns (Maria)
- we punch each other (Georgia)
- we bring unnecessary things from our homes to school (Mike)
- we tear up our drawings (Maria)
- we start a new play without having first tidied up the place and the items we occupied before (Nasos)
- the teachers ask us twice or more to come to the cycle but we ignore them and keep on with what we are doing (Costis)
- we put in the wrong order the days of the week (Orion)
- when we throw things for fear that we might cause any accident (Rhodi)
- when we throw away our food when other people do not have food to eat (Rhodi)
- when we are naughty (Vasos)

Note: This activity allows much reflection for both teachers and the children. Each statement was occasionally revisited to remind to children behaviours that make the teachers angry without the need for the teacher to get immediately angry. It was also tested whether there are really good reasons for the teachers to get angry in these cases. Furthermore, each statement was an opportunity for the teachers to reflect and possibly self correct in case they got angry when it was not really necessary.

There was further debate for some statements. For instance, why should the teacher get angry if the children bring something from their house? Do the children have not the right to bring objects from their houses that make them feel more comfortable in the school? Is it not a good idea for children to bring stimuli from their house that could be used somehow in the classroom? The counter argument that children brought, without my need to interfere was that sometimes these objects might be stolen or broken by other children which can make the children upset. Also, sometimes the objects children bring are too distractive and do not allow children to pay attention to other activities in the school. A whole discussion about what makes an activity important or what makes an object distractive took place. There were also suggestions about what items children could bring to the school without causing distraction (e.g. books, puzzles but not our mothers' cosmetics which possibly are not good enough for children's skin!),

What this activity shows is how philosophy can blend with everyday dilemmas and how to seek solutions so as to live better (achieve a state of temporary eudemonia). It would be interesting if this activity was flipped around and the teachers were asked what is it that makes children angry. Such a question would also offer moments for reflection and self correction.

Appendix 5

Stimuli that the children produce which can be used philosophically

a) Children's drawings: My ideal house

These drawings took place after having discussed with children about people's houses, what materials they need to build them, how are the exterior and interior spaces of a house, what is each room's function and so on. Children started describing their houses, some of them had also brought photographs of their houses. We discussed about the differences that houses have (e.g. different types of houses: flats, semi-detached houses, different numbers of rooms and floors etc). Some children were not that happy with their house so I asked them to think how their ideal house would be. This gave some food to imaginative thinking and later on to some artistic activities as they were willing to draw their ideal houses for me. Below, there are the children's drawings with a few descriptions as they explained them to me.



Picture 26: Orion's ideal house

Orion's house has a new orange stable outdoors ladder on the right and a black old one on the left that is broken and bent. There is also an interior ladder. The roof of the house is multicoloured with nice little lights. The family's dormitories are on the second floor. When Orion drew his ideal house the other members of his family were sleeping.

Picture 27: Rhodi's invisible house among a great garden with lots of flowers and birds



Picture 28: Vasos' ideal house.

Picture 28 shows two slopes that are available with this house; an easy one and a stepped one with a really dangerous red point for more exciting moments. Mum is hidden in the kitchen, Vasos is in the garden, the baby is sleeping on the second floor and dad is on the balcony bending and fixing one of the two outdoors ladders that lead to the roof.



Picture 29: Maria's house is situated in the suburbs and there are lots of flowers and butterflies surrounding it. Also, the door has a system that allows father's smoke to get out of the house without getting cold inside

b) Children's constructions

Picture 30: The former twin towers in New York

Picture 31: Living in a Palace. (The cones serve as machines for making ice-cream.) The wheels serve as wheels if one needs to move the palace somewhere else

c) Children's art crafts

Picture 32: Children used all the same materials to decorate their Christmas cards yet the outcomes are all so different!

Picture 33: Can you tell the real mobile from the crafts?

Observing the details can give birth to spontaneous discussions that push thinking further

- What if the mobiles had letters instead of numbers?
- Would that make us press the name and call directly the person we would like to speak to?
- What if we had in our entries more people with the same name?

Picture 34: Mobile Model 1

- "There is a camera and antenna but still my mobile is not real. I like it though!" (Helen)

Picture 35: Mobile Model 2

- What if mobiles had more than 0-9 numbers? Why should we exclude 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15?
- How does a painted navigation menu be of any help?
- Do you like my screen saver?

Picture 36: Mobile Model 3

In what ways are your mobiles not 'real'?

- "My dad can change the photos on his phone screen because it is real. Mine is not real, that's why only this drawing can appear" (Rhodi explaining in what ways their mobiles are not real)
- "It's paper made" (Vasos)
- "It has an antenna but it's not a real one" (Vasilis)
- "You can not really dial anybody. You can only pretend that you are speaking on the phone (Rhodi)

d) Decorating Windows

Picture 37: Winter window decorations made by children

When children had cut and decorated their houses and trees they had to stick them on the windows. It was suggested to them to stick on their crafts, then go a bit back and see how they fit in with the 'big picture' they have in their mind. If it didn't fit, they were allowed to change place. Aesthetics in this case was not a discussion but already incorporated into children's everyday life. As for the tree on top of the window well..."it was too windy and the air blew it away...and also there was not enough place down there" (Maira).

e) Cooking activities

Picture 38: Preparing cookies and discussion time

Cooking gives many opportunities for talking philosophically about:

- Transformations: 'How from olive oil, salt, flower, orange juice and cinnamon do you get dough?',
- Identity: 'Is the final cookie something more than its ingredients? Am I more than my parts?'
- Aesthetics: 'What makes a cookie nice; its flavour, its shape, both, something else?'
- Perception: 'What makes a cookie delicious?', 'Why is this cookie delicious for me but not for you?'

f) Children's own books and possible discussion plans that can occur

1st sample: The book below is illustrated and written by Teresa (age 5). She was narrating and I was writing her story.



Picture 39: Front page Title of the book: Snow White's child
Writer: Teresa

Picture 40: Once upon a time a child (Snow White's child) found a little rabbit.



Picture 41: Snow White's child went back home with the little rabbit but the mother (Snow White) sent the rabbit away.



Picture 42: The rabbit went back to the forest and its mother punished it because she thought that she had lost her child forever. The little rabbit promised to its mother that it would never go away again. They lived happy ever after.

2nd sample: The book below is illustrated and written by Manos (age 4). Manos was narrating after he finished his drawing and I was writing his story.

Picture 43: Front page Title of the book: The little mouse
Illustration: A dolphin
Writer: Manos



Picture 44: Once upon a time there was a kitten. The cat found the mice and ate them. One mouse, however, the little one, managed to hide itself from the kitten.
(The illustration points where exactly the eaten mice are in the kitten's belly).



Picture 45: The little mouse escaped from the kitten. It climbed on her. The cat went to her house and there she discovered the little mouse because it slipped and fell in front of the cat's paws. Still though the mouse hid in the cat's house.
(The illustration shows the cat's house. The up arrow shows where exactly the mouse has hidden itself).



Picture 46: When the cat fell asleep the mouse went out to the balcony of the cat's house and jumped so high up to the sun
(The black line is the balcony, below is the cat's house. The blue little line shows the mouse's jump!)

Picture 47: The sun was happy to have the mouse's company. To show how happy sun was, he put on the sky a big rainbow.



Picture 48: At that moment the mouse slipped from the sky and the sun so it went back home and lived with the other mice happily ever after.

3rd sample: The book is written and illustrated by Maria (age 4)

Picture 49: Front page title: A heart for the little girl
Writer: Maria



Picture 50: Once upon a time there was a girl living in a house but somehow she got lost one day. Her mother and father started looking around for their daughter but they couldn't find her anywhere.



Picture 51: The girl had gone to the sea. Her father and mother finally found her at the sea and they asked her not to leave them again. Her parents gave some presents to their little child. Even her godmother gave presents to the child.

Picture 52: Here are some of the presents the girl got whose name was Maria: a) a car, b) a smiley heart and c) a fake sea



Picture 53: Maria was happy so she made a nice drawing for her parents. They lived happy ever after.
(The black and white shape represents Maria's heart when she was lost at sea)

Appendix 6

Examples that show possible ways of elaborating further (and philosophically) on the stimuli that children produce

1) **Questions that may occur from Maria's book (appendix 5. Sample 3) and could possibly lead the group of children to a philosophical dialogue:**

Discussion Plan

- Can we select where to get lost?
- Did the girl know she was lost?
- Can we be lost without knowing it?
- When we hide ourselves are we lost?
- Why did the girl go to the sea?
- What does giving presents mean?
- Why do we give presents?
- Do we need to do something in order to get a present?
- What makes a sea fake?
- What makes something fake/ real?
- Can a bag be a fake? (Ask your mum!)
- Is something fake not real?
- How does a fake sea appear?
- In what ways is a fake sea different to a real sea?
- What does it mean for a heart not to have any colours? Why?
- Is there any difference between things that are lost with things that are forgotten?
- Is there any difference between things that are lost and things that are hidden?

Possible activities regarding the idea of fake:

Observations:

- Find things in the classroom that are fakes. In what ways are they fake?
- Are maps fake?
- Are the doll's clothes fake?
- Are the plastic fruits fake?

Drawings:

- Drawing real and fake things. Inviting others to tell the fake ones from the real
- Show to children real works of arts and forgeries. Can you tell the differences?

Drama activities:

- How is it to be a present yourself? Can you ever be a present? Would that be real or fake?
- Becoming a fake tree/ sea/ bird and then turning into a real one. How can we act these differently?

Logic activities

Can it be fake?	Yes	No	?
A toy			
A friend			
Your mind			
A heart pain			
Your memory			
A baby			
Your life			
The windows of your house			
Your memory			
The sky			
Yourself			
The supermarket of your neighbourhood			
Your imagination			
A song			

Possible activities regarding the idea of lost:

Everyday life

- Tidying up the rooms and collecting all the possible lost things
- Setting rules to avoid losing things

Drama activities

- Acting as if I am lost in a sea, in a busy city centre, in a desert (See Burmingham's *Would you rather…* for more ideas for children to act upon)
- Acting as if I am lost/ hidden/ forgotten somewhere. Where that place would be? What would it be like?
- Being lost: Showing my emotions using: a) my face, b) my body, c) a mask, d) choosing a piece of music
- Lost and found:
    - Pretend you have lost a friend and you find him/her again. How do you react?
    - You find a lost drawing. How do you react?

- You find a lost favourite doll. How do you react?

Literature:

- Reading Shaw Tan's *The lost thing* and discussing
- Remembering characters of traditional fairy tales that were lost (e.g. Red Riding Hood, Cinderella, Hansel and Gretel, Snow White etc)
- Writing new stories about something lost.

Geography

- Can an island be lost?
- The lost city of Atlantis: A city lost in the sea. Is it lost or just hidden? Is it real or fake?

History

- A lost war. Work out the consequences.

Cooking

Sugar is sweet but still we would like to make a sweet cake. Think of alternatives that could replace sugar, find a recipe, adapt it and make the final cake

Logic activities

Can you lose	Yes	No	?
A toy			
Your time			
Your mind			
A friend			
A headache			
A baby			
Your stomach			
Dirt			
Your memory			
The sky			
Yourself			
Happiness			
The tree outside your house			
The grocery shop in your neighbourhood			

Outdoors activities

- Playing hide and seek. Is it a form of losing somebody?

2) Questions that could occur from children's constructions (palace and twin towers) See appendix 5

- Can two towers be twin? Can two towers be exactly the same as each other?
- Are these towers the same? (For instance: Is there the same number of bricks? Do the bricks have the same shape, order, arrangement and colour?)
- What makes two things exactly the same?
- Are twin siblings exactly the same?
- How would it be to live in a palace?
- What would be the positives and the negatives of living in a palace?
- What facilities would you like a palace to have?
- How would a modern palace be?
- Who lives in a palace? Why?
- What makes a palace a palace?
- What are the differences between a palace and: a) a castle, b) a villa, c) a tower, d) a very rich resort?
- What is it that makes a palace important? (e.g. the people living into it? the quality of the materials it is made of?)
- What if the palaces turned into slums and the slums into palaces?
- What if the palaces were portable?
- What would happen if all the palaces had ice-cream making machines?
- What if the palaces were ruled by children/ animals/ criminals?
- Does living in a palace make someone a different person?

Drawings and constructions

- Draw your ideal palace.
- Draw (or construct by using other materials) the facilities you would like the palace to have.
- Design the plans for a palace. If a child has a parent that is an architect we could ask him/her to bring some designs into school.

Fashion designing

- Designing clothes for people who live in a palace.
- Decorating the interior of a palace
- Flicking through decorative journals and saying our opinions about what makes a decoration nice (a whole aesthetic dialogue about what is concerned as beautiful may occur)
- Sewing prince clothes for dolls by using tissues that are of no need.

Drama activities:

- Living in a palace
- Working in a palace
- Sleeping in a comfortable bed in a palace
- Arranging a party

Excursion:

- Arranging a visit to a palace.
- Writing down in advance the questions we would like to ask to specialists
- Organizing the questions into categories e.g. factual, specific, open questions
- Thinking of the equipment we might need to take with us (e.g. notebooks, cameras, recorders)

Geography & history:

- Finding historical places on the maps
- Recognizing the symbols that represent palaces, churches etc on a map

Literature

- Thinking of castles, towers and palaces in fairy tales and stories we have read in the classroom or elsewhere

3) Philosophical discussion that could occur because of Rhodi's invisible house

- What is an invisible house?
- What would be the positives and the negatives of an invisible house?
- What if the people who lived in the invisible house were visible?
- Does an invisible thing really exist?
- How can you tell whether an invisible thing really exists?
- Can you name things that are invisible?
- Can people be invisible?
- Is ignoring someone a wayd of treating someone as if s/he is invisible?
- How would life be if we all were invisible?
- Is something invisible a secret?
- If something is invisible can you ever tell whether it is completed or half completed or totally unfinished?
- Is death a way for someone to turn invisible

Drama activities:

- Acting as if I were invisible

Invisible drawings:

Using lemon juice to create our invisible drawing: What will happen if we ask our mothers to iron them? Why does this happen?

Imagination:

- What would I do if I were invisible?
- Is an invisible map of any use? Why? Why not?
- If I am invisible, are the things that I carry with me also invisible?
- Can you make a visible song?

Literature

- What happened to the emperor with the invisible clothes?
- Is wearing invisible clothes the same as being naked?
- Harry Potter had as a present a cape that when he wore it could make him become invisible. However, some people could still recognise him. Why?

Appendix 7

More examples of analysis of picture-books

In the '*Manneken Pis*' (Radunsky, 2003) there is use of light and bright colours in the beginning to indicate how peace makes a city beautiful before the war starts, and how the same city looks ugly in dark colours because of the war.

Figure 5.13: Picture from Radunsky's *Manneken Pis* (bright colours and smiley happy faces during the period of peace).



Figure 5.14: Picture from Radunsky's *Manneken Pis*.

The black colour will take over in the next photo. The white colour font is

neutral so as to highlight the comical expressions of those who fight and possibly to indicate ironically the pointlessness of war. People have either green or orange faces: the defenders and the enemies. There is no need for further colours to depict differences among the faces: in a period of war the only useful thing is to separate allies from enemies.

Figure 5.15: Picture from Radunsky's *Manneken Pis*. The black background shows the sadness of the war. It also shows how small the city looks now

The dark colours as depicted in Anthony Browne's, Gorilla (p.5-6) along with the picture details (e.g. the girls stillness and nervousness depicted in the crossing of her fingers behind her back) indicate an upsetting situation, whilst the use of green and purple for the dance of the girl with the gorilla may indicate a more dreamy, calm and natural situation (Graham, 1990).



Figure 5.20: Picture from Browne's *Gorilla.*

Figure 5.21: Picture from Browne's *Gorilla.*

Figure 5.22: Picture from Browne's *Gorilla*.

The use of shadows can help the reader create many thoughts. An example will illustrate this point. In *'Gorilla'* (1985, p.6), the main character, Hanna, is alone in an empty room in a corner with a plate of toast in front of a television. The only light comes from the television. There are bright colours on the wall, tapestry that is illuminated, but the rest of the room is depicted dark with figures of mysterious and maybe scary animals, such as wolves and other animals that have horns and wild eyes. There is a picture of Africa too: the 'dark' continent and the country of origin for gorillas. The light bulb of the room which is switched off could also be interpreted as a dark moon. Does the dark indicate the emotional state of the lonely girl? Does the lack of any furniture and commodity indicate the loneliness of the girl and the need for another person rather than equipment? Is television a good companion for people who feel alone?[2] Is Hanna abandoned and neglected by the adults in her life?

The contrast between the simple colours used to describe the adults world and the rich colours to describe children's imaginary world is evident in John Burningham's *'Time to get out of the bath, Shirley'.* The pages with the text describe the realistic world, at least as it is perceived by Shirley's mother, and the pages with the colourful images depict the imaginary world of Shirley while she is having a bath. In each case careful observation of the details in images provoke questioning aesthetic responses, as well as many other philosophical questions.

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[2] The lack of any furniture helps the reader focus on the child's figure, which seems to be small and isolated in the corner of a room. The realistic representations blend with the symbolic significances that people who read the book bring to it. Through the blending of realistic and symbolic strategies Browne implies questions such as "Where is the girl's mother?" (Bradford, 1998)..

Figure 5.23: Pictures from Burningham's, *Time to get out of the bath, Shirley*.

Appendix 8

Abstract from my research diary that shows how philosophy as an evaluative and generative force becomes a way of life:

At the corner there was a fountain. Many signs were pointing to this particular corner but even if you had not noticed them, which I very much doubt, the crowd of tourists taking photos of it spoke on its own that there was something worth seeing over there. I walked closer and stood on my toes to see what it was all about. All I saw was a statue of a child urinating, the famous Manneken Pis which I had already seen in cards, posters and its chocolate version at tourists shops. While looking at the statue and a group of young Japanese tourists laughing, posing and taking photos, I heard the guide explaining the different versions of Manneken Pis' history; that a child was relieving himself at this corner and he didn't notice that his water went directly onto a bishop's head walking by this place. What, however, struck me was that there was somewhere in the city a whole museum with the costumes that every year during the carnival the Manneken Pis was dressed in. A whole museum with costumes! This was certainly something I wouldn't like to miss. Fortunately, all the sightseeing in Brussels is within a walkable distance so I would be able to visit it before setting back for the UK. (22/11/2009 Visit Brussels)

I had never expected that my visit to Brussels and particularly the Manneken Pis statue and the museum of the Manneken Pis costumes would become a stimulus for further philosophical thinking. Below, I present all the questions that were swimming around in my mind after my visit to the Manneken Museum as I wrote them down in my notebook when I had a cup of hot chocolate and some little Belgian bars of chocolate.

Some thoughts on Manneken Pis:

- *How a symbol can be created? There are many versions and different myths for the Manneken Pis apart from the one described in the book I bought from the museum. According to a version, the corner where the Manneken Pis statue is situated was a place where a child regularly relieved himself. Another version claims that a child once peed on a bishop's beard. It could be just an accident but a whole myth created out of it which remained throughout history until today.*
- *Why does the Manneken Pis appeal so much to people today?*
- *Does it indicate the child's innocence? (Because it came from a child who didn't know how important was the person they offended).*
- *What does the peeing indicate?*
    - *Is it to show the child's cuteness, childishness or freedom to express oneself under no conventions?*
    - *Is it a convention to hide physical needs or pleasures?*
    - *Is it fun?*
    - *Is it a form of approved disrespect?*

- *Why has Manneken Pis become such a big issue for Brussels? Is it because Brussels does not have a long history so as a nation it tries to create history?*
- *Manneken Pis is part of Brussels': a) history, b) tourist attraction, c) economy industry (tourists' souvenirs, chocolate shaped as Manneken Pis, costumes, books).*
- *Why are there costumes for the Manneken Pis? Is it people's attempts to hide its nudity (is it conservatism?) and that's why they created costumes for it?*
- *So far there are 705 costumes created for Manneken Pis. These costumes leave just a hole for the manneken to use. They are of very good quality and well tailored. The themes of the costumes: a) national costumes from all over the world (e.g. Greek euzonas, Indian, Italian, English etc), b) Special costumes for celebrating (e.g. African dances), c) costumes of certain people in history (e.g. Napoleonic costume), d) entertainment industry (e.g. Elvis Presley costume), e) fun costumes (e.g. Ovelix), f) seasonal costumes (e.g. beach attire), g) sport industry (e.g. footballer's kit) etc. During carnival there is an offer for a new costume for the manneken and the new costume is revealed to Belgians during athe celebrations. People clap and drink beer.*

- *The offering of costumes to the manneken has its own autonomous history! It is amazing to think how the history and the folk tradition of something are created!*

- *The manneken looks differently in a costume. Does the manneken change identity according to which costume it wears?*
- *Multiple images of the manneken in the different suits: Does that indicate multiple identities as well?*
- *What does the Manneken Pis represent when dressed as Napoleon for instance? Or an Indian? Or Policeman? Does the urinating identity of the Manneken Pis match with the identity of the person that the dressed manneken represents? Is it offensive for the country to know that there is a Manneken Pis wearing its national costume? Does the manneken change identity?*
- *Does the manneken (dressed or not) represent the same idea as the first time it was made?*

- *Museum with the different costumes of the Manneken Pis. It shows how:*
  - *a whole history of costume designing for a statue is created*
  - *a symbol is the base on which a costume tradition is built on*
  - *the costumes acquired their own identity and history*
  - *richness (of textiles, designes, creative ideas according to the themes of the costumes) is developed.*
  - *Manneken Pis becomes a symbol that can draw the attention of people from different fields e.g. history, science, or fashion design.*

- *Urinating as relieving self/ getting rid of the unnecessary in a way that is straight forward/ no camouflage/ inability to hold something that is not useful anymore.*
- *What does it mean for a country to have as cultural symbol a boy urinating? Is it a symbol of rebellion? a symbol of freedom?*
- *If there was an adult's urinating instead of a child's what would be different?*
- *If the child hadn't urinated on the bishop's beard would this legend have survived? What makes something important?*
- *What makes something survive in history and become historical?*
- *What makes somebody known/ unknown? Why?*

Greece is a country full of history. However, bits of its history are not so much advertised (IDEA: Too much stimulation may cause things to be left aside). Belgium, on the contrary, is a country with not so rich a history. However, Belgium makes the most in many different ways (economy, tourism, history, culture) out of a detail such as the Manneken Pis.

Stimulation:

- *Too much stimulation can lead to losing or not giving attention or leaving aside things.*
- *Not too much may lead to concentrating better to one aspect and giving it more depth (22/11/2009 Visit in Brussels)*

Later on that week gazing at the children's books in the library I came across a book about Manneken Pis (Radunsky, 2003). See appendix 7.

Appendix 9

Ethical Forms

University of Wales, Newport
School of Education

Prifysgol Cymru, Casnewydd
Ysgol Addysg

Research Ethics Committee

Participant Consent Form (RE2)

Full title of research programme: Ph.D. in Philosophy of Education

Title of the thesis: THE ROLE OF STIMULI IN DOING PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN AND ADULTS

Summary of the research project:

- **Aim and purpose of research**: The aim of my Ph.D. research is to investigate what makes a stimulus good for doing philosophy with children and adults. In other words I am looking at what criteria the stimuli should meet so as to be suitable for doing philosophy.

- **What is expected of participants**: The participants are free to participate in the inquiries that I will facilitate using different stimuli each time. No special previous knowledge is required.

- **How will data be collected**: The data will be collected by audio recording some of the sessions and taking notes based on my observations on children's and adults dialogue

- **Will participants have an opportunity to comment on data / interpretation?** The participants can have an opportunity to comment on data interpretation upon their request.

- **Will research be published?** The data will be used for research reasons in order to complete my dissertation for my Ph.D. There are possibilities of publishing part of the data in a form of papers for educational journals or papers for conferences, altering people's name for anonymity's sake. There is no profit to be gained by the researcher in both cases.

Please tick each box if you agree with the statement.

- I have read the information about the programme of research in which I have been asked to participate (see over) and have been given a copy of this letter to keep. ☐
- The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this information. ☐
- I understand what is being proposed and the procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me. ☐
- I understand that my involvement in this study will remain strictly confidential and that data collected will be made anonymous. It has been explained to me what will happen to the data once the programme has been completed. ☐
- **I hereby fully and freely consent to participation in the study.** ☐
- Having given this consent, I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the programme at any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason. ☐

Participant's name
(BLOCK CAPITALS): _____

Participant's signature: _____ Date: _____

Principal investigator's name: _____

Principal investigator's signature: _____ Date: _____